The President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13835 on May 21, 2018. Subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions related to the sale, transfer, assignment, or pledging as collateral by the Government of Venezuela (GOV) of any equity interest in an entity owned 50 percent or more by the GOV. One effect of subsection 1(a)(iii) is to require authorization before U.S. persons may engage in certain transactions regarding any equity interest in an entity owned 50 percent or more by the GOV. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. 13835, OFAC received inquiries about how and whether subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 could affect the ability to enforce bondholder rights to the CITGO shares serving as collateral for the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) 2020 8.5 percent bond. OFAC issued General License (GL) 5 on July 19, 2018, which removed E.O. 13835 as an obstacle to holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond gaining access to their collateral.
General License 5 was replaced and superseded by General License 5A on October 24, 2019 with a delay in the effectiveness of the authorization in the general license. Since that date, OFAC has extended the delay in effectiveness multiple times. Most recently, OFAC issued General License 5Z on September 16, 2026, which further delays the effectiveness of the authorization in GL 5 until November 5, 2026. Between October 24, 2019 and November 5, 2026 (the date the authorization in General License 5Z becomes effective), there is no authorization in effect that licenses against subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 applicable to the holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond. As a result, during such period, transactions related to the sale or transfer of CITGO shares in connection with the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond are prohibited, unless specifically authorized by OFAC.
To the extent an agreement may be reached on proposals to restructure or refinance payments due to the holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond, additional licensing requirements may apply. OFAC would encourage parties to apply for a specific license and would have a favorable licensing policy toward such an agreement.
The following is a Presidential Determination submitted to Congress September 15, 2026:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228) (FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
A country’s presence on the foregoing list is not necessarily a reflection of its government’s current counterdrug efforts, or coordination with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or drug producing country set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on the list due to a combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs or precursor chemicals to transit or be produced, even if a government has engaged in robust and diligent narcotics control and law enforcement measures.
Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Colombia as having failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to make substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures required by 22 U.S.C. § 2291h(a)(1). Included with this determination are justifications for the designations of Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Colombia as described in section 706(2)(B) of the FRAA. I have also determined, in accordance with section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that provision of United States assistance to Bolivia, Burma and Colombia is currently vital to the national interests of the United States.
My Administration has made historic progress in protecting the American people from deadly drugs and vicious narcoterrorist organizations. Under my Administration, our southern border is the most sealed and secure in American history, thanks to the largest investments in border security and law enforcement in our Nation’s history. After four years of open border chaos, seizures of fentanyl and other drugs being smuggled into the United States have been reduced by more than half, and drug overdose deaths have plunged. My Administration has saved tens of thousands of American lives from this scourge. The narcoterrorists responsible for this invasion are either dead, in jail, or living in fear knowing they will be next to face American justice. I have unleashed the strongest military in the history of the world to strike narcoterrorists wherever they threaten our country. Behind the might of the American military, my Administration has destroyed cartel infrastructure, shut down former trafficking highways across sea and land borders, and captured and killed hundreds of the most vicious narcoterrorists. Under the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition, an alliance with over a dozen countries in the Western Hemisphere, we have achieved historic results, drastically reducing United States-bound drug flows and seizing billions of dollars of illicit cartel finances. United States law enforcement agencies are reporting record drug seizures, and our allies are extraditing more cartel bosses to the United States than ever before. We have inflicted unprecedented losses on our enemies, and we are just getting started.
While my Administration has successfully secured our borders from invasion, Canada and Mexico need to do far more to stop the flows of deadly drugs into our country. Fentanyl continues to be illicitly produced in clandestine Canadian labs, and precursor chemicals and synthetic drugs continue to enter the United States through Canada. Canada needs to take meaningful action to dismantle drug labs, strengthen supply chain security, and degrade criminal networks and Chinese gangs operating along our northern border. We recognize Mexican President Sheinbaum’s administration for seizing greater volumes of drugs, dismantling clandestine laboratories, and deploying additional law enforcement and military resources to our shared border. Additionally, United States-Mexican security cooperation has helped eliminate some of the world’s most notorious cartel bosses, including “El Mencho.” However, Mexico must take additional action against the narcoterrorist organizations that dominate vast areas of its territory and continue to threaten the American people. Mexico needs to bolster supply chain integrity by soliciting greater private industry participation and significantly increasing inspections at its ports of entry. Additionally, Mexico’s current investments in its security forces are insufficient to sustain and expand its campaigns against narcoterrorists, their finances, and their criminal networks. This includes exposing, arresting, and prosecuting the many corrupt public officials that have aided and abetted the cartels and betrayed their own country’s security and sovereignty.
The drug threat to America extends beyond our northern and southern borders. The PRC continues to be the world’s largest producer of many of the precursor chemicals used to illicitly produce fentanyl, methamphetamine, and other deadly synthetic drugs. I have raised this directly with State Chairman Xi Jinping, and last year, at my request, the PRC implemented new requirements for its companies to obtain licenses before exporting designated precursor chemicals to North America. However, criminals continue to find ways around these controls through the use of unregulated precursor chemicals. The PRC needs to take more aggressive action to effectively reduce the flow of these substances by scheduling additional chemical precursors and substances requested by the United States. This enhanced cooperation will enable timely prosecution of the criminals responsible for supplying drug traffickers with deadly precursor chemicals.
Other governments have taken measures to confront drug trafficking and narcoterrorism. Dramatic political changes in South America over the past year have created historic openings for United States cooperation with governments in the region. In Venezuela, thanks to my Administration’s arrest and removal of former illegitimate dictator and drug trafficker Nicolás Maduro, we are already seeing the results of growing cooperation with the country’s interim government against cartels, including the elimination of Tren de Aragua leader Niño Guerrero. Given the positive steps taken under interim President Delcy Rodríguez, I have determined Venezuela should no longer be designated as having failed demonstrably to fulfill its drug control commitments. I expect to see continued, measurable progress from the interim government in dismantling narcoterrorist groups and stopping drug trafficking through Venezuela to the United States.
After decades of inept socialist governments, the United States welcomed the Bolivian people’s democratic choice in the 2025 elections and the opportunity to open a new chapter in United States-Bolivia relations under President Rodrigo Paz. Cooperation between Bolivia and the United States has significantly expanded over the last year, and I welcome the resumption of law enforcement coordination between our governments to target illicit drug production and criminal networks. Bolivia’s extradition of narcoterrorist Sebastián Marset to the United States in March 2026 highlighted our growing friendship and cooperation and prevented one of our hemisphere’s most notorious drug traffickers from shipping more drugs to American communities. However, the new government has not yet had sufficient time to reduce coca cultivation that increased under the previous government. Corruption in Bolivia continues to facilitate drug trafficking and impede investigations. If Bolivia can demonstrate progress in reducing illicit drug production in the coming year, and make substantive progress in tackling the endemic corruption weakening Bolivia, I will consider revisiting its status as having failed demonstrably to uphold its counterdrug commitments.
The people of Colombia made the courageous choice to elect Abelardo de la Espriella as President. He has pledged to lead an aggressive campaign against coca cultivation and cocaine production, which reached record levels under the failed socialist policies of his predecessor. Colombia is poised to resume its place as our foremost security partner in the hemisphere, and the country’s military, police, prosecutors, and courts now finally have a worthy champion in President de la Espriella. If, as expected, Colombia makes progress on aggressive coca eradication and dismantling its narcoterrorist networks over the coming year, I will consider lifting the country’s “failed demonstrably” status, which remains in place solely due to the incompetence and chaos produced by the previous far-left government in office throughout the bulk of the past year.
I welcome Prime Minister Modi and the Government of India’s efforts to address illicit opium poppy cultivation and bolster supply chain integrity. I look forward to continued cooperation through the United States-India Drug Policy Framework. In Peru, I likewise welcome the commitment of new President Keiko Fujimori to work with the United States and other allies to destroy the criminals ailing Peru and reduce cocaine flows bound for the United States. I also applaud three of America’s greatest allies in our hemisphere – Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador – for their leadership, resolve, and success in the fight against narcoterrorism.
While many governments in the Western Hemisphere are taking courageous action to reduce drug flows and eradicate cartels, the Government of Brazil has failed to confront the designated foreign terrorist organizations Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho,which have transformed Brazil into a hub for global cocaine flows. These Brazilian terrorist organizations are a growing threat to peace and security around the world, and Brazil’s government urgently must take aggressive measures to confront and defeat them before they spread and grow. Unsurprisingly, for a socialist dictatorship, the illegitimate Ortego-Murillo regime in Nicaragua has failed to take sufficient action against drug trafficking and the complicity of regime actors in the drug trade.
In Burma, the military regime has made little discernible effort to crack down on its drug economy, making the country the world’s largest source of opium poppy and one of the largest suppliers of methamphetamine. Despite the Taliban’s announced opium poppy ban, Afghanistan continues to supply drug markets across the world, likely funding Islamist terrorism. For these reasons, I am again determining that Burma and Afghanistan have failed demonstrably to uphold their drug control obligations.
You are authorized and directed to submit this determination, with the accompanying memoranda of justification, under Section 706 of the FRAA, to the Congress, and to publish this determination in the Federal Register.
1245. What activities are authorized by Venezuela General License (GL) 52C, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.”?
Answer
GL 52C authorizes, subject to its conditions and exclusions, transactions prohibited by Executive Orders (E.O.s) 13884 or 13850 with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) and any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (collectively, “PdVSA Entities”), by established U.S. entities. Transactions authorized by GL 52C include activities related to:
the lifting, exportation, reexportation, sale, resale, supply, storage, marketing, purchase, delivery, or transportation of Venezuelan oil or petroleum products of Venezuelan-origin oil and petroleum products;
the provision to Venezuela of diluent, goods, services, and technologies necessary for exploration, development, or production activities in the oil, gas, or petrochemical products sectors;
entry into new investment contracts for exploration, development, or production activities in the oil, gas, or petroleum products sectors of Venezuela;
the formation of new joint ventures or other entities in Venezuela related to such activities; and
all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to such activities, including the performance of commercial, legal, technical, safety, and environmental due diligence and assessments related to the foregoing.
GL 52C also authorizes individuals blocked pursuant to the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (VSR) to execute and sign contracts authorized by GL 52C in their official capacity as officers, employees, or authorized representatives of PdVSA or PdVSA Entities.
Notably, GL 52C does not authorize transactions that would otherwise be prohibited by the VSR and associated Executive Orders, including E.O. 13808 and E.O. 13835, such as:
transactions related to bonds and debt issued by PdVSA and its subsidiaries, including settlement of such bonds and debt;
transactions involving equity interest in PdVSA and its subsidiaries, including the sale, transfer, assignment, or use as collateral of equity interests in PdVSA and its subsidiaries by the Government of Venezuela;
transactions involving the transfer of equity interest in PDV Holding, CITGO Holding, or CITGO Petroleum Corp.;
transactions to affect or alter the governance of PDV Holding, Inc., Citgo Holding, Inc., or CITGO Petroleum Corporation, including the appointment, removal, or replacement of any director, officer, or other corporate governance official; or
transactions involving any other individuals or entities on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.
GL 52C also does not authorize:
transactions that are not on commercially reasonable terms;
payment in gold or the use of debt swaps;
payments denominated in digital currency, digital coin, or digital tokens issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, including the petro;
any transaction involving a person located in the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, or any entity that is owned or controlled by or in a joint venture with such persons;
transactions involving an entity located in or organized under the laws of Venezuela or the United States that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by or in a joint venture with a person located in or organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China;
the unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to the VSR; or
OFSI Updates Guidance on Permitted Travel Expenses for Sanctions Licence Applications
OFSI has updated its guidance, ‘Permitted travel expenses for sanctions licence applications’, to clarify its expectations of applicants and align the guidance with wider OFSI guidance and current practice.
The update:
Clarifies that the guidance applies not only to travel undertaken by designated persons, but also to travel undertaken by legal representatives or other individuals where an OFSI licence is required to make the relevant payments;
Reflects current practice and expectations that applicants provide sufficient evidence at the outset and that OFSI may return an incomplete application for resubmission or refuse an application where adequate evidence is not provided;
Confirms that in exceptional circumstances, OFSI may license a flight in a class above that which is normally permitted;
Clarifies that where higher-cost travel or accommodation is not justified, OFSI may license a lower amount equivalent to permitted rates (subject to receiving sufficient evidence);
Confirms that each application will be assessed on its own merits; and
Removes outdated mileage rates and updates links to other relevant guidance.
Permitted travel expenses for sanctions licence applications
Updated 10 September 2026
This guidance is produced by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), part of HM Treasury, the authority for the implementation of financial sanctions in the UK.
This guidance sets out OFSI’s policy on licensing for travel and applies to travel and associated expenses for which an OFSI licence is sought. It is not limited to travel undertaken by the designated person or their dependents and may include travel undertaken by a designated person’s legal or other representatives where an OFSI licence is required to make the relevant payments.
This should be considered supplementary to, and not a replacement for, OFSI’s general guidance. Further sources of information that may prove helpful can be found at the end of this guidance.
This guidance does not represent legal advice.
If you are unsure about your obligations in a given case, you should consider seeking independent legal advice.
1. Licensing travel expenses
If you are applying for a licence from OFSI to release otherwise frozen funds for the purpose of travel and associated expenses, (for example, to allow you to attend legal meetings or court hearings), you will likely come across the term ‘reasonableness’. An associated expense may be incurred by attending legal meetings or court hearings for example, and when issuing a licence to enable the payment of such expenses, OFSI is legally obliged to ensure that those expenses are ‘reasonable’ as required under the various regime or sector specific regulations made under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2018).
Each application is reviewed on a case-by-case basis and based on the facts provided, which may not necessarily be covered in this guidance.
Applicants may also apply for travel costs under another licensing purpose which does not carry a requirement for OFSI to conduct a reasonableness assessment. Nevertheless, they should provide a full explanation as to why a specific licensing ground applies to their case.
This guidance should be considered best practice and OFSI would expect the same considerations to be demonstrated. This guidance is not intended to cover all eventualities.
2. Applying for a licence
Various regime or sector specific regulations made under the Sanctions and Anti Money Laundering Act set out the basis upon which HM Treasury may issue a licence. The specific regime regulations appear on the financial sanctions targets by regime on GOV.UK.
It is important that applicants consult the relevant regulations before applying to OFSI.
Each set of regulations will have their own licensing purposes, but commonly the regulations will include two licensing purposes which include a ‘reasonableness’ test. These are ‘legal services’ and ‘maintenance of funds and economic resources’.
OFSI generally receives requests under these licensing purposes to enable the payment of:
• Reasonable professional fees for the provision of legal services
• Reasonable expenses associated with the provision of legal services
• Reasonable fees arising from the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources
• Reasonable service charges arising from the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources
It may be the case that other licensing grounds could be relevant to an application for travel expenses and applicants should provide an explanation as to why a specific licensing purpose reasonably applies to their case.
OFSI receives many licence applications where applicants have not provided sufficient evidence of reasonableness or with no evidence at all.
OFSI requires a significant level of evidence when scrutinising the reasonableness threshold. This is because the various specific regime regulations made under the Sanctions and Anti Money Laundering Act gives HM Treasury the power to issue licences, also stipulates legal fees and maintenance of funds and economic resources should be ‘reasonable’.
If OFSI does not receive the level of detail it needs, OFSI may deem the licence application incomplete and return it to the applicant for resubmission, or refuse the licence application.
In addition, applicants are strongly encouraged to apply to OFSI no less than four weeks in advance of making any travel arrangements.
Reasonableness may have different meanings in different contexts and applicants should note that just because a payment has been licensed in a previous case, does not necessarily mean that it will be licensed again. OFSI assesses each application on a case-by-case basis and applicants will be required to justify the proposed expenditure in each application.
OFSI does not want to cause delays to the consideration and issuance of any licence, so this guidance is aimed at setting out what information OFSI requires when considering if an application for travel costs is ‘reasonable’.
Before making any travel arrangements or applying to OFSI for a licence, you should consider the following four criteria:
Step 1. Consider alternatives to travel
As a first step in all cases, applicants should consider whether there are any practical alternatives to travelling in the first place, such as video, audio or web-based conferencing. They should explain why these alternative options are not possible in their particular case.
Step 2. Consider efficiency and cost-effectiveness
If travel is deemed to be the only option available, then consideration should be given to efficiency and cost-effectiveness (booking in advance, travelling off-peak, using timed trains, economy or standard class), safety and security.
Step 3. Consider necessity
OFSI would expect that only those individuals who absolutely must travel, do so. Support staff, such as paralegals, trainees and secretaries for example, should not be included unless deemed to be essential. In such cases, applicants should provide a clear explanation as to why these additional people are considered necessary and justifying the additional, proportionate cost.
Step 4. Apply for a licence before travel
Applicants should make an application for a licence to OFSI no less than 4 weeks in advance of travel and before making any concrete arrangements. Where an applicant is unable to apply for a licence 4 weeks in advance then explanation as to why should be provided.
3. Travel types
The rates shown in this section act as an indicator as to what OFSI would ordinarily deem to be reasonable. In exceptional cases, OFSI may issue a licence exceeding these rates. Applicants will need to provide a clear explanation of such additional costs being reasonable, including supporting evidence.
Designated persons subject to certain regimes may also be subject to a travel ban. The applicant should ensure that anyone subject to a travel ban also has permission to travel and the necessary supporting documents.
In the event of a licence being issued for a travel expense, any travel ban in place would still apply and is not negated by any licence that may be issued by OFSI. It is the applicant’s responsibility to ensure they are aware of any such restrictions.
3.1 Air travel
The cost of air travel is governed by the fare structure as set by airlines on various routes, as well as the duration of the flight and calendar dates. Prices often rise at popular times of the year, such as school breaks or national holidays, so OFSI would expect timings to be fully considered in line with the earlier pre-planning section.
For flights up to 6 hours, OFSI expects applicants to use economy class wherever possible, even if this means that flights may be very early or late, or alternative dates need to be considered.
For flights more than 6 hours, OFSI expects applicants to consider efficiency and cost effectiveness, safety and security when booking flights.
The table below should be used as a guide.
If there are exceptional circumstances where a flight in a class above what is permitted is needed, applicants should provide an explanation and supporting documentation.
Where exceptional circumstances have not been demonstrated and a flight in a class above what is permitted has been booked, OFSI will generally only license the cost equivalent of the fare of the permitted class of travel. In these circumstances, OFSI requires applicants to provide supporting evidence demonstrating the cost of the permitted fare. If this evidence is not provided, OFSI may refuse the entire amount.
When making a licence application for taxi costs, the applicant will need to demonstrate that public transport has been considered and explain why the need for a taxi is appropriate and cost-effective.
Please note that carrying important documents will not generally in itself be considered an adequate justification. Many people can and do carry important documents, laptops etc on public transport.
3.3 Rail
When travelling by rail, OFSI expects applicants to travel standard class and generally at off-peak times. Moreover, OFSI expects that these rail tickets should be booked in advance, wherever possible, to take advantage of any discounts that may be available.
If an alternative class is required, applicants must explain how such costs are reasonable, like a higher class of air travel.
3.4 Hire Cars
The use of self-drive hire cars may be considered where this is cost-effective. The applicant will need to demonstrate their consideration of public transport options and explain how the need for car hire is appropriate and cost-effective.
3.5 Private vehicles and motor mileage allowance
The use of a private vehicle to travel on official business may be considered where the mileage rate provides a cost-effective means of transport. Applicants will need to provide mileage and destination details in their application and explain why this is cost-effective. Expected rates for mileage can be found at the link at the end of this document.
3.6 Hotels
OFSI will generally expect hotel stays to be minimised. Overnight accommodation should only be used where this is essential, for example, for a court hearing of more than one day. Applicants are expected to book the lowest reasonable class of hotel available, for example 3* rather than 5* wherever it is available. If overnight accommodation is essential, each case will be considered on its own merits. The general guidance provided by HMRC, which can be accessed through the link at the end of this document, will be a good indicator of costs that will be considered reasonable. Typically, OFSI would not licence a 4* and above hotel unless there are genuinely exceptional needs (such as a medical need for a particular facility). As with higher levels of air travel or rail travel, the applicant will need to explain how such costs are reasonable.
Where a 4* hotel or above is booked without demonstrating genuinely exceptional needs or the unavailability of suitable 3* accommodation, OFSI may instead license the cost equivalent of 3* accommodation. In these circumstances, OFSI requires applicants to provide supporting evidence demonstrating this cost. If this evidence is not provided, OFSI may alternatively license an amount capped at the costs outlined in the HMRC guidance.
3.7 Meals
Where meals are not included in the costs of the hotel or otherwise provided, it is possible to include these costs in the overall travel costs being applied for. The following table provides information on expected subsistence rates in the UK.
Meal Limit
London Limit
UK elsewhere
Breakfast
£6.00
£6.00
Lunch
£10.00
£10.00
Dinner
£25.00
£20.00
Subsistence rates outside of the UK will depend on the location of travel and will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
4. Further support
For further support with UK financial sanctions, you can:
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending several Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) today (5, 13, 51, 58, 59, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 78) as part of its ongoing process of reviewing published guidance to ensure information remains current. This batch includes review of OFAC’s FAQ topic pages, OFAC Licenses, and Assessing OFAC Name Matches. OFAC is also publishing two new license-related FAQs (FAQs 1269 and 1270).
Here are the two new FAQs – 1269:
1269. How do I find the case identification (“Case ID”) number for my license application? Is it different from the Reference ID or Application Alias in my original application?
Answer
Case Identification Number: Once OFAC receives and begins to process your specific license application, OFAC’s Licensing Division will assign a case identification (“Case ID”) number. This number will be in the Year-Case ID format (i.e., YYYY-9999999). Note the Case ID number is different from the Reference ID that was created when you submitted your application. Please take note of the Case ID as you will need to reference it throughout the application process, including to view your application’s status. For more information on checking the status of your specific license application, see FAQ 77 or the OFAC Specific Licenses and Interpretive Guidance page on OFAC’s website.
Reference ID: A Reference ID helps with the tracking and processing of your application until OFAC provides a Case ID. You may request to receive an email confirming OFAC’s receipt of your application upon submission, which will include your Reference ID. The Reference ID is also listed in the PDF copy of your submission, which is displayed on the screen confirming that your application was successfully submitted to OFAC.
If you submitted your specific license application as a guest user, you were asked to create a unique Reference ID for your application. OFAC’s Licensing Division will contact you to provide a Case ID when it is assigned to your application.
If you submitted your specific license application through an account, a unique Reference ID was automatically assigned to your application. When a Case ID is assigned to an application, it will automatically be reflected in your “My Applications” account dashboard.
Application Alias: If you submitted your specific license application through an account, you may have created an Application Alias to help easily identify and differentiate it among your applications when viewing your “My Applications” account dashboard. The Application Alias is not included in your application or tracked by OFAC.
Note that if you are submitting questions to the OFAC Licensing Hotline, you should refer to one of the above numbers, preferably the Case ID if you have received one, within your submission. You may contact the OFAC Licensing Hotline for specific licensing-related questions.
Date Released
September 9, 2026
and 1270:
1270. How can I get my OFAC specific license amended or renewed?
Answer
If you currently have a specific license from OFAC and seek to amend the terms of the license due to a change in circumstance, or wish to renew or extend the license’s expiration date, please visit the OFAC Specific Licenses and Interpretive Guidance page on OFAC’s website and submit the same type of application as your current license (e.g., Transactional). You should reference your current license in the “Previous License Number” field.
Where applicable, OFAC recommends you apply at least 60 days prior to the current specific license’s expiration date to avoid a lapse in authorization.
The legislation, which enters in force on 29 September imposes (previously announced) further sectoral sanctions on Iran, broadly corresponding to measures lifted by the UK and partners as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
It follows the UK complying with UN sanctions obligations relating to the snapback of UN Iran sanctions in October 2025. New legislation includes financial measures to reduce the ability of the Government of Iran to access the UK financial systems. It will also bring forward trade prohibitions targeting significant industries advancing Iran’s nuclear escalation, including the energy, metals, gold, and software sectors, and related activities such as shipping, insurance and banking. We are also expanding our powers to target Iranian vessels which enable and facilitate Iran’s nuclear programme and malign activity.
Like all sanctions measures the legislation includes carefully designed mitigations. This will include general licensing to enable the continued operation of the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan, which provides critical energy supplies to our European partners. It is a continuation of long-standing policy that aligns the UK with the EU and US, who have similar carveouts for activities related to Shah Deniz.
Written Ministerial Statement: Iran Sanctions, 8 September 2026
The Minister for the Middle East, Stephen Doughty MP, has provided a written update to parliament on Iran Sanctions measures.From:Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Stephen Doughty MPPublished:8 September 2026Delivered on:8 September 2026
Today we are laying legislation which will tackle Iranian nuclear activity and other hostile Iranian activity.
The lack of transparency around Iran’s nuclear programme has long posed a serious threat to international peace and security. We have repeatedly seen Iran not act in good faith to address these concerns. For over two decades, the international community has sought clarity and assurance about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has expanded its nuclear programme in ways that lack any credible civilian justification. This includes Iran’s accumulation of over 400kg of uranium enriched to 60%. Iran is the only country without nuclear weapons to enrich uranium to this level.
The UK complied with its UN obligations to implement the snapback of UN Iran sanctions on 1 October 2025 when the Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 came into force. The UK went further and designated 71 individuals and entities in sectors that have links to Iran’s nuclear programme, including financial institutions and energy companies.
As my predecessor set out in a written ministerial statement to the House of 13 October 2025, and also in their oral statement to the House on 13 January 2026, the UK will now introduce legislation to impose further sectoral measures on Iran. Today, I am laying in the House ‘The Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2026’, through which the Government is amending both The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 and The Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
These Regulations introduce sectoral measures which are broadly those lifted as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Today’s legislation therefore doubles down on our action to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Financial measures will further reduce the Government of Iran’s ability to access the UK financial system and raise funds in support of its nuclear programme. Trade prohibitions against Iran are expanded under this legislation to additional goods, technology and services, including those key to significant industries contributing to Iranian nuclear escalation, such as energy, software, metals, gold, and related activities such as shipping, insurance and banking. The export of additional goods and technology key to Iran’s conventional weapons and nuclear capabilities are also prohibited. In addition, to bolster our existing designations and the termination of our bilateral air services arrangements in 2024, Iranian aircraft will be prohibited from landing in the UK unless certain exemptions apply.
The legislation will further expand our powers to sanction ships – strengthening our ability to target ships enabling and facilitating Iran’s nuclear programme and malign and destabilising behaviour.
As part of the UK’s responsible approach to the use of sanctions, this legislation (like all sanctions legislation) includes carefully-designed sanctions mitigations.
This will include general licences to enable the continued operation of the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan, which provides critical energy supplies to our European partners. This is a continuation of long-standing policy and aligns us with the EU and US who have similar carveouts for activities related to Shah Deniz.
Through these measures, the Government will uphold its commitment to ensuring that Iran is never able to acquire a nuclear weapon, and will strengthen sanctions that reduce Iranian hostile capabilities.
Iran’s nuclear programme has long been a serious concern to the international community. Iran remains in significant non-compliance with their international safeguards obligations.
A negotiated outcome is the only long-term solution to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. We remain fully committed to a lasting and sustainable diplomatic solution that ensures Iran never develops a nuclear weapon.
Published 8 September 2026
when the other elements noted in the OFSI notice are published (and in force), I will publish them – but since they are not, I will hold off. If folks want to plan, they can click through and review the anticipated changes.
The United States remains committed to cutting off the Iranian regime’s access to the international financial system and the resources it uses to destabilize the region and threaten U.S. interests and partners. Today’s U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctions on Türkiye-based Golden Global Bank mark the latest step in Operation Economic Outcast, a whole-of-government effort to sever the networks that allow the regime to launder funds, evade sanctions, and finance its terrorist proxies across the Middle East.
This action sends a clear message to financial institutions worldwide: facilitating Iran’s illicit financial activity carries serious consequences. This demonstrates the Trump Administration’s commitment to eliminating resources the regime uses to threaten regional stability, support terrorism, and advance its military capabilities.
The United States will continue to use every diplomatic and economic tool at its disposal to isolate the Iranian regime until it abandons its support for terrorism and its destabilizing activities in the region. We urge the international community to join this effort and ensure no institution serves as a financial lifeline for a regime that threatens peace and security.
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets the financial sector of Iran’s economy and advances Operation Economic Outcast—a campaign to completely isolate the regime from the financial lifelines that sustain its malign behavior. Please see the Department of the Treasury’s Press Release.
On July 1, 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a recent actions notice, reminding U.S. persons holding blocked property as of June 30, 2026, to file an Annual Report of Blocked Property (ARBP) no later than September 30, 2026. Failure to file the ARBP by September 30 may lead to an enforcement referral.
Additionally, OFAC is issuing Venezuela-related General License 51D, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Coal or Minerals, Including Gold;” Venezuela-related General License 54C, “Authorizing the Supply of Certain Items and Services for Coal or Minerals Operations in Venezuela;” and Venezuela-related General License 55A, “Authorizing Negotiations of and Entry Into Contingent Contracts for Certain Investment in Venezuela’s Coal or Minerals Sectors.”
Lastly, OFAC has amended one Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Question, FAQ 1247.
No, provided that non-U.S. persons comply with certain conditions outlined in GLs 46D, 51D, and 52B as described below. Subject to certain conditions, GLs 46D, 51D, and 52B authorize established U.S. entities to engage in certain transactions involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), as well as certain transactions with the Government of Venezuela, including Carbones del Zulia S.A. (Carbozulia), PdVSA, or CVG Compania General de Mineria de Venezuela CA (Minerven) that are ordinarily incident and necessary to, among other activities, the exportation, sale, supply, storage, purchase, delivery, or transportation of Venezuelan-origin oil, petrochemical products, minerals (including gold), or coal. Generally, non-U.S. persons do not risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in transactions authorized under GLs 46D, 51D, and 52B — such as transacting with PdVSA or importing Venezuelan-origin oil, petrochemical products, minerals, or coal, into a third country — provided that:
The non-U.S. entity was organized under the laws of a third country on or before January 29, 2025;
Any monetary payment to a blocked person, excluding payments for local taxes, permits, or fees, is made into the Foreign Government Deposit Funds, as specified in Executive Order 14373 of January 9, 2026, or any other account as instructed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury;
The payment terms are commercially reasonable;
The payment terms do not involve debt swaps, and are not denominated in digital currency, digital coin, or digital tokens issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, including the petro;
The transaction does not involve a person located in or organized under the laws of the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, or any entity that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by or in a joint venture with such persons;
The transaction does not involve an entity located in or organized under the laws of Venezuela or the United States that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by or in a joint venture with a person located in or organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China;
The transaction does not involve a blocked vessel; and
With respect to GL 51D, the transaction does not involve the processing or refining of Venezuelan-origin coal or minerals, including gold, in the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, or the People’s Republic of China.
These conditions are designed to ensure that transactions involving the Government of Venezuela, including Carbozulia, PdVSA, Minerven, or Venezuelan-origin oil, petrochemical products, minerals, or coal occur through legitimate and authorized channels, consistent with efforts to restore prosperity, safety, and security to Venezuela. Non-U.S. persons who continue to transact with PdVSA or Minerven, or import Venezuelan-origin oil, petrochemical products, minerals including gold, or coal, without complying with the above conditions risk being designated themselves, including for providing financial, material, or technological support to blocked persons, being responsible for or complicit in a transaction involving deceptive practices or corruption and the Government of Venezuela, or operating in the gold or oil sectors of the Venezuelan economy.
Please note that GL 52B contains additional restrictions on engaging in certain transactions prohibited by other Venezuela-related Executive orders, such as transactions related to bonds and debt issued by PdVSA, as well as on the entry into a settlement agreement or the enforcement of any lien, judgment, or other order through execution, garnishment, or other judicial process purporting to transfer or otherwise alter or affect property or interests in property of any persons blocked pursuant to the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations.
Please see FAQ 1226 for the definition of “Venezuelan-origin oil,” which includes petroleum products.
Please see FAQ 1232 for what OFAC considers “commercially reasonable terms.”
Please see FAQ 1239 for information on how to make authorized payments to the Foreign Government Deposit Funds, as specified in E.O. 14373.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
OFAC Programs:
SDGT Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
IFSR Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 561
TAEEDI, Reza Mohammad
Address: Dubai, United Arab Emirates
DOB: 24 Aug 1975
Nationality: Iran
Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
Gender: Male
Passport: P6602606
Alt. Passport: E96037407
National ID No.: 784-1975-3624749-3 (United Arab Emirates)
Party Type: Individual
Linked to: Bank Melli Iran
Supplemental Information: Taeedi is the general manager of Bank Melli Iran’s Dubai branch. Treasury says that branch has moved billions of dollars through accounts tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), letting the IRGC-QF and its parent organization move funds into and out of Iran and helping fund Iran-aligned proxies, including in Iraq. State’s parallel statement describes Bank Melli more broadly as a financial hub for Iran’s armed forces, naming both the IRGC-QF and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics as beneficiaries. OFAC designated Taeedi under E.O. 13224, as amended, for acting on Bank Melli’s behalf.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
OFAC Program: IRAN-EO13902 Executive Order 13902
KAMENG TRADING LIMITED
Address:
Room 701, Unit 108, 7/F, Tower B, New Mandarin Plaza, 14 Science Museum Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
Unit 89, 3F, Yau Lee Centre, No. 45, Hoi Yuen Rd, Kwun Tong, Hong Kong, China
Organization Established Date: 24 Jul 2024
Business Registration Number: 76846373 (Hong Kong)
Supplemental Information: Treasury ties Kameng Trading Limited to Pedram Pirouzan Exchange House, also known as Opal Exchange, an already-designated Iranian exchange house that used the Hong Kong company to launder money for Iran. State’s statement likewise describes the firm as a Hong Kong-based company that helped already-designated Iranian individuals and entities access the international financial system. OFAC designated Kameng Trading Limited under E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
and here is the NPRM (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) of the Section 311 designation proposed by FinCEN:
The U.S. Department of State has revoked the visa of an Iraqi national who was presented an award by the Biden Administration for her purported role in fighting corruption and her advocacy for “gender equity.”
Taif Sami Mohammed Al Shakarchi was given the International Woman of Courage Award in 2022 by former Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and former First Lady Jill Biden.
The award recognized “women from around the globe who have demonstrated exceptional courage, strength, and leadership in advocating for peace, justice, human rights, gender equity and equality, and the empowerment of women and girls, in all their diversity.”
This Iraqi national’s visa has now been revoked by the State Department following her placement on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terror Watchlist. She is no longer present in the United States.
Under President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, suspected terrorists will never be allowed to remain in the United States.
