The press release:

U.S. Implements Operation Economic Outcast Sanctioning Iran’s Military Activities, Cyber Threats, and Illicit Oil Trade

PRESS STATEMENT

THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, SPOKESPERSON

AUGUST 24, 2026

Today, the United States took sweeping action against multiple entities, individuals, and vessels enabling the Iranian regime’s destabilizing activities.  Such activities include attacks against U.S. forces and allies in the region, illicit weapons procurement, cyber intrusions into American infrastructure, and the movement of energy products whose sale funds terrorism globally 

The measures target Iranian military officials responsible for procuring weapons and directing attacks against U.S. servicemembers and regional partners, Iran-based entities that gathered intelligence for targeting U.S. forces and allies, and a procurement ring supplying Iran’s military and missile programs.  They also target a regime-directed cyber group responsible for extensive intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure.  Finally, we are targeting a sprawling group of shippers and brokers moving Iranian petroleum as well as petroleum and petrochemical products through the UAE, China, Singapore, and Europe to bankroll the U.S.-designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and other regime elements.

The cyber component of today’s action was carried out in close coordination with the FBI, which announced last week indictments against eight Iranian nationals tied to a hacking campaign that compromised U.S. energy companies, defense contractors, healthcare institutions, and government offices at the local, state, and federal levels.

Last week, the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program offered a reward of up-to-$10 million for information on five of these individuals conducting malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure on behalf of the Iranian government — reflecting the seriousness with which the United States treats threats to its digital infrastructure and reinforcing that those who attack American systems, wherever they are located, will be pursued and held accountable.

The United States will continue to disrupt, expose, and dismantle Iran’s military and proliferation activities, procurement schemes, malicious cyber operations, and illicit oil trade that sustains the regime’s malign behavior.  We call on the international community to join us in holding these actors to account.

The Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846, which authorizes and reimposes certain sanctions with respect to Iran, and E.O. 13949, which targets certain persons with respect to the conventional arms activities of Iran.  The Department of the Treasury targets are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; E.O. 13694, as amended, which targets malicious cyber-enabled activities; E.O. 13902, which targets certain sectors of the Iranian economy, and E.O. 13224, as amended, a counterterrorism authority. For more information about today’s actions, see the RFJ website, the Department of State’s fact sheet and Treasury’s press release.

The fact sheet:

United States Implements Operation Economic Outcast with Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Military Activities and Procurements, and Petroleum and Petrochemical Product Traders

FACT SHEET

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

AUGUST 24, 2026

Today, the Department of State is sanctioning numerous entities, individuals, and vessels to further expose individuals and entities that enabled strikes against U.S. forces and allies and to restrict the revenue that the Iranian regime uses to attack its neighbors, support terrorism abroad, brutally oppress its own people, and hold the global economy hostage. 

Last week, the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offered a reward of up to $10 million for information on the key leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including Ahmed Vahidi and Ali Abdollahi.  More information about RFJ rewards is available on the RFJ website. 

All Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846, which authorizes and reimposes certain sanctions with respect to Iran, and E.O. 13949, which targets certain persons with respect to the conventional arms activities of Iran. 

Concurrently, the Department of the Treasury is designating nearly 60 entities, individuals, and identifying vessels as blocked property.  These persons enable the Iranian regime’s illicit procurement, cyber operations, and petroleum and petrochemical product revenue generation networks. 

Exposing Iran-based Entities and Individuals Involved in Targeting U.S. Forces During Operation Epic Fury and Military Procurement 

Today’s action targets two Iran-based entities involved in the procurement of sensitive imagery that supported targeting of U.S. service members and partners in the region, along with seven individuals responsible for Iran’s military activities and procurement efforts, including directing the use of conventional weapons against U.S. forces and neutral neighboring states and advocating for defense partnerships with Iran’s international partners that would contravene U.S. sanctions. 

• DADENEGAR STARTUP STUDIO (DADENEGAR) supported targeting of U.S. and partner facilities in the Middle East for the Iranian military during Operation Epic Fury. It utilized commercial Chinese satellite imagery for some of these efforts.  DADENEGAR supported Iran’s military targeting and battle damage assessment activities.  Additionally, DADENEGAR conducted an online influence operation for the Iranian government.  DADENEGAR is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13949 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in any activity that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of arms or related materiel or items intended for military end-uses or military end-users, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by the Government of Iran (including persons owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of the Government of Iran) or paramilitary organizations financially or militarily supported by the Government of Iran.  

• IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS CYBER-ELECTRONIC COMMAND (IRGC-CEC) obtained information related to U.S. military assets and facilities that supported Iran’s military targeting during Operation Epic Fury. The IRGC-CEC is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13949 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in any activity that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of arms or related materiel or items intended for military end-uses or military end-users, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by the Government of Iran (including persons owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of the Government of Iran) or paramilitary organizations financially or militarily supported by the Government of Iran.  

• MOHAMMAD BAQER ZOLQADR (ZOLQADR) was the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s top formal decision-making body on national security and defense policy. ZOLQADR played an active role advocating for Iran’s continued support of its so-called Axis of Resistance.  ZOLQADR was designated by the UN Security Council in Annex I of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1747 (2007), reimposed on September 27, 2025, in response to Iran’s “significant non-performance” of its nuclear commitments.  ZOLQADR is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13949 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in any activity that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of arms or related materiel or items intended for military end-uses or military end-users, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by the Government of Iran (including persons owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of the Government of Iran) or paramilitary organizations financially or militarily supported by the Government of Iran.

• ALI ABDOLLAHI (ABDOLLAHI) is the commander of Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, a U.S.-sanctioned Iranian government entity responsible for joint and wartime operations. ABDOLLAHI has driven decisions related to Iran’s kinetic actions during Operation Epic Fury.  ABDOLLAHI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.

• AHMAD VAHIDI (VAHIDI) is the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, which is considered the military vanguard of Iran. VAHIDI is one of the most influential individuals in Iran, both politically and militarily, driving decisions on Iran’s kinetic actions during Operation Epic Fury.  VAHIDI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.

• SAYYED HOSEIN MAJID MUSAVI EFTEKHARI (EFTEKHARI) is the Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, the entity responsible for the IRGC’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. EFTEKHARI exercised responsibility for Iran’s ballistic missile and UAV programs during Operation Epic Fury.  EFTEKHARI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.

• SEYYED MAHDI FARAHI (FARAHI) is the Deputy Defense Minister for Industrial and Research Affairs at MODAFL. FARAHI directs the procurement of arms and related materiel and has demonstrated in-depth knowledge of various missile systems, including those that Iran has reportedly used against U.S. forces and allies during Operation Epic Fury.  FARAHI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.

• AMIR HATAMI (HATAMI) is the Commander of the Artesh, Iran’s conventional military. HATAMI is responsible for the aspects of the conventional armaments of the Iranian armed forces and has responsibilities for the use of missiles and UAVs, including during Operation Epic Fury.  HATAMI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.

• REZA TALAEI-NIK (TALAEI-NIK) is the spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), the country’s main defense ministry body which functions as the central manager of the country’s military industries, procurement, and logistics. TALAEI-NIK has publicly advocated for defense partnerships with Iran’s international partners that would be in contravention of U.S. sanctions and the reimposed Iran-related UN Security Council restrictive measures and sanctions.  TALAEI-NIK is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13949 for engaging in activity that materially contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of arms or related materiel, including spare parts.

Continued Targeting of Iran’s Petroleum and Petrochemical Product Traders, Dark Fleet, and Maritime Service Providers

Today, the Department of State is sanctioning multiple companies that have engaged in the illicit trade of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, activities that have generated millions of dollars in revenue for the Iranian regime.  Iran’s exports of petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemical products are facilitated by shell companies and intermediaries in third countries.  These Iranian petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemical cargos are frequently transported by shadow fleet operators, including vessel management companies that regularly engage in dark activity and other deceptive shipping practices, endangering other vessels and trade flows.  Finally, import and logistics companies, such as customs brokers and port agents, facilitate the entry of Iranian- origin commodities through customs on behalf of buyers in third countries.   Today’s action targets all the nodes of this illicit trade, and promotes accountability for the buyers, sellers, intermediaries, and service providers that help facilitate Iran’s destabilizing activities. 

Targeting Customs Broker Involved in Facilitating the Trade of Iranian Petrochemical Products

• PORTEASE PARTNERS LLP (PORTEASE) is an India-based customs broker that facilitated the import of multiple shipments of Iranian petrochemical products to India. INDRISMIYA ASHARAFMIYA SHEKH (INDRISMIYA) is an Indian national and a designated partner of PORTEASE. HARISH RAMCHANDRA RANGI (HARISH) is an Indian national and a designated partner of PORTEASE. 

• PORTEASE is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

• INDRISMIYA is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of PORTEASE.

• HARISH is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of PORTEASE.

Continued Targeting of Iran’s Shadow Fleet

• CLEVER SHIPPING LIMITED (CLEVER SHIPPING) is the Hong Kong-based commercial manager of STAR PIONE (IMO: 9389019), a Barbados-flagged crude oil tanker that loaded Iranian-origin petroleum on at least six occasions between 2025 and 2026.

• CLEVER SHIPPING is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. STAR PIONE is being identified as property in which CLEVER SHIPPING has an interest.

Continued Targeting of Iranian Petroleum and Petrochemical Product Traders

• OSHIDA PETROKIMYA URUNLERI SANAYI VE TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI (OSHIDA) is a Türkiye-based petrochemical trader, which imported approximately $1 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products from January 2024 to August 2024. MOHSEN FARAHI is an Iranian national and the director of OSHIDA.

• OSHIDA is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

• FARAHI is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of OSHIDA.

• HUZUR PLASTIK KIMYEVI MADDELER ITHALAT IHRACAT SANAYI VE TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI (HUZUR PLASTIK) is a Türkiye-based petrochemical company that imported Iranian-origin polyethylene valued at $28 million from multiple Iran-based entities, including U.S.-designated ARYA SASOL POLYMER COMPANY, between June 2022 and May 2024. Additionally, between January and September 2024, the company supplied over $900,000 worth of shipments containing Iranian-origin petrochemical products to multiple companies in Türkiye.  CENGIZ BEKGOZ is a Turkish national and the manager of HUZUR PLASTIK.

• HUZUR PLASTIK is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

• CENGIZ BEKGOZ is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of HUZUR PLASTIK.

• NARMINA DADASHOVA is a Singapore national and a principal executive officer or equivalent of ALT CAPITAL PTE. LTD. (ALT CAPITAL). ALT CAPITAL was designated on May 28, 2026, pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.  Between March and April 2024, ALT CAPITAL conducted multiple transactions for the export of approximately $900,000 worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products.

• NARMINA DADASHOVA is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a director, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of U.S.-designated ALT CAPITAL.

• SADASHIVA OVERSEAS LIMITED (SADASHIVA OVERSEAS) is an India-based company that imported approximately $69 million worth of Iranian-origin petroleum products from multiple companies, including U.S.-designated BONJOURE COMMODITY F.Z.E. between February 2024 and June 2025

• SADASHIVA OVERSEAS is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.

• PP SOFTTECH PRIVATE LIMITED (PP SOFTTECH) is an India-based company that imported approximately $25 million worth of Iranian-origin petroleum products between January 2024 and June 2025. PRASHANT GARG is an Indian national and a director of PP SOFTTECH.

• PP SOFTTECH is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.

• PRASHANT GARG is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of PP SOFTTECH.

• ABHAR POLYMER COMPOUNDS CO. (ABHAR) is an Iran-based entity that exported approximately $1.7 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products between January 2024 and September 2024.

• ABHAR is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

• STARPLAS KIMYA SANAYI VE TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI (STARPLAS KIMYA) is a Türkiye-based company that imported approximately $1.7 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products from ABHAR between January and September 2024.

• STARPLAS is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

• PRAKRUTEES INFRA IMPEX INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED (PRAKRUTEES INFRA) is an India-based company that imported Iranian-origin petroleum products valued at $25 million from multiple companies, including U.S.-designated BONJOURE COMMODITY F.Z.E., between May 2023 and February 2026.

• PRAKRUTEES INFRA is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.

• SELFPLAST PLASTIK AMBALAJ SANAYI DIS TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI (SELFPLAST) is a Türkiye-based company that imported over $4.7 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products from multiple companies, including SELENIUM RESOURCES LIMITED, between January 2023 and May 2024.

• SELFPLAST is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

• SELENIUM RESOURCES LIMITED (SELENIUM) is a Hong Kong-based company that exported Iranian-origin petrochemical products valued at over $22.8 million to multiple companies, including SELFPLAST, between January 2023 and September 2024.

• SELENIUM is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

Sanctions Implications 

As a result of today’s sanctions-related actions, and in accordance with E.O.s 13949 and 13846, all property and interests in property of the sanctioned persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  In addition, all entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  

All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt.  These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.  

The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. 

Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to: OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov.  Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page.