Mr. Sanctions

Category: Reporting & Other Filings

  • Burning Question: Should OFAC be TARred and Feathered?

    The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control — better known as OFAC — runs some of the most consequential financial sanctions programs in the world. It freezes assets, blacklists entities, and plays a central role in U.S. foreign policy enforcement. But there’s a quiet accountability gap that deserves more attention: OFAC has apparently stopped publishing its own signature transparency report, and almost nobody seems to have noticed.

    What Is the Terrorist Assets Report?

    Every year since 1993, OFAC has been legally required to submit the Terrorist Assets Report (TAR) to Congress. The report breaks down frozen and blocked assets by sanctions program — covering everything from state sponsors of terrorism like Iran and Syria, to designated terrorist organizations like Hamas and al-Qaeda. It’s the closest thing to a public accounting of how much money is actually sitting frozen in U.S. financial institutions under each OFAC program.

    The mandate comes from Section 304 of Public Law 102-138, which directs the Secretary of the Treasury to provide an annual report on “the nature and extent of assets held in the United States by terrorism-supporting countries and organizations engaged in international terrorism.”

    The Last One Was Published in 2021 — Covering 2020 Data

    Here’s the problem: the most recent TAR on OFAC’s website is the 2020 edition, quietly released on September 8, 2021. It reported that approximately $63 million in assets relating to Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) and Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) were blocked as of December 31, 2020.

    That’s it. No 2021 report. No 2022. No 2023. No 2024. As of April 2026, there’s a roughly four-and-a-half year gap in this congressionally mandated publication — with no public explanation from Treasury.

    The Annual Report of Blocked Property Is Not a Substitute

    It’s worth distinguishing the TAR from the Annual Report of Blocked Property (ARBP), which is a separate mechanism. Under 31 C.F.R. § 501.603, financial institutions and other holders of blocked property are required to file the ARBP with OFAC each year by September 30, covering assets held as of June 30. OFAC even issued a reminder about this requirement as recently as September 2025.

    But the ARBP is an internal compliance filing — that data is never published. The TAR was the public-facing output that turned those filings into a meaningful, program-by-program accounting for Congress and the public. Without it, there’s no way to know the aggregate scale of assets frozen under each program.

    Why Does This Matter?

    Sanctions are one of the most powerful tools in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. The question of whether they’re actually working — whether assets are being frozen in meaningful quantities, whether programs are achieving their stated goals — ought to be answerable. The TAR existed precisely to enable that kind of oversight.

    The lapse is especially striking given how much the sanctions landscape has shifted since 2020. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted one of the most sweeping sanctions expansions in U.S. history. The Biden administration added thousands of new designations. The Trump administration has added more still, including the landmark designation of major drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2025. All of that activity has happened in a period when OFAC has published zero program-level data on frozen asset totals.

    Congress passed a law requiring this report. Treasury has apparently stopped producing it. Someone should ask why.

    Yeah, I asked Claude about the statistical reports OFAC used to publish – it had seemed a while since we saw one. Guess I was right.

    Also, fun fact: instead of cutting and pasting, I asked Claude to create a post draft for me with this title. There’s a connector to WordPress that lets me automate a whole bunch of stuff – even cutting out a few steps here and there is a nice productivity improvement.

    There are actually a lot of useful connectors – like MS Office 365 (for work accounts), Google Drive, Gmail, Calendar, Slack, Asana … but also a bunch of personally useful stuff like Taskrabbit (which I don’t use), Viator & Booking.com (both of which I have used).

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  • April 14, 2026: OFAC Update 2, Part 3: The latest TSRA report

    Additionally, OFAC has released a Quarterly Report of Licensing Activities pursuant to Section 906(b) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), covering activities undertaken by OFAC under Section 906(a)(1) of the TSRA from October through December 2025. Under the procedures established in its TSRA-related regulations, OFAC processes license applications requesting authorization to export agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran under the specific licensing regime set forth in Section 906 of the TSRA.

    Here’s the latest report:

    1quarter2026Download

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  • Burning Questions: Outside the US, Beyond the letter of regulation

    The prompt:

    Outside the US, what governments issue sanctions-related guidance, advisories, frequently-asked questions and other publications which clarify sanctions legislation and regulation? pease describe the types of publications and their level of detail and specificity for each government, and compare and contrast each country’s set of such documents, Do not limit yourself to English-language texts. And please quote all sources, with URLs when available.

    The response:

    The United States (via OFAC) is often viewed as the “gold standard” for volume and specificity of sanctions guidance. However, owing largely to the complex sanctions landscape post-2022 (Russia/Ukraine), other major economies have rapidly developed their own detailed interpretive infrastructure.

    The following is an analysis of non-US government publications that clarify sanctions legislation, organized by jurisdiction.

    1. United Kingdom: Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI)

    Since Brexit, the UK has developed a sanctions infrastructure that rivals the US in complexity and specificity. OFSI is the primary issuing body.

    • Types of Publications:
      • General Guidance: The “Standard Bearer” document. It covers the UK’s definition of ownership and control, licensing processes, and reporting obligations.
      • Sector-Specific Guidance: Detailed guidance for Maritime shipping (oil price cap), Charity/NGOs, and Financial Services.
      • FAQs: Extensive Q&A covering specific regulations (especially the Russia regulations).
      • Blog/Alerts: OFSI uses its blog to publish “Red Alerts” on evasion typologies (e.g., gold, artwork).
      • General Licences: Unlike the US, the UK publishes “General Licences” (GLs) with accompanying explanatory notes that act as effectively binding guidance on what is permitted.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: High.OFSI provides very specific interpretive guidance. For example, they define “ownership and control” in granular detail (e.g., examining “dominant influence” over a board of directors). They are one of the few bodies outside the US that publishes enforcement actions (monetary penalties) which serve as case-law-like guidance for the industry.
    • Source: OFSI General Guidance and FAQs

    2. European Union: European Commission & Council of the EU

    The EU issues sanctions at the bloc level, but enforcement is done by member states. To ensure uniformity, the Commission has become extremely prolific in issuing interpretive guidance.

    • Types of Publications:
      • Consolidated FAQs: The primary vehicle for EU guidance. Since 2022, the Commission has published hundreds of pages of FAQs specifically on the Russia/Belarus regimes.
      • “Best Practices” Guidelines: High-level documents from the Council of the EU detailing how to implement asset freezes or identifying beneficial ownership.
      • Commission Opinions: Formal legal opinions on how to interpret specific articles of Council Regulations (e.g., whether “transfer” of goods includes transit).
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: High (but Legalistic).EU guidance is often drafted by lawyers for lawyers. It focuses heavily on statutory interpretation (e.g., “Does Article 5aa prohibit X?”). It is less operational than US/UK guidance but provides definitive answers on scope, such as the exact calculation of “50% ownership” and whether it applies to aggregation of shares.
    • Source: European Commission Sanctions FAQs

    3. Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) & Australian Sanctions Office (ASO)

    Australia has moved toward a user-friendly, toolkit-based approach for the private sector.

    • Types of Publications:
      • Sanctions Compliance Toolkit: A consolidated PDF designed for businesses/universities to build their own compliance programs.
      • Guidance Notes: Thematic papers on specific high-risk sectors (e.g., “Conflict Minerals,” “Maritime Shipping,” “Ransomware”).
      • Advisory Notes: Alerts on specific evasion risks.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: Medium.Australia’s guidance is excellent on process (how to assess risk, how to apply for a permit) but arguably offers fewer specific interpretive rulings on complex financial scenarios than the UK or EU. It relies heavily on “due diligence” principles rather than prescriptive rules.
    • Source: Australian Sanctions Office Guidance Notes

    4. Canada: Global Affairs Canada (GAC)

    Historically, Canada provided very little guidance beyond the legislative text. This has changed significantly in recent years with the release of formal interpretive documents.

    • Types of Publications:
      • Sanctions Guidance: A formal document released to clarify “Deemed Ownership” (a unique Canadian concept where any entity in a sanctioned country might be “deemed” owned by that state).
      • Thematic Guidance: Specific papers for the Financial Sector and Academic/Research Sector.
      • Sanctions Notices: Updates notifying the public of new listings.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: Medium-Low.While improving, Canada’s guidance is often broader and less scenario-based. For example, while the definition of “property” is clarified, the specific application to complex financial instruments is often left to the “judgment” of the operator compared to the detailed FAQs of the EU.
    • Source: Global Affairs Canada Sanctions Guidance

    5. Japan: Ministry of Finance (MOF) & METI

    Japan’s guidance differs culturally; it is often integrated into broader trade control and anti-money laundering (AML) frameworks rather than standing alone as “sanctions guidance.”

    • Types of Publications:
      • Trade Control Policy (METI): Detailed lists of controlled items and end-user lists (the “Foreign End User List”) which function as de facto sanctions lists.
      • AML/CFT Guidelines (JFSA/MOF): Guidelines for financial institutions that include sections on asset freezing and screening.
      • Q&A on Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act: Technical Q&A on how to process payments to sanctioned jurisdictions.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: High (Technical).The guidance is highly technical regarding trade classifications (goods codes) and payment processing permissions. It is less focused on “sanctions evasion typologies” in the Western sense and more on administrative compliance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act.
    • Source: METI Security Export Control Q&A (Japanese/English)

    6. Singapore: Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)

    Singapore issues sanctions guidance strictly through its financial regulator, focusing on Financial Institutions (FIs).

    • Types of Publications:
      • MAS Regulations & Notices: Legally binding notices prohibiting transactions with specific countries (e.g., DPRK, Iran, Russia).
      • “Red Flag” Indicators: Publications highlighting suspicious transaction indicators related to proliferation financing or sanctions evasion.
      • FAQs: Specific Q&As for Financial Institutions regarding asset freezing implementation.
    • Level of Detail & Specificity: Medium.The guidance is precise but narrow; it targets FIs almost exclusively. It is highly specific regarding the mechanics of freezing funds but offers less guidance for non-financial corporates (e.g., exporters, manufacturers) compared to the EU or UK.
    • Source: MAS Targeted Financial Sanctions

    Comparative Analysis

    FeatureUK (OFSI)EU (Commission)Australia (ASO)Canada (GAC)Japan (METI/MOF)
    Primary FocusFinancial & Trade interpretationLegal interpretation for Member StatesCompliance process & Risk AssessmentLegislative clarificationTrade control & Admin procedure
    FormatDetailed General Guidance + Blog AlertsMassive Consolidated FAQs“Toolkit” & Thematic NotesThematic WebpagesTechnical Q&A & End-User Lists
    “Control” Defined?Yes (Very detailed tests)Yes (Detailed criteria)Yes (General principles)Yes (“Deemed ownership”)Implicit(subsidiary rules)
    Scenario SpecificityHigh (e.g., Crypto, Maritime)High (e.g., Transit, IP rights)Medium (Sectoral risks)Low-MediumHigh (Product specs)
    ToneCollaborative but strictLegalistic / FormalEducational / PracticalAdvisoryAdministrative / Bureaucratic

    Summary for the User

    • If you need US-style detail: Look to the UK (OFSI) and EU. They are the closest to providing “answers” to specific hypothetical scenarios.
    • If you need to build a program: Australia’s “Toolkit” is one of the best structural guides for how to set up compliance, regardless of jurisdiction.
    • If you are in Trade/Manufacturing: Japan (METI) and EU guidance provide the most detail on controlled goods codes and transit.

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  • July 28, 2026: OFSI blog post on crypto assets and sanctions

    OFSI and partners clamp down on the abuse of cryptoassets

    Sanctions enablers are increasingly turning to cryptoassets to move and hide illicit funds, including those linked to sanctions evasion. But every transaction leaves a trace. By working together, UK agencies are following those traces to identify, investigate and disrupt criminal activity.

    The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) is working closely with UK law enforcement and regulatory partners to tackle the abuse of cryptoassets and associated money laundering activities.

    Recently, OFSI joined forces with the Crypto Cash Fusion Cell (CCFC) to target criminal funds linked to sanctions offences. The CCFC is a pilot, multiagency initiative that brings together the National Crime Agency, the Metropolitan Police Service, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority, City of London Police and OFSI. The aim is to improve how the UK enforcement and regulatory community identifies, understands and responds to criminal abuse of cryptoassets.

    OFSI shared detailed intelligence with the CCFC to enable joint working against specific, prioritised targets. This led to action against potential breaches of financial sanctions involving cryptoassets by UK-based individuals. The collaboration, which involves law enforcement, regulators and private sector partners such as blockchain analytics provider Elliptic, is enhancing our understanding of the threat and supporting joint learning across partners. During a short, focussed, analytical operation, UK law enforcement, government agencies and the private sector worked side-by-side sharing intelligence in real time and rapidly turning data into operational outcomes.

    The message for the sector is clear: the use of cryptoassets to evade sanctions is treated no differently to the exploitation of traditional currencies. OFSI stands ready to investigate and pursue sanctions offences involving cryptoassets, alongside partners from across government, law enforcement and industry, as our intelligence continues to be developed. OFSI’s collaboration with the CCFC marks an important step forward on working operationally against the abuse of cryptoassets.

    The blog post also links to OFSI’s July 2025 Cryptoassets Threat Assessment:

    OFSI_Cryptoassets_Threat_AssessmentDownload

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  • ECJU wants your paperwork… now

    Export Control & Sanctions
    Open Licence Annual Returns for 2025 Exporters holding certain Open General Licences (OGLs) will have received automatic requests from SPIRE to complete their annual returns for 2025.

    Before you submit your return, check the following:

    • Select the correct reporting period (01-JAN-25 to 31-DEC-25)
    • Usage count must be entered accurately.
    • Surrender any licences no longer in use after submitting returns.

    The Open Licence Returns guidance is being updated and will be ready in the new year. 

    It has also come to our attention that whilst the current guidance requires details of ‘trades’ to be submitted under licence usage, there are inconsistent interpretations over what is meant by this wording. For the avoidance of doubt, exporters of tangible items should regard this as requiring details on a shipment-level basis (i.e. if 400 items were exported together as one shipment, this would be 1 use of the licence). Exporters of intangible items should regard this as requiring details on each transfer.

    ECJU’s website can be found on GOV.UK

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