Category: OTSI (UK)

  • OTSI header

    New general trade licences published under the Russia sanctions regime

    Today, the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI) has published two general trade licences under the Russia sanctions regime.  

    The licences relate to UK involvement in the maritime transportation of Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) to Japan and South Korea under specific, pre-existing contractual arrangements.  

    Supporting diversification away from Russian energy strengthens long-term pressure on Russia’s energy sector. Japan and South Korea are close partners and important contributors to international support for Ukraine. 

    Any persons intending to use either general licence should consult the licences for full details of the authorisations and conditions for use. 

    Context for the licences 

    Today, 1 October 2026, the UK is designating and specifying 31 individuals, entities and ships under the UK’s Russia sanctions regulations. This follows the UK’s introduction of trade sanctions on 20 May 2026 prohibiting the involvement of UK businesses in the maritime transportation of Russian LNG. From 1 January 2027, these restrictions will extend to trade carried out under long-term contracts concluded before 17 June 2025.  

    What do the licences do 

    The general trade licences provide a targeted and time-limited authorisation to support the energy security of the UK’s close partners Japan and South Korea, as they reduce reliance on Russian energy.  

    The licences only authorise UK involvement in Japanese and South Korean imports of LNG where all licence conditions are met, specifically: 

    • the imports are from the Sakhalin-2 Project 
    • they take place under a contract for the supply of LNG concluded before 17 June 2025 
    • they take place between 1 January 2027, when the relevant regulations take effect, and 31 March 2028 

    The licences do not authorise LNG trade under new contracts or trade involving designated persons.  

    Read the licences: 

    If you have any queries about these licences, contact OTSI using the contact form. 

    Further information on UK sanctions against Russia is available on GOV.UK. For specific queries about the sanctions regime, email, fcdo.correspondence@fcdo.gov.uk

    OTSI’s website can be found on GOV.UK

    The Japan license:

    and the South Korea one:

  • BIST OTSI ECJU Header

    EC&S Symposium 2026:

    Wednesday 14 October 2026 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel, Tower Bridge, London

    Dear Subscriber,

    We are pleased to announce that bookings for the 2026 Export Control and Sanctions Symposium are now open. Places are limited and expected to fill quickly.

    The Symposium will take place on Wednesday 14 October 2026, 8.45am – 5pm, Leonardo Royal Hotel, Tower Bridge, London E1 8GP

    Attendance is open to exporters and service providers of all sizes at a cost of £396 (Including VAT) per person. Please review the registration requirements below before booking your place.

    In addition to the opening Plenary, there are now four workshop choices delivered by ECJU, OTSI and partner organisations, as well as some joint sessions.

    The popular Knowledge Hub returns with an extended lunchtime session, providing direct access to representatives from across EC&S, wider government and trade associations who can answer your questions and offer practical guidance.

    Please complete a separate registration for each delegate.

    Due to anticipated high demand, registrations will initially be limited to two delegates per business unit/division. Large organisations may register delegates from separate business units or divisions. Consulting, freight forwarding and law firms are limited to one delegate per organisation.

    To view the agenda and book your place, please visit:Booking Webpage

    For any enquiries, please contact the EC&S Symposium team at: ECS.Symposium@businessandtrade.gov.uk

    Once we have reached capacity you will automatically be directed to join a waiting list. We will contact you should a place become available.

    We look forward to welcoming you. 

    Export Control and Sanctions Directorate

    ECJU’s website can be found on GOV.UK

    OTIS’s website can be found on GOV.UK

  • UK Gov logo, 50% resolution.png

    Yesterday, September 8th, the Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2026 (The Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2026) was laid in Parliament.

    The legislation, which enters in force on 29 September imposes (previously announced) further sectoral sanctions on Iran, broadly corresponding to measures lifted by the UK and partners as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 

    It follows the UK complying with UN sanctions obligations relating to the snapback of UN Iran sanctions in October 2025. New legislation includes financial measures to reduce the ability of the Government of Iran to access the UK financial systems. It will also bring forward trade prohibitions targeting significant industries advancing Iran’s nuclear escalation, including the energy, metals, gold, and software sectors, and related activities such as shipping, insurance and banking. We are also expanding our powers to target Iranian vessels which enable and facilitate Iran’s nuclear programme and malign activity. 

    Like all sanctions measures the legislation includes carefully designed mitigations. This will include general licensing to enable the continued operation of the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan, which provides critical energy supplies to our European partners. It is a continuation of long-standing policy that aligns the UK with the EU and US, who have similar carveouts for activities related to Shah Deniz.

    Key resources relating to the new legislation:

    The Ministerial Statement:

    Written statement to Parliament

    Written Ministerial Statement: Iran Sanctions, 8 September 2026

    The Minister for the Middle East, Stephen Doughty MP, has provided a written update to parliament on Iran Sanctions measures.From:Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Stephen Doughty MPPublished:8 September 2026Delivered on:8 September 2026

    Stephen Doughty MP

    Today we are laying legislation which will tackle Iranian nuclear activity and other hostile Iranian activity.

    The lack of transparency around Iran’s nuclear programme has long posed a serious threat to international peace and security. We have repeatedly seen Iran not act in good faith to address these concerns. For over two decades, the international community has sought clarity and assurance about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has expanded its nuclear programme in ways that lack any credible civilian justification. This includes Iran’s accumulation of over 400kg of uranium enriched to 60%. Iran is the only country without nuclear weapons to enrich uranium to this level.

    The UK complied with its UN obligations to implement the snapback of UN Iran sanctions on 1 October 2025 when the Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 came into force. The UK went further and designated 71 individuals and entities in sectors that have links to Iran’s nuclear programme, including financial institutions and energy companies.

    As my predecessor set out in a written ministerial statement to the House of 13 October 2025, and also in their oral statement to the House on 13 January 2026, the UK will now introduce legislation to impose further sectoral measures on Iran. Today, I am laying in the House ‘The Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2026’, through which the Government is amending both The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 and The Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

    These Regulations introduce sectoral measures which are broadly those lifted as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Today’s legislation therefore doubles down on our action to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

    Financial measures will further reduce the Government of Iran’s ability to access the UK financial system and raise funds in support of its nuclear programme. Trade prohibitions against Iran are expanded under this legislation to additional goods, technology and services, including those key to significant industries contributing to Iranian nuclear escalation, such as energy, software, metals, gold, and related activities such as shipping, insurance and banking. The export of additional goods and technology key to Iran’s conventional weapons and nuclear capabilities are also prohibited. In addition, to bolster our existing designations and the termination of our bilateral air services arrangements in 2024, Iranian aircraft will be prohibited from landing in the UK unless certain exemptions apply.

    The legislation will further expand our powers to sanction ships – strengthening our ability to target ships enabling and facilitating Iran’s nuclear programme and malign and destabilising behaviour.

    As part of the UK’s responsible approach to the use of sanctions, this legislation (like all sanctions legislation) includes carefully-designed sanctions mitigations.

    This will include general licences to enable the continued operation of the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan, which provides critical energy supplies to our European partners. This is a continuation of long-standing policy and aligns us with the EU and US who have similar carveouts for activities related to Shah Deniz.

    Through these measures, the Government will uphold its commitment to ensuring that Iran is never able to acquire a nuclear weapon, and will strengthen sanctions that reduce Iranian hostile capabilities.

    Iran’s nuclear programme has long been a serious concern to the international community. Iran remains in significant non-compliance with their international safeguards obligations.

    A negotiated outcome is the only long-term solution to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. We remain fully committed to a lasting and sustainable diplomatic solution that ensures Iran never develops a nuclear weapon.

    Published 8 September 2026

    when the other elements noted in the OFSI notice are published (and in force), I will publish them – but since they are not, I will hold off. If folks want to plan, they can click through and review the anticipated changes.

  • From OTSI’s blog:

    OTSI Blog post – Annual Review 2025-2026 

    Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation, 28 August 2026 – Trade Sanctions

    The Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI) has published its Annual Review for 2025-26. OTSI was launched in October 2024 as part of wider efforts to enhance the effectiveness of UK sanctions in supporting domestic and global security.  

    This Annual Review reflects on the breadth of OTSI’s activities over the 2025-26 financial year in supporting compliance through our extensive engagement, guidance and outreach programme as well as licensing, and in tackling non-compliance by assessing breach reports received, taking forward enforcement action and further developing intelligence-led casework.

    As our figures show, implementing and enforcing the Russia sanctions regime has been a key focus for OTSI in 2025-26. We continue to see Russia going to ever greater lengths to try to obtain the goods and services necessary to fuel its illegal war in Ukraine. OTSI, as the UK’s dedicated, expert trade sanctions implementation body, is committed to taking the actions necessary to disrupt malign activity and to promote the importance of compliance and due diligence.  

    We continue to build on the foundations we set in 2025-26. The implementation of new Sanctions End-Use Controls in May this year marks an important expansion of OTSI’s powers to tackle circumvention. This comes alongside the expansion of OTSI’s licensing remit in April to include exports of sanctioned goods and ancillary services.

    As ever, OTSI welcomes our stakeholders’ feedback and engagement; we continue to strive to ensure that businesses receive a high-quality and efficient service. Upcoming sanctions workshops across the UK will offer businesses, in particular small and medium-sized businesses which may be less confident in navigating trade sanctions, opportunities to learn more about sanctions compliance and get practical support. In addition, we always welcome queries or comments via our webpage.

    and here’s the annual review:

  • See what you think of the guides Claude assembled to European Union:

    and United Kingdom sanctions:

    Do you find these useful? Let me know in the comments…

  • I decided to take a break from OFAC sanctions guides, so I asked Claude to evaluate the breadth, depth and sophistication of sanctions in the UK, EU, Switzerland, Singapore, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. It recommended that the EU and UK were most worthy, with Canada and Australia being the next tier of regulatory output.

    So, now the Resources pages now have the following Practitioners and Plain Language guides for both the EU and UK:

    • A thematic guide to how all the sanctions programs are organized, with overviews of each sanctions program, and
    • A specialized guide for Russian sanctions

    I will post the thematic guides, since they’re a different kind of animal from the others we’ve posted. If you want the Russia guides, well… click on that Resources page link and go get it, OK?

  • The first one is related to sanctioned processed oil products (only in HTML for some reason):

    Notice

    General Trade Licence for sanctioned processed oil products

    Published 19 May 2026

    Licence number: GBSAN0004

    1․ The Secretary of State grants this General Trade Licence under regulation 65 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (the ‘Russia Regulations’).

    2․ The prohibitions in regulations 46Z9F, 46Z9G, 46Z9H, and 46Z9I of Chapter 4IB (relevant processed oil products) of the Russia Regulations do not apply to anything done that is authorised under this licence.

    Interpretation

    3․ For the purposes of this licence:

    a) “2709 oil and oil products” means those oil and oil products which–

    i) fall within commodity code 2709, and

    ii) originate in Russia;

    b) “oil and oil products” means anything specified in Schedule 3F to the Russia Regulations;

    c) “person” means an individual, a body of persons corporate or unincorporate, any organisation or any association or combination of persons;

    d) “relevant processed oil products” means oil and oil products which–

    i) fall within commodity code 2710, and

    ii) have been processed in a third country from 2709 oil and oil products;

    e) “third country” means any country other than the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man or Russia;

    f) paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Russia Regulations applies for the purposes of—

    i) interpreting the definitions of “2709 oil and oil products” and “relevant processed oil products”, and

    ii) determining whether products fall within the commodity codes in paragraph 5 of this licence.

    Authorisations

    4․ The prohibitions specified at regulations 46Z9F, 46Z9G, 46Z9H, and 46Z9I of the Russia Regulations do not apply to relevant processed oil products, or in relation to those products, provided that the condition set out in paragraph 5 of this licence is met.

    5․ The condition is that the products fall within any of the following commodity codes:

    a) 2710 19 42 or 2710 19 44 (diesel);

    b) 2710 19 21 (jet fuel).

    General

    6․ This licence does not authorise any act which the person carrying out the act knows, or has reasonable grounds for suspecting, will result in a breach of any part of the Russia Regulations, save as authorised under this licence or any other licence granted under the Russia Regulations.

    7․ Information provided to the Secretary of State in connection with this licence shall be processed in accordance with the UK General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018. This information may be disclosed to third parties as permitted or required by law, including as required under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 or permitted under regulation 78 of the Russia Regulations.

    8․ This licence is subject to any obligation arising in respect of the Windsor Framework as it may apply through section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 in respect of Northern Ireland.

    9․ The provisions of regulation 76 (general trade licences: records) of the Russia Regulations apply to any act under the authority of this Licence.

    10․ This licence comes into force on 20 May 2026. It is of indefinite duration and shall be periodically reviewed by the Secretary of State.

    11․ The Secretary of State has the power to vary, revoke or suspend this licence at any time. The Secretary of State will endeavour to provide 4 months’ notice of any decision to revoke this licence.

    An Official of the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), authorised to act on behalf of the Secretary of State.

    Issued on 19 May 2026.

    Contact DBT

    Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to:

    Import controls and trade sanctions

    Department for Business and Trade
    Old Admiralty Building
    Admiralty Place
    London
    SW1A 2DY

    Email importsanctions@businessandtrade.gov.uk

    If you require this publication in an alternative format, email importsanctions@businessandtrade.gov.uk.

    and the second one is related to liquefied natural gas (in HTML and PDF):

  • OTSI header

    Sanctions End-Use Controls

    Yesterday, legislation was laid before Parliament to introduce Sanctions End-Use Controls into specified trade sanctions regimes. These powers will come into force on 12th May 2026. 

    To assist businesses, OTSI has published guidance on how these controls will be used. 

    OTSI’s website can be found on GOV.UK

    And here’s that guidance:

    Guidance

    Sanctions End-Use Controls: guidance for businesses

    Published 22 April 2026

    1. Disclaimer

    This guidance is set out to support UK businesses potentially affected by Sanctions End-Use Controls. It does not constitute legal advice. Any party in doubt about its legal position should seek independent legal advice.

    2. Foreword

    Sanctions End-Use Controls form part of the wider approach of the government to tackling the circumvention of trade sanctions. This publication is intended to help UK businesses understand Sanctions End-Use Controls that have been introduced in relevant sanctions legislation containing export prohibitions, and to support exporters to third countries where there is a high risk of diversion of goods and related technology to a sanctioned destination or person. It sets out the key features of the controls, what exporters can expect if ‘informed’ by the government that their goods or related technology may pose a sanctions diversion risk, and how to respond in practice. It also provides clarity on the intended operation of Sanctions End-Use Controls and outlines best practice around compliance, record keeping, and risk awareness. This guidance will be updated as necessary.

    3. Sanctions End-Use Controls (SEUC)

    Sanctions End-Use Controls constitute a new licensing requirement for export to a non-sanctioned third country where the exporter has been informed by the government that there is a risk of ultimate diversion of the goods or related technology, via that route, to a sanctioned destination. These controls build upon current ‘making available’ prohibitions, that make it an offence to make available restricted goods and technology to a sanctioned destination by direct or indirect means.  

    This measure will only apply to goods, or technology related to the export of a good, that are not otherwise subject to strategic export controls (i.e., items that are not included on the UK’s strategic control lists for military and dual-use items, or subject to the UK’s WMD or Military End-Use Controls).  

    Sanctions End-Use Controls are designed to: 

    • prevent sanctioned goods and related technology from reaching sanctioned jurisdictions and end users 
    • complement existing circumvention provisions under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA) 

    The government will apply this control where there are concerns around sanctions diversion risks with the end user of the good or technology.

    4. Purpose of the measure

    Trade sanctions include prohibitions on supplying specific goods and related technologies to specific locations and people. The government has seen sanctioned countries go to great lengths to circumvent our trade sanctions by purchasing sanctioned goods and related technologies via intermediaries in third countries. 

    Prior to the introduction of Sanctions End-Use Controls, in situations where the government suspected specific shipments were at risk of being diverted to sanctioned destinations, HMRC and DBT were able to advise the exporter of the risk. Once advised of the risk, it was at the discretion of the exporter whether to continue with the export.  

    Once a good has left the UK there are limited options for the government to prevent onward diversion to sanctioned people and destinations. If a sanctions breach has occurred, this is a criminal offence. However, enforcement action of such an offence takes place after the breach has occurred and cannot prevent the transfer occurring in the first place.  

    Sanctions End-Use Controls give the government the power to impose a licensing requirement on UK exporters who wish to progress specific exports, once they have been informed by the government of a high risk of the goods and related technologies being diverted to a sanctioned person or destination. This applies where such exports are not otherwise subject to export controls. Ultimately this will allow the government to assess and, where necessary, prevent exports where there is a credible risk of diversion of an item subject to sanctions to use by a sanctioned person or in a sanctioned destination. This is an important tool to tackle circumvention of trade sanctions at source.

    5. Goods covered by Sanctions End-Use Controls

    Sanctions End-Use Controls apply to all trade sanctions regimes where restrictions extend beyond arms embargoes (where the military end-use control already applies). Currently this means it applies to goods and related technologies sanctioned under the following sanctions regimes: 

    However, the requirement to obtain a licence under Sanctions End-Use Controls only applies following a process where the government ‘informs’ an exporter that their goods or related technologies and, if applicable, related technology may be at risk of diversion to a sanctioned end user, intermediary, or jurisdiction.  

    Once an exporter has been informed, it becomes a criminal offence to export those goods or related technologies without first obtaining an appropriate licence to export. Exporters who have not been ‘informed of the need for a licence should continue as normal. These regulations do not establish a blanket requirement for licensing types of goods or technologies. Exporters will be notified if the government deem a licence is necessary.

    6. What to do when you get ‘informed’

    Sanctions End-Use Controls are designed and intended to be used in a targeted way, where the government has identified a specific sanctions diversion risk linked to the good or exporter, the route, end user or intermediary. 

    If you are informed by the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), which may come through HMRC’s national clearance hub or through direct contact with DBT (through the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation, OTSI), that your export is at risk of sanctions circumvention you will receive a written informing notice which will: 

    • identify the shipment or transaction in scope, 
    • set out that an export licence is required before the goods or technologies can be exported 

    From the point you are informed, you must not proceed with export of the goods or technologies covered by the notice unless a licence is granted. If you choose not to apply for a licence and still seek to export the goods or technologies after being informed, you will be in breach of UK sanctions law and subject to enforcement action. 

    If the goods have already been intercepted at the border, HMRC may: 

    • detain the goods while a licensing decision is made 
    • allow the goods to be returned to the exporter, pending the outcome of the licence application 

    When you are informed, you will be given information on how to apply for a licence, and any evidence you should provide to help DBT assess the risk of diversion.  

    OTSI is currently not accepting advance sanctions end-use controls licence applications. You should wait to be informed before applying for a licence. OTSI will keep this approach under consideration.

    7. When goods may be stopped at the border

    Sanctions End-Use Control powers apply to all goods and related technologies within the sanctions regimes outlined in section 3, where these are not otherwise controlled under strategic export control legislation.  

    As a general rule, the government will seek to apply Sanctions End-Use Controls to address exports that have been identified and publicised to exporters as of potential concern. the government will always endeavour to publicise known risks to assist businesses in understanding higher risk goods and transactions. 

    Currently, the highest risks identified by the government are related to circumvention of our Russia regime. The government has published guidance on the highest risk goods and export destinations in our Countering Russian Sanctions Evasion: Guidance for Businesses, which is kept up to date as patterns of circumvention change and will inform OTSI’s application of sanctions end-use controls. You can also check the Russia Common High Priority List, an internationally agreed list of Western items critical to Russian weapons systems and its military development. 

    The government uses a range of sources to inform and prioritise which exports are most at risk of circumvention. This includes, but is not limited to, publicly available sanctions evasion typologies and data indicating increased risk. Exporters are strongly encouraged to do the same as relates to their products and end users. 

    The requirement for a licence only applies where the exporter has been ‘informed’. Goods will only be subject to a licensing requirement where the government has informed’ you in writing of a specific diversion risk. This risk will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  

    OTSI does not intend to impose blanket licensing requirements for a specific type of good going to a specific destination but reserves the right to do so, should the need arise.

    8. How to apply for a licence

    If you are informed under Sanctions End-Use Control powers, you must apply for a licence before proceeding with the export of the goods or technologies covered by the informing notice. 

    Find out how to submit a licence application to the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI). 

    Applications will be assessed on a case-by-case basis by DBT, working closely with other departments as needed. Factors that could be considered include: 

    • the nature of the good or related technology and its potential uses 
    • the diversion risks associated with the customer, route or end-user 
    • the exporter’s compliance history and due diligence processes 
    • any additional intelligence available to HM Government 

    Possible outcomes include: 

    • the licence is granted, and the export may proceed subject to any licence conditions 
    • the licence is refused, and the goods or technologies may not be exported to the end-user or route identified 

    The complexity of the case and the availability of information will affect how long it takes to reach a decision. Exporters are encouraged to submit detailed, complete and accurate applications as early as possible after receiving an ‘informing’ letter to minimise potential delays.

    9. Information needed for a licence application

    Further information on applying for a trade sanctions licence can be found at the following link: 

    10. Record keeping and due diligence requirements

    Sanctions End-Use Controls do not change your record keeping or due diligence expectations. If exporting goods or related technologies, you are expected to conduct adequate due diligence to demonstrate compliance with UK sanctions. If you are informed, you may be asked to supply details of your due diligence and a licence for export will be granted if you can satisfactorily demonstrate that your goods are not ultimately destined for a sanctioned destination. 

    For more information on due diligence please read our countering Russian sanctions evasion – guidance for businesses. While this guidance is Russia-specific, much of the advice can be applied to other UK trade sanctions regimes.

    11. Penalties for non-compliance

    Failure to comply with the licensing requirement pursuant to a notice issued under Sanctions End-Use Controls is a breach of trade sanctions and may result in enforcement action. 

    Possible consequences include: 

    • detention or seizure of goods by HMRC at the border 
    • revocation or refusal of existing and future export licences 
    • being publicly named under OTSI’s powers to name companies who breach sanctions  
    • a report about the breach being published by OTSI 
    • OTSI imposing a monetary penalty 
    • criminal investigation and potential prosecution 

    HMRC is responsible for the enforcement of trade sanctions within its role as the UK customs authority. This applies to goods that cross the UK border and strategic goods and technology (as well as services ancillary to those movements). HMRC also criminally investigates relevant breaches referred by other agencies. OTSI leads on the civil enforcement of sanctioned services, as well as trade in sanctioned goods, technologies and services outside the UK, where a UK person is involved. OTSI can refer cases to HMRC to consider criminal investigation.  

    In some circumstances, monetary penalties may be imposed on a strict liability basis. This means that a monetary penalty can be imposed even where the person did not know or have reasonable cause to suspect that they were in breach of sanctions.  

    Exporters are encouraged to cooperate fully with any enquiries by HMRC, OTSI or other enforcement authorities and to seek legal advice where appropriate.

    12. Case studies

    Sanctions End-Use Controls apply to exports to non-sanctioned destinations where the exporter has been informed by the government that the export is at risk of diversion to a sanctioned destination. During the licensing process it may be determined that this risk is minimal and therefore the government is content with the onward export of these goods or related technologies. In these circumstances, a licence will be issued for the export of these goods or related technologies. If, however, the exporter ignores the informing letter and proceeds with the export without applying for a licence, this would constitute a criminal offence.

    12.1 Case Study 1: Licence refused after being ‘informed’

    For example:

    A UK company exporting industrial cooling systems to a Central Asian third country distributor is informed by DBT that the goods are likely to be re-exported to a sanctioned Russian entity. The goods were stopped at port by HMRC and the details referred to DBT for assessment. The company then receives a letter requiring them to apply for a licence under the Sanctions End-Use Controls. The goods are either held or can be returned to the customer pending a decision. These goods cannot be exported to the end user until the outcome is determined. The application is refused due to diversion concerns. The company updates its due diligence procedures and stops trading with that distributor.

    12.2 Case Study 2: Licence granted after being ‘informed’ 

    For example:

    A UK trader applies for a licence to export precision electronics to a Middle Eastern country after being stopped at customs and informed. During the licence review, the exporter provides clear information on the end use of the products that indicates a reduced risk of diversion. The exporter is issued with a licence for these goods, and the export can continue its onward journey. 

    12.3 Case Study 3:  Continuing with an unauthorised export after having been ‘informed’  

    For example:

    A freight forwarder receives an informing letter about a consignment of bearings due for export to a company in the Caucasus region, raising diversion concerns. The letter makes clear that an export licence is required before proceeding. The forwarder overlooks the letter and exports the shipment. The company is investigated for breach of Sanctions End-Use Controls, and risks enforcement action as set out in section 8.

    13. Further information

    13.1 Goods are not being banned for export

    Sanctions End-Use Controls are a targeted mechanism that only apply once you are informed of specific risk factors. If informed, you must apply for a licence before exporting. 

    13.2 Differences between SEUC and existing catch-all controls

    The UK’s existing end-use export controls apply where there are specific risks that an item might be used for the production of WMD or for a military end use in a country subject to a full or partial arms embargo. Sanctions End-Use Controls focus on goods and related technology not subject to these controls (e.g. where they are not for export to a country subject to a full or partial arms embargo), but where there is an identified risk of circumvention of an export subject to sanctions for use in a sanctioned destination or by a sanctioned person.  

    13.3 Comparison of UK sanctions end‑use controls and the EU catch‑all provisions

    The UK SEUC are similar to the EU’s “catch-all” provision in that they both provide powers to impose licensing conditions on goods to prevent circumvention, however, sanctions end-use controls apply across all sanctioned goods in all sanctions regimes, whereas the EU’s “catch-all” provision applies only to the highest risk goods within their Russia sanctions. 

    13.4 Applying for a licence where there is a risk of diversion

    If you believe your goods are at risk of diversion to a sanctioned destination , you should consider not carrying out the transaction. You are strongly encouraged to undertake further due diligence before proceeding and you may also wish to seek legal advice. Sanctions regulations prohibit direct and indirect supply, so you may be at risk of a breach of sanctions regulations if you proceed with a transaction where you have reason to believe the goods are ultimately intended for a sanctioned jurisdiction or person. 

    OTSI is not currently accepting advance licence applications but will keep this under review. You should wait until you are informed before submitting a licence application. If you suspect that your export may be in scope of Sanctions End-Use Controls and have determined that you wish to proceed.  In any event, the licensing process should not be used as a replacement for substantive due diligence. To speed up the process you are encouraged to provide as much information as possible during the licensing process. For more information please read our guidance on applying for a licence from OTSI.

    14. Contacts and further information

  • The prompt:

    How are sanctioned goods licensed today in the UK? Why is that responsibility being transferred to OTSI? Were there any specific problems with the current situation? Provide sources for your analysis.

    Gemini’s response:

    As of today, April 11, 2026, the licensing of sanctioned goods in the UK is in the final stages of a major structural transition. While the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) still handles most “today,” a significant transfer of power to the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI) is scheduled for April 27, 2026.

    Below is an analysis of the current landscape, the reasons for the transfer, and the systemic problems this change aims to solve.


    1. How Sanctioned Goods are Licensed “Today” (April 11, 2026)

    Currently, the responsibility is split between three primary bodies, often requiring businesses to apply for multiple licenses for a single transaction:

    • Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU): Historically the “heavy lifter,” the ECJU remains responsible for licensing strategic goods (military and dual-use items). For another two weeks, they also continue to process licenses for sanctioned goods (non-strategic items heading to sanctioned destinations like Russia).
    • Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI): Launched in October 2024, OTSI currently handles the licensing of sanctioned services (e.g., professional, business, and legal services) and enforcement of trade sanctions for activities occurring outside the UK border.
    • Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI): Handles the “financial” side (asset freezes and funds), as seen with the Maritime Mutual license discussed previously.

    2. The Transfer to OTSI (Effective April 27, 2026)

    From April 27, 2026, OTSI will take over the licensing of all sanctioned goods and associated ancillary servicesdestined for sanctioned countries.

    • What stays with ECJU: Strategic export controls (military/dual-use goods) will remain under the ECJU to ensure that national security expertise stays centralized.
    • The System: Even after the transfer, exporters will continue to use the SPIRE system for goods, while “standalone” services licenses will remain on the OTSI portal.

    3. Why the Transfer? (Solving Specific Problems)

    The UK Government’s May 2025 Cross-Government Review of Sanctions identified several “frictions” in the pre-2024 system that OTSI was created to fix:

    A. The “Services Gap”

    Before OTSI, the UK had robust enforcement for goods at the border (via HMRC), but enforcement for services (like accounting or consulting provided to sanctioned entities) was fragmented and lacked a dedicated civil enforcement body. OTSI provides a “civil” counterpart to OFSI, specifically for trade.

    B. The Enforcement “Clarity” Problem

    Historically, trade sanctions enforcement was primarily criminal, handled by HMRC. This created a high bar for prosecution. OTSI was granted the power to issue civil monetary penalties (up to £1 million or 50% of the breach value), allowing for more “proportionate and frequent” enforcement action against non-compliant businesses that didn’t meet the threshold for criminal intent.

    C. Administrative Fragmentation

    Businesses previously struggled with “license-stacking.” A single deal might require a financial license from OFSI, a goods license from ECJU, and a services license from the Department for Business and Trade (DBT). Moving sanctioned goods to OTSI concentrates trade-related expertise in one office, reducing the need for businesses to navigate multiple departments for the same sanctions regime.

    D. The “Shadow Fleet” and Circumvention

    Traditional export controls were designed for “shipment-to-destination” tracking. Modern sanctions evasion (like the Russian shadow fleet) often involves complex third-country brokering where goods never touch UK soil. HMRC’s powers are border-centric; OTSI was given broader jurisdiction over UK persons globally, allowing them to target circumvention that occurs entirely outside the UK.


    Source List

    1. OTSI Official Blog (April 9, 2026): “Expanding OTSI’s Licensing Remit” – Confirms the April 27 transition date.
    2. GOV.UK Guidance (March 2026): “UK Government’s Strategic Approach to Sanctions Enforcement” – Details the civil penalty framework and the 2025 cross-government review findings.
    3. OFSI Annual Review 2024-25: Provides data on the increase in license applications and the need for specialized “aftercare” services now being mirrored by OTSI.
    4. Business and Trade Committee Report (February 2026): Correspondence from the Chair regarding the 185 investigations opened by OTSI in its first year, highlighting the “services sector” as the primary source of breaches.
    5. Department for Business and Trade (DBT): “Trade Sanctions, Arms Embargoes, and Other Trade Restrictions”(Updated 2026).

    Analysis of Source Support

    • Fully Supported: The dates of the transfer, the new civil penalty limits, and the split between strategic and sanctioned goods.
    • Inferred/Expert Analysis: The “Administrative Fragmentation” point is a common industry critique found in legal briefings (e.g., from Clifford Chance and Linklaters) and was a central theme of the 2025 review, though the government describes it more diplomatically as “improving the user experience.”