Category: US State Department (US)

  • Press Release:

    Disrupting Iran’s Weapons Procurement

    PRESS STATEMENT

    THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, SPOKESPERSON

    JUNE 10, 2026

    Today, the United States is imposing sanctions on thirteen individuals and entities based in Iran, Belarus, and China, including Hong Kong, that have sought to source and purchase weapons, including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  These designations follow our action on May 8, 2026, to disrupt procurement networks that support Iran’s military programs and degrade Iran’s ability to advance its military activities in the region.

    Today’s action supports the implementation of United Nations (UN) sanctions and restrictive measures on Iran, reimposed as a direct result of Iran’s “significant non-performance” of its nuclear commitments.  UN Security Council resolution 1929 requires UN Member States to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of conventional weapons such as MANPADS to Iran.

    Consistent with the President’s National Security Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), the United States continues to maintain maximum pressure on Iran and take actions to deny the IRGC and the government of Iran access to the resources that sustain their destabilizing activities.  The United States continues to use all available tools, to expose, disrupt, and counter Iran’s destabilizing activities and to stop Iran from efforts to reconstitute its proliferation-sensitive programs.

    The Department of State’s action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13949, which targets certain persons with respect to the conventional arms activities of Iran.  The Department of the Treasury’s action was taken pursuant to E.O. 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters, and E.O. 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran’s financial sector.  For more information on today’s actions, please see the Department of State’s fact sheet and Department of the Treasury’s press release.

    Fact Sheet:

    Disrupting Iran’s Weapons Procurement

    FACT SHEET

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    JUNE 10, 2026

    Today, the Department of State is taking action to designate four Iran- and Belarus-based entities and individuals involved in the procurement of arms and related materiel intended to support Iran’s military.

    The United States, as directed in the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, is committed to disrupting procurement efforts supporting Iran’s military programs.  This action represents the commitment to stop Iran from engaging in activities related to the reconstitution of its proliferation-sensitive programs.

    All Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13949, which targets certain persons with respect to the conventional arms activities of Iran.

    The Department of the Treasury is concurrently designating nine entities and individuals who have worked to procure weapons on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  For more information on these actions, please see the Department of the Treasury’s press release.

    Designations Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13949

    The Department is designating the following entity and individual pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13949 for engaging in activity that materially contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of arms or related materiel, including spare parts. 

    Armory Alliance

    Armory Alliance is a Belarus-based entity that has acted as an intermediary between China-based companies and Iran and has been involved in facilitating the purchase of hundreds of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and their shipment from China to Iran including attempting to route the shipments through third party countries and obfuscating their origin and true end-user.  The Department of the Treasury previously designated Armory Alliance pursuant to E.O. 13382 on May 8, 2026.

    Mohammadmahdi Maleki

    Mohammadmahdi Maleki is a Belarus-based Iranian individual who, as an employee of Armory Alliance has contributed to Armory Alliance’s efforts to procure weapons for benefit of Iran. The Department of the Treasury previously designated Mohammadmahdi Maleki pursuant to E.O. 13382 on May 8, 2026.

    Designating Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949

    The Department is designating the following entity pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for having provided to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in subsection (a)(i) of section 1 of E.O. 13949. 

    Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation

    Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC) is an Iran-based government entity involved in the procurement of satellite imagery to support kinetic strikes by Iranian armed forces. CITC coordinated with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) about striking locations within and around a facility hosting U.S. armed forces in late March 2026.  The facility was subsequently targeted by an Iranian attack in late March 2026, resulting in the injury of U.S. service members.  Additionally, officials of CITC have approached China-based facilitators to attempt to procure weapons for use by Iran’s military.  Center for Progress and Development of Iran (CDPI) is the latest name of Iran’s CITC.  CITC was previously designated by the United States on July 12, 2012, pursuant to E.O. 13382.  MOIS was previously designated by the United States on February 6, 2012, pursuant to E.O. 13224 and E.O. 13553.  MOIS was also designated by the United States on April 22, 2012, pursuant to E.O. 1306; September 9, 2022, pursuant to E.O. 13694; and September 8, 2023, pursuant to E.O. 14078.

    Designating Pursuant to Section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13949

    The Department is designating the following individual pursuant to Section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13949 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in any activity that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of arms or related materiel or items intended for military end-uses or military end-users, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by the Government of Iran (including persons owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of the Government of Iran) or paramilitary organizations financially or militarily supported by the Government of Iran. 

    Sajjad Ahadzadeh

    Sajjad Ahadzadeh (Ahadzadeh) is the head of CITC. Ahadzadeh has approached China-based facilitators, such as U.S.-designated China-based Yushita Shanghai International Trade Co Ltd (Yushita), to procure man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).  Ahadzadeh has attempted to facilitate the procurement of weapons and other arms and related materiel from China for use by Iran including through U.S.-designated Yushita.  Yushita was designated by the Department of the Treasury on May 8, 2026, pursuant to E.O. 13382.

  • Continuing to Promote Accountability for the Murillo-Ortega Dictatorship 

    PRESS STATEMENT

    MARCO RUBIO, SECRETARY OF STATE

    JUNE 8, 2026

    The United States will not ignore the Murillo-Ortega dictatorship’s responsibility for the horrific death of political prisoner Brooklyn Rivera.  U.S.-sanctioned Lumberto Campbell Hooker was directly involved in denying medical care to Brooklyn Rivera and prevented his family from burying his remains.

    Today the Trump Administration took decisive steps to impose additional visa restrictions on more than 100 dictatorship officials and their family members.  With this new set of restrictions, the U.S. government has now taken steps to impose visa restrictions on over 2,350 Nicaraguan officials and their family members for their complicit role in Rosario Murillo and Daniel Ortega’s dictatorship.  The United States stands with the Nicaraguan people who, like Rivera, aspire to see a free Nicaragua.

    This action was taken pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 10309, which suspends entry into the United States as immigrants and nonimmigrants for members of the Government of Nicaragua and other individuals who formulate, implement, or benefit from policies or actions that undermine democratic institutions.  For questions, please reach out to https://www.state.gov/information-for-journalists.

  • Counter Terrorism Designations; Issuance of Amended Iran-related Frequently Asked Question

    Treasury Press Release: Economic Fury Targets Iranian Network Defrauding U.S. Firms to Supply Tehran’s Military

    State Press Release: Sanctioning Iranian-Affiliated Fraud Network Targeting American Companies

    State Press Release: Terrorist Designation of Comando Vermelho and Primeiro Comando da Capital

    Note: This update also includes the issuance of one amended Iran-related Frequently Asked Question, FAQ 1249.

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    • OFAC Programs:
      • SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorist — designations pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886, targeting terrorists, terrorist organizations, and those who provide support to acts of terrorism.
      • IFSR Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations — designations under 31 C.F.R. Part 561, implementing financial sanctions applicable to Iran’s financial sector and creating secondary sanctions risk for foreign financial institutions that conduct significant transactions with designated persons.

    AKHTARIAN, Sayyed Payam

    • AKA: AKHTARIAN, Payam
    • Address: Tehran, Iran
    • DOB: 28 Aug 1984
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • National ID No.: 0068490585 (Iran)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: SORENA HUSHMAND SAMANEH COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Akhtarian served as a sales manager at Sorena Hushmand Samaneh Company and helped Sepehr facilitate the transfer of U.S.-origin products to Iran.

    BAGHERI, Hoda Baradaran

    • AKA: BAGHERI, Hoda
    • Address: Tehran, Iran
    • DOB: 15 Sep 1984
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Female
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • National ID No.: 0074993305 (Iran)
    • Birth Certificate Number: 7616 (Iran)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: SORENA HUSHMAND SAMANEH COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Bagheri served as a sales manager at Sorena Hushmand Samaneh Company and helped Sepehr facilitate the transfer of U.S.-origin products to Iran.

    DAREHSHIRI, Mohammadali Mansour

    • AKA:
      • DAREH SHIRI, Mohammadali Mohammad
      • DAREHSHIRI, Mansour
      • DAREHSHIRI, Mohammad Ali
      • DARREH SHIRI, Mohammed Ali
    • Address: Tehran, Iran; United Arab Emirates
    • DOB: 27 Jul 1964
    • POB: Yazd, Iran
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: N61034949 (Iran) expires 06 Dec 2027
    • National ID No.: 4430983704 (Iran)
    • Birth Certificate Number: 2377 (Iran)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: SEPEHR, Ali Majd

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Darehshiri acted as an intermediary for Sepehr and Sorena, paying U.S. freight forwarders on Sepehr’s behalf to store and ship fraudulently procured goods from the United States to the UAE. Darehshiri founded and controls Green Light Computer Co LLC, a Dubai-based company he used alongside another Dubai-based front company, Al Kawther Neon LLC, to facilitate receipt of shipments and arrange their re-export from the UAE to Iran. Darehshiri also separately procured export-controlled network security equipment, computer hardware, and product and software licenses for Sepehr and Sorena in Iran.

    REZAEI, Farzaneh

    • AKA: REZAI, Farzaneh
    • Address: Tehran, Iran
    • DOB: 07 Oct 1975
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Female
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • National ID No.: 0072615125 (Iran)
    • Birth Certificate Number: 4712 (Iran)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: SORENA HUSHMAND SAMANEH COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Rezaei served as a sales manager at Sorena Hushmand Samaneh Company and helped Sepehr facilitate the transfer of U.S.-origin products to Iran.

    SARMADI, Roudabeh

    • AKA: SARMADI, Rudabeh
    • Address: Tehran, Iran
    • DOB: 11 Nov 1983
    • POB: Tehran, Iran
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Female
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • National ID No.: 0070144011 (Iran)
    • Birth Certificate Number: 13019 (Iran)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: SORENA HUSHMAND SAMANEH COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Sarmadi serves as the chairperson of the board of directors of Sorena Hushmand Samaneh Company.

    SEPEHR, Ali Majd

    • AKA:
      • BITAZAR, Ali
      • BITAZER, Ali
    • Address: Tehran, Iran
    • DOB: 22 Dec 1980
    • POB: Tehran, Iran
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • National ID No.: 0071722221 (Iran)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury and State press releases, Sepehr led the network. Via his Iranian company Sorena Hushmand Samaneh Company, Sepehr impersonated U.S. small businesses to defraud dozens of U.S. information technology companies, resellers, and vendors out of millions of dollars in order to procure restricted goods—including network security and encryption software and hardware. The scheme involved creating fake websites mimicking real U.S. companies and routing shipments through Dubai-based intermediaries. Sepehr also specifically attempted to source spectrum analyzers and non-linear junction detectors from U.S. vendors for the benefit of MODAFL-controlled SAAFTA.

    ZAHEDI, Saeid

    • Address: Rome, Italy; Iran
    • DOB: 03 Oct 1987
    • POB: Tehran, Iran
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Alt. Nationality: Italy
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: YB2971531 (Italy) expires 08 Apr 2028
    • National ID No.: 0078347726 (Iran)
    • Alt. National ID No.: ZHDSDA87R03Z224O (Italy)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: SEPEHR, Ali Majd

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Zahedi is an Italy-based Iranian national who used a U.S. financial account to pay for domain registration services from a U.S.-based company. The registered domains were created by Sepehr to impersonate U.S. businesses when procuring goods from U.S. companies under false pretenses. Zahedi’s account was also used to pay freight forwarding warehouses used by Sepehr.

    ZANDIAN, Manoochehr

    • AKA: ZANDIAN, Manoochehr Shahryar
    • Address: Tehran, Iran
    • DOB: 02 May 1960
    • POB: Meybod, Iran
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • National ID No.: 4489859856 (Iran)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: SORENA HUSHMAND SAMANEH COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Zandian served as a sales manager at Sorena Hushmand Samaneh Company and helped Sepehr facilitate the transfer of U.S.-origin products to Iran.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    • OFAC Programs:
      • SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorist — designations pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886, targeting terrorists, terrorist organizations, and those who provide support to acts of terrorism.
      • IFSR Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations — designations under 31 C.F.R. Part 561, implementing financial sanctions applicable to Iran’s financial sector and creating secondary sanctions risk for foreign financial institutions that conduct significant transactions with designated persons.

    AL KAWTHER NEON LLC

    • AKA:
      • Arabic: للنیون الکوثر م.م.ذ.ش
      • ALKAWTHER NEON CO
    • Address: P.O. Box 80123, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 30 Jun 2003
    • Commercial Registry Number: 996952 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Chamber of Commerce Number: 99850 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Registration Number: 546643 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Economic Register Number (CBLS): 10814414 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Linked To: SEPEHR, Ali Majd

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Al Kawther Neon LLC is a Dubai-based front company used by Darehshiri alongside Green Light Computer Co LLC to facilitate the receipt of fraudulently procured shipments and arrange their re-export from the UAE to Iran.

    GREEN LIGHT COMPUTER CO LLC

    • AKA:
      • Arabic: شرکة الضوء الاخضر للکمبیوتر ذ.م.م
      • GREEN LIGHT COMPUTER CO
    • Address: Deira Al Khabeesi, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 47167, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Website: www.greenlightuae.com
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 30 Aug 1999
    • License: 513937 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Economic Register Number (CBLS): 10801439 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Linked To: DAREHSHIRI, Mohammadali Mansour

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Green Light Computer Co LLC was founded and is controlled by Darehshiri. It was used to facilitate the receipt of fraudulently procured shipments in the UAE and their subsequent re-export to Iran.

    SAIRAN INFORMATION EXCHANGE SPACE SECURITY INDUSTRIES COMPANY

    • AKA:
      • SAIRAN INFORMATION EXCHANGE SPACE SECURITY INDUSTRY
      • “SAAFTA”
    • Address: Shahid Teymouri Alley, Shahid Langari Street, Nobonyad Square, Pasdaran Street, Tehran 1957975713, Iran
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 05 Apr 2015
    • National ID No.: 14004828226 (Iran)
    • Identification Number: 411481176816 (Iran)
    • Registration Number: 470437 (Iran)
    • Linked To: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, SAAFTA is a MODAFL-controlled entity. Sepehr specifically attempted to source spectrum analyzers and non-linear junction detectors from U.S. vendors for the benefit of SAAFTA.

    SORENA HUSHMAND SAMANEH COMPANY

    • AKA:
      • Arabic: شرکت سامانھ ھوشمند سورنا
      • SAMANEH HOUSHMAND SORENA
      • SORENA SMART SYSTEM CO LTD
      • SORENA TECHNOLOGY
    • Address: Unit 9, No. 7, Alley 12, South Ghandi Street, Vanak Square, Tehran, Iran
    • Website: sorena.ir
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • National ID No.: 10103647730 (Iran)
    • Registration Number: 323911 (Iran)
    • Linked To: SEPEHR, Ali Majd

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Sorena Hushmand Samaneh Company is Sepehr’s Iranian company, used to impersonate U.S. small businesses in order to fraudulently procure restricted goods—including network security and encryption software and hardware—from U.S.-based companies.

    OFAC Program: SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorist — designations pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886, targeting terrorists, terrorist organizations, and those who provide support to acts of terrorism.

    COMANDO VERMELHO

    • AKA: “RED COMMAND”
    • Address: Brazil
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Type: Transnational Terrorist Group
    • Target Type: Criminal Organization

    Supplemental Information: Per the State Department press releases, Comando Vermelho (CV) is one of Brazil’s most violent criminal organizations, commanding thousands of members. CV has orchestrated brutal attacks against Brazilian police officers, public officials, and civilians, with its influence and illicit networks extending across the region and into the United States. The State Department designated CV as an SDGT pursuant to E.O. 13224 and announced its intent to designate CV as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) effective June 5, 2026, pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

    Amendments:

    The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    • OFAC Programs:
      • SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorist — designations pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886, targeting terrorists, terrorist organizations, and those who provide support to acts of terrorism.
      • ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059 Executive Order 14059 (December 15, 2021) — targets foreign persons who play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking or who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for such persons.

    PRIMEIRO COMANDO DA CAPITAL

    • AKA:
      • “FIRST CAPITAL COMMAND”
      • “PCC”
    • Address: Brazil
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Type: Transnational Terrorist Group
    • Target Type: Criminal Organization

    Supplemental Information: Per the State Department press releases, Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) is one of Brazil’s most violent criminal organizations, commanding thousands of members. PCC has orchestrated brutal attacks against Brazilian police officers, public officials, and civilians, with its influence and illicit networks extending across the region and into the United States. Previously designated under the ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059 program, PCC is now also designated as an SDGT pursuant to E.O. 13224. The State Department announced its intent to designate PCC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) effective June 5, 2026, pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

    List of Changes:

    • Field Name: Secondary sanctions risk
      • Added: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Field Name: Organization Type
      • Added: Transnational Terrorist Group
    • Field Name: Target Type
      • Added: Criminal Organization
    • Field Name: Program Tags
      • Added: [SDGT]

  • Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Russia-related General License and Amended Frequently Asked Questions

    Treasury Press Release: Economic Fury Targets Illicit Oil Revenue Fueling Iran’s Military

    State Press Release: U.S. Continues Maximum Pressure with Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Shadow Oil Economy

    State Fact Sheet: U.S. Continues Maximum Pressure with Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Shadow Oil Economy Fact Sheet

    Additions:

    The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: IRAN-EO13846 Iran-related Sanctions. Pursuant to Executive Order 13846 of August 6, 2018 (Reimposing Certain Sanctions with Respect to Iran).

    BAGRECHA, Swaroop Jayantilal

    • Address: No. 29/504, A Block, Zindasahib, St Kodithope, Chennai, Tamil Nadu 600003, India
    • DOB: 30 Apr 1983
    • Nationality: India
    • Gender: Male
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Tax ID No.: AIGPB2199D (India)
    • Identification Number: 07184934 (India)
    • Party Type: Individual

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, BAGRECHA is an Indian national and resident who serves as the designated partner of RISHABH TRIEXIM LLP. He is designated in connection with RISHABH TRIEXIM LLP’s activities, which include the import of approximately $54.6 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products from multiple companies between February and August 2024.


    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: IRAN-EO13846 Iran-related Sanctions. Pursuant to Executive Order 13846 of August 6, 2018 (Reimposing Certain Sanctions with Respect to Iran).

    AGILITY SHIPPING LIMITED

    • AKA: Chinese Traditional: 迅捷航運有限公司
    • Address: Room A, 12th Floor, ZJ 300, 300, Lockhart Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 25 Nov 2024
    • Identification Number: IMO 0113465
    • Business Registration Number: 77373993 (Hong Kong)

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, AGILITY SHIPPING LIMITED is a Hong Kong-based commercial manager of RCELEBRA (IMO: 9286073), a Cameroon-flagged crude oil tanker. RCELEBRA conducted three ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of Iranian-origin crude oil from August 2025 to May 2026 in East Asia, including one transfer in January 2026 with the U.S.-designated tanker LONGBOW LAKE (IMO: 9237539). RCELEBRA also conducted two additional transfers of illicit cargo in September and October 2025. AGILITY SHIPPING LIMITED is designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. RCELEBRA is identified as property in which AGILITY SHIPPING LIMITED has an interest.

    ALT CAPITAL PTE. LTD

    • Address: Singapore
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 09 Sep 2016
    • Registration Number: 201624862C (Singapore)

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, ALT CAPITAL PTE. LTD is a Singapore-based company involved in the export of over $900,000 worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products. On October 15, 2025, the United Kingdom designated ALT CAPITAL for supporting Russia’s defense sector or supplying equipment to Russia critical to Russia’s defense sector. ALT CAPITAL is designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

    CLASSY PANSY TRADING AND CONTRACTING WLL

    • Address: Building No. 79, Street 750, Zone 71, Umm Salal, Qatar
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 2023
    • Business Registration Number: 182712 (Qatar)

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, CLASSY PANSY TRADING AND CONTRACTING WLL is a Qatar-based petrochemicals trader that exported over $1 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products to various buyers in 2023 and 2024. CLASSY PANSY is designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

    CRYSTAL BLUE SKY INC

    • Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro 96960, Marshall Islands
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 05 Mar 2025
    • Identification Number: IMO 0202363
    • Business Registration Number: 130500 (Marshall Islands)

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, CRYSTAL BLUE SKY INC is the Marshall Islands-based commercial manager of ILL GAP (IMO: 9294305), a Panama-flagged crude oil tanker. During CRYSTAL BLUE’s tenure as commercial manager, ILL GAP loaded Iranian-origin petroleum on at least one occasion in 2025 and at least one occasion in 2026, and also loaded illicit cargo on at least five additional occasions between 2025 and 2026. CRYSTAL BLUE SKY INC is designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. ILL GAP is identified as property in which CRYSTAL BLUE SKY INC has an interest.

    EVER SHINING LIMITED

    • AKA:
      • Chinese Simplified: 宜欣有限公司
      • EVER SHINING LTD
    • Address: 60, Xingang Wudao, Baiquanzhen, Zhoushan, Zhejiang 316000, China
    • Address: Rm 925 9/F METRO CTR II 21 Lam Hing St, Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong, China
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 08 Sep 2000
    • Identification Number: IMO 6225490
    • Company Number: 0730649 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 31234002 (Hong Kong)

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, EVER SHINING LIMITED is the Hong Kong-based commercial manager and registered owner of the Palau-flagged chemical/oil products tanker MAYMEI (IMO: 9133082), which loaded petrochemical products from Iran in July 2024. EVER SHINING LIMITED also owns and manages FLORA (IMO: 9133070), a Marshall Islands-flagged chemical/oil products tanker that loaded petrochemical products from Iran on at least 14 occasions since 2023. EVER SHINING LIMITED is designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran. MAYMEI and FLORA are identified as property in which EVER SHINING LIMITED has an interest.

    HK YUANHANG SHIPPING LIMITED

    • AKA: Chinese Traditional: 香港遠航海運有限公司
    • Address: Room B2109, 21st Floor, CC Wu Building, 302-308, Hennessy Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 29 Mar 2021
    • Identification Number: IMO 6227068
    • Company Number: 3032924 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 72832194 (Hong Kong)

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, HK YUANHANG SHIPPING LIMITED is the Hong Kong-based commercial manager and registered owner of YONGAN OCEAN (IMO: 9288758), a Panama-flagged chemical/oil products tanker. YONGAN OCEAN loaded petrochemical products from Iran in July 2022, November 2024, and March 2025. HK YUANHANG SHIPPING LIMITED is designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran. YONGAN OCEAN is identified as property in which HK YUANHANG SHIPPING LIMITED has an interest.

    RISHABH TRIEXIM LLP

    • Address: No. 69, VOC Salai (Walltax Road) Park Town, Sowcarpet, Chennai, Tamil Nadu 600003, India
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 21 Aug 2015
    • Legal Entity Number: 335800PDBJX6MG68EG15
    • Registration Number: AAE-6093 (India)

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, RISHABH TRIEXIM LLP is an India-based petrochemical trader that imported approximately $54.6 million worth of Iranian-origin petrochemical products from multiple companies between February and August 2024. SWAROOP JAYANTILAL BAGRECHA, an Indian national and resident, is the designated partner of RISHABH TRIEXIM LLP. RISHABH TRIEXIM LLP is designated pursuant to section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran.

    SEAFOAM MARINE LTD

    • Address: 80, Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia
    • Address: 6th Floor, Meydan Grandstand, Al Meydan Road, Nad Al Sheba, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 2024

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, SEAFOAM MARINE LTD is a United Arab Emirates-based vessel commercial manager that has been involved in the transport of Iranian-origin crude oil on at least three occasions in 2025. SEAFOAM MARINE LTD is designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.

    SYMPHONY SHIPPING AND MARITIME MANAGEMENT INC

    • AKA: SYMPHONY SHIPPING & MARITIME MANAGEMENT
    • Address: 11th Floor, Opus Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 2023
    • Identification Number: IMO 6404935

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, SYMPHONY SHIPPING AND MARITIME MANAGEMENT INC is the United Arab Emirates-based commercial manager of HAUNCAYO (IMO: 9180164), a Comoros-flagged crude oil tanker. During SYMPHONY’s tenure as commercial manager, HAUNCAYO loaded Iranian-origin petroleum on at least two occasions in 2025 and 2026, and illicit petroleum on at least two separate occasions in 2025 and 2026. SYMPHONY is designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. HAUNCAYO is identified as property in which SYMPHONY SHIPPING AND MARITIME MANAGEMENT INC has an interest.

    TRASTOK SHIPPING CO., LTD.

    • Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro 96960, Marshall Islands
    • Address: Room 406, Building 2, 37 Miaoling Lu, Laoshan Qu, Qingdao, Shandong 266000, China
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 14 Oct 2024
    • Identification Number: IMO 0101799
    • Business Registration Number: 128299 (Marshall Islands)

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, TRASTOK SHIPPING CO., LTD. is the Marshall Islands-registered commercial manager of THEA (IMO: 9298284), a Panama-flagged crude oil tanker. THEA loaded approximately 400,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil on August 26, 2025 in a ship-to-ship transfer with the U.S.-designated tanker LOTUS (IMO: 9203784). THEA also transported six shipments of illicit cargo in November and December 2025. TRASTOK SHIPPING CO., LTD. is designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. THEA is identified as property in which TRASTOK SHIPPING CO., LTD. has an interest.

    VANGUARD MARINE VENTURES INC.

    • Address: X2-49, Saif Suite, Al-Dhaid Road, Saif Zone, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
    • Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv)
    • Organization Established Date: 22 Sep 2020
    • Identification Number: IMO 6252049

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, VANGUARD MARINE VENTURES INC. is the United Arab Emirates-based commercial manager of GAS NORA (IMO: 8813116), a San Marino-flagged LPG tanker. GAS NORA completed at least nine shipments of Iranian-origin petrochemical products during VANGUARD MARINE VENTURES INC.’s tenure as commercial manager. VANGUARD MARINE VENTURES INC. is designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(iii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from Iran. GAS NORA is identified as property in which VANGUARD MARINE VENTURES INC. has an interest.


    • OFAC Programs:
      • SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive Order 13886 of September 9, 2019 (Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism).
      • IFSR Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations. Pursuant to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 561 (Part 561 Program).

    DAMAI TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

    • AKA: Chinese Simplified: 大麥科技發展有限公司
    • Address: 1801, Easey Commercial Building, 253-261, Hennessy Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 25 Apr 2025
    • Business Registration Number: 78062606 (Hong Kong)
    • Linked to: SEPEHR ENERGY JAHAN NAMA PARS COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: According to the Treasury press release, DAMAI TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT LIMITED is a Hong Kong-based entity that has served as the charterer of multiple vessels carrying Iranian oil on behalf of the Iranian armed forces, including the IRGC, since mid-2025. DAMAI TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT LIMITED is designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company.

    GROWTH TRADING CO., LIMITED

    • AKA: Chinese Traditional: 高富貿易有限公司
    • Address: Room D5, 5/F, King Yip Factory Building, 59 King Yip Street, Kwun Tong, Hong Kong, China
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 03 Apr 2024
    • Business Registration Number: 76394009 (Hong Kong)
    • Linked to: SEPEHR ENERGY JAHAN NAMA PARS COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: According to the Treasury press release, GROWTH TRADING CO., LIMITED is a Hong Kong-based entity that received commission payments for its role in Sepehr Energy Jahan crude oil shipments aboard the sanctioned vessels BOREAS (IMO: 9248497; now URI), SIRI (IMO: 9281683), and OXIS (IMO: 9224805). These commissions were paid by UAE-based vessel chartering company Luan Bird Shipping Service LLC, acting on behalf of Sepehr Energy Jahan, throughout late 2024 and early 2025. GROWTH TRADING CO., LIMITED is designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company.

    MEHDIYEV TRADING CO., LIMITED

    • Address: Room 08, 14th Floor, Witty Commercial Building, 1A-1L Tung Choi Street, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 11 Nov 2022
    • Company Number: 3207580 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 74596574 (Hong Kong)
    • Linked to: SEPEHR ENERGY JAHAN NAMA PARS COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: According to the Treasury press release, MEHDIYEV TRADING CO., LIMITED is a Hong Kong-based Sepehr Energy Jahan front company that has facilitated the shipment of Iranian crude oil to China on behalf of the Iranian armed forces. Throughout 2024, U.S.-designated Sepehr Energy Jahan front company Star Energy International Limited made multiple payments to Mehdiyev Trading; payment amounts coincided with storage and other port fees Mehdiyev Trading paid for Iranian oil stored in shore tanks in Qingdao, China while awaiting final delivery to Chinese buyers. MEHDIYEV TRADING CO., LIMITED is designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company.

    TIDA CO., LIMITED

    • Address: Room 2112C, 21/F, Witty Commercial Building, Nos. 1A-1L Tung Choi Street, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 28 Sep 2022
    • Company Number: 3194427 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 74463397 (Hong Kong)
    • Linked to: SEPEHR ENERGY JAHAN NAMA PARS COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: According to the Treasury press release, TIDA CO., LIMITED is a Hong Kong-based Sepehr Energy Jahan front company that frequently serves as the shipper and consignee of Iran’s military oil cargoes. In early 2024, Tida Co., Limited shipped nearly two million barrels of Iranian crude oil worth over $100 million to Dongjiakou, China aboard the HECATE (then known as the ATILAN). In early 2025, Sepehr Energy Jahan used Tida Co., Limited to deliver nearly two million barrels of Iranian crude oil aboard the SIRI to Dalian, China. TIDA CO., LIMITED is designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company.

    WORTH SEEN ENERGY LIMITED

    • AKA: Chinese Traditional: 沃興能源有限公司
    • Address: Flat A516, 5/F, Efficiency House, 35 Tai Yau Street, San Po Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 29 Jul 2021
    • Company Number: 3071886 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 73226916 (Hong Kong)
    • Linked to: SEPEHR ENERGY JAHAN NAMA PARS COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: According to the Treasury press release, WORTH SEEN ENERGY LIMITED is a Hong Kong-based Sepehr Energy Jahan front company that procures refined petroleum products for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) on behalf of Sepehr Energy Jahan. In January 2025, Worth Seen Energy Limited supplied NIOC with hundreds of thousands of barrels of gasoline, loaded in the UAE and transported to Bandar Abbas, Iran. WORTH SEEN ENERGY LIMITED is designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company.


    The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: IRAN-EO13846 Iran-related Sanctions. Pursuant to Executive Order 13846 of August 6, 2018 (Reimposing Certain Sanctions with Respect to Iran).

    FLORA (V7MJ8)

    • Vessel Type: Chemical/Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Marshall Islands
    • Vessel Year of Build: 1997
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9133070
    • MMSI: 538006405
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked to: EVER SHINING LIMITED

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, FLORA is a Marshall Islands-flagged chemical/oil products tanker owned and managed by EVER SHINING LIMITED. FLORA loaded petrochemical products from Iran on at least 14 occasions since 2023.

    GAS NORA (T7AQ9)

    • Vessel Type: LPG Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: San Marino
    • Vessel Year of Build: 1991
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 8813116
    • MMSI: 268245700
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked to: VANGUARD MARINE VENTURES INC.

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, GAS NORA is a San Marino-flagged LPG tanker managed by VANGUARD MARINE VENTURES INC. GAS NORA completed at least nine shipments of Iranian-origin petrochemical products during VANGUARD MARINE VENTURES INC.’s tenure as commercial manager.

    HAUNCAYO (D6A3556)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Comoros
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2000
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9180164
    • MMSI: 620999556
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked to: SYMPHONY SHIPPING AND MARITIME MANAGEMENT INC

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, HAUNCAYO is a Comoros-flagged crude oil tanker managed by SYMPHONY SHIPPING AND MARITIME MANAGEMENT INC. During SYMPHONY’s tenure as commercial manager, HAUNCAYO loaded Iranian-origin petroleum on at least two occasions in 2025 and 2026, and illicit petroleum on at least two separate occasions in 2025 and 2026.

    ILL GAP (3E8783)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Panama
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2004
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9294305
    • MMSI: 352005534
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked to: CRYSTAL BLUE SKY INC

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, ILL GAP is a Panama-flagged crude oil tanker managed by CRYSTAL BLUE SKY INC. During CRYSTAL BLUE’s tenure as commercial manager, ILL GAP loaded Iranian-origin petroleum on at least one occasion in 2025 and at least one occasion in 2026, and also loaded illicit cargo on at least five additional occasions between 2025 and 2026.

    MAYMEI (T8A5501)

    • Vessel Type: Chemical/Products Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Palau
    • Vessel Year of Build: 1997
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9133082
    • MMSI: 511101961
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked to: EVER SHINING LIMITED

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, MAYMEI is a Palau-flagged chemical/oil products tanker owned and managed by EVER SHINING LIMITED. MAYMEI loaded petrochemical products from Iran in July 2024.

    RCELEBRA (TJMQ3)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Cameroon
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2005
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9286073
    • MMSI: 613902500
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked to: AGILITY SHIPPING LIMITED

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, RCELEBRA is a Cameroon-flagged crude oil tanker managed by AGILITY SHIPPING LIMITED. RCELEBRA conducted three ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of Iranian-origin crude oil from August 2025 to May 2026 in East Asia, including one transfer in January 2026 with the U.S.-designated tanker LONGBOW LAKE (IMO: 9237539). RCELEBRA also conducted two additional transfers of illicit cargo in September and October 2025.

    THEA (3E8853)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Panama
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2005
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9298284
    • MMSI: 352005622
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked to: TRASTOK SHIPPING CO., LTD.

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, THEA is a Panama-flagged crude oil tanker managed by TRASTOK SHIPPING CO., LTD. THEA loaded approximately 400,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil on August 26, 2025 in a ship-to-ship transfer with the U.S.-designated tanker LOTUS (IMO: 9203784). THEA also transported six shipments of illicit cargo in November and December 2025.

    YONGAN OCEAN (3EWR6)

    • Vessel Type: Chemical/Products Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Panama
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2004
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9288758
    • MMSI: 373336000
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked to: HK YUANHANG SHIPPING LIMITED

    Supplemental Information: According to the State Department Fact Sheet, YONGAN OCEAN is a Panama-flagged chemical/oil products tanker owned and managed by HK YUANHANG SHIPPING LIMITED. YONGAN OCEAN loaded petrochemical products from Iran in July 2022, November 2024, and March 2025.

  • Here’s the joint statement:

    Joint Statement on DPRK Sanctions Accountability

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    MAY 29, 2026

    The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom, and by the European External Action Service.

    Begin Text:

    The Governments of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States and the European External Action Service welcomed the April 30 Open Source Centre briefing to the United Nations Security Council on continuing maritime sanctions evasion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The evidence presented—including vessel imagery, voyage reconstruction, Automatic Identification System (AIS) manipulation, and port call analysis—indicates clear violations of obligations under Security Council resolutions prohibiting the export of DPRK coal and iron ore. The vessels identified as involved in these activities in recent months are DREAM WAVE (IMO 8693073), PEACEFUL 8 (IMO 1039424), ORION (IMO 9638953), FU RUN DA 1 (IMO 1099814), and OSTROV ANTSIFEROVA (IMO 9178070).

    We further note the clear evidence supporting the seven vessels nominated to the 1718 Committee in December 2025 for designation under Security Council resolution 2321 that remain under consideration and call on the Committee to act swiftly to designate these vessels: FLYFREE (IMO 1092684), CASIO (IMO 9125786), MARS (IMO 1077402), CARTIER (IMO 1091898), SOPHIA/PRADA (IMO 1079345), ARMANI (IMO 1078561), and YI LI 1 (IMO 1059149).

    Under United Nations Security Council resolution 1718, paragraph 12, the Committee is mandated to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding violations and to strengthen implementation of the measures it oversees. Prompt designations are essential to preserving the credibility and effectiveness of the UN sanctions regime.

    End Text

  • Termination of Green Card of Cuban National Tied to Communist Regime’s Top Financial Official

    PRESS STATEMENT

    MARCO RUBIO, SECRETARY OF STATE

    MAY 21, 2026

    Today, Adys Lastres Morera, a Cuban national with ties to the communist regime in Havana, was arrested following the Department of State’s termination of her lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, at my direction.

    Morera is now in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody.

    Morera is the adult sister of Ania Guillermina Lastres Morera, who was sanctioned earlier this month for her role as the Executive President of GAESA (Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.). GAESA is the Cuban military-controlled financial conglomerate. While the Cuban people suffer from the collapse of Cuba’s non-functioning communist economy, GAESA functions to allow a small circle of regime elites to plunder all the remaining resources of the island, squirreling away as much as $20 billion in illicit funds away in hidden overseas bank accounts.

    Ania Guillermina Lastres Morera is a Cuban military official who is the senior-most GAESA executive responsible for managing those illicit international assets – assets utilized not to improve the lives of the Cuban people, but to fuel the lavish lifestyles of Castro family members and other regime elites, and to finance overseas influence operations as part of Cuba’s long-standing ambition of a global communist revolution. While ordinary Cubans endure daily blackouts and dire food, fuel and medicine shortages, GAESA’s ill-gotten riches are not spent on repairing the collapsing power grid, stocking empty pharmacies, feeding hungry families, or providing for the most basic and essential needs of the Cuban people. Instead, they are used to enrich Havana’s elites and underwrite their ongoing campaign of espionage, subversion, and revolutionary militancy against the free peoples of this hemisphere.

    For far too long, the family members of terrorist organizations, repressive anti-American regimes and other bad actors who would threaten the national security of the United States have been given a free pass to enjoy the privileges of living in the United States. Past Administrations have permitted the families of Cuban military elites, Iranian terrorists and other reprehensible organizations to enjoy lavish lifestyles in our country funded by stolen blood-money, while the people they repress at home suffer in increasingly dire circumstances.

    No longer. Under President Trump, we are removing from our country the family members of IRGC terrorists and Cuban regime elites.

    Let me be very clear: if you threaten the national security of the United States, there will be nowhere on this earth – much less in our country – that you and your cronies can live lavishly. We will find you, and we will hold you accountable.

    To the members of the GAESA and Cuban Communist mafia, we have a simple message: the appeasement of the past is over. Return the funds you have stolen from the Cuban people, make reforms to improve the lives of ordinary Cubans, and let the Cuban people have the freedom, opportunity, and dignity that they yearn for and so richly deserve.

    The U.S. Department of State extends its appreciations to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement and Homeland Security Investigations for their continued collaboration and partnership in keeping Americans safe.

  • Designation of Tanzanian Police Force Official for Involvement in Gross Violations of Human Rights

    PRESS STATEMENT

    MARCO RUBIO, SECRETARY OF STATE

    MAY 21, 2026

    The Department of State is designating Tanzanian Police Force (TPF) Senior Assistant Commissioner Faustine Jackson Mafwele under Section 7031(c) based on credible information that he was involved in gross violations of human rights. One year ago, members of the TPF detained, tortured, and sexually assaulted Ugandan Agather Atuhaire and Kenyan Boniface Mwangi, who were in Dar es Salaam to observe the judicial trial of opposition leader Tundu Lissu. This designation prohibits Mafwele from entering the United States.

    This public designation is made under Section 7031(c) of the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (Div. F, P.L. 119-75).

  • Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness with New Global Tool

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    MAY 20, 2026

    On May 20, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau announced the first use of a new tool in the Department’s more assertive global approach to protecting the U.S. fishing industry and global fish resources. The Department is taking steps to impose visa restrictions on 26 foreign nationals responsible for, complicit in, facilitating, or benefiting from illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and IUU fishing-related activities.

    This move marks a significant step towards ending impunity for individuals associated with IUU fishing and fulfilling the promise President Trump made to the American people in his 2025 Executive Order to Restore American Seafood Competitiveness. As announced by the Deputy Secretary on X, among the actions taken against these individuals, the Trump Administration has revoked the visas of former Argentine official Pablo Ferrara for corrupt activities that facilitated IUU fishing and undermined fair market access for American fishermen and Mexican national Jose Ali Amador for the illegal harvest of an endangered fish species, fueling trafficking operations along the U.S. border.

    The United States and every other country that engages in fishing must effectively manage its fisheries, and the actions of these individuals who seek to ignore the rules for short-term, selfish gain at the expense of U.S. consumers and producers must stop. With these visa restrictions we are sending a clear message: people who seek to enrich themselves through IUU fishing are not welcome in the United States.

    These actions are being taken pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

  • Sanctioning Two Sinaloa Cartel Networks for Trafficking Illicit Fentanyl

    PRESS STATEMENT

    THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, SPOKESPERSON

    MAY 20, 2026

    The United States is sanctioning two networks linked to the Sinaloa Cartel responsible for narcotics trafficking and money laundering operations.

    These sanctions target six Mexican individuals and two Mexican companies involved in laundering the proceeds of illicit fentanyl and other narcotics sales via cryptocurrency on behalf of the Sinaloa Cartel. The sanctions also target Jesús González Penuelas and five other Mexican individuals in his organization, which is a major distributor of fentanyl to the United States, killing too many American citizens. In 2024, the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs announced a reward offer under the Narcotics Rewards Program of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of González.

    Last year, the Trump Administration designated the Sinaloa Cartel as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). The Sinaloa Cartel endangers Americans by trafficking illicit fentanyl, designated by President Trump as a Weapon of Mass Destruction. The United States remains committed to protecting the American people from vicious FTOs and SDGTs.

    Today’s action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, which targets the proliferation of illicit drugs and their means of production, and E.O. 13224, which targets terrorist groups and their supporters. This action also implements E.O. 14367, which designated illicit fentanyl and its core precursor chemicals as Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    For more information about today’s sanctions, please see the Department of the Treasury’s press release.

  • Two press releases related to the earlier set of designationsone:

    U.S. Sanctions Hamas Support Networks

    PRESS STATEMENT

    THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, SPOKESPERSON

    MAY 19, 2026

    Today, the United States is taking decisive action to target the international networks that enable Hamas to sustain its terrorist operations, expand political influence, and undermine efforts to achieve lasting peace in the Middle East.  Today’s designations target three categories of Hamas enablers: organizers of a Hamas-backed flotilla attempting to reach Gaza; operatives within Hamas-aligned Muslim Brotherhood networks that facilitate violent terrorist attacks; and coordinators of Samidoun, a front organization for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

    Hamas uses these enablers to sustain its position in Gaza, finance its operations, and engage in terrorist violence beyond its borders. Today’s action exposes how Hamas exploits diaspora organizations, religious institutions, and purported civil society groups to advance its malign agenda while claiming humanitarian objectives.

    Under President Trump, the United States remains committed to supporting efforts to achieve lasting peace in the Middle East. We will continue to use all available tools to counter those who support terrorism and obstruct the path to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

    Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended.  Hamas, the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad, Samidoun, and HASM are designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, and Hamas and HASM are also designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  For more information on today’s action, please see the Department of the Treasury’s press releases.

    and two:

    United States Sanctions Iranian Financial and Shipping Networks

    PRESS STATEMENT

    THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, SPOKESPERSON

    MAY 19, 2026

    Today, the United States sanctioned several Iranian regime currency exchange houses, associated personnel, and front companies, as well as 19 vessels that collectively enable Iran’s regime to evade international sanctions and fund its destabilizing activities across the Middle East. As part of the Economic Fury campaign, this action targets the shadow financial system and illicit shipping operations that allow Iran to move billions of dollars annually from oil and petrochemical sales, directly supporting the regime’s military operations and its proxies throughout the region.

    These sanctions target Amin Exchange, a major Iranian currency exchange house that operates through a network of front companies in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and China, including Hong Kong, to launder money for sanctioned Iranian banks and state-owned enterprises.

    By taking steps to dismantle these financial channels, the United States aims to deny the Iranian regime the resources it uses to threaten regional stability, support terrorist organizations, and develop weapons programs.

    This action reinforces the United States’ commitment to maximum economic pressure on Iran until the regime ceases its malign activities. The Trump Administration will continue to hold Iran accountable and counter its dangerous and malign behavior. As part of Economic Fury, we will intensify economic pressure on Iran and the international network that sustains its illicit energy trade.

    Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program is offering a reward of up to $15 million for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its various branches. More information is available on the RFJ website.

    Today’s action is being taken pursuant to E.O. 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran’s financial, petroleum and petrochemical sectors. These designations build on OFAC’s previous actions targeting Iran’s shadow banking mechanisms, including exchange houses, Iranian bank rahbar companiesdigital asset exchanges, and facilitators used to evade sanctions. This action is in furtherance of the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), which supports Treasury’s continued campaign of maximum economic pressure against Iran’s shadow banking, money laundering, and sanctions evasion networks. For more information on today’s action, please see the Department of the Treasury’s press release.