The legislation, which enters in force on 29 September imposes (previously announced) further sectoral sanctions on Iran, broadly corresponding to measures lifted by the UK and partners as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
It follows the UK complying with UN sanctions obligations relating to the snapback of UN Iran sanctions in October 2025. New legislation includes financial measures to reduce the ability of the Government of Iran to access the UK financial systems. It will also bring forward trade prohibitions targeting significant industries advancing Iran’s nuclear escalation, including the energy, metals, gold, and software sectors, and related activities such as shipping, insurance and banking. We are also expanding our powers to target Iranian vessels which enable and facilitate Iran’s nuclear programme and malign activity.
Like all sanctions measures the legislation includes carefully designed mitigations. This will include general licensing to enable the continued operation of the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan, which provides critical energy supplies to our European partners. It is a continuation of long-standing policy that aligns the UK with the EU and US, who have similar carveouts for activities related to Shah Deniz.
Written Ministerial Statement: Iran Sanctions, 8 September 2026
The Minister for the Middle East, Stephen Doughty MP, has provided a written update to parliament on Iran Sanctions measures.From:Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Stephen Doughty MPPublished:8 September 2026Delivered on:8 September 2026
Today we are laying legislation which will tackle Iranian nuclear activity and other hostile Iranian activity.
The lack of transparency around Iran’s nuclear programme has long posed a serious threat to international peace and security. We have repeatedly seen Iran not act in good faith to address these concerns. For over two decades, the international community has sought clarity and assurance about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has expanded its nuclear programme in ways that lack any credible civilian justification. This includes Iran’s accumulation of over 400kg of uranium enriched to 60%. Iran is the only country without nuclear weapons to enrich uranium to this level.
The UK complied with its UN obligations to implement the snapback of UN Iran sanctions on 1 October 2025 when the Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 came into force. The UK went further and designated 71 individuals and entities in sectors that have links to Iran’s nuclear programme, including financial institutions and energy companies.
As my predecessor set out in a written ministerial statement to the House of 13 October 2025, and also in their oral statement to the House on 13 January 2026, the UK will now introduce legislation to impose further sectoral measures on Iran. Today, I am laying in the House ‘The Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2026’, through which the Government is amending both The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 and The Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
These Regulations introduce sectoral measures which are broadly those lifted as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Today’s legislation therefore doubles down on our action to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Financial measures will further reduce the Government of Iran’s ability to access the UK financial system and raise funds in support of its nuclear programme. Trade prohibitions against Iran are expanded under this legislation to additional goods, technology and services, including those key to significant industries contributing to Iranian nuclear escalation, such as energy, software, metals, gold, and related activities such as shipping, insurance and banking. The export of additional goods and technology key to Iran’s conventional weapons and nuclear capabilities are also prohibited. In addition, to bolster our existing designations and the termination of our bilateral air services arrangements in 2024, Iranian aircraft will be prohibited from landing in the UK unless certain exemptions apply.
The legislation will further expand our powers to sanction ships – strengthening our ability to target ships enabling and facilitating Iran’s nuclear programme and malign and destabilising behaviour.
As part of the UK’s responsible approach to the use of sanctions, this legislation (like all sanctions legislation) includes carefully-designed sanctions mitigations.
This will include general licences to enable the continued operation of the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan, which provides critical energy supplies to our European partners. This is a continuation of long-standing policy and aligns us with the EU and US who have similar carveouts for activities related to Shah Deniz.
Through these measures, the Government will uphold its commitment to ensuring that Iran is never able to acquire a nuclear weapon, and will strengthen sanctions that reduce Iranian hostile capabilities.
Iran’s nuclear programme has long been a serious concern to the international community. Iran remains in significant non-compliance with their international safeguards obligations.
A negotiated outcome is the only long-term solution to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. We remain fully committed to a lasting and sustainable diplomatic solution that ensures Iran never develops a nuclear weapon.
Published 8 September 2026
when the other elements noted in the OFSI notice are published (and in force), I will publish them – but since they are not, I will hold off. If folks want to plan, they can click through and review the anticipated changes.
Today, OFAC posted the following alert on its International Criminal Court (ICC) Sanctions page:
Alert: Ongoing Litigation – L.C. et al. v. Trump et al., No. 1:26-cv-688 (D.D.C.). On May 13, 2026, in L.C. et al. v. Trump et al., No. 1:26-cv-688 (D.D.C.), the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued an order enjoining the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and U.S. Department of Justice, as well as their “officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all other persons in active concert” with them, from, among other things, implementing or enforcing the designation of Francesca Albanese as a designated foreign national under Section 1(a)(ii)(A) of Executive Order 14203. The designation of Francesca Albanese is not being implemented or enforced while this order remains in effect.
Claude explains the court case that the Alert references, for those of us (including yours truly) who are unfamiliar:
Background: The ICC Sanctions Program
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a permanent international tribunal established in 2002 under the Rome Statute to prosecute individuals for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression. The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and has historically had a complicated relationship with the ICC.
In November 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. The Trump administration viewed this as a direct threat to a key US ally.
On February 6, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14203, “Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court,” declaring the ICC’s actions an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” The EO authorized OFAC to block the property of ICC officials and others who directly engaged in ICC efforts to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute “protected persons” — a category that includes nationals of US allies such as Israel — without that country’s consent. The ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Karim Khan, was the first individual designated under the EO, in February 2025. Multiple ICC judges followed.
Who Is Francesca Albanese?
Francesca Albanese is an Italian legal scholar who has served since May 2022 as the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967. She was appointed by the UN Human Rights Council and serves on a voluntary (unpaid) basis as an independent expert. Her mandate is to monitor and report on human rights conditions in the West Bank and Gaza.
In her capacity as Special Rapporteur, Albanese publicly recommended that the ICC investigate and pursue arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant for alleged war crimes — recommendations that, while non-binding, drew intense controversy. The Trump administration accused her of antisemitism and “biased and malicious activities,” and Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated her on July 9, 2025 under Section 1(a)(ii)(A) of EO 14203. The State Department characterized her recommendation to the ICC as “directly engaging” in the ICC’s effort to prosecute protected persons.
In practical terms, the sanctions froze any US-based assets, barred US persons from doing business with her, cut off her access to US banking and payment systems, and blocked her from traveling to the United States — where she had previously lived with her family. Albanese, who has described the impact on her daily life as “brutal,” noted she was reduced to relying on cash lent by family members.
The Lawsuit: L.C. et al. v. Trump et al.
Albanese herself is barred by UN policy from filing claims in her own name. Instead, her husband, Massimiliano Cali, and their minor daughter — identified in the court record only as “L.C.,” a US citizen — filed suit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia in February 2026. The defendants named are President Trump, Secretary of State Rubio, Treasury Secretary Bessent, and Attorney General Bondi.
The lawsuit’s central argument is a First Amendment one: that the Trump administration imposed sanctions not because Albanese directly participated in ICC operations, but because it disagreed with her speech — specifically, her non-binding recommendation that the ICC pursue warrants against Israeli and US-allied officials. In the plaintiffs’ words, “Francesca’s expression of her views about the facts as she has found them in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and about the work of the ICC is core First Amendment activity.”
One notable legal wrinkle: Albanese is an Italian national who currently lives outside the US. Ordinarily, the First Amendment protects US persons (citizens and those within US territory). The court addressed this by finding that because the US government’s actions specifically targeted her extensive connections to the United States — her property, banking relationships, and professional ties — she could claim First Amendment protection through her family members who filed the suit on her behalf.
The Court’s Ruling
On May 13, 2026, US District Judge Richard Leon — a George W. Bush appointee — granted a preliminary injunction suspending enforcement of Albanese’s designation. In his 26-page opinion, Judge Leon found that the Trump administration had imposed sanctions in retaliation for Albanese’s speech, specifically her opinion expressed in her role as a UN expert. “Albanese has done nothing more than speak,” he wrote. He further found that “protecting the freedom of speech is always in the public interest.”
The injunction is preliminary — it is not a final ruling on the merits. The case is ongoing, and the government may appeal. But while it stands, the injunction bars the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice from implementing or enforcing Albanese’s designation, effectively restoring her ability to access US banking, conduct transactions with US persons, and travel to the United States.
What This Means for Compliance Purposes
This is why OFAC posted the Alert. Albanese remains listed on the SDN List, but the designation is not currently being implemented or enforced. That means US persons who transact with her are not presently at risk of violating the ICC-Related Sanctions Regulations — as long as the court order remains in effect. OFAC is alerting the compliance community to this gap between the SDN listing and the practical enforceability of the designation.
More broadly, the ruling raises questions about the legal limits of EO 14203’s reach. The judge drew a sharp line between directly participating in ICC proceedings (potentially sanctionable) and publicly advocating for ICC action (protected speech). How courts ultimately resolve that question — and whether this decision survives appeal — could affect other ICC-related designations as well.
