The following is a Presidential Determination submitted to Congress September 15, 2026:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228) (FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
A country’s presence on the foregoing list is not necessarily a reflection of its government’s current counterdrug efforts, or coordination with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or drug producing country set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on the list due to a combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs or precursor chemicals to transit or be produced, even if a government has engaged in robust and diligent narcotics control and law enforcement measures.
Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Colombia as having failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to make substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures required by 22 U.S.C. § 2291h(a)(1). Included with this determination are justifications for the designations of Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Colombia as described in section 706(2)(B) of the FRAA. I have also determined, in accordance with section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that provision of United States assistance to Bolivia, Burma and Colombia is currently vital to the national interests of the United States.
My Administration has made historic progress in protecting the American people from deadly drugs and vicious narcoterrorist organizations. Under my Administration, our southern border is the most sealed and secure in American history, thanks to the largest investments in border security and law enforcement in our Nation’s history. After four years of open border chaos, seizures of fentanyl and other drugs being smuggled into the United States have been reduced by more than half, and drug overdose deaths have plunged. My Administration has saved tens of thousands of American lives from this scourge. The narcoterrorists responsible for this invasion are either dead, in jail, or living in fear knowing they will be next to face American justice. I have unleashed the strongest military in the history of the world to strike narcoterrorists wherever they threaten our country. Behind the might of the American military, my Administration has destroyed cartel infrastructure, shut down former trafficking highways across sea and land borders, and captured and killed hundreds of the most vicious narcoterrorists. Under the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition, an alliance with over a dozen countries in the Western Hemisphere, we have achieved historic results, drastically reducing United States-bound drug flows and seizing billions of dollars of illicit cartel finances. United States law enforcement agencies are reporting record drug seizures, and our allies are extraditing more cartel bosses to the United States than ever before. We have inflicted unprecedented losses on our enemies, and we are just getting started.
While my Administration has successfully secured our borders from invasion, Canada and Mexico need to do far more to stop the flows of deadly drugs into our country. Fentanyl continues to be illicitly produced in clandestine Canadian labs, and precursor chemicals and synthetic drugs continue to enter the United States through Canada. Canada needs to take meaningful action to dismantle drug labs, strengthen supply chain security, and degrade criminal networks and Chinese gangs operating along our northern border. We recognize Mexican President Sheinbaum’s administration for seizing greater volumes of drugs, dismantling clandestine laboratories, and deploying additional law enforcement and military resources to our shared border. Additionally, United States-Mexican security cooperation has helped eliminate some of the world’s most notorious cartel bosses, including “El Mencho.” However, Mexico must take additional action against the narcoterrorist organizations that dominate vast areas of its territory and continue to threaten the American people. Mexico needs to bolster supply chain integrity by soliciting greater private industry participation and significantly increasing inspections at its ports of entry. Additionally, Mexico’s current investments in its security forces are insufficient to sustain and expand its campaigns against narcoterrorists, their finances, and their criminal networks. This includes exposing, arresting, and prosecuting the many corrupt public officials that have aided and abetted the cartels and betrayed their own country’s security and sovereignty.
The drug threat to America extends beyond our northern and southern borders. The PRC continues to be the world’s largest producer of many of the precursor chemicals used to illicitly produce fentanyl, methamphetamine, and other deadly synthetic drugs. I have raised this directly with State Chairman Xi Jinping, and last year, at my request, the PRC implemented new requirements for its companies to obtain licenses before exporting designated precursor chemicals to North America. However, criminals continue to find ways around these controls through the use of unregulated precursor chemicals. The PRC needs to take more aggressive action to effectively reduce the flow of these substances by scheduling additional chemical precursors and substances requested by the United States. This enhanced cooperation will enable timely prosecution of the criminals responsible for supplying drug traffickers with deadly precursor chemicals.
Other governments have taken measures to confront drug trafficking and narcoterrorism. Dramatic political changes in South America over the past year have created historic openings for United States cooperation with governments in the region. In Venezuela, thanks to my Administration’s arrest and removal of former illegitimate dictator and drug trafficker Nicolás Maduro, we are already seeing the results of growing cooperation with the country’s interim government against cartels, including the elimination of Tren de Aragua leader Niño Guerrero. Given the positive steps taken under interim President Delcy Rodríguez, I have determined Venezuela should no longer be designated as having failed demonstrably to fulfill its drug control commitments. I expect to see continued, measurable progress from the interim government in dismantling narcoterrorist groups and stopping drug trafficking through Venezuela to the United States.
After decades of inept socialist governments, the United States welcomed the Bolivian people’s democratic choice in the 2025 elections and the opportunity to open a new chapter in United States-Bolivia relations under President Rodrigo Paz. Cooperation between Bolivia and the United States has significantly expanded over the last year, and I welcome the resumption of law enforcement coordination between our governments to target illicit drug production and criminal networks. Bolivia’s extradition of narcoterrorist Sebastián Marset to the United States in March 2026 highlighted our growing friendship and cooperation and prevented one of our hemisphere’s most notorious drug traffickers from shipping more drugs to American communities. However, the new government has not yet had sufficient time to reduce coca cultivation that increased under the previous government. Corruption in Bolivia continues to facilitate drug trafficking and impede investigations. If Bolivia can demonstrate progress in reducing illicit drug production in the coming year, and make substantive progress in tackling the endemic corruption weakening Bolivia, I will consider revisiting its status as having failed demonstrably to uphold its counterdrug commitments.
The people of Colombia made the courageous choice to elect Abelardo de la Espriella as President. He has pledged to lead an aggressive campaign against coca cultivation and cocaine production, which reached record levels under the failed socialist policies of his predecessor. Colombia is poised to resume its place as our foremost security partner in the hemisphere, and the country’s military, police, prosecutors, and courts now finally have a worthy champion in President de la Espriella. If, as expected, Colombia makes progress on aggressive coca eradication and dismantling its narcoterrorist networks over the coming year, I will consider lifting the country’s “failed demonstrably” status, which remains in place solely due to the incompetence and chaos produced by the previous far-left government in office throughout the bulk of the past year.
I welcome Prime Minister Modi and the Government of India’s efforts to address illicit opium poppy cultivation and bolster supply chain integrity. I look forward to continued cooperation through the United States-India Drug Policy Framework. In Peru, I likewise welcome the commitment of new President Keiko Fujimori to work with the United States and other allies to destroy the criminals ailing Peru and reduce cocaine flows bound for the United States. I also applaud three of America’s greatest allies in our hemisphere – Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador – for their leadership, resolve, and success in the fight against narcoterrorism.
While many governments in the Western Hemisphere are taking courageous action to reduce drug flows and eradicate cartels, the Government of Brazil has failed to confront the designated foreign terrorist organizations Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho,which have transformed Brazil into a hub for global cocaine flows. These Brazilian terrorist organizations are a growing threat to peace and security around the world, and Brazil’s government urgently must take aggressive measures to confront and defeat them before they spread and grow. Unsurprisingly, for a socialist dictatorship, the illegitimate Ortego-Murillo regime in Nicaragua has failed to take sufficient action against drug trafficking and the complicity of regime actors in the drug trade.
In Burma, the military regime has made little discernible effort to crack down on its drug economy, making the country the world’s largest source of opium poppy and one of the largest suppliers of methamphetamine. Despite the Taliban’s announced opium poppy ban, Afghanistan continues to supply drug markets across the world, likely funding Islamist terrorism. For these reasons, I am again determining that Burma and Afghanistan have failed demonstrably to uphold their drug control obligations.
You are authorized and directed to submit this determination, with the accompanying memoranda of justification, under Section 706 of the FRAA, to the Congress, and to publish this determination in the Federal Register.
As stated in President Trump’s Executive Order (EO) 14204, “Addressing Egregious Actions of the Republic of South Africa,” the United States remains gravely concerned about racially motivated crime and government-sponsored discrimination occurring against the Afrikaners and other minority populations in South Africa, including race-based discriminatory legislation, threats of land expropriation without compensation, and incitement of racial violence through dehumanizing chants and slogans.
The South African government has not adequately addressed the previously laid out concerns and so today, I am announcing a new visa restriction policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act targeting foreign nationals who are responsible for, or complicit in, the enactment or implementation of laws or policies that enable uncompensated land seizures, race-based discrimination, and/or the incitement of imminent violence against members of minority ethnic or racial groups in South Africa. The United States will not allow such behavior to go unchecked. These actions directly undermine peace, economic stability, and the rule of law, and they are incompatible with the pillars of America’s foreign policy.
We once again strongly urge the South African government to quickly address these egregious actions.
This visa restriction policy is pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes the Secretary of State to render inadmissible any alien whose entry into the United States “would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.” Certain family members may also be covered by these restrictions.
The United States is exposing corruption at the highest levels of Ecuador’s justice system. The Department of State is publicly designating seven former Ecuadorian officials for their involvement in significant corruption linked to Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) designated by the Trump Administration last year. These actions render all seven individuals and their immediate family members generally ineligible for entry into the United States.
Pablo Ramírez Erazo, former director of Ecuador’s Prison Authority; Wilman Terán Carillo, former judge on Ecuador’s National Court of Justice; and Ronaldo Xavier Guerrero Cruz, former criminal judge on Ecuador’s Judicial Council, each significantly abused their former government positions by accepting bribes from gangs linked to narco-terrorist organizations. In exchange for bribes, these officials interfered with judicial, electoral, or public processes on behalf of Ecuadorian gangs linked to designated FTOs Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Los Choneros, and Los Lobos.
Pablo Bolívar Muentes Alarcón, former member of the Ecuadorian National Assembly; María Fabiola Gallardo Ramia, former President of the Guayas Provincial Court; Johann Marfetán Medina, former criminal judge of the Guayas Provincial Court; and Mayra Carolina Salazar Merchán, former public relations officer of the Guayas Provincial Court, each abused their former public positions by accepting bribes in exchange for interfering with judicial processes to benefit narco-terrorist organizations like Los Choneros and the Sinaloa Cartel, and their criminal facilitators.
The former Ecuadorian officials’ actions constituted significant corruption and had serious adverse effects on the security of the United States, fueling drug trafficking and poisoning American communities. The United States will continue using every available tool to protect our country and deny entry to narco-terrorists, their corrupt facilitators, and their immediate family members. To any foreign officials corruptly abusing their public position for personal financial gain: the United States will find you and expose you.
These public designations are made under the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (Div. F, P.L. 119-75)(“Section 7031(c)”). Section 7031(c) requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate foreign officials and their immediate family members about whom the Secretary has credible information of involvement in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights.
The United States remains committed to cutting off the Iranian regime’s access to the international financial system and the resources it uses to destabilize the region and threaten U.S. interests and partners. Today’s U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctions on Türkiye-based Golden Global Bank mark the latest step in Operation Economic Outcast, a whole-of-government effort to sever the networks that allow the regime to launder funds, evade sanctions, and finance its terrorist proxies across the Middle East.
This action sends a clear message to financial institutions worldwide: facilitating Iran’s illicit financial activity carries serious consequences. This demonstrates the Trump Administration’s commitment to eliminating resources the regime uses to threaten regional stability, support terrorism, and advance its military capabilities.
The United States will continue to use every diplomatic and economic tool at its disposal to isolate the Iranian regime until it abandons its support for terrorism and its destabilizing activities in the region. We urge the international community to join this effort and ensure no institution serves as a financial lifeline for a regime that threatens peace and security.
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets the financial sector of Iran’s economy and advances Operation Economic Outcast—a campaign to completely isolate the regime from the financial lifelines that sustain its malign behavior. Please see the Department of the Treasury’s Press Release.
The U.S. Department of State has revoked the visa of an Iraqi national who was presented an award by the Biden Administration for her purported role in fighting corruption and her advocacy for “gender equity.”
Taif Sami Mohammed Al Shakarchi was given the International Woman of Courage Award in 2022 by former Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and former First Lady Jill Biden.
The award recognized “women from around the globe who have demonstrated exceptional courage, strength, and leadership in advocating for peace, justice, human rights, gender equity and equality, and the empowerment of women and girls, in all their diversity.”
This Iraqi national’s visa has now been revoked by the State Department following her placement on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terror Watchlist. She is no longer present in the United States.
Under President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, suspected terrorists will never be allowed to remain in the United States.
Attached is today’s State Department Fact Sheet on “Operations Economic Outcast” and Treasury’s related press release. Also attached are Treasury Secretary Bessent’s related remarks. Look at these, and any 3rd party news and commentary pieces on today’s OFAC action. Summarize what happened, and analyze the short-term and longer-term implications of these actions. What is substantive, and what is rhetorical? Are there measures that will be implemented in the really near future, such that US consumers and voters are likely to see tangible benefits from these actions by Election Day in November 2026? Add any other commentary you find that adds to the overall picture. Check all that you write against the sources you use – and correct anything that is not well-supported by the sources. List the sources at the end. No hallucinations, please. Write this for an audience that has interest in US politics and the economy, but is not necessarily well-versed in sanctions except in the most basic way – so write accordingly.
And here is Claude’s analysis of yesterday’s Iran sanctions actions and rhetoric – with some significant pushback from me on some elements that Claude initially thought too much of:
Treasury and State spent August 24 rolling out “Operation Economic Outcast” with the kind of language usually reserved for military campaigns: an “economic D-Day,” a “zero leakage” approach, nearly 60 new entries on the SDN list, and five new sectoral determinations under Executive Order 13902 covering digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping. Secretary Bessent framed it as the start of a sustained campaign to collapse every remaining option for Tehran.
That’s a lot of rollout. The burning question is how much of it is actually new, once you get past the press conference and into the designation text itself.
The determinations nobody used
Start with the five sectoral determinations, since that’s where the branding worked hardest. E.O. 13902 isn’t a new authority. Trump signed it in January 2020 to cover construction, mining, manufacturing, and textiles. Treasury added the financial sector that October. Petroleum and petrochemicals followed in October 2024. Digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping are the fourth round of sector additions to an order that’s now six and a half years old.
That history matters for a second reason beyond age. Iran and the Government of Iran are already subject to a comprehensive US embargo under the ITSR. A sectoral determination adds nothing to what a US person is already barred from doing with Iran directly. Its entire function is secondary sanctions exposure for non-US persons. That works by giving OFAC an easier evidentiary path, operating in the sector rather than proving a specific significant transaction, to reach someone who isn’t otherwise within US jurisdiction. Whether a determination matters in practice depends entirely on whether OFAC designates anyone under it.
So who did OFAC designate today under the five new sectors? Nobody. Every one of the roughly 60 new entries in the State Department fact sheet and the Treasury press release cites an authority that predates this week.
Authority
What it covers
Used for today’s designations?
E.O. 13382 (2005)
WMD and missile proliferation
Yes, the Hong Kong/China procurement network supporting Malek Ashtar University, the BRE Line logistics network
E.O. 13694, as amended (2015 onward)
Malicious cyber activity
Yes, the six individuals tied to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security
E.O. 13224, as amended (2001)
Counterterrorism
Yes, Mohammad Ahmed Suhil Fattouh, Ivan Obukhov, and their shipping vehicles
Yes, the shadow fleet vessels and owners, the Wellbred trading network
E.O. 13949 (2020)
Conventional arms
Yes, the seven Iranian military officials named by State
E.O. 13846 (2018)
JCPOA reimposition, petroleum trade
Yes, the petrochemical traders named by State
E.O. 13902, the five sectors added Aug. 24, 2026
Digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, shipping
No
Five new sectors, zero new designees. That’s worth sitting with, because it’s a useful diagnostic for reading any Treasury rollout of this size. The announced legal architecture and the actual designation list are two different documents, and they don’t have to move together. A determination is Treasury giving itself a faster path to designate people operating in a sector. It isn’t a designation. Until OFAC puts a name under one of the five new sectors, the practical effect on Iran’s economy from that piece of Monday’s announcement is exactly zero, no different from the day before the press conference.
There’s a comparison worth keeping in mind for judging how much these five sectors could eventually matter. When Treasury added the financial sector to E.O. 13902 in October 2020, analysts flagged it at the time as functionally close to a full embargo, since almost any transaction with an Iranian counterparty eventually touches Iran’s banking system somewhere. A narrower sector, like textiles or mining, only closes off that one line of business, and a counterparty can just trade in something else. Of this week’s five, shipping and gold probably have that kind of financial-sector-style reach, since they sit close to how Iran actually moves and stores value. Digital assets and technology are narrower by comparison, and aviation narrower still. None of that is testable yet. It’s a question about which sector Treasury reaches for first, once it reaches for any of them. Bessent told reporters he expects Treasury to designate a major financial institution later this week. Whether that designation cites one of Monday’s five new sectors, rather than the financial sector determination that’s already existed since 2020, is the detail worth checking when it happens.
What the general license suspensions actually touch
The other piece of Monday’s announcement billed as tightening the screws is the suspension of several general licenses. The Treasury release describes them as licenses that had authorized certain remittance payments to Iran and Iranian access to the US cultural and academic system. OFAC’s own recent actions listing for August 24 confirms Iran General License G, the academic exchange license in place since 2014, covering university exchange agreements, scholarships, and the administration of entrance exams for Iranian applicants, along with a license covering professional and amateur sports exchanges. Trade press reporting also has the personal, noncommercial remittance license under 31 CFR 560.550 suspended, with a wind down running through roughly September 8 under a newly issued General License BB.
That’s a real change for the people who use those licenses. It isn’t a real change for the IRGC or for regime leadership, and the reason is built into how the licenses were written. General licenses covering personal remittances and academic exchange exist because they were carved out of the comprehensive embargo for individuals and civil society. As a matter of standard OFAC drafting, that class of license already excludes the Government of Iran and any blocked person from using it. The IRGC was never moving money through a remittance channel covered by GL 560.550, and regime officials weren’t the ones administering entrance exams under GL G. The population that loses access when these licenses come off the board is Iranian civilians receiving money from family abroad, and Iranian students, researchers, and athletes trying to participate in exchange programs. Regime and IRGC finance runs through exchange houses, shadow banking networks, gold, and crypto, the same channels the new designations and the sectoral determinations are aimed at, not through a university scholarship program.
That’s a real tension in how Monday’s action describes itself. The stated target throughout is the regime and its enablers. The general license suspensions land somewhere else, on ordinary Iranians and on the people-to-people channels Iran sanctions programs have historically tried to preserve even during periods of maximum pressure, not on the regime the campaign says it’s targeting.
What this adds up to
None of this makes Monday’s action empty. Roughly 60 new SDN entries is a real expansion of target lists in networks already under scrutiny: the Hong Kong and China procurement chains, the shadow fleet, the MOIS cyber cluster, the oil brokerage networks running through the UAE and Singapore. Those designations use existing, well-tested authorities. They carry the consequences designations ordinarily carry:
Blocked property in the United States or in the hands of US persons
Correspondent banking exposure for foreign financial institutions that keep dealing with the newly listed parties
A paper trail other governments and banks will have to account for in their own due diligence
The two pieces of Monday’s announcement built to sound the most unprecedented are the five new sectors and the general license suspensions. They’re also the two doing the least actual work right now. The determinations haven’t been used yet. The license suspensions hit civilians rather than the regime they’re framed as targeting. That’s a pattern worth checking for in any sanctions rollout that leans hard on scale and language. Look at what got designated under the headline new authority before assuming the headline new authority did anything. If Treasury designates a bank or a shipping registry under the aviation or shipping determination in the coming weeks, that’s the moment the unprecedented framing starts to earn itself. Until then, it’s capacity, not action.
Source verification
Sources checked directly: the State Department fact sheet and the Treasury press release announcing Operation Economic Outcast, both dated August 24, 2026; Secretary Bessent’s prepared remarks from the same day; and OFAC’s own recent actions listing for August 24, 2026, which confirms the suspension of Iran General License G and the sports and cultural exchange license. Every legal basis cited above for the roughly 60 new designations was checked against the authority codes in the two primary announcements rather than assumed. The E.O. 13902 sector determination history (2020 construction, mining, manufacturing, and textiles; October 2020 financial sector; October 2024 petroleum and petrochemicals) is confirmed against OFAC FAQ 831 and contemporaneous client alerts from that period. The personal remittance general license under 31 CFR 560.550 and the General License BB wind down window were reported by trade press covering the rollout and have not yet been independently pulled from OFAC’s own general license text. Treat that specific detail as reported rather than primary source confirmed until the underlying license is checked directly.
Today, the United States took sweeping action against multiple entities, individuals, and vessels enabling the Iranian regime’s destabilizing activities. Such activities include attacks against U.S. forces and allies in the region, illicit weapons procurement, cyber intrusions into American infrastructure, and the movement of energy products whose sale funds terrorism globally
The measures target Iranian military officials responsible for procuring weapons and directing attacks against U.S. servicemembers and regional partners, Iran-based entities that gathered intelligence for targeting U.S. forces and allies, and a procurement ring supplying Iran’s military and missile programs. They also target a regime-directed cyber group responsible for extensive intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure. Finally, we are targeting a sprawling group of shippers and brokers moving Iranian petroleum as well as petroleum and petrochemical products through the UAE, China, Singapore, and Europe to bankroll the U.S.-designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and other regime elements.
The cyber component of today’s action was carried out in close coordination with the FBI, which announced last week indictments against eight Iranian nationals tied to a hacking campaign that compromised U.S. energy companies, defense contractors, healthcare institutions, and government offices at the local, state, and federal levels.
Last week, the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program offered a reward of up-to-$10 million for information on five of these individuals conducting malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure on behalf of the Iranian government — reflecting the seriousness with which the United States treats threats to its digital infrastructure and reinforcing that those who attack American systems, wherever they are located, will be pursued and held accountable.
The United States will continue to disrupt, expose, and dismantle Iran’s military and proliferation activities, procurement schemes, malicious cyber operations, and illicit oil trade that sustains the regime’s malign behavior. We call on the international community to join us in holding these actors to account.
The Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846, which authorizes and reimposes certain sanctions with respect to Iran, and E.O. 13949, which targets certain persons with respect to the conventional arms activities of Iran. The Department of the Treasury targets are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; E.O. 13694, as amended, which targets malicious cyber-enabled activities; E.O. 13902, which targets certain sectors of the Iranian economy, and E.O. 13224, as amended, a counterterrorism authority. For more information about today’s actions, see the RFJ website, the Department of State’s fact sheet and Treasury’s press release.
United States Implements Operation Economic Outcast with Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Military Activities and Procurements, and Petroleum and Petrochemical Product Traders
Today, the Department of State is sanctioning numerous entities, individuals, and vessels to further expose individuals and entities that enabled strikes against U.S. forces and allies and to restrict the revenue that the Iranian regime uses to attack its neighbors, support terrorism abroad, brutally oppress its own people, and hold the global economy hostage.
Last week, the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offered a reward of up to $10 million for information on the key leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including Ahmed Vahidi and Ali Abdollahi. More information about RFJ rewards is available on the RFJ website.
All Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846, which authorizes and reimposes certain sanctions with respect to Iran, and E.O. 13949, which targets certain persons with respect to the conventional arms activities of Iran.
Concurrently, the Department of the Treasury is designating nearly 60 entities, individuals, and identifying vessels as blocked property. These persons enable the Iranian regime’s illicit procurement, cyber operations, and petroleum and petrochemical product revenue generation networks.
Exposing Iran-based Entities and Individuals Involved in Targeting U.S. Forces During Operation Epic Fury and Military Procurement
Today’s action targets two Iran-based entities involved in the procurement of sensitive imagery that supported targeting of U.S. service members and partners in the region, along with seven individuals responsible for Iran’s military activities and procurement efforts, including directing the use of conventional weapons against U.S. forces and neutral neighboring states and advocating for defense partnerships with Iran’s international partners that would contravene U.S. sanctions.
DADENEGAR STARTUP STUDIO (DADENEGAR) supported targeting of U.S. and partner facilities in the Middle East for the Iranian military during Operation Epic Fury. It utilized commercial Chinese satellite imagery for some of these efforts. DADENEGAR supported Iran’s military targeting and battle damage assessment activities. Additionally, DADENEGAR conducted an online influence operation for the Iranian government. DADENEGAR is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13949 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in any activity that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of arms or related materiel or items intended for military end-uses or military end-users, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by the Government of Iran (including persons owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of the Government of Iran) or paramilitary organizations financially or militarily supported by the Government of Iran.
IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS CYBER-ELECTRONIC COMMAND (IRGC-CEC) obtained information related to U.S. military assets and facilities that supported Iran’s military targeting during Operation Epic Fury. The IRGC-CEC is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13949 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in any activity that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of arms or related materiel or items intended for military end-uses or military end-users, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by the Government of Iran (including persons owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of the Government of Iran) or paramilitary organizations financially or militarily supported by the Government of Iran.
MOHAMMAD BAQER ZOLQADR (ZOLQADR) was the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s top formal decision-making body on national security and defense policy. ZOLQADR played an active role advocating for Iran’s continued support of its so-called Axis of Resistance. ZOLQADR was designated by the UN Security Council in Annex I of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1747 (2007), reimposed on September 27, 2025, in response to Iran’s “significant non-performance” of its nuclear commitments. ZOLQADR is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13949 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in any activity that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of arms or related materiel or items intended for military end-uses or military end-users, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by the Government of Iran (including persons owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of the Government of Iran) or paramilitary organizations financially or militarily supported by the Government of Iran.
ALI ABDOLLAHI (ABDOLLAHI) is the commander of Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, a U.S.-sanctioned Iranian government entity responsible for joint and wartime operations. ABDOLLAHI has driven decisions related to Iran’s kinetic actions during Operation Epic Fury. ABDOLLAHI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.
AHMAD VAHIDI (VAHIDI) is the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, which is considered the military vanguard of Iran. VAHIDI is one of the most influential individuals in Iran, both politically and militarily, driving decisions on Iran’s kinetic actions during Operation Epic Fury. VAHIDI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.
SAYYED HOSEIN MAJID MUSAVI EFTEKHARI (EFTEKHARI) is the Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, the entity responsible for the IRGC’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. EFTEKHARI exercised responsibility for Iran’s ballistic missile and UAV programs during Operation Epic Fury. EFTEKHARI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.
SEYYED MAHDI FARAHI (FARAHI) is the Deputy Defense Minister for Industrial and Research Affairs at MODAFL. FARAHI directs the procurement of arms and related materiel and has demonstrated in-depth knowledge of various missile systems, including those that Iran has reportedly used against U.S. forces and allies during Operation Epic Fury. FARAHI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.
AMIR HATAMI (HATAMI) is the Commander of the Artesh, Iran’s conventional military. HATAMI is responsible for the aspects of the conventional armaments of the Iranian armed forces and has responsibilities for the use of missiles and UAVs, including during Operation Epic Fury. HATAMI is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for providing to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of E.O. 13949.
REZA TALAEI-NIK (TALAEI-NIK) is the spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), the country’s main defense ministry body which functions as the central manager of the country’s military industries, procurement, and logistics. TALAEI-NIK has publicly advocated for defense partnerships with Iran’s international partners that would be in contravention of U.S. sanctions and the reimposed Iran-related UN Security Council restrictive measures and sanctions. TALAEI-NIK is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13949 for engaging in activity that materially contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of arms or related materiel, including spare parts.
Continued Targeting of Iran’s Petroleum and Petrochemical Product Traders, Dark Fleet, and Maritime Service Providers
Today, the Department of State is sanctioning multiple companies that have engaged in the illicit trade of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, activities that have generated millions of dollars in revenue for the Iranian regime. Iran’s exports of petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemical products are facilitated by shell companies and intermediaries in third countries. These Iranian petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemical cargos are frequently transported by shadow fleet operators, including vessel management companies that regularly engage in dark activity and other deceptive shipping practices, endangering other vessels and trade flows. Finally, import and logistics companies, such as customs brokers and port agents, facilitate the entry of Iranian- origin commodities through customs on behalf of buyers in third countries. Today’s action targets all the nodes of this illicit trade, and promotes accountability for the buyers, sellers, intermediaries, and service providers that help facilitate Iran’s destabilizing activities.
Targeting Customs Broker Involved in Facilitating the Trade of Iranian Petrochemical Products
PORTEASE PARTNERS LLP (PORTEASE) is an India-based customs broker that facilitated the import of multiple shipments of Iranian petrochemical products to India. INDRISMIYA ASHARAFMIYA SHEKH (INDRISMIYA) is an Indian national and a designated partner of PORTEASE. HARISH RAMCHANDRA RANGI (HARISH) is an Indian national and a designated partner of PORTEASE.
PORTEASE is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.
INDRISMIYA is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of PORTEASE.
HARISH is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of PORTEASE.
Continued Targeting of Iran’s Shadow Fleet
CLEVER SHIPPING LIMITED (CLEVER SHIPPING) is the Hong Kong-based commercial manager of STAR PIONE (IMO: 9389019), a Barbados-flagged crude oil tanker that loaded Iranian-origin petroleum on at least six occasions between 2025 and 2026.
CLEVER SHIPPING is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. STAR PIONE is being identified as property in which CLEVER SHIPPING has an interest.
Continued Targeting of Iranian Petroleum and Petrochemical Product Traders
OSHIDA PETROKIMYA URUNLERI SANAYI VE TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI (OSHIDA) is a Türkiye-based petrochemical trader, which imported approximately $1 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products from January 2024 to August 2024. MOHSEN FARAHI is an Iranian national and the director of OSHIDA.
OSHIDA is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.
FARAHI is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of OSHIDA.
HUZUR PLASTIK KIMYEVI MADDELER ITHALAT IHRACAT SANAYI VE TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI (HUZUR PLASTIK) is a Türkiye-based petrochemical company that imported Iranian-origin polyethylene valued at $28 million from multiple Iran-based entities, including U.S.-designated ARYA SASOL POLYMER COMPANY, between June 2022 and May 2024. Additionally, between January and September 2024, the company supplied over $900,000 worth of shipments containing Iranian-origin petrochemical products to multiple companies in Türkiye. CENGIZ BEKGOZ is a Turkish national and the manager of HUZUR PLASTIK.
HUZUR PLASTIK is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.
CENGIZ BEKGOZ is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of HUZUR PLASTIK.
NARMINA DADASHOVA is a Singapore national and a principal executive officer or equivalent of ALT CAPITAL PTE. LTD. (ALT CAPITAL). ALT CAPITAL was designated on May 28, 2026, pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran. Between March and April 2024, ALT CAPITAL conducted multiple transactions for the export of approximately $900,000 worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products.
NARMINA DADASHOVA is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a director, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of U.S.-designated ALT CAPITAL.
SADASHIVA OVERSEAS LIMITED (SADASHIVA OVERSEAS) is an India-based company that imported approximately $69 million worth of Iranian-origin petroleum products from multiple companies, including U.S.-designated BONJOURE COMMODITY F.Z.E. between February 2024 and June 2025
SADASHIVA OVERSEAS is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.
PP SOFTTECH PRIVATE LIMITED (PP SOFTTECH) is an India-based company that imported approximately $25 million worth of Iranian-origin petroleum products between January 2024 and June 2025. PRASHANT GARG is an Indian national and a director of PP SOFTTECH.
PP SOFTTECH is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.
PRASHANT GARG is being blocked pursuant to section 5(a)(vii) of E.O. 13846 as a principal executive officer, or a person performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of PP SOFTTECH.
ABHAR POLYMER COMPOUNDS CO. (ABHAR) is an Iran-based entity that exported approximately $1.7 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products between January 2024 and September 2024.
ABHAR is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.
STARPLAS KIMYA SANAYI VE TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI (STARPLAS KIMYA) is a Türkiye-based company that imported approximately $1.7 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products from ABHAR between January and September 2024.
STARPLAS is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.
PRAKRUTEES INFRA IMPEX INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED (PRAKRUTEES INFRA) is an India-based company that imported Iranian-origin petroleum products valued at $25 million from multiple companies, including U.S.-designated BONJOURE COMMODITY F.Z.E., between May 2023 and February 2026.
PRAKRUTEES INFRA is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.
SELFPLAST PLASTIK AMBALAJ SANAYI DIS TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI (SELFPLAST) is a Türkiye-based company that imported over $4.7 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products from multiple companies, including SELENIUM RESOURCES LIMITED, between January 2023 and May 2024.
SELFPLAST is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.
SELENIUM RESOURCES LIMITED (SELENIUM) is a Hong Kong-based company that exported Iranian-origin petrochemical products valued at over $22.8 million to multiple companies, including SELFPLAST, between January 2023 and September 2024.
SELENIUM is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for, on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.
Sanctions Implications
As a result of today’s sanctions-related actions, and in accordance with E.O.s 13949 and 13846, all property and interests in property of the sanctioned persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). In addition, all entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.
All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.
Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to: OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov. Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page.
Today, I authorized the formal rescission of Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), following the conclusion of the mandatory 45-day Congressional notification period. I have also delisted Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). These actions represent another historic step by President Trump to give the Syrian people a path to prosperity.
In the past year the Trump Administration has taken unprecedented steps to provide sanctions relief for the benefit of the Syrian people. The historic June 2025 Executive Order ‘Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions’ accelerated the process of sanctions relief for Syria, including by terminating the Syria Sanctions Program and the national emergency with respect to Syria, and directing reviews on various Syria-related sanctions and terrorist designations.
These actions were all taken in recognition of the positive actions taken and further commitments by the Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa to fully distance Syria from acts of international terrorism. In the past year, the Government of Syria has taken significant steps to counter terrorism, to include formally joining the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in November and conducting operations to disrupt the terror networks of ISIS, al-Qa’ida, Hizballah, and Iran-aligned groups. Rescinding Syria’s designation as an SST and HTS’ designation as an SDGT eliminates the final major barriers for private sector investment in Syria and promotes Syria’s economic recovery and reintegration into the global economy.
For a summary of U.S. sanctions and export control relief for Syria to date, please refer to the Tri-Seal Advisory [235 KB] published by U.S. Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and State.
Treasury and State Departments Deliver Additional Sanctions Relief on Syria
August 24, 2026
WASHINGTON—In line with President Trump’s promise to deliver sanctions relief to Syria, the U.S. Department of State today rescinded Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and revoked the designation of al-Nusrah Front, also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization. Concurrently, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removed HTS from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”).
“Treasury is following through on President Trump’s promise to give the Syrian people a chance at greatness,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Today’s action will help foster additional investment in Syria to promote political and economic stability.”
Today’s action builds on the Department of State’s revocation of HTS’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on July 8, 2025. For a summary of U.S. sanctions and export control relief for Syria to date, please refer to the Tri-Seal Advisory published by U.S. Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and State.
As a result of today’s action, HTS is no longer blocked pursuant to the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594, or Executive Order 13224, as amended. U.S. persons do not require authorization from OFAC to engage in transactions or activities with HTS, provided such activities do not involve blocked persons or otherwise prohibited activities.
The decision today to remove these restrictions on Syria does not change Treasury’s posture with regards to countering global terrorism and our commitment to hold bad actors in Syria accountable. Concurrently with the removal of HTS as an SDGT, OFAC is designating two former HTS affiliates who continue to support al-Qa’ida and Hurras al-Din, respectively. These two designations ensure appropriate measures are taken against terrorist financing threats and to further safeguard the stability and security of Syria.
Today’s designations are being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups and their supporters. The U.S. Department of State designated al-Qa’ida as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on October 8, 1999. On September 25, 2001, the President identified al-Qa’ida as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in the annex of E.O. 13224. On September 10, 2019, the Department of State designated Hurras al-Din, al-Qa’ida’s affiliate in Syria, as an SDGT.
Sa’d Bin Sa’d Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka’bi (al-Ka’bi) supervised the provision of financial and logistical support for terrorist groups, including transferring funds to al-Qa’ida leaders. OFAC previously designated al-Ka’bi on August 5, 2015, pursuant to E.O. 13224 for his fundraising activities in support of HTS. Al-Ka’bi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, al-Qa’ida.
Jamal Husayn Zayniyah (Zayniyah) has been a leader of Hurras al-Din since 2020, around when he left his role as a senior leader of HTS. In that same period, Liwa al-Muqatileen Al-Ansar (LMA), a group founded by Zayniyah, split from HTS over strategic disputes. Zayniyah and LMA continued to align themselves with al-Qa’ida and merged with Hurras al-Din around this time. OFAC previously designated Zayniyah on November 10, 2016, for acting for or on behalf of HTS. As of 2025, Zayniyah was forming a Hurras al-Din cell in Syria, which included teaching children how to use weapons and organizing a team to carry out assassinations. Zayniyah is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for acting or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Hurras al-Din.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the United States or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here.
The United States is taking decisive action to cut the financial lifelines that sustain Iran’s ruling elite. Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury took steps to dismantle a web of currency exchange houses and shell companies that helped Iran secretly move hundreds of millions of dollars through the international financial system. Through these networks, Tehran accessed oil revenue and evaded sanctions designed to curb its destabilizing activities, laundering funds using front companies.
This action demonstrates the Trump Administration’s continued maximum pressure on Iran by cutting off resources the regime uses to threaten regional stability, support terrorism, and advance its military capabilities. By targeting the banks, exchange houses, and individual facilitators that operate this illicit system, the United States makes clear that those who help Iran evade sanctions will face serious consequences.
The United States remains committed to working with partners across the region and the world to close every avenue Iran uses to fund its destabilizing activities. As the regime’s economic mismanagement and corruption become increasingly apparent to the Iranian people, actions like today’s further isolate the regime from the international financial system and reinforce that Iran’s continued support for terrorism and regional aggression will carry a steep and lasting cost.
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran’s financial and petroleum sectors, and advances the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), to impose maximum pressure on Iran. This is OFAC’s eighth action in 2026 targeting Iran’s shadow banking apparatus, including Iranian banks and their rahbar front companies, exchange houses and their managers, major financiers, and the Iranian importers and exporters who rely on these financial networks to launder and repatriate revenues. Please see the Department of the Treasury’s press releases.
but I have not gotten anything from OFAC yet – even checked the Recent Actions page.
But the press release page already has 2 things with today’s date:
so, stay tuned? I’ll include both Treasury releases when we get the official stuff from OFAC (since my prompt includes the relevant info with the specific designations)
