Category: Regulatory

  • OFSI and partners clamp down on the abuse of cryptoassets

    Sanctions enablers are increasingly turning to cryptoassets to move and hide illicit funds, including those linked to sanctions evasion. But every transaction leaves a trace. By working together, UK agencies are following those traces to identify, investigate and disrupt criminal activity.

    The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) is working closely with UK law enforcement and regulatory partners to tackle the abuse of cryptoassets and associated money laundering activities.

    Recently, OFSI joined forces with the Crypto Cash Fusion Cell (CCFC) to target criminal funds linked to sanctions offences. The CCFC is a pilot, multiagency initiative that brings together the National Crime Agency, the Metropolitan Police Service, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority, City of London Police and OFSI. The aim is to improve how the UK enforcement and regulatory community identifies, understands and responds to criminal abuse of cryptoassets.

    OFSI shared detailed intelligence with the CCFC to enable joint working against specific, prioritised targets. This led to action against potential breaches of financial sanctions involving cryptoassets by UK-based individuals. The collaboration, which involves law enforcement, regulators and private sector partners such as blockchain analytics provider Elliptic, is enhancing our understanding of the threat and supporting joint learning across partners. During a short, focussed, analytical operation, UK law enforcement, government agencies and the private sector worked side-by-side sharing intelligence in real time and rapidly turning data into operational outcomes.

    The message for the sector is clear: the use of cryptoassets to evade sanctions is treated no differently to the exploitation of traditional currencies. OFSI stands ready to investigate and pursue sanctions offences involving cryptoassets, alongside partners from across government, law enforcement and industry, as our intelligence continues to be developed. OFSI’s collaboration with the CCFC marks an important step forward on working operationally against the abuse of cryptoassets.

    The blog post also links to OFSI’s July 2025 Cryptoassets Threat Assessment:

  • Report for Licensing Activities Undertaken Pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA)

    The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has released a Quarterly Report of Licensing Activities pursuant to Section 906(b) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), covering activities undertaken by OFAC under Section 906(a)(1) of the TSRA from July through September 2025. Under the procedures established in its TSRA-related regulations, OFAC processes license applications requesting authorization to export agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran under the specific licensing regime set forth in Section 906 of the TSRA.

    OFAC TSRA Program Information Page

    Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) text

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  • Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury

    UK Lowers Oil Price Cap on Seaborne Russian Crude Oil

    Today, the UK, alongside the EU, has announced that the Oil Price Cap on seaborne Russian Crude Oil will be lowered from $47.60 to $44.10 per barrel. The lowered Oil Price Cap of $44.10 per barrel comes into effect at 23:01 (GMT), Saturday, 31 January 2026. 

    This action will maintain regulatory alignment in targeting Russian revenues and is part of the UK’s ongoing commitment to supporting Ukraine in its struggle against Russia’s illegal war of aggression. 

    This will apply to all services captured by the Oil Price Cap, including maritime transportation and the provision, directly, or indirectly, of brokering services or financial services or funds, related to the maritime transport of Russian crude from a place in Russia to third countries or from one third country to another.  

    For any trades with an effective date of contract before 23:01 (GMT), Saturday, 31 January 2026 and which are compliant with the existing price cap of $47.60 per barrel, there will be a wind-down ending at 22.59 (BST), Thursday, 16 April.  After the wind-down, the lower price cap of $44.10 per barrel takes effect. This measure is necessary to give UK businesses the required time to adjust and ensure the consistent implementation of the price cap by all operators.  

    OFSI has updated FAQs 154-161 today to support industry in adapting to the lower price cap over the wind-down period. Market participants must comply with the usual reporting and attestation requirements imposed by the Oil Price Cap General Licence. 

    To read OFSI’s FAQs, click here

    For the updated Oil Price Cap general licence, click here
     
    For OFSI’s full Oil Price Cap guidance, click here
  • Today, OFAC issued Russia-related General License 131B – identical to 131A, except that the expiration date got moved to end of February.

    Two Frequently Asked Questions got updated – 1224:

    1224. What negotiations does Russia-related General License 131B authorize, and what transaction conditions will OFAC consider when evaluating requests for further authorization to effectuate a sale of Lukoil International GmbH (LIG) assets?

    and 1225:

    1225. What activities do Russia-related General License 128B and General License 131B authorize related to Lukoil International GmbH (LIG)?

    Both were changed to refer to the new version of the GL, of course.

  • I will admit to not being really conversant in legislation like TWEA and IEEPA – to my uninformed mind, I see the significantly different civil monetary penalty caps. And I wondered:

    Given that IEEPA penalties are much heftier than those under TWEA, are there any compelling reasons to create a new sanctions program under TWEA?

    And I got this very surprising answer:

    While your premise regarding the penalties is legally correct—IEEPA civil penalties are indeed roughly 3x higher than those under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)—there is one “nuclear” authority that TWEA possesses and IEEPA lacks: Vesting.

    Under IEEPA, the government can generally only freeze (block) assets. Under TWEA, the government can seize (vest) them, taking full ownership.

    Because of this, the lower penalty cap under TWEA is misleading. In a TWEA scenario, the government doesn’t just fine you for the transaction; it can potentially take the entire underlying asset.

    Here is the breakdown of why a administration might theoretically prefer TWEA, despite the lower fine schedule, and why it is rarely used today.

    1. The “Nuclear Option”: Vesting vs. Blocking

    The most compelling reason to use TWEA is the power of vesting.

    • IEEPA (Peacetime Emergency): The President can “block” assets. This freezes the money or property, preventing the target from using it. However, the title (ownership) remains with the target. The U.S. government cannot simply take the money and spend it or give it to someone else without new, specific legislation (as seen with the REPO Act for Ukraine).
    • TWEA (Wartime): The President can “vest” assets. This means the U.S. government takes the title to the property. It becomes U.S. government property to be sold, liquidated, or used as the U.S. sees fit.
      • Context: This was used during WWII to seize enemy assets (e.g., Bayer, IG Farben) and repurpose them for the war effort.

    2. The Scope of “Regulation” (Tariffs and Trade)

    TWEA has historically provided broader cover for aggressive trade interventions, such as tariffs, that are currently being legally challenged under IEEPA.

    • Judicial Deference: Courts have historically given the President massive deference under TWEA (e.g., U.S. v. Yoshida International), effectively allowing the Executive to rewrite tariff schedules at will.
    • IEEPA Challenges: Recent court cases have begun to challenge the President’s ability to use IEEPA for tariffs, arguing that IEEPA is for “sanctions” (blocking assets), not “revenue generation” (tariffs). TWEA’s broader “regulate importation” authority during wartime is less legally fragile in this specific area.

    3. The “War” Barrier (The Catch)

    There is a massive legal barrier that makes creating a new TWEA program nearly impossible for standard foreign policy issues.

    • 1977 IEEPA Split: When Congress passed IEEPA in 1977, it explicitly split the President’s emergency powers. It confined TWEA authorities strictly to “time of war” (declared by Congress).
    • Peacetime Restriction: The President cannot invoke TWEA simply by declaring a National Emergency (as they do for IEEPA). Congress must formally declare war.
    • Current Status: The only TWEA program that remains active is the embargo on Cuba, which was grandfathered in before the 1977 split. All other modern sanctions (Iran, Russia, China, etc.) are under IEEPA because we are not in a declared state of war with those nations.

    Summary Comparison

    FeatureIEEPA (Peacetime)TWEA (Wartime)
    TriggerNational Emergency DeclarationDeclared War (by Congress)
    Asset AuthorityBlocking (Freeze only)Vesting (Seize/Take Title)
    Civil Penalty (2025)~$377,700 (or 2x transaction)~$111,300 (per violation)
    Statute of Limitations10 Years (as of 2024)10 Years (as of 2024)
    Judicial ScrutinyModerate (Recent challenges on tariffs)Low (Historically very high deference)

    Verdict

    You would only create a new program under TWEA if the U.S. entered a declared war and the goal was to permanently seize enemy assets rather than just freeze them. The lower civil penalty is irrelevant in that context because the government’s primary leverage is the ability to confiscate the property itself.

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  • In 2008, President Bush performed a legal maneuver that essentially updated the “operating system” for North Korea sanctions from an old version (TWEA) to a modern version (IEEPA). While this was technically possible for North Korea, it is legally impossible for a President to do the same for Cuba without Congress.

    The reason lies in the difference between Executive Orders (rules the President makes) and Statutory Law (rules Congress makes).

    The Layperson Explanation: “The Golden Handcuffs”

    Imagine sanctions are a fence built around a country.

    • North Korea’s Fence (Pre-2008): The fence was built by President Truman in 1950 using his own authority. Because a President built it, a later President (Bush) had the power to tear it down or rebuild it using different materials (swapping TWEA for IEEPA) without asking permission.
    • Cuba’s Fence: This fence was also originally built by a President (Kennedy). However, in 1996, Congress passed a law (the Helms-Burton Act) that effectively poured concrete over the fence posts. Congress declared that the President’s fence was now Federal Law.
    • The Result: The President can no longer simply swap the legal authority or take down the fence. Congress holds the only key to unlock it. If the President tried to “terminate” the TWEA authority for Cuba, they would be violating the law passed in 1996 which mandates those specific restrictions remain in place until Cuba becomes a democracy.

    Comparison: Creation and Evolution of Sanctions

    The two programs started similarly but diverged wildly in the 1990s.

    1. North Korea: The “Executive” Model

    • Origin (1950): Upon the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman declared a national emergency and imposed sanctions using the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).
    • The “Grandfather” Clause (1977): In 1977, Congress passed a law (IEEPA) saying TWEA could only be used for wars, not peacetime emergencies. However, they allowed existing emergencies (like North Korea and Cuba) to continue under TWEA (“grandfathered in”).
    • The 2008 Swap: To aid nuclear negotiations, President Bush wanted to remove North Korea from the list of TWEA countries. Because these sanctions were largely kept in place by Executive Order, he issued Proclamation 8271, terminating the TWEA emergency. He immediately issued Executive Order 13466 to place North Korea under IEEPA authorities instead. This kept sanctions in place but updated their legal basis to the modern standard.

    2. Cuba: The “Statutory” Model

    • Origin (1960s): President Kennedy imposed the embargo under the Foreign Assistance Act and TWEA. For decades, it operated just like the North Korea program—renewed annually by the President.
    • The Codification (1996): In reaction to Cuba shooting down two American civilian planes (Brothers to the Rescue), Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act (LIBERTAD Act).
      • Section 102(h): This specific section “codified” the embargo. It stated that all regulations in effect on March 1, 1996, were now law.
    • The Lock: This removed the President’s discretion. While Presidents (like Obama or Biden) can modify the rules (licensing travel or remittances), they cannot terminate the underlying authority (TWEA) or the embargo itself. The law requires a Presidential certification to Congress that a “transition government” is in power in Cuba before the sanctions can be lifted.

    Summary of Differences

    FeatureNorth Korea Sanctions (2008 Era)Cuba Sanctions (Present Day)
    Primary AuthorityIEEPA (Executive discretion)TWEA (Congressionally Mandated)
    Can the President End it?Yes. (Until 2016*)No. Requires Congress.
    Legal BasisExecutive Orders & Proclamations.Helms-Burton Act (1996) (Statutory Law).
    Renewal ProcessPresident declares yearly “Emergency”.President must renew TWEA authority annually or violate the statute.

    *Note: Since 2016, Congress has passed stricter laws on North Korea (NKSPEA), effectively beginning to “codify” those sanctions as well, making them harder to lift today than they were in 2008.

    Sources

    • Bush’s 2008 Action: Proclamation 8271 (Termination of the Exercise of Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act With Respect to North Korea) and Executive Order 13466.
    • Cuba Codification: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-114), specifically Title I, Section 102(h).
    • TWEA vs. IEEPA History: Congressional Research Service Report R45618, “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use.”
    • General Comparison: Haney, P. J., & Vanderbush, W. (1999). “The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation.” International Studies Quarterly.
  • The following history outlines how North Korea sanctions were established, how they were updated through regulatory changes rather than just Executive Orders, and how the Bush administration formalized the modern system.


    North Korea Sanctions History: Mechanisms and Evolution

    The Core Legal Concept

    To understand this history, you only need to know two main laws. The Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) is a 1917 wartime law that creates a total wall against trade—it is a blunt instrument. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is a 1977 law that allows the President to fine-tune sanctions during a “national emergency” without declaring war. The story of North Korea sanctions is essentially the story of moving from the blunt instrument (TWEA) to the flexible one (IEEPA).


    Phase 1: The Total Embargo and Regulatory Updates (1950–1999)

    • Establishment (December 17, 1950): The sanctions regime began during the Korean War. President Harry S. Truman declared a national emergency and used the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) to impose a total economic embargo. This froze all North Korean assets in the U.S. and made virtually all financial and commercial transactions illegal.
    • The Mechanism of Updates (1990s): Unlike modern sanctions which are often adjusted by issuing new Executive Orders, the updates during this period were primarily done through regulatory amendments. Because the TWEA provided broad authority, the President could direct agencies to loosen restrictions without signing a new Executive Order or asking Congress for permission.
      • 1995 Easing: Following the “Agreed Framework” (where North Korea agreed to freeze plutonium production), the U.S. Treasury Department amended the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. This regulatory change allowed for specific humanitarian donations and telecommunications links but left the broader embargo intact.
      • 1999 “Perry Process” Easing: The most significant change prior to the Bush years occurred under President Bill Clinton. In exchange for a North Korean moratorium on long-range missile testing, Clinton announced a broad easing of sanctions.
        • How it was done: This was not a new Executive Order. Instead, the President waived specific restrictions, and the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Transportation issued new federal regulations(specifically amending the Export Administration Regulations).
        • The Effect: These new rules allowed the import and export of most consumer goods (like food or clothing) and opened flight and shipping routes. However, strict bans on military and “dual-use” technology remained firmly in place.

    Phase 2: The United Nations Steps In (2006)

    For over 50 years, sanctions were largely a U.S. project. This changed when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. The U.S. worked with the United Nations Security Council to turn sanctions into a global requirement rather than just American policy.

    • UN Resolution 1718 (October 14, 2006): This resolution fundamentally changed the landscape by making sanctions multilateral. It legally required all UN member states to enforce three main bans:
      1. Heavy Weapons: A ban on selling tanks, missiles, and combat aircraft to North Korea.
      2. Asset Freezes: A requirement to freeze funds related to North Korea’s weapons programs.
      3. Luxury Goods: A ban on selling high-end items (like expensive watches, yachts, or liquor) to North Korea. This was designed specifically to target the lifestyle of the North Korean elite without hurting the impoverished general population.

    Phase 3: The Bush Administration and the Shift to IEEPA (2008)

    By 2008, the U.S. was deep in the “Six-Party Talks” to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. As a reward for progress in these talks, the U.S. agreed to remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and terminate the application of the wartime TWEA.

    However, President George W. Bush faced a legal dilemma: How could he fulfill the promise to “lift” the wartime TWEA sanctions without actually letting North Korea off the hook, especially regarding nuclear proliferation?

    His solution was a simultaneous “legal swap” executed on June 26, 2008, using Executive Orders rather than just regulatory tweaks:

    1. Ending the Old War Status (Proclamation 8271): President Bush signed this proclamation to formally terminate the exercise of TWEA authorities with respect to North Korea. This symbolically ended the “trading with the enemy” status that had existed since 1950.
    2. Creating a New Emergency (Executive Order 13466): On the exact same day, he signed this Executive Order. He declared that North Korea’s nuclear material posed an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the U.S., which allowed him to activate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

    The Result:

    Executive Order 13466 effectively “grandfathered” the existing restrictions. It continued to block North Korean property and prohibit U.S. citizens from registering ships in North Korea. By doing this, the administration successfully migrated the sanctions from the 1917 wartime law to the modern 1977 regulatory framework. This IEEPA framework became the foundation for the expanded sanctions used by Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden in the years that followed.

    Sources Used

    • The White House Archives (George W. Bush): Executive Order 13466 & Proclamation 8271
    • United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1718 (2006)
    • U.S. Department of the Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control): North Korea Sanctions Program Overview
    • Congressional Research Service: North Korea: Economic Sanctions (Report R41438)
    • Federal Register: Amendments to Export Administration Regulations (2000)
  • From the Ukraine’s Presidential website:

    Ukraine Imposed Sanctions on Individuals and Companies Producing and Supplying Communications Equipment, EW Systems, and Microelectronics for Russia’s Military-Industrial Complex

    President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy has signed a decree enacting a decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to impose sanctions on 95 individuals and 70 legal entities, the majority of whom are citizens and residents of the Russian Federation.

    These are individuals and companies linked to servicing Russia’s state defense order and to the activities of its military-industrial complex.

    They include enterprises and their executives that produce and supply products in the fields of communications, electronic warfare, and microelectronics for Russia’s military-industrial complex and security agencies.

    Sanctions have been imposed on industrial enterprises in Russia’s chemical, extractive, and metallurgical sectors, as well as in its fuel and energy complex.

    The imposed restrictions are intended to complicate the servicing of Russia’s military-industrial complex and to limit its capacity to produce weapons and military equipment used in the war against Ukraine.

    Our country will continue working with partners to synchronize Ukrainian sanctions within partner jurisdictions. Some of these listings will be reflected in the 20th sanctions package of the European Union, which is currently being prepared.

    No links were provided to the details of the designated parties.

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  • Today’s OFAC Action includes the publication of Russia-Related General License 13P, which extends the expiration date of the GL from January 9th to April 9th:

    OFAC also updated two Frequently-Asked Questions (FAQs) to refer to the new version of the GL – 999:

    999. What authorizations exist for entities subject to Directive 4 under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” as amended (Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive)?

    and 1118:

    1118. As of December 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation may require a so-called “exit tax” payment prior to the divestment of assets located in the Russian Federation, potentially requiring transactions involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. Do U.S. sanctions prohibit the payment of this so-called “exit tax”? Does Russia-related General License (GL) 13P authorize transactions that involve the payment of this exit tax?