Mr. Sanctions

Category: Regulatory

  • February 18, 2026: Sanctions-Adjacent: Visa Restrictions for Iranian officials & telecom officials

    Announcement of Additional Visa Restriction Targets for Individuals Involved in Inhibiting Iranians’ Rights to Freedom of Expression

    PRESS STATEMENT

    THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SPOKESPERSON

    FEBRUARY 18, 2026

    During Iran’s nationwide protests in December 2025 and January 2026, the Iranian regime has unleashed violence and repression against tens of thousands of peaceful demonstrators. The regime imposed a near-total nationwide internet shutdown, unprecedented in scope and duration, that severely restricted independent documentation of abuses and cut Iranians off from the world. Even today, the regime continues to restrict the ability of Iranians to exercise their basic freedoms. As President Trump has made clear, the United States stands with the Iranian people.

    Today, pursuant to his authority under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Secretary Rubio is taking steps to impose visa restrictions against 18 Iranian regime officials and telecommunications industry leaders, as well as their immediate family members. This visa restriction policy will target individuals who are complicit, or believed to be complicit, in serious violations of human rights, particularly inhibiting the right of Iranians to free expression and peaceful assembly. 58 individuals have now been targeted by this policy.

    The United States will continue to stand with the right of the Iranian people to free expression. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Iranians and their demand for peace and dignity. We will continue to use all tools available to expose and promote accountability for the abuses by Iranian regime officials and other individuals.

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  • February 13, 2026: Two more Venezuela General Licenses… and a Press Release from the State Department

    From the Recent Actions page:

    Issuance of Venezuela-related General Licenses

    The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Venezuela-related General License 49, “Authorizing Negotiations of and Entry Into Contingent Contracts for Certain Investment in Venezuela;” and Venezuela-related General License 50, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Oil or Gas Sector Operations in Venezuela of Certain Entities.”

    GL 49:

    venezuela_gl49Download

    GL 50:

    venezuela_gl50Download

    And, in a related note, the State Department recapped all the recent relaxations in the sanctions program:

    Actions to Implement President Trump’s Vision for Venezuelan Oil

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    FEBRUARY 13, 2026

    The Trump Administration is rapidly implementing President Trump’s vision to reopen and develop Venezuela’s oil industry for the shared benefit of the American and Venezuelan people. Thanks to President Trump’s leadership, the United States has already issued several general licenses at record speed for oil and gas companies to make unprecedented investments in Venezuela’s energy infrastructure. 

    On January 29, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) issued Venezuela General License (GL) 46, which authorizes firms incorporated in the United States to market Venezuelan oil to buyers around the world, and largely in the United States. Payment must be made on commercially reasonable terms – in contrast to the heavily discounted prices for which the corrupt Maduro regime sold oil – and must be paid into an account in the United States established and with oversight by the Departments of State and Treasury. We will assure these funds are spent transparently and for the benefit of the Venezuelan people.

    • On February 3, OFAC issued Venezuela GL 47, which authorizes firms to sell U.S.-origin diluent – a product essential for oil production – to Venezuela. This action provides significant benefit both to the Venezuelan people and to the U.S. economy.
    • On February 10, OFAC issued Venezuela GL 48, which authorizes U.S. firms to provide goods, equipment, and services for the Venezuelan oil and gas industry. By utilizing this GL, U.S. firms will play a critical role in repairing and upgrading Venezuela’s oil and gas infrastructure for the benefit of the Venezuelan people.
    • On February 13, OFAC issued Venezuela GL 50, which authorizes certain firms in Venezuela to expand their operations, including pursing additional upstream oil and gas projects. On February 13, OFAC issued Venezuela GL 49, which authorizes oil and gas firms to negotiate and enter into contingent contracts with Venezuela to invest in upstream oil and gas projects. The Trump Administration will subsequently review for approval the proposed contracts to ensure they advance the interests of the American and Venezuelan people. These investments will lay the foundation for the modernization of the Venezuelan oil and gas industry, increase production, and shore up U.S. supply lines in our own hemisphere. 

    Venezuela holds tremendous economic potential, but years of instability, corruption, and economic mismanagement have limited the nation’s growth and prosperity. These general licenses invite American and other aligned companies to play a constructive role in supporting economic recovery and responsible investment. Additional authorizations may also be issued as necessary in furtherance of President Trump’s vision. The United States is committed to restoring Venezuela’s prosperity, safety, and security for the benefit of both the American and Venezuelan people. With renewed cooperation and sound economic stewardship, Venezuela can reemerge as a stable, prosperous partner whose citizens benefit from its vast natural wealth and strengthened ties with the United States.

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  • February 16, 2026: OFSI asks for your input on ownership and control

    Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury

    Call for evidence on ownership and control in financial sanctions regulations

    OFSI has launched a call for evidence to seek industry’s views on how UK financial sanctions regulations on ownership and control are applied in practice, including how firms implement the regulations and where they face challenges.   

    The ownership and control test is designed to stop sanctioned individuals and entities from sidestepping UK sanctions by hiding behind complex company structures, trusts or proxies. However, industry representatives report to OFSI that assessing the ability of a designated person to control an entity – even if they are not actively doing so – can be difficult in practice and may create additional costs and legal risk. 

    We are therefore asking firms, representative bodies and other interested stakeholders to share evidence and practical examples of: 

    • How often ‘hypothetical control’ is present in real financial sanctions cases; 
    • The impact it has on compliance costs, legal risk and business decisions (including derisking); 
    • Whether existing legal concepts and typologies of control are helpful in applying ownership and control regulations.  

    This information will help us understand whether the current approach is as clear, effective and proportionate as it should be, so that sanctions remain tough on those they target while being workable for legitimate businesses. 

    The Call for Evidence is open until 13th April 2026. 

    The Call for Evidence page:

    Open call for evidence

    Ownership and Control Test in UK Financial Sanctions Regulations

    From: Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation

    Published 16 February 2026

    Summary

    Ownership and Control Test in UK Financial Sanctions Regulations

    This call for evidence is being held on another website.

    This call for evidence closes at

    Call for evidence description

    HMG is launching a call for evidence to seek industry’s views on how UK financial sanctions regulations on ownership and control are applied in practice, including how firms implement the regulations and where they face challenges.   

    We are asking firms, representative bodies and other interested stakeholders to share evidence and practical examples of: 

    • How often ‘hypothetical control’ is present in real financial sanctions cases; 
    • The impact it has on compliance costs, legal risk and business decisions (including de-risking); 
    • Whether existing legal concepts and typologies of control are helpful in applying ownership and control regulations.  

    This information will help us understand whether the current approach is as clear, effective and proportionate as it should be, so that sanctions remain tough on those they target while being workable for legitimate businesses. 

    How to respond

    OFSI is keen to hear from a wide range of stakeholders in response to the consultation, including businesses, financial institutions, legal and compliance professionals, civil society and other interested parties.  

    This Call for Evidence goes live on Monday 16th February 2026 and will be open for eight weeks. Responses will be accepted until 11:59pm on Monday 13th April 2026. 

    Responses are encouraged via the online form.

    If you cannot respond via the online form, you may send your response by email to oc-callforevidence@hmtreasury.gov.uk 

    Please state whether you are responding as an individual or representing the views of an organisation, business, or representative body.

    Privacy notice

    Click here to view the privacy notice for the call for evidence, which sets out how HM Treasury will use your personal data and explains your rights under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA).

    The Call for Evidence PDF:

    Call_for_EvidenceDownload

    There’s an HTML page, too.

    Finally, OFSI wrote a blog post:

    Call for evidence on ownership and control in financial sanctions regulations

    OFSI, 16 February 2026 – OFSI Blog

    OFSI has launched a call for evidence to seek industry’s views on how UK financial sanctions regulations on ownership and control are applied in practice, including how firms implement the regulations and where they face challenges.   

    The ownership and control test is designed to stop sanctioned individuals and entities from sidestepping UK sanctions by hiding behind complex company structures, trusts or proxies. However, industry representatives report to OFSI that assessing the ability of a designated person (DP) to control an entity – even if they are not actively doing so – can be difficult in practice and may create additional costs and legal risk. 

    This information will help us understand whether the current approach is as clear, effective and proportionate as it should be, so that sanctions remain tough on those they target while being workable for legitimate businesses. 

    Background  

    The policy intention of the UK government’s approach to ownership and control (O&C) in UK sanctions regulations is to ensure that sanctions cannot be easily circumvented. The two-condition O&C test set out in legislation (e.g. Regulation 7(4) of The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019) serves as a critical safeguard against sanctions circumvention, by ensuring that entities owned or controlled by a DP are subject to financial sanctions, even if not explicitly named on the UK Sanctions List. In particular, the second condition of that test (also referred to as ‘the control test’) is broadly drafted to capture as much activity as possible. 

     We have repeatedly heard from financial and legal representatives that they face challenges when implementing O&C provisions, with particular emphasis on the degree of uncertainty of the control test and the potential for multiple and sometimes conflicting interpretations. Firms have told OFSI that determining when these situations constitute control for sanctions purposes can be challenging and that it is not always clear what evidence should be reasonably sought to support these assessments. 

    In response to industry feedback, HM Government committed to delivering measures to provide further clarity on ownership and control as part of the Review of Sanctions Implementation and Enforcement, published in May 2025. We are therefore launching a call for evidence on how the UK’s O&C test is applied during financial sanctions compliance. We want to hear from those who apply the test about where it works well, where challenges arise and the practical impacts of these assessments. Formal evidence across these areas, in addition to anecdotal evidence already held by OFSI, will help form a comprehensive picture of how implementation works in practice.  

    The call for evidence focuses on control as a direct response to industry feedback, which has highlighted greater implementation challenges associated with the control element of the O&C test rather than the ownership element. On ownership, HMG continues to actively explore options to respond to calls for greater alignment with international partners, including adopting an aggregation model and amending the 50% ownership rule to “50% or more,” in line with the EU and US sanctions frameworks.   

    Why we are calling for evidence 

    Under UK financial sanctions, a DP is subject to an asset freeze. The regulations also apply to entities that designated persons own or control.  

    An entity is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by another person in any of the following circumstances:  

    • The person holds more than 50% of the shares or voting rights in an entity.  
    • The person has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the entity.  
    • It is reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances, to expect that a DP would (if  they chose to) be able, in most cases or significant respects, by whatever means and whether directly or indirectly, to achieve the result that affairs of an entity are conducted in accordance with that DP’s wishes.   

    Evidence presented that the DP has not exercised control does not mean they do not have the ability to do so and therefore does not necessarily refute a DP’s control over an entity. This may be referred to as a DP’s hypothetical ability to exercise control, or simply ‘hypothetical control.’  If a DP can continue to move money or operate through others, the impact of sanctions is weakened. The O&C test helps ensure that sanctions bite on the real economic interests of DP. 

    At the same time, firms need regulations they can apply in a clear and proportionate way. Uncertainty can mean operational delays while investigations are conducted, higher costs to ensure compliance and de-risking behaviour, where firms may exit contracts or avoid new business relationships to avoid breaching sanctions. 

    This call for evidence will help us understand those pressures by gathering evidence on these issues in a structured way. It will build a picture of how firms and practitioners are currently interpreting and applying the test, which aspects of the ownership and control test cause the most difficulty and the practical impacts – including on costs, timing and business decisions. Our aim is to build a concrete, evidence-based picture of practice, rather than relying on anecdote.  

    Scope of the call for evidence 

    It is important to be clear about scope. The call for evidence does not invite comment on whether ownership and control rules are desirable as a matter of policy. Instead, we are asking for evidence across the following areas: 

    • Chapter 2 examines the prevalence and nature of hypothetical control in financial sanctions, including how frequently this form of control is encountered and in what contexts.  
      We are seeking evidence on its significance in the application of financial sanctions. 
       
    • Chapter 3 explores the practical challenges and ease of implementation associated with the control test.  
      This chapter has a particular focus on the assessment of the hypothetical element of the test and the financial impact of compliance and implementation. 
       
    • Chapter 4 considers the practical utility of control typologies as a tool to assist with assessing the hypothetical element of the control test for financial sanctions.  
      This includes, in particular, the typology of control set out by Deputy Judge Nicholas Thompsell in his ruling on Kevin Hellard & Ors v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank & Ors. 

    We are particularly interested in concrete examples (anonymised where necessary) that show the realities of sanctions compliance and welcome evidence from any organisation or individual involved in sanctions implementation.  

    How to respond 

    The call for evidence is open until 13th April 2026.  

    Read the full call for evidence and how to respond here: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/ownership-and-control-test-in-uk-financial-sanctions-regulations  

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  • February 9, 2026: OFSI updates its enforcement guidance

    Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury

    Financial sanctions enforcement and monetary penalties guidance updated

    Following our recent consultation, we have published updated guidance, reflecting a stronger and more transparent enforcement framework. These updates are designed to support compliance, give firms greater certainty and ensure sanctions are applied in a fair, effective and robust way. This guidance comes into effect from today and as a matter of policy OFSI assess all breaches of financial sanctions in line with the enforcement guidance in effect at the time of making its first formal decision whether to take enforcement action.

    To read the guidance click here.

    The guidance published today includes minor updates to a number of chapters, and the significant updates and additions below:

    Early Account Scheme, Settlements & Financial Hardship

    • Chapter 4 – Early Account Scheme (EAS): Introduction of a new EAS (with a penalty discount of up to 20%), enabling subjects to provide an early factual account of a breach in eligible cases. This section sets out clear eligibility criteria, a step-by-step process, and the information OFSI expects to receive.
    • Chapter 6 – Settlement Scheme: Introduction of a new Settlement Scheme (with a penalty discount of 20%). This section sets out how the scheme operates in practice and how it can apply to existing cases.
    • Chapter 7 – Financial Hardship: New policy explaining how OFSI will consider exceptional claims of financial hardship, including the burden on the subject to evidence hardship and OFSI’s ability to consider public interest factors.

    Enforcement Case Assessment & Discounts

    • Chapter 5 – Updated Case Factors: Several case factors have been updated, added, removed or renamed to provide clearer and more consistent assessments.
    • Chapter 5 – Four Level Seriousness Model: Replacement of the previous framework with a new four-tiered seriousness model (Levels 1–4), each with indicative outcomes ranging from warning letters to monetary penalties.
    • Chapter 6 – Voluntary Disclosure & Cooperation Discount: Introduction of a single penalty discount (up to 30%) for complete voluntary disclosure and co-operation, supported by expanded guidance clarifying what OFSI considers complete and timely cooperation.

    Information, Reporting & Licensing Offences

    • Chapter 13 – Fixed Monetary Penalties: New section detailing how £5,000 and £10,000 fixed penalties will be applied for relevant offences, including the assessment process, penalty determination, and examples of applicable conduct. This section also expands on OFSI’s interpretation of information offences.

    OFSI will host an online webinar in March 2026 to explain these changes in more detail. Further details on registration will follow.

    Unlike earlier versions of enforcement guidance, this is not in PDF – it’s a standard HTML web page here:

    Contents

    1. Overview
    2. Introduction
    3. Our enforcement approach
    4. The Early Account Scheme (EAS)
    5. Case assessment
    6. The monetary penalty process: imposing a penalty
    7. Procedure for imposing a monetary penalty
    8. The right of review
    9. Right of appeal
    10. Paying a monetary penalty
    11. Publication of penalties
    12. Publication of breaches where no monetary penalty is imposed
    13. Fixed Monetary Penalties (Information and Licensing)

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  • February 6, 2026: Friday FAQs for OFAC Venezuela program

    Announced late Friday:

    1235. Does Venezuela General License (GL) 46 authorize downstream trading activities in Venezuelan-origin oil? 

    Yes. Once a transaction with the Government of Venezuela (GOV), Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), or its majority-owned subsidiaries (PdVSA Entities) has been completed pursuant to GL 46, and the interest—including any future or contingent interest—of a blocked entity is fully extinguished, then the oil can be freely sold, resold, and traded by any downstream purchaser, including entities that are not established U.S. entities, as defined in GL 46.

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1234. How does a financial institution verify a transaction is compliant with Venezuela General License (GL) 46? 

    In connection with its normal due diligence, a financial institution may rely on the statements of its customer that the transaction is consistent with the terms of GL 46, unless it knows or has reason to know otherwise.

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1233. Are all entities engaged in a transaction authorized by Venezuela General License (GL) 46 required to have contracts with the dispute resolution requirement included in paragraph (a)(1)? 

    No. The dispute resolution requirement in paragraph (a)(1) of GL 46 applies only to contracts governing transactions undertaken by an established U.S. entity when the contract is with the Government of Venezuela (GOV), Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (PdVSA Entities).

    This requirement does not apply to indirect parties or indirect counterparties involved in transactions authorized by GL 46, such as downstream transactions involving the provision of shipping, insurance, or other services to an entity engaged in a transaction involving PdVSA. For example, this provision would not apply to a contract between an insurance provider and an established U.S. entity engaged in a transaction with PdVSA to purchase Venezuelan-origin oil (though it would apply to the contract between the U.S. entity and PdVSA).

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1232. What does OFAC consider “commercially reasonable terms,” as described in Venezuela General License (GL) 46? 

    “Commercially reasonable terms” means terms that are consistent with prevailing market and industry standards for like or similar products produced by a company of similar size and scope, while taking into account characteristics such as quality, quantity, pricing, performance, and safety, among others. Commercially reasonable terms include terms related to, among other things, the governance, economics, operations, and legal/compliance requirements of a contract negotiated at arm’s length between two or more parties.

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1231. What entities or jurisdictions are excluded from transactions authorized under Venezuela General License (GL) 46? 

    GL 46 excludes the involvement of persons located in or organized under the laws of the Russia Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Cuba—as well as any entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly (including by or in a joint venture with) any of the foregoing.

    In addition, GL 46 does not authorize transactions with any Venezuelan or U.S. entity that is owned or controlled by, or in a joint venture with, a person located in or organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China. However, GL 46 does not restrict the resale of Venezuelan-origin oil to China by an established U.S. entity.

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1230. Can an entity that is not an “established U.S. entity” be involved in transactions authorized by Venezuela General License (GL) 46? 

    Yes. Non-U.S. persons may engage in transactions or provide services that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the established U.S. entity’s transactions authorized by GL 46. Such activities or ancillary services could include: providing transportation and logistics services to an established U.S. entity for the export of Venezuelan-origin oil; providing marine insurance to vessels chartered by established U.S. entities to transport Venezuelan-origin oil; the financing of related cargoes or receivables; leasing storage facilities for Venezuelan-origin oil purchased by an established U.S. entity; or contracting with established U.S. entities for repair or maintenance services of infrastructure necessary to effectuate the export of oil from Venezuela, among others.

    Please see FAQ 1235 for additional information regarding authorized downstream trading activities.

    Please see FAQ 1231 for certain individuals and jurisdictions excluded from the scope of GL 46.

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1229. Venezuela General License (GL) 46 authorizes certain activity by an “established U.S. entity.” What is an “established U.S. entity” for purposes of GL 46? 

    For purposes of GL 46, the term “established U.S. entity” means any entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States on or before January 29, 2025.

    GL 46 is designed to help ensure that the oil exported from Venezuela will be through legitimate and authorized channels, consistent with U.S. law and President Trump’s efforts to restore prosperity, safety, and security to the United States and Venezuela. Established U.S. companies should be familiar with complying with U.S. laws and regulations, including U.S. sanctions regulations, which will help ensure their ability to market Venezuelan oil in the global marketplace for the benefit of the United States, Venezuela, and our allies.

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1228. Does Venezuela General License (GL) 46, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Oil,” authorize exploration activity or negotiations for new investment activities? 

    No. GL 46 authorizes the purchase, exportation, and sale of Venezuelan-origin oil that has already been extracted, including the refining of such oil. It does not authorize other exploration or production activities, such as conducting geological surveys, drilling wells, or extracting oil from fields in Venezuela, nor does it authorize activities related to investment in the Venezuelan oil sector, such as negotiations with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) to enter into a contract to develop or operate oil fields, blocks, or other concessions. For more information on what transactions are authorized by GL 46, see FAQ 1227.

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1227. What activities does Venezuela General License (GL) 46 authorize? 

    GL 46 authorizes activities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the lifting (which refers to the physical loading and removal of oil from a terminal, storage facility, or production site for delivery to a buyer), exportation, reexportation, sale, resale, supply, storage, marketing, purchase, delivery, or transportation of Venezuelan-origin oil by an established U.S. entity, which may include:

    • engaging in commercial, legal, and technical discussions necessary to scope purchases of Venezuelan-origin oil, including with third-party legal, commercial, or due diligence consultants;
    • conducting safety, environmental, and other relevant inspections, including site surveys;
    • arranging logistics, security services, delivery points, and shipping preparation, including obtaining marine insurance and engaging with relevant port or maritime authorities of the Government of Venezuela (GOV) or their personnel;
    • conducting certain downstream activities, including the refining and resale of Venezuelan-origin oil;
    • coordinating payment structures, including payments in the form of swaps of oil, diluents, or refined petroleum products, among others;
    • making required repairs and maintenance to pipeline, storage, or port infrastructure necessary to effectuate the loading of vessels; or
    • the financing of related cargos or receivables.

    Notably, GL 46 does not authorize:

    • transactions that are not on commercially reasonable terms;
    • payment in gold or the use of debt swaps;
    • payments denominated in digital currency, digital coin, or digital tokens issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, including the petro;
    • any transaction involving a person located in the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, or any entity that is owned or controlled by or in a joint venture with such persons;
    • transactions involving an entity located in or organized under the laws of Venezuela or the United States that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by or in a joint venture with a person located in or organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China;
    • the unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations; or
    • any transaction involving a blocked vessel.

    For information on how an entity that is not an “established U.S. entities” (including non-U.S. entities) can be involved in transactions authorized by GL 46, see FAQ 1230.

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1226. Does “Venezuelan-origin oil” as referenced in Venezuela General License (GL) 46, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Oil,” include petroleum products? 

    Yes. Consistent with the term “Venezuelan oil” as defined in section 5(a) of Executive Order 14245, “Imposing Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil,” the term “Venezuelan-origin oil” means crude oil or petroleum products extracted, refined, or exported from Venezuela, regardless of the nationality of the entity involved in the production or sale of such crude oil or petroleum products.

    As defined by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), petroleum products include unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and miscellaneous products obtained from the processing of crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas, and other hydrocarbon compounds. In keeping with the EIA’s standard definition, petroleum products do not include natural gas, liquefied natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non-petroleum fuels.

    Accordingly, crude oil blends such as Merey 16 or bitumen blends, as well as petroleum products or byproducts, including gasoline, asphalt, flexicoke, and petroleum coke, are considered “Venezuelan-origin oil” for the purposes of GL 46.

    Released on Feb 06, 2026

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  • Burning Questions: Ownership and Control, around the World

    I asked Gemini to compare and contrast “ownership and control” guidance and regulation across the world. Based on the responses I got, I ended up adding FATF, Wolfsberg, Switzerland and Japan to the bodies offering guidance:

    This comprehensive analysis compares the “Ownership and Control” guidance across major national and international bodies.

    Executive Summary: The “Control” vs. “Ownership” Divide

    The central divergence in global sanctions regulation lies in how “Control” is treated:

    • The “Mathematical” Approach (US): Ownership (50% or more) automatically triggers sanctions. Control without ownership does not automatically trigger sanctions—it is merely grounds for future designation.
    • The “Status-Based” Approach (EU, UK, Canada): If a sanctioned person controls an entity (even with 1% ownership), that entity is automatically treated as sanctioned by operation of law. This shifts the burden of identifying “shadow control” onto the private sector.

    1. Comparative Matrix: Global Ownership & Control Rules

    JurisdictionOwnership ThresholdAggregation RuleDoes “Control” Automatically Sanction?Key Differentiator
    USA (OFAC)50% or more (≥ 50%)YESNO (See FAQ 398)Strict mathematical application; Control is a designation criteria, not an automatic trigger.
    EU (Council)50% or more (≥ 50%)*YESYESRecent 2024 update aligned EU with US. Burden is on operators to detect “dominant influence.”
    UK (OFSI)More than 50% (> 50%)NO (Unless acting in concert)YESHigher threshold (>50%); Aggregation is rare; “Control” test is extremely broad.
    Canada (GAC)50% or more (≥ 50%)ImpliedYES (“Deemed Ownership”)“Deemed ownership” legally conflates control and ownership into one trigger.
    Australia (ASO)“Owned or Controlled”Silent(Principles-based)YESLess prescriptive; relies on “due diligence” to determine if assets are “indirectly” controlled.
    Japan (MOF)“Substantial Control”Case-by-CaseYES (Permission required)Uses a “Permission System” for payments rather than “Blocking” assets.
    Switzerland50% or moreDe Facto YesYES (Indirect Prohibition)Subsidiaries aren’t “blocked” per se, but paying them is “making funds indirectly available.”
    UN (Security Council)Varies by RegimeN/AVariesNo global standard; relies on Member State implementation.

    2. Detailed Jurisdictional Analysis

    United States: The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

    The US provides the most “bright-line” guidance, prioritizing clarity over catch-all nuance.

    • The “50% Rule”: If Blocked Persons own 50% or more, individually or in the aggregate, the entity is blocked.
    • Aggregation: Explicitly required. If SDN A owns 25% and SDN B owns 25%, the entity is blocked.
    • The “Control” Gap: OFAC explicitly states (FAQ 398) that an entity controlled by an SDN (but owned <50%) is not automatically blocked.
      • Why? OFAC prefers to name and shame. If they want a controlled entity sanctioned, they will list it.
    • Applicability: Applies to all OFAC regimes unless specified otherwise (e.g., Sectoral Sanctions).

    European Union: Council & Commission

    The EU has moved aggressively to close loopholes, resulting in complex “control” tests.

    • Ownership Update (July 2024): The EU updated its “Best Practices” to align with the US, changing its test from “more than 50%” to “50% or more.”
    • The “Control” Trigger: If a Designated Person (DP) has “dominant influence” (e.g., right to appoint board majority, use of assets), the entity is sanctioned.
    • Burden of Proof: Unlike the US, EU operators must assess control themselves. If you trade with a subsidiary of a Russian oligarch, and the EU later decides the oligarch “controlled” it, you are liable for a breach, even if the subsidiary was never listed.

    United Kingdom: Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI)

    The UK is unique for its rejection of automatic aggregation and its slightly higher ownership threshold.

    • Threshold: Strictly “more than 50%.” A 50/50 Joint Venture is not automatically sanctioned in the UK (unlike US/EU).
    • Aggregation: OFSI does not aggregate ownership of different DPs unless there is evidence they are parties to a “joint arrangement” (acting in concert).
    • Broad “Control” Definition: The UK test asks if it is “reasonable to expect” that the DP can achieve their desires regarding the entity’s affairs. This is a functional, outcome-based test.

    Canada: Global Affairs Canada (GAC)

    Canada uses a unique legal mechanism called “Deemed Ownership.”

    • Concept: Property is “deemed” to be owned by a DP if the DP “controls” it directly or indirectly.
    • Ambiguity: The definition includes any situation where the DP can “direct the entity’s activities.” This creates significant gray areas for compliance teams, as “influence” is often conflated with “control.”

    Australia: Australian Sanctions Office (ASO)

    Australia utilizes a “principles-based” approach rather than strict mathematical formulas.

    • Guidance: “Control” is defined as a question of fact—whether someone has “command or direction” over an asset.
    • Differentiation: Australia does not publish a “50% Rule” document comparable to OFAC. Instead, it relies on the prohibition against “making assets available to” a DP. If a DP owns a company, paying that company is effectively paying the DP.

    Japan: Ministry of Finance (MOF) & METI

    Japan operates a “Permission System” under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA).

    • Mechanism: Rather than “blocking” an entity, Japan prohibits payments to DPs without “permission” (which is never granted).
    • Substantial Control: Restrictions apply if a DP holds a majority of shares OR exercises “substantial control” (e.g., dispatching executives).
    • End-User Lists: Japan places heavy reliance on METI’s “End User List.” If a subsidiary is not on the list, Japanese firms often presume trade is permitted unless “control” is glaringly obvious.

    Switzerland: SECO

    Switzerland aligns autonomously with the EU but maintains legal distinctiveness.

    • “Making Available”: Swiss law does not always “block” the subsidiary of a DP. Instead, it prohibits “making funds available” to the DP.
    • Interpretation: Paying a subsidiary is viewed as “indirectly” making funds available to the parent.
    • Differentiation: In the Popov case, Swiss courts demanded high evidence of control. However, 2024 guidance has aligned Switzerland closer to the EU’s broad “control” presumption to prevent circumvention.

    United Nations (UNSC)

    • No Global Standard: The UN designates individuals/entities but leaves “ownership/control” interpretation to Member States.
    • Regime Specific: Some resolutions (e.g., DPRK) include specific language on “entities owned or controlled by” designated persons, but the implementation of what “controlled” means (e.g., 50% vs 25%) is decided by national authorities (OFAC, OFSI, etc.).

    3. International Standard Setters

    FATF (Financial Action Task Force)

    • Focus: Anti-Money Laundering (AML) & Beneficial Ownership (BO).
    • The “25% Gap”: FATF recommends a 25% threshold for identifying beneficial owners for AML screening.
    • Conflict: This creates a disconnect. Compliance teams screen at 25% (for FATF/AML) but block at 50% (for Sanctions). FATF guidance on “Proliferation Financing” urges countries to look beyond legal ownership to “ultimate effective control” to prevent evasion.

    The Wolfsberg Group

    • Guidance: Represents global banking best practices.
    • Recommendation: Wolfsberg explicitly notes that the “50% Rule” is a legal baseline, not a risk management ceiling.
    • Control Risk: They advise that relying solely on lists is insufficient in “Control-based” jurisdictions (UK/EU). They recommend screening for Beneficial Owners (at 10-25%) to identify “aggregation” risks that might sum up to >50%.

    Summary of Practical Implications

    1. The “Joint Venture” Trap: A 50-50 JV with a sanctioned party is Blocked in the US/EU, but Allowed in the UK (statutorily, though high risk).
    2. The “Minority Owner” Risk: A company 25% owned by a sanctioned oligarch who appoints the CEO is Safe in the US (unless listed), but Radioactive in the EU/UK (due to “Control”).
    3. The “Aggregation” Headache: Three sanctioned individuals each owning 20% of a company results in a Block in the US/EU (60% total), but No Block in the UK (unless they are proven to be working together).

    Source List for “Ownership and Control” Analysis

    The following is a curated list of the primary government and regulatory source documents used in the comparative analysis.

    1. United States (OFAC)

    2. European Union (Council of the EU)

    • Document: Update of the EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures (July 3, 2024)
    • Description: The critical update that aligned the EU ownership threshold (“50% or more”) with the US and clarified the “Dominant Influence” control tests.
    • URL: EU Best Practices (Council Document ST 11377 2024 INIT)
    • Additional Source: Commission Consolidated FAQs on the Implementation of Council Regulation No 833/2014
    • URL: European Commission Sanctions FAQs

    3. United Kingdom (OFSI)

    • Document: OFSI General Guidance – UK Financial Sanctions
    • Description: See specifically Chapter 4 (Ownership and Control), which details the “reasonable to expect” test and the rejection of automatic aggregation.
    • URL: OFSI General Guidance (GOV.UK)

    4. Canada (Global Affairs Canada)

    • Document: Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) – Amendments regarding Deemed Ownership
    • Description: The legislative text (Section 2.1) establishing that property controlled by a designated person is “deemed” to be owned by them.
    • URL: Consolidated SEMA Legislation (Justice Laws Website)
    • Guidance Page: Canadian Sanctions: Essential Information
    • URL: GAC Sanctions Guidance

    5. Australia (Australian Sanctions Office)

    • Document: ASO Guidance Note: Dealing with Assets Owned or Controlled by Designated Persons
    • Description: A thematic guidance note explaining the “control” test as a question of fact rather than a mathematical formula.
    • URL: DFAT/ASO Sanctions Guidance Notes

    6. Japan (MOF & METI)

    7. Switzerland (SECO)

    • Document: Ordinance on Measures Connected with the Situation in Ukraine (FAQs)
    • Description: The primary source for the “making funds available” interpretation and the alignment with EU “control” standards.
    • URL: SECO Sanctions Measures & FAQs

    8. The Wolfsberg Group

    • Document: Wolfsberg Guidance on Sanctions Screening (2019)
    • Description: Industry best practices recommending beneficial ownership screening (10-25%) to mitigate “Control” risks.
    • URL: Wolfsberg Group Guidance on Sanctions Screening

    9. Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

    • Document: Guidance on Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons
    • Description: The global standard setting the 25% threshold for beneficial ownership, which conflicts with the 50% sanctions standard.
    • URL: FATF Guidance on Beneficial Ownership

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  • Burning Questions: Outside the US, Beyond the letter of regulation

    The prompt:

    Outside the US, what governments issue sanctions-related guidance, advisories, frequently-asked questions and other publications which clarify sanctions legislation and regulation? pease describe the types of publications and their level of detail and specificity for each government, and compare and contrast each country’s set of such documents, Do not limit yourself to English-language texts. And please quote all sources, with URLs when available.

    The response:

    The United States (via OFAC) is often viewed as the “gold standard” for volume and specificity of sanctions guidance. However, owing largely to the complex sanctions landscape post-2022 (Russia/Ukraine), other major economies have rapidly developed their own detailed interpretive infrastructure.

    The following is an analysis of non-US government publications that clarify sanctions legislation, organized by jurisdiction.

    1. United Kingdom: Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI)

    Since Brexit, the UK has developed a sanctions infrastructure that rivals the US in complexity and specificity. OFSI is the primary issuing body.

    • Types of Publications:
      • General Guidance: The “Standard Bearer” document. It covers the UK’s definition of ownership and control, licensing processes, and reporting obligations.
      • Sector-Specific Guidance: Detailed guidance for Maritime shipping (oil price cap), Charity/NGOs, and Financial Services.
      • FAQs: Extensive Q&A covering specific regulations (especially the Russia regulations).
      • Blog/Alerts: OFSI uses its blog to publish “Red Alerts” on evasion typologies (e.g., gold, artwork).
      • General Licences: Unlike the US, the UK publishes “General Licences” (GLs) with accompanying explanatory notes that act as effectively binding guidance on what is permitted.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: High.OFSI provides very specific interpretive guidance. For example, they define “ownership and control” in granular detail (e.g., examining “dominant influence” over a board of directors). They are one of the few bodies outside the US that publishes enforcement actions (monetary penalties) which serve as case-law-like guidance for the industry.
    • Source: OFSI General Guidance and FAQs

    2. European Union: European Commission & Council of the EU

    The EU issues sanctions at the bloc level, but enforcement is done by member states. To ensure uniformity, the Commission has become extremely prolific in issuing interpretive guidance.

    • Types of Publications:
      • Consolidated FAQs: The primary vehicle for EU guidance. Since 2022, the Commission has published hundreds of pages of FAQs specifically on the Russia/Belarus regimes.
      • “Best Practices” Guidelines: High-level documents from the Council of the EU detailing how to implement asset freezes or identifying beneficial ownership.
      • Commission Opinions: Formal legal opinions on how to interpret specific articles of Council Regulations (e.g., whether “transfer” of goods includes transit).
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: High (but Legalistic).EU guidance is often drafted by lawyers for lawyers. It focuses heavily on statutory interpretation (e.g., “Does Article 5aa prohibit X?”). It is less operational than US/UK guidance but provides definitive answers on scope, such as the exact calculation of “50% ownership” and whether it applies to aggregation of shares.
    • Source: European Commission Sanctions FAQs

    3. Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) & Australian Sanctions Office (ASO)

    Australia has moved toward a user-friendly, toolkit-based approach for the private sector.

    • Types of Publications:
      • Sanctions Compliance Toolkit: A consolidated PDF designed for businesses/universities to build their own compliance programs.
      • Guidance Notes: Thematic papers on specific high-risk sectors (e.g., “Conflict Minerals,” “Maritime Shipping,” “Ransomware”).
      • Advisory Notes: Alerts on specific evasion risks.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: Medium.Australia’s guidance is excellent on process (how to assess risk, how to apply for a permit) but arguably offers fewer specific interpretive rulings on complex financial scenarios than the UK or EU. It relies heavily on “due diligence” principles rather than prescriptive rules.
    • Source: Australian Sanctions Office Guidance Notes

    4. Canada: Global Affairs Canada (GAC)

    Historically, Canada provided very little guidance beyond the legislative text. This has changed significantly in recent years with the release of formal interpretive documents.

    • Types of Publications:
      • Sanctions Guidance: A formal document released to clarify “Deemed Ownership” (a unique Canadian concept where any entity in a sanctioned country might be “deemed” owned by that state).
      • Thematic Guidance: Specific papers for the Financial Sector and Academic/Research Sector.
      • Sanctions Notices: Updates notifying the public of new listings.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: Medium-Low.While improving, Canada’s guidance is often broader and less scenario-based. For example, while the definition of “property” is clarified, the specific application to complex financial instruments is often left to the “judgment” of the operator compared to the detailed FAQs of the EU.
    • Source: Global Affairs Canada Sanctions Guidance

    5. Japan: Ministry of Finance (MOF) & METI

    Japan’s guidance differs culturally; it is often integrated into broader trade control and anti-money laundering (AML) frameworks rather than standing alone as “sanctions guidance.”

    • Types of Publications:
      • Trade Control Policy (METI): Detailed lists of controlled items and end-user lists (the “Foreign End User List”) which function as de facto sanctions lists.
      • AML/CFT Guidelines (JFSA/MOF): Guidelines for financial institutions that include sections on asset freezing and screening.
      • Q&A on Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act: Technical Q&A on how to process payments to sanctioned jurisdictions.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: High (Technical).The guidance is highly technical regarding trade classifications (goods codes) and payment processing permissions. It is less focused on “sanctions evasion typologies” in the Western sense and more on administrative compliance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act.
    • Source: METI Security Export Control Q&A (Japanese/English)

    6. Singapore: Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)

    Singapore issues sanctions guidance strictly through its financial regulator, focusing on Financial Institutions (FIs).

    • Types of Publications:
      • MAS Regulations & Notices: Legally binding notices prohibiting transactions with specific countries (e.g., DPRK, Iran, Russia).
      • “Red Flag” Indicators: Publications highlighting suspicious transaction indicators related to proliferation financing or sanctions evasion.
      • FAQs: Specific Q&As for Financial Institutions regarding asset freezing implementation.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: Medium.The guidance is precise but narrow; it targets FIs almost exclusively. It is highly specific regarding the mechanics of freezing funds but offers less guidance for non-financial corporates (e.g., exporters, manufacturers) compared to the EU or UK.
    • Source: MAS Targeted Financial Sanctions

    Comparative Analysis

    FeatureUK (OFSI)EU (Commission)Australia (ASO)Canada (GAC)Japan (METI/MOF)
    Primary FocusFinancial & Trade interpretationLegal interpretation for Member StatesCompliance process & Risk AssessmentLegislative clarificationTrade control & Admin procedure
    FormatDetailed General Guidance + Blog AlertsMassive Consolidated FAQs“Toolkit” & Thematic NotesThematic WebpagesTechnical Q&A & End-User Lists
    “Control” Defined?Yes (Very detailed tests)Yes (Detailed criteria)Yes (General principles)Yes (“Deemed ownership”)Implicit(subsidiary rules)
    Scenario SpecificityHigh (e.g., Crypto, Maritime)High (e.g., Transit, IP rights)Medium (Sectoral risks)Low-MediumHigh (Product specs)
    ToneCollaborative but strictLegalistic / FormalEducational / PracticalAdvisoryAdministrative / Bureaucratic

    Summary for the User

    • If you need US-style detail: Look to the UK (OFSI) and EU. They are the closest to providing “answers” to specific hypothetical scenarios.
    • If you need to build a program: Australia’s “Toolkit” is one of the best structural guides for how to set up compliance, regardless of jurisdiction.
    • If you are in Trade/Manufacturing: Japan (METI) and EU guidance provide the most detail on controlled goods codes and transit.

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  • February 3, 2026: DFAT updates its Iran sanctions

    Notice of Changes to the Consolidated List – 3 February 2026

    DFAT updated the Consolidated List on 3 February 2026 pursuant to the below listed legislative instrument made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

    The updated Consolidated List can be downloaded from the following page:Consolidated List | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

    Australian Sanctions Office

    _______________________________

    Australian Sanctions Office | Regulatory and Legal Policy Division

    Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

    dfat.gov.au | X | Facebook | Instagram | LinkedIn

    F2026L00077Download

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  • February 2, 2026: and U? Yet another new version of Venezuela GL 5 (and an updated FAQ, too)

    This is the General License (GL) that authorizes transactions on PDVSA’s (Petróleos de Venezuela SA) 8.5% bond after a specified date… which this version pushes back another 6 weeks or so:

    venezuela_gl5u_0Download

    and the related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) was updated, too:

    595. What does Venezuela-related General License 5U authorize?

    The President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13835 on May 21, 2018. Subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions related to the sale, transfer, assignment, or pledging as collateral by the Government of Venezuela (GOV) of any equity interest in an entity owned 50 percent or more by the GOV. One effect of subsection 1(a)(iii) is to require authorization before U.S. persons may engage in certain transactions regarding any equity interest in an entity owned 50 percent or more by the GOV. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. 13835, OFAC received inquiries about how and whether subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 could affect the ability to enforce bondholder rights to the CITGO shares serving as collateral for the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) 2020 8.5 percent bond. OFAC issued General License (GL) 5 on July 19, 2018, which removed E.O. 13835 as an obstacle to holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond gaining access to their collateral.

    General License 5 was replaced and superseded by General License 5A on October 24, 2019 with a delay in the effectiveness of the authorization in the general license. Since that date, OFAC has extended the delay in effectiveness multiple times. Most recently, OFAC issued General License 5U on February 2, 2026, which further delays the effectiveness of the authorization in GL 5 until March 20, 2026. Between October 24, 2019 and March 20, 2026 (the date the authorization in General License 5U becomes effective), there is no authorization in effect that licenses against subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 applicable to the holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond. As a result, during such period, transactions related to the sale or transfer of CITGO shares in connection with the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond are prohibited, unless specifically authorized by OFAC.

    To the extent an agreement may be reached on proposals to restructure or refinance payments due to the holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond, additional licensing requirements may apply. OFAC would encourage parties to apply for a specific license and would have a favorable licensing policy toward such an agreement.

    Date Updated: February 2, 2026

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  • January 29, 2026: OFSI publishes response to enforcement framework consultation

    Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury

    OFSI Publishes Response to Enforcement Consultation

    We’ve published the response to our public consultation, setting out improvements to make sanctions enforcement more transparent and predictable.

    These changes are designed to support compliance, give firms greater certainty and help this government apply sanctions in a fair, effective and robust way.

    Here’s what’s changing:

    • Improve transparency for industry with a new case assessment matrix and updated guidance to make enforcement decisions clearer and more predictable.
    • Enable OFSI to resolve cases more efficiently by introducing settlement and Early Account schemes which will give suitable cases quicker routes to resolution.
    • Streamline process for lower-level breaches with set penalties for appropriate information, reporting and licensing offences.
    • Strengthen deterrence for serious breaches with plans to double OFSI’s maximum civil penalties, subject to legislation.

    Blog post: New and updated enforcement framework – a message from Giles Thomson, Director of OFSI

    Consultation outcome page: Improving civil enforcement processes for financial sanctions

    Consultation:

    OFSI_s_enforcement_processesDownload

    Consultation Response:

    Consultation_ResponseDownload

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