Mr. Sanctions

Category: Export Control

  • May 20, 2026: ECJU updates military end-use controls guidance

    Export Control & Sanctions

    Military end-use controls

    The guidance on the UK’s military end-use controls has been updated to provide more detail on the scope and application of the enhanced control, which was extended in 2022 to cover a wider range of exports to destinations subject to UK arms embargoes.

    Building on the extensive exporter engagement ECJU has undertaken in recent months, this guidance now includes detail on types of exports that have been made subject to the enhanced military end-use control since 2022, updated case studies to help outline indicate whether the control would likely be applicable in different circumstances, and further considerations for businesses and research organisations. 

    These updates are intended to help exporters better understand which items are commonly controlled due to end-use concerns and to anticipate and better meet potential compliance obligations.

    ECJU’s website can be found on GOV.UK

    and here’s that guidance page (HTML only, sorry!):

    Guidance

    Military end-use controls

    When military end-use export controls apply and to which destinations.From:Export Control Joint Unit and Department for Business and TradePublished19 May 2022Last updated19 May 2026 — See all updatesGet emails about this page

    Disclaimer

    This guidance explains the operation of the military end-use controls set out in export control legislation. It does not constitute legal advice. If you are unsure about your obligations in any given case, you should consider taking independent legal advice.

    Military end-use controls

    The purpose of end-use controls is to allow export controls to be imposed, on a case-by-case basis, to goods, software and technology (referred to as ‘items’) which are not specified in the UK Strategic Export Control Lists. In practice, this means that even if the items which you intend to export do not usually require an export licence, you might still require one.

    Circumstance 1: Where the purchasing country or country as of destination is an embargoed destination and the exporter has been informed in writing by the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU), or is aware, that otherwise non-controlled items are or may be intended:

    • for incorporation into military items listed in Schedule 2 (the UK military list) to the Export Control Order 2008
    • for the use of production, test or analytical equipment and components therefor, for the development, production or maintenance of military items listed in Schedule 2 (the UK military list)
    • for use in any unfinished products in a plant for the production of military items listed in Schedule 2 (the UK military list)

    Circumstance 2: Where the exporter has been informed, or is aware, that otherwise non-controlled items are or may be intended for use as parts or components of military items listed in Schedule 2 (the UK military list) to the Export Control Order 2008, when those military items were originally exported without authorisation or in violation of an authorisation granted by the Secretary of State.

    Circumstance 3: Where the exporter has been informed that otherwise non-controlled items are or may be intended for use by a ‘relevant entity’, which means:

    • any military forces, para-military forces, police forces, security services or government intelligence organisations of an embargoed destination
    • any person or entity involved in the procurement, research, development, production or use of items on behalf of these entities

    Circumstance 3 is commonly referred to as the ‘enhanced military end-use control’.

    The enhanced military end-use control does not apply to:

    • the export of medical goods, including medicines and medical devices for the benefit of the civilian population of a country
    • the export of consumer goods generally available to the public
    • the transfer of software or technology generally available to the public

    The enhanced military end-use control will also only be invoked, and a licence application refused, where it is assessed that the export would be capable of having a ‘relevant consequence’, within the meaning given to that term in the Schedule to the Export Control Act 2002.

    Such consequences include, in summary:

    • a threat to the UK’s national security
    • having an adverse effect on peace, security or stability
    • an act threatening international peace and security
    • an act contravening the international law of armed conflict
    • an act of internal repression
    • an act that breaches human rights
    • an act of carrying out (or of acts which facilitate) acts of terrorism or serious crime

    End-use controls applicable to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Please note end-use controls also apply to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) related items and technical assistance. WMD end-use controls can be triggered in different ways to the military end-use control. You have an obligation under the export control legislation to notify ECJU if you are aware, have been informed by government, or suspect that your items are, or may be used for, WMD purposes.

    Typical items which could be in scope

    The enhanced military end-use control is not limited to specific technologies, capabilities or sectors, and can be used to control exports of any goods, software and technology as long as their end use could have a ‘relevant consequence’.

    However, the most common types of items made subject to the enhanced military end-use control include (but are not limited to):

    • aerospace and marine (including submersible) vehicle parts
    • biotechnology, including engineering biology or synthetic biology
    • materials analysis equipment
    • quantum computing technology, including enabling technologies for quantum programmes (such as imaging cameras and cryogenic equipment)
    • semiconductor design and manufacturing equipment
    • telecommunications or advanced connectivity technologies

    Note: This list is an indicative list based on licensing data since 2022 but is not exhaustive and may change over time.

    Embargoed destinations

    For the purposes of the military end-use controls, an ‘embargoed destination’ means a destination to which one or both of the following applies:

    • it is subject to an arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
    • it is listed in Parts 1 or 2 of Schedule 4 to the Export Control Order 2008

    As of May 2026, the embargoed destinations are:

    • Belarus
    • Central African Republic
    • China (including Hong Kong and Macao)
    • Democratic Republic of the Congo
    • Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
    • Haiti
    • Iran
    • Iraq
    • Lebanon
    • Libya
    • Myanmar (Burma)
    • Russia
    • Somalia
    • South Sudan
    • Sudan
    • Venezuela
    • Zimbabwe

    What you must do when you are informed of a licence requirement

    You will be ‘informed’ that an export requires a licence under the military end-use control in writing. That letter will also set out the applicable legislation that makes the export licensable.

    A decision to make the export licensable and subject to the controls will be based on an assessment of both the specific items and specific end-user.

    The most common scenarios in which you may be informed an export licence is required are:

    • having submitted an export licence application to ECJU, before you receive a final decision, you may receive an electronic letter via the licensing system advising you that a licence is required – this means that even if you withdraw the application, a licence is still required if you wish to later export the same items to the same end-user
    • having presented goods for export, HMRC or Border Force detain the shipment for checks – if the detaining agency seek advice from ECJU, and we have concerns about the goods being used in an embargoed destination, you will receive a letter advising that an export licence is required, along with guidance on how to apply

    Once you are informed that an export requires a licence, you must then apply for an export licence to proceed with that export. It is a criminal offence to attempt to export items without a licence if you have been informed of the need for a licence by ECJU.

    End-User Advisory Service

    The End-User Advisory Service (EUAS) on Spire enables exporters to seek advice on whether exports to named overseas entities could require a licence because of the WMD or military end-use concerns. This focuses on the end-user and does not consider the types of items being exported and for what purpose.

    This advice is ‘non-statutory’ which means it does not constitute advice on how to follow the law and is no substitute for seeking your own independent legal advice. However, we recognise it is a helpful service to understand how export control rules might apply to complement exporters’ own due diligence.

    For the purposes of military end – use controls, any advice given through EUAS should be treated as a recommendation. It is not the same as being informed that the controls apply and a licence is therefore required for export. As set out previously, if that is the case you will be clearly informed by ECJU separately. Nonetheless, advice from EUAS may be relevant as to whether you are aware the military end use controls might apply.

    Apply for an export licence

    Apply for a standard individual export licence (SIEL).

    What you must do when you are aware of certain military end-uses 

    If you are aware that your items are or may be intended for one or more of the end-uses specified in circumstances 1 or 2, you must contact ECJU who will advise on whether an export licence is required.

    Additional due diligence and compliance guidance

    It is the responsibility of the exporter to fully determine the extent of their specific risk exposure to military end-uses, including risk of diversion, and to develop an appropriate set of safeguards tailored to the organisation’s particular circumstances.

    Staying up to date

    It is therefore important to stay up to date with changes to the UK’s export controls, and to consider how any amendments affect your organisation’s compliance obligations. ECJU regularly provides these updates via notices to exporters. Visit the collection page to see previous notices and to sign up to receive the e-mail alerts.

    Assessing end-users and risks of diversion

    While there is no one size fits all approach, it is also important to consider risks of diversion and whether the ultimate end-user may be – or may be working on behalf of – the military, police or security forces of an embargoed destination before making arrangements for an export or transfer.

    As well as using the EUAS, there are several steps your organisation can take when undertaking a risk assessment. This includes identifying potential red flag indicators of export controls evasion from open-source reporting and implementing an enhanced due diligence model to screen customers and business partners. In general, these practices could also be used to support subsequent licence applications. See guidance on compliance best practice and enhanced due diligence procedures for sanctions and export controls.

    Compliance Code of Practice

    The Compliance Code of Practice includes further guidance and advice on managing risks and ensuring compliance with export controls.

    Licensing process

    We assess all licence applications on a case-by-case basis against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria. The Criteria provide a thorough risk assessment framework. We will not grant a licence when it is inconsistent with the criteria. Applications for countries subject to sanctions or embargoes are also considered against trade sanctions, arms embargoes, and other trade restrictions.

    In reaching a decision on an application, the Department for Business and Trade receives advice from several departments, including the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Processing licences for sanctioned, embargoed or highly sensitive destinations is likely to take significantly longer than the standard 20 working day target.

    See further information on the process and requirements for applying for a Standard Individual Export Licence.

    Example scenarios where an export licence may be required

    A. Exporting components for the repair or maintenance of military equipment to an embargoed destination:

    The military end-use control applies to exports of non-listed dual-use items where the items are for incorporation of military items (listed in Schedule 2 of the Export Control Order) or for the development, production or maintenance of military items in an embargoed destination. These apply to any exporter whether they are a business or an academic institution, and whether the export consists of a physical export or a transfer of technology (information).

    Example

    Exporter A is approached to supply commercial spare parts and equipment to an embargoed destination in order to undertake repair of a military aircraft. Exporter A is aware that the items will be used for the repair of military equipment listed in the military list in an embargoed destination. Exporter A therefore has an obligation to contact the ECJU who will advise whether an export licence is required.

    B. Exchanging research with a potential military application (upon being informed that a licence is required):

    The military end-use control may apply to transfers of technology (information) even if the technology is not explicitly intended for a military programme. If your role in a collaborative research project involves sharing technology with organisations (such as universities) in embargoed destinations and those organisations also work on programmes which may have an end-use concern, the military end-use control may apply.

    In this context, universities and research organisations should identify the risks that certain technologies pose to national security or human rights, as they may have applications in programmes of military concern, as well as civilian applications.

    Example

    Academic A works for a UK university and is collaborating on research with Academic B who works in an embargoed destination. Academic A exchanges (imports and exports) technology as part of their work.

    The research is intended to underpin development of civil vehicle technologies for the consumer market. However, Academic B is also working on projects exploring military applications for emerging civil vehicle technologies and the technology being exchanged could be applied to military programmes.

    The military end-use control would apply if Academic A has been informed that a UK export licence is required if it is assessed that the export of technology, in whole or in part, may be used to develop military capabilities of an embargoed destination.

    C. Exporting equipment to a large organisation that undertakes many areas of work (upon being informed that a licence is required)

    The military end-use control may apply to exports of equipment even if the intended end-use appears benign. If you are exporting equipment to an organisation that undertakes many different projects, such as a research organisation, and that organisation is supporting a programme of concern operated by the government or armed forces in an embargoed destination, then there may be a risk that the equipment may be used for purposes other than what is stated.

    Example

    Company A is exporting analytical equipment to a laboratory in a university in an embargoed destination. The laboratory declare that the equipment will be used by their project team to analyse new materials without a particular application, but the university is state-owned and equipment used by the laboratory is also available for use by other teams who undertake research and development (R&D) on behalf of the military.

    The military end-use control would apply if Company A has been informed that a UK export licence is required if it is assessed that the equipment might be used by teams working on military R&D programmes.

    D. Exporting items to a non-embargoed destination which could be diverted for use by an entity of concern in an embargoed destination

    The military end-use control may apply to exports even if the exported items are intended for use in a non-embargoed destination. If you are exporting items, even on a temporary basis, that are at risk of being diverted and used by a ‘relevant entity’ (for example the military) of an embargoed destination, there may be a risk that the equipment may be used for hostile purposes within scope of the ‘relevant consequences’ in the Export Control Act 2002. It is important that your due diligence processes consider all potential end-uses and end-users, including the risk of diversion to an embargoed destination.

    Example

    Company A is exporting underwater survey equipment to a distributor based in a shipyard in a non-embargoed third country. The distributor has a trading partnership with the navy of an embargoed destination, and could install Company A’s survey equipment on board a vessel operated by the navy. The military end-use control would apply where Company A was informed that a UK export licence was required because it is assessed that the vessel is undertaking operations that are a threat to national security of the UK or allies because of its connection with an embargoed destination.

    Further information

    What to do if you are aware that the items are intended for a military end-use in an embargoed destination

    If you are ‘aware’ that your items are or may be intended for one or more of the end-uses specified in circumstances 1 or 2, you must contact ECJU who will advise whether an export licence is required.

    If you are aware (but have not yet been ‘informed’) that the items are or may be intended for use by a ‘relevant entity’ (as described in circumstance 3‘enhanced military end-use control’), you should engage with the ECJU’s end-user advisory service and consider applying for a licence. As part of this process ECJU will determine whether a licence is required for the export and will inform you of this requirement.

    Typical types of end-users or end-uses to look out for

    The military end-use control is not limited to specific technologies, capabilities or programme sectors.

    The application of the control includes equipment with end-uses in many areas and the list of sectors is indicative of these cases.

    The control applies to the 17 embargoed destinations, which since 2022 include China (including Hong Kong and Macao). More specifically, your organisation should consider where your otherwise non-controlled items are or may be intended for use by a “relevant entity”, which means: * any military forces, para-military forces, police forces, security services or government intelligence organisations of an embargoed destination * any person or entity involved in the procurement, research, development, production or use of items on behalf of these entities.

    Considerations to minimise delays in an export licence application to make sure the process is an efficient as possible

    To minimise delays on export licence applications and ensure the most efficient process, you must provide comprehensive and accurate documentation, specifically focusing on clearly defining the items (technical specifications, model numbers, intended design use), as well as the end-user and end-use. In short, providing as much information as you have on your goods, customer and their intended use and the supply chain can help our advisers.

    Incomplete, inconsistent, or incorrect applications are a very common reason for delays, often resulting in requests for more information.

    Considerations for how to manage customer expectations when waiting for a licensing application outcome

    The government seeks to run a responsible export system, that enables UK growth whilst protecting national and global security. ECJU is very mindful of the commercial pressures on businesses, and the need to process licence applications with minimum delay. We strive to meet the public targets to conclude 70% of standard individual export licence applications within 20 working days and 99% within 60 working days.

    Some destinations remain more challenging to assess and therefore take longer, particularly where geopolitical situations are complex. Licence applications under military end-use controls can sometimes take longer to assess than exports caught by the control list.

    In general, we would also encourage exporters to review ECJU’s past processing performance in the licensing statistics we publish on a quarterly basis to help manage customer expectations.

    As with all licence applications, ensuring that you submit accurate and complete applications will help avoid delays. Making amendments to live applications can substantially impact the time it takes ECJU to assess it.  See more information about how to apply for a licence here: Apply to export controlled goods.

    Interaction with military end-use controls for universities when hosting visiting researchers or PhD students from embargoed destinations

    First, consider how other national security risks and regulations apply. The Research Collaboration Advice Team (RCAT) – which is part of the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, provide advice to research institutions on the national security risks linked to international research.

    Generally, export controls do not apply to activity conducted wholly within the UK, except in specific cases where the WMD end-use control might apply.

    However, controls – including military end-use controls – could apply to any material the researchers or students send overseas from the UK (including via email and other forms of intangible transfer), or which they take home at the end of their stay.

    See guidance on how export controls can apply to the academic research from the UK.

    Contact ECJU

    General queries about strategic export licensing

    Export Control Joint Unit
    Department for Business and Trade
    Old Admiralty Building
    Admiralty Place
    London
    SW1A 2DY

    Email exportcontrol.help@businessandtrade.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7215 4594

    Published 19 May 2022

    Last updated 19 May 2026

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  • May 19, 2026: OTSI (not OFSI) issues two Russia-related General Trade Licences

    The first one is related to sanctioned processed oil products (only in HTML for some reason):

    Notice

    General Trade Licence for sanctioned processed oil products

    Published 19 May 2026

    Licence number: GBSAN0004

    1․ The Secretary of State grants this General Trade Licence under regulation 65 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (the ‘Russia Regulations’).

    2․ The prohibitions in regulations 46Z9F, 46Z9G, 46Z9H, and 46Z9I of Chapter 4IB (relevant processed oil products) of the Russia Regulations do not apply to anything done that is authorised under this licence.

    Interpretation

    3․ For the purposes of this licence:

    a) “2709 oil and oil products” means those oil and oil products which–

    i) fall within commodity code 2709, and

    ii) originate in Russia;

    b) “oil and oil products” means anything specified in Schedule 3F to the Russia Regulations;

    c) “person” means an individual, a body of persons corporate or unincorporate, any organisation or any association or combination of persons;

    d) “relevant processed oil products” means oil and oil products which–

    i) fall within commodity code 2710, and

    ii) have been processed in a third country from 2709 oil and oil products;

    e) “third country” means any country other than the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man or Russia;

    f) paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Russia Regulations applies for the purposes of—

    i) interpreting the definitions of “2709 oil and oil products” and “relevant processed oil products”, and

    ii) determining whether products fall within the commodity codes in paragraph 5 of this licence.

    Authorisations

    4․ The prohibitions specified at regulations 46Z9F, 46Z9G, 46Z9H, and 46Z9I of the Russia Regulations do not apply to relevant processed oil products, or in relation to those products, provided that the condition set out in paragraph 5 of this licence is met.

    5․ The condition is that the products fall within any of the following commodity codes:

    a) 2710 19 42 or 2710 19 44 (diesel);

    b) 2710 19 21 (jet fuel).

    General

    6․ This licence does not authorise any act which the person carrying out the act knows, or has reasonable grounds for suspecting, will result in a breach of any part of the Russia Regulations, save as authorised under this licence or any other licence granted under the Russia Regulations.

    7․ Information provided to the Secretary of State in connection with this licence shall be processed in accordance with the UK General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018. This information may be disclosed to third parties as permitted or required by law, including as required under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 or permitted under regulation 78 of the Russia Regulations.

    8․ This licence is subject to any obligation arising in respect of the Windsor Framework as it may apply through section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 in respect of Northern Ireland.

    9․ The provisions of regulation 76 (general trade licences: records) of the Russia Regulations apply to any act under the authority of this Licence.

    10․ This licence comes into force on 20 May 2026. It is of indefinite duration and shall be periodically reviewed by the Secretary of State.

    11․ The Secretary of State has the power to vary, revoke or suspend this licence at any time. The Secretary of State will endeavour to provide 4 months’ notice of any decision to revoke this licence.

    An Official of the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), authorised to act on behalf of the Secretary of State.

    Issued on 19 May 2026.

    Contact DBT

    Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to:

    Import controls and trade sanctions

    Department for Business and Trade
    Old Admiralty Building
    Admiralty Place
    London
    SW1A 2DY

    Email importsanctions@businessandtrade.gov.uk

    If you require this publication in an alternative format, email importsanctions@businessandtrade.gov.uk.

    and the second one is related to liquefied natural gas (in HTML and PDF):

    general_trade_licence_maritime_transportation_of_LNG_Download

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  • Notice to Exporters 2026/13: I do declare (on the UK’s customs declaration system)

    Export Control & Sanctions

    NTE 2026/13: declaring exports under OGELs and GEAs on the UK’s customs declarations system

    Published 13 May 2026

    Introduction

    When exporters register to use Open General Export Licences (OGELs) or General Export Authorisations (GEAs), they are given a unique licence reference in the form ‘GBOGE20XX/XXXXX’.

    The UK’s Customs Declarations System (CDS) includes a field, currently box 44, where this licence reference can be entered. Presently only a small number of OGELs have a condition that requires exporters to enter this field on CDS.

    We will be updating all relevant OGELs in the coming months to add a condition requiring the licence reference to be entered on CDS for all tangible exports. Including the licence reference on CDS will bring tangible exports made under OGELs and GEAsinto line with Standard Individual Export License (SIELs) and Open individual export licence (OIEL). The roll-out of this requirement across all relevant OGELs aims to deliver data that will help us to maintain the appropriate balance between transparency and administrative burden whilst providing insight into OGEL usage and trends.

    When this becomes a condition on relevant licences, the inclusion of the licences reference on CDS will be an enforcement matter for HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC). To ensure a smooth transition for OGEL users, export control joint unit (ECJU) are encouraging exporters to employ good practice by including their OGEL or GEA licence reference on CDS now.

    Using Freight Forwarders

    When using freight forwarders, exporters must provide the correct licence reference and an instruction to ensure the licence is correctly referenced in the Customs Declaration Service.  An incorrect declaration could constitute a criminal offence under Customs and Excise Management Act (CEMA) Article 167. The exporter of the goods and any agent concerned in the exportation or shipment may be considered responsible for the accuracy of a declaration.

    More information on using freight forwarders and customs agents can be found here.

    Updating information on CDS

    If the licence reference is missed or incorrectly added, a CDS entry can be amended at any time until cleared. If already cleared, exporters can complete a C1700 form and advise that a licence was omitted from the declaration, HMRC will then be able to amend the record to show licence usage.

    Record Keeping

    Each declaration on CDS generates an Export Entry Reference. Exporters must keep a record of this reference, or a copy of the entry with the other records they are required to keep for that export. Where exporters use freight forwarders to make a declaration on their behalf, they should request that the freight forwarder provide them with this refence number or a copy of the entry.

    Get customs data for import and export declarations – GOV.UK

    Where can you find the Licence Reference

    You can find the unique licence reference number by logging into your SPIRE account and checking the SPIRE letter that confirmed your registration. If you registered for multiple OGELs or GEAs at the same time the letter will contain a unique licence reference for each OGEL or GEA you registered for.

    OGELS with no registration requirements

    For certain OGELs, there is no requirement to register to use it meaning there will be no associated unique licence reference for exporters to enter into CDS. For these OGELs, a condition will be added requiring a reference relating to the OGEL name to be entered onto CDS. The required text will be set out in each OGEL. The OGELs with no registration requirements are:

    Contact ECJU

    General queries about strategic export licensing

    Export Control Joint Unit
    Department for Business and Trade
    Old Admiralty Building
    Admiralty Place
    London
    SW1A 2DY

    Email exportcontrol.help@businessandtrade.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7215 4594

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  • April 30, 2026: May Day! May Day! (for Canada’s Export Control List)

    This message is to notify registered New EXCOL users that as of tomorrow, May 1, 2026, the January 2026 edition of A Guide to Canada’s Export Control List (the Guide) will be in force.

    The new version of the Guide will bring into force the commitments Canada has made in the various multilateral export control regimes up to January 1, 2026.

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  • April 27, 2026: Global Affairs Canada’s about to update its Export Control List

    Notice: pre-publication of proposed additions to the Export Control List / Avis : prépublication des ajouts proposés à la Liste des marchandises d’exportation contrôlée

    NB: This notice relates to export controls. Information on sanctions will continue to be published separately, as applicable.

    Greetings,  

    On April 25, 2026, proposed amendments to the Export Control List were pre-published in the Canada Gazette for a 30-day public consultation.

    The proposed amendments would cause additional items to be controlled for export, including certain semiconductors, assemblies that contain them, and advanced manufacturing technologies. If approved, these amendments would become law and be reflected in the next update to the Guide to Canada’s Export Control List.

    Stakeholders and the public can read about and comment on these proposed regulations in Canada Gazette Part I, Volume 160, number 17, which can be found here: https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2026/index-eng.html.

    This consultation will end on May 25th.  

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  • April 27, 2026: ECJU nags you again about its survey

    Export Control & Sanctions

    Final reminder to have your say: Survey on Open General Export Licences

    The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) administers the UK’s system of export controls and licensing for military and dual-use items. This includes Open General Export Licences (OGELs), which are available for pre-determined military and dual-use controlled items being exported to a range of permitted restricted destinations.
    OGELs are often reported as a flexible and useful licence option, and can generally be used as soon as the exporter has registered. As such, ECJU is reviewing their usage and our overall service to exporters.
    If you are an exporter who has applied for an export licence from ECJU (whether or not you have registered for or regularly use OGELs), we would welcome your views to help shape our thinking.
    This week is your last chance to provide feedback via our short survey on:
    • exporter behaviour and experience in terms of using OGELs
    • why you do (or do not) use OGELs
    • what improvements to our service could be made to optimise their use

    The survey takes around 15 minutes to complete. Please note there is an opportunity to share contact details to allow us to follow up with you for further insights, but this is entirely optional and otherwise your survey responses will remain anonymous.

    Give your feedback via our survey hosted on Qualtrics.

    The closing date is 11:45pm on Thursday 30 April 2026.

    ECJU’s website can be found on GOV.UK

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  • April 23, 2026: OTSI is making updates on May 12th, too – hello, end-use controls

    OTSI header

    Sanctions End-Use Controls

    Yesterday, legislation was laid before Parliament to introduce Sanctions End-Use Controls into specified trade sanctions regimes. These powers will come into force on 12th May 2026. 

    To assist businesses, OTSI has published guidance on how these controls will be used. 

    OTSI’s website can be found on GOV.UK

    And here’s that guidance:

    Guidance

    Sanctions End-Use Controls: guidance for businesses

    Published 22 April 2026

    1. Disclaimer

    This guidance is set out to support UK businesses potentially affected by Sanctions End-Use Controls. It does not constitute legal advice. Any party in doubt about its legal position should seek independent legal advice.

    2. Foreword

    Sanctions End-Use Controls form part of the wider approach of the government to tackling the circumvention of trade sanctions. This publication is intended to help UK businesses understand Sanctions End-Use Controls that have been introduced in relevant sanctions legislation containing export prohibitions, and to support exporters to third countries where there is a high risk of diversion of goods and related technology to a sanctioned destination or person. It sets out the key features of the controls, what exporters can expect if ‘informed’ by the government that their goods or related technology may pose a sanctions diversion risk, and how to respond in practice. It also provides clarity on the intended operation of Sanctions End-Use Controls and outlines best practice around compliance, record keeping, and risk awareness. This guidance will be updated as necessary.

    3. Sanctions End-Use Controls (SEUC)

    Sanctions End-Use Controls constitute a new licensing requirement for export to a non-sanctioned third country where the exporter has been informed by the government that there is a risk of ultimate diversion of the goods or related technology, via that route, to a sanctioned destination. These controls build upon current ‘making available’ prohibitions, that make it an offence to make available restricted goods and technology to a sanctioned destination by direct or indirect means.  

    This measure will only apply to goods, or technology related to the export of a good, that are not otherwise subject to strategic export controls (i.e., items that are not included on the UK’s strategic control lists for military and dual-use items, or subject to the UK’s WMD or Military End-Use Controls).  

    Sanctions End-Use Controls are designed to: 

    • prevent sanctioned goods and related technology from reaching sanctioned jurisdictions and end users 
    • complement existing circumvention provisions under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA) 

    The government will apply this control where there are concerns around sanctions diversion risks with the end user of the good or technology.

    4. Purpose of the measure

    Trade sanctions include prohibitions on supplying specific goods and related technologies to specific locations and people. The government has seen sanctioned countries go to great lengths to circumvent our trade sanctions by purchasing sanctioned goods and related technologies via intermediaries in third countries. 

    Prior to the introduction of Sanctions End-Use Controls, in situations where the government suspected specific shipments were at risk of being diverted to sanctioned destinations, HMRC and DBT were able to advise the exporter of the risk. Once advised of the risk, it was at the discretion of the exporter whether to continue with the export.  

    Once a good has left the UK there are limited options for the government to prevent onward diversion to sanctioned people and destinations. If a sanctions breach has occurred, this is a criminal offence. However, enforcement action of such an offence takes place after the breach has occurred and cannot prevent the transfer occurring in the first place.  

    Sanctions End-Use Controls give the government the power to impose a licensing requirement on UK exporters who wish to progress specific exports, once they have been informed by the government of a high risk of the goods and related technologies being diverted to a sanctioned person or destination. This applies where such exports are not otherwise subject to export controls. Ultimately this will allow the government to assess and, where necessary, prevent exports where there is a credible risk of diversion of an item subject to sanctions to use by a sanctioned person or in a sanctioned destination. This is an important tool to tackle circumvention of trade sanctions at source.

    5. Goods covered by Sanctions End-Use Controls

    Sanctions End-Use Controls apply to all trade sanctions regimes where restrictions extend beyond arms embargoes (where the military end-use control already applies). Currently this means it applies to goods and related technologies sanctioned under the following sanctions regimes: 

    However, the requirement to obtain a licence under Sanctions End-Use Controls only applies following a process where the government ‘informs’ an exporter that their goods or related technologies and, if applicable, related technology may be at risk of diversion to a sanctioned end user, intermediary, or jurisdiction.  

    Once an exporter has been informed, it becomes a criminal offence to export those goods or related technologies without first obtaining an appropriate licence to export. Exporters who have not been ‘informed of the need for a licence should continue as normal. These regulations do not establish a blanket requirement for licensing types of goods or technologies. Exporters will be notified if the government deem a licence is necessary.

    6. What to do when you get ‘informed’

    Sanctions End-Use Controls are designed and intended to be used in a targeted way, where the government has identified a specific sanctions diversion risk linked to the good or exporter, the route, end user or intermediary. 

    If you are informed by the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), which may come through HMRC’s national clearance hub or through direct contact with DBT (through the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation, OTSI), that your export is at risk of sanctions circumvention you will receive a written informing notice which will: 

    • identify the shipment or transaction in scope, 
    • set out that an export licence is required before the goods or technologies can be exported 

    From the point you are informed, you must not proceed with export of the goods or technologies covered by the notice unless a licence is granted. If you choose not to apply for a licence and still seek to export the goods or technologies after being informed, you will be in breach of UK sanctions law and subject to enforcement action. 

    If the goods have already been intercepted at the border, HMRC may: 

    • detain the goods while a licensing decision is made 
    • allow the goods to be returned to the exporter, pending the outcome of the licence application 

    When you are informed, you will be given information on how to apply for a licence, and any evidence you should provide to help DBT assess the risk of diversion.  

    OTSI is currently not accepting advance sanctions end-use controls licence applications. You should wait to be informed before applying for a licence. OTSI will keep this approach under consideration.

    7. When goods may be stopped at the border

    Sanctions End-Use Control powers apply to all goods and related technologies within the sanctions regimes outlined in section 3, where these are not otherwise controlled under strategic export control legislation.  

    As a general rule, the government will seek to apply Sanctions End-Use Controls to address exports that have been identified and publicised to exporters as of potential concern. the government will always endeavour to publicise known risks to assist businesses in understanding higher risk goods and transactions. 

    Currently, the highest risks identified by the government are related to circumvention of our Russia regime. The government has published guidance on the highest risk goods and export destinations in our Countering Russian Sanctions Evasion: Guidance for Businesses, which is kept up to date as patterns of circumvention change and will inform OTSI’s application of sanctions end-use controls. You can also check the Russia Common High Priority List, an internationally agreed list of Western items critical to Russian weapons systems and its military development. 

    The government uses a range of sources to inform and prioritise which exports are most at risk of circumvention. This includes, but is not limited to, publicly available sanctions evasion typologies and data indicating increased risk. Exporters are strongly encouraged to do the same as relates to their products and end users. 

    The requirement for a licence only applies where the exporter has been ‘informed’. Goods will only be subject to a licensing requirement where the government has informed’ you in writing of a specific diversion risk. This risk will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  

    OTSI does not intend to impose blanket licensing requirements for a specific type of good going to a specific destination but reserves the right to do so, should the need arise.

    8. How to apply for a licence

    If you are informed under Sanctions End-Use Control powers, you must apply for a licence before proceeding with the export of the goods or technologies covered by the informing notice. 

    Find out how to submit a licence application to the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI). 

    Applications will be assessed on a case-by-case basis by DBT, working closely with other departments as needed. Factors that could be considered include: 

    • the nature of the good or related technology and its potential uses 
    • the diversion risks associated with the customer, route or end-user 
    • the exporter’s compliance history and due diligence processes 
    • any additional intelligence available to HM Government 

    Possible outcomes include: 

    • the licence is granted, and the export may proceed subject to any licence conditions 
    • the licence is refused, and the goods or technologies may not be exported to the end-user or route identified 

    The complexity of the case and the availability of information will affect how long it takes to reach a decision. Exporters are encouraged to submit detailed, complete and accurate applications as early as possible after receiving an ‘informing’ letter to minimise potential delays.

    9. Information needed for a licence application

    Further information on applying for a trade sanctions licence can be found at the following link: 

    10. Record keeping and due diligence requirements

    Sanctions End-Use Controls do not change your record keeping or due diligence expectations. If exporting goods or related technologies, you are expected to conduct adequate due diligence to demonstrate compliance with UK sanctions. If you are informed, you may be asked to supply details of your due diligence and a licence for export will be granted if you can satisfactorily demonstrate that your goods are not ultimately destined for a sanctioned destination. 

    For more information on due diligence please read our countering Russian sanctions evasion – guidance for businesses. While this guidance is Russia-specific, much of the advice can be applied to other UK trade sanctions regimes.

    11. Penalties for non-compliance

    Failure to comply with the licensing requirement pursuant to a notice issued under Sanctions End-Use Controls is a breach of trade sanctions and may result in enforcement action. 

    Possible consequences include: 

    • detention or seizure of goods by HMRC at the border 
    • revocation or refusal of existing and future export licences 
    • being publicly named under OTSI’s powers to name companies who breach sanctions  
    • a report about the breach being published by OTSI 
    • OTSI imposing a monetary penalty 
    • criminal investigation and potential prosecution 

    HMRC is responsible for the enforcement of trade sanctions within its role as the UK customs authority. This applies to goods that cross the UK border and strategic goods and technology (as well as services ancillary to those movements). HMRC also criminally investigates relevant breaches referred by other agencies. OTSI leads on the civil enforcement of sanctioned services, as well as trade in sanctioned goods, technologies and services outside the UK, where a UK person is involved. OTSI can refer cases to HMRC to consider criminal investigation.  

    In some circumstances, monetary penalties may be imposed on a strict liability basis. This means that a monetary penalty can be imposed even where the person did not know or have reasonable cause to suspect that they were in breach of sanctions.  

    Exporters are encouraged to cooperate fully with any enquiries by HMRC, OTSI or other enforcement authorities and to seek legal advice where appropriate.

    12. Case studies

    Sanctions End-Use Controls apply to exports to non-sanctioned destinations where the exporter has been informed by the government that the export is at risk of diversion to a sanctioned destination. During the licensing process it may be determined that this risk is minimal and therefore the government is content with the onward export of these goods or related technologies. In these circumstances, a licence will be issued for the export of these goods or related technologies. If, however, the exporter ignores the informing letter and proceeds with the export without applying for a licence, this would constitute a criminal offence.

    12.1 Case Study 1: Licence refused after being ‘informed’

    For example:

    A UK company exporting industrial cooling systems to a Central Asian third country distributor is informed by DBT that the goods are likely to be re-exported to a sanctioned Russian entity. The goods were stopped at port by HMRC and the details referred to DBT for assessment. The company then receives a letter requiring them to apply for a licence under the Sanctions End-Use Controls. The goods are either held or can be returned to the customer pending a decision. These goods cannot be exported to the end user until the outcome is determined. The application is refused due to diversion concerns. The company updates its due diligence procedures and stops trading with that distributor.

    12.2 Case Study 2: Licence granted after being ‘informed’ 

    For example:

    A UK trader applies for a licence to export precision electronics to a Middle Eastern country after being stopped at customs and informed. During the licence review, the exporter provides clear information on the end use of the products that indicates a reduced risk of diversion. The exporter is issued with a licence for these goods, and the export can continue its onward journey. 

    12.3 Case Study 3:  Continuing with an unauthorised export after having been ‘informed’  

    For example:

    A freight forwarder receives an informing letter about a consignment of bearings due for export to a company in the Caucasus region, raising diversion concerns. The letter makes clear that an export licence is required before proceeding. The forwarder overlooks the letter and exports the shipment. The company is investigated for breach of Sanctions End-Use Controls, and risks enforcement action as set out in section 8.

    13. Further information

    13.1 Goods are not being banned for export

    Sanctions End-Use Controls are a targeted mechanism that only apply once you are informed of specific risk factors. If informed, you must apply for a licence before exporting. 

    13.2 Differences between SEUC and existing catch-all controls

    The UK’s existing end-use export controls apply where there are specific risks that an item might be used for the production of WMD or for a military end use in a country subject to a full or partial arms embargo. Sanctions End-Use Controls focus on goods and related technology not subject to these controls (e.g. where they are not for export to a country subject to a full or partial arms embargo), but where there is an identified risk of circumvention of an export subject to sanctions for use in a sanctioned destination or by a sanctioned person.  

    13.3 Comparison of UK sanctions end‑use controls and the EU catch‑all provisions

    The UK SEUC are similar to the EU’s “catch-all” provision in that they both provide powers to impose licensing conditions on goods to prevent circumvention, however, sanctions end-use controls apply across all sanctioned goods in all sanctions regimes, whereas the EU’s “catch-all” provision applies only to the highest risk goods within their Russia sanctions. 

    13.4 Applying for a licence where there is a risk of diversion

    If you believe your goods are at risk of diversion to a sanctioned destination , you should consider not carrying out the transaction. You are strongly encouraged to undertake further due diligence before proceeding and you may also wish to seek legal advice. Sanctions regulations prohibit direct and indirect supply, so you may be at risk of a breach of sanctions regulations if you proceed with a transaction where you have reason to believe the goods are ultimately intended for a sanctioned jurisdiction or person. 

    OTSI is not currently accepting advance licence applications but will keep this under review. You should wait until you are informed before submitting a licence application. If you suspect that your export may be in scope of Sanctions End-Use Controls and have determined that you wish to proceed.  In any event, the licensing process should not be used as a replacement for substantive due diligence. To speed up the process you are encouraged to provide as much information as possible during the licensing process. For more information please read our guidance on applying for a licence from OTSI.

    14. Contacts and further information

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  • Plain-Language Summary of GE Settlement for DDTC Settlement

    Note: The Consent Agreement and Order documents were both not machine-readable, but Claude says the Proposed Charging Letter is more detailed anyhow.

    GE Aerospace’s $36 Million Export Violation Settlement — Plain-Language Summary

    What Happened?

    On April 17, 2026, the U.S. Department of State announced that GE Aerospace (the jet-engine arm of General Electric) agreed to pay $36 million to settle 116 violations of U.S. arms export law. The violations took place over a roughly six-year window, from April 2018 through late 2024.

    The relevant law is called ITAR — the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Think of it as the strict rulebook that governs who American defense companies can share military technology with, and how. Violating ITAR is serious: it can harm national security and, in theory, expose a company to penalties exceeding $1.27 million per violation.

    The Four Categories of Violations

    1. Sending Sensitive Military Data to China (the most serious)

    China is on America’s “do not share” list for arms and military technology. Despite this, GE had three separate incidentsof sending controlled technical data to China without authorization:

    • In 2018, an employee traveling to China carried a company laptop containing data related to F-35, F-16, F-15, and U-2 aircraft engines — and then left the laptop unattended with Chinese university officials for 90 minutes.
    • In 2021, an employee emailed a technical drawing of a component from the F118 military engine to a Chinese supplier, mistakenly thinking it was governed by a less-restrictive export rule (Commerce Department rules, rather than ITAR).
    • In 2023, GE shipped maintenance manuals for the F110 engine to Singapore on three occasions — but routed the packages through China, which itself is prohibited. Nobody had configured the shipping account to flag that as a problem.

    The U.S. government determined that at least one of these incidents — the F118 engine drawing — actually provided China with useful military information.

    2. Mismanaging Export Licenses and Agreements (the largest category — 103 charges)

    GE held many government-approved licenses and agreements covering what military technology it could share with foreign partners, and under what conditions. It repeatedly failed to follow the fine print. Examples include:

    • Shipping repaired military components to the UK Ministry of Defense when the UK MoD wasn’t listed as an authorized recipient on the relevant agreement.
    • Allowing Japanese partners to pass military engine components to 31 unauthorized sub-suppliers over five years, because GE didn’t properly verify who was in the chain.
    • Sending technical data to suppliers in Mexico that went beyond what the license actually permitted.
    • Using a license exemption to ship turbine blade castings to Canada 30 times when a specific government condition required obtaining separate licenses for each shipment — and then failing to track the quantities properly.
    • Having a Swedish partner share engine maintenance data with an unauthorized entity in South Africa.
    • Failing to notify Congress of certain defense exports to Sweden, as required by law.
    • Repeatedly failing to submit required paperwork — things like purchase orders, amendment notifications, and lists of parties to agreements — on time or at all.

    The root causes cited repeatedly: outdated internal procedures (some not updated in over 10 years), inadequate training, and insufficient oversight of foreign partners.

    3. Exporting Defense Hardware Without Authorization (4 charges)

    • A wrong engine combustion liner (for the F404-400) was accidentally shipped to Sweden because commercial paperwork got mixed up between two different items.
    • 15 machined chassis for the F-35 aircraft were temporarily exported to Israel across three shipments because an employee misclassified them under the wrong export control regime.

    4. Failing to Update Its Government Registration (3 charges)

    GE repeatedly failed to report material changes to its registration statement with the government’s defense trade regulator, as required within five days of any such change. This kind of administrative failure can obscure the government’s visibility into who a company is and what it’s doing.

    The Settlement Terms

    GE Aerospace will pay a civil penalty of $36 million. The Department of State agreed to suspend $18 million of that amount on the condition that those funds are used for remedial compliance improvements instead. For at least 24 months, GE must also engage an external Special Compliance Officer to oversee its compliance program, and must submit to at least one independent external audit. The full consent agreement runs for 36 months.

    Why Wasn’t the Penalty Larger?

    The maximum theoretical penalty for 116 violations would be enormous. The penalty was reduced significantly because:

    • GE voluntarily disclosed all 116 violations itself — it found the problems and reported them, rather than waiting to be caught.
    • GE fully cooperated with the government’s review.
    • GE had already started fixing its compliance program before the settlement.

    That said, the government also noted aggravating factors: some of the exports involved Significant Military Equipment, violations were systemic across multiple business units, and the China incidents caused real national security harm.

    Key Takeaways for Non-Expert Professionals

    1. Self-disclosure matters enormously. GE’s decision to report its own violations — all 116 of them — likely saved the company hundreds of millions of dollars in potential penalties and avoided debarment from government contracting.
    2. Compliance programs need maintenance. A recurring theme here is procedures that hadn’t been updated in a decade. Regulations change; compliance infrastructure has to keep pace.
    3. You’re responsible for your partners’ compliance. Many violations occurred not at GE directly, but through foreign partners and sublicensees. Under ITAR, the U.S. license-holder is responsible for ensuring the whole chain follows the rules.
    4. China is a red line. Any unauthorized sharing of military-related technical data with China — even routing a package through a Chinese airport — is treated as a serious aggravated violation.
    5. Paperwork isn’t optional. A surprisingly large number of the 116 charges were essentially administrative failures: late filings, missing notifications, wrong forms. These are avoidable with proper systems.

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  • April 17, 2026: GE gets ITARed and feathered by DDTC

    U.S. Department of State Concludes $36 Million Settlement Resolving Export Violations by General Electric Company

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    APRIL 17, 2026

    The U.S. Department of State has concluded an administrative settlement with General Electric Company (GE Aerospace) to resolve 116 violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq., and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. parts 120-130. The Department of State and GE Aerospace reached this settlement following an extensive compliance review by the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance in the Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

    The administrative settlement between the Department of State and GE Aerospace, concluded pursuant to ITAR § 128.11, addresses multiple categories of ITAR violations, including GE Aerospace’s unauthorized exports of technical data to the People’s Republic of China; violations of terms, conditions, and provisos of several Directorate of Defense Trade Controls authorizations involving various countries; unauthorized exports of defense articles to two countries; and failure to report material changes to its ITAR registration.

    GE Aerospace voluntarily disclosed all the alleged violations, a substantial portion of which predate 2023. GE Aerospace also fully cooperated with the Department’s review of this matter and has implemented numerous improvements to its ITAR compliance program since the conduct at issue.

    Under the terms of the 36-month Consent Agreement, GE Aerospace will pay a civil penalty of $36 million. The Department has agreed to suspend $18 million of this amount on the condition that the funds will be used for the Department-approved Consent Agreement’s remedial compliance measures to strengthen GE Aerospace’s compliance program. In addition, for an initial period of at least 24 months, GE Aerospace will engage an external Special Compliance Officer to oversee the Consent Agreement, which will also require at least one external audit of its ITAR compliance program and implementation of additional compliance measures.

    This settlement demonstrates the Department’s role in furthering the national security and foreign policy of the United States by controlling the export of defense articles. The settlement also highlights the importance of exporting defense articles pursuant only to appropriate authorization from the Department. 

    The Consent Agreement and related documents will be available for public inspection in the Public Reading Room of the Department of State and on the Penalties and Oversights Agreements section of the DDTC’s website. 

    For additional information, please contact the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and Internal Security at T_Outreach_PM@state.gov.

    and here are the documents from the DDTC site:

    Proposed Charging Letter GE Aerospace 20260417Download
    Consent Agreement GE Aerospace 20260417Download
    Order GE Aerospace 20260417Download

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  • Burning Questions: Export Control on both sides of the pond

    The Claude prompt:

    Explain the UK’s export control licensing system, and compare and contrast it to that of the US, in language suitable for non-expert professionals. Show your sources and verify that the response is supported by the sources. If anything is less than well-supported, see if you can find sources that buttress or clarifies those points.

    The response:

    UK and US Export Control Licensing Systems: A Plain-English Guide

    Export controls are laws that regulate what goods, technology, and services a country allows to leave its borders — and to whom. They exist to prevent sensitive or dangerous items from reaching hostile states, terrorist groups, or others who might misuse them. Both the UK and US have comprehensive systems, but they’re structured quite differently. Here’s how each works, followed by a direct comparison.

    Part 1: The UK System

    Who runs it?

    The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) administers the UK’s system of export controls and licensing for military and dual-use items. It brings together operational and policy expertise from the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). DBT has overall responsibility for the statutory and regulatory framework of export controls and for decisions to grant or refuse an export licence. FCDO and MOD are DBT’s principal advisers, advising on the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria used to assess licence applications.

    Think of the ECJU as a single front door for the whole system — but with three departments consulting behind the scenes before a decision is made.

    What items are controlled?

    The UK maintains the Strategic Export Control Lists, which detail military goods, dual-use items, and controlled technologies. These lists align broadly with EU and international lists but diverge in specific areas, particularly post-Brexit. The list is searchable online through the UK government website.

    Controlled goods include most items which have been specially designed or modified for military use and their components, including any technology and software used in or with the item, as well as dual-use items — goods that can be used for both commercial or military purposes, such as ball bearings that use technology which could be repurposed to make ballistic missiles.

    Importantly, even if a product is not listed on the control lists, it may be subject to end-use controls if the exporter knows or suspects it will be used in prohibited applications, such as weapons development or military purposes in embargoed countries. This “catch-all” provision imposes a responsibility on exporters to obtain licences for unlisted goods if they possess knowledge of restricted end-use.

    What types of licences are there?

    The UK offers three main licence types, designed to suit different export scenarios:

    1. Open General Export Licence (OGEL) — the simplest route. OGELs are the most flexible and commonly used licence, enabling unlimited exports to pre-approved destinations. You only need to register once to start using them. They’re pre-published, publicly available, and cover many routine, lower-risk situations.

    2. Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) — needed when no OGEL applies. SIELs for permanent exports are generally valid for 2 years or until the quantity specified has been exported, whichever occurs first. The ECJU aims to provide a decision on 70% of SIEL applications within 20 working days, and 99% within 60 working days.

    3. Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL) — for repeat business. An OIEL allows a named exporter to export multiple shipments of specific controlled goods to named destinations. It is tailored to an exporter’s specific needs and is available to exporters who have a track record in applying for export licences, or those who can demonstrate business need. OIELs are usually valid for 3 to 5 years.

    How are applications assessed?

    The ECJU assesses all licence applications on a case-by-case basis against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, which provide a thorough risk assessment framework. A licence will not be granted when it is inconsistent with the Criteria. Those criteria weigh factors including human rights in the destination country, regional stability, the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the UK’s international obligations.

    What are the consequences of non-compliance?

    It is a criminal offence to export controlled goods without the correct licence. Penalties vary depending on the nature of the offence. They can range from de-registration to fines or imprisonment.

    Part 2: The US System

    A more fragmented structure

    The US system is notably more complex because it is split across multiple agencies depending on the type of item involved. The three principal bodies are: the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which oversees the Export Administration Regulations (EAR); the US Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), which oversees the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Arms Export Control Act; and the US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which administers economic sanctions and embargoes. Nuclear-related export controls are additionally administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy.

    In practice, most exporters need to navigate two main regimes: ITAR and EAR.

    ITAR — for purely military items

    Administered by the US Department of State through the DDTC, ITAR governs items on the United States Munitions List (USML). This list covers a wide range of defense-related items, from firearms and explosives to spacecraft and advanced targeting systems. ITAR does not only apply to the physical objects themselves — it also applies to technical data and services related to those items. That means design documents, instructions, or even the know-how to maintain an ITAR-controlled aircraft engine are just as tightly regulated as the engine itself.

    ITAR regulations place strict restrictions on who can view or handle controlled items and data. In almost all cases, only US persons (meaning US citizens or permanent residents) are permitted access unless a special licence is obtained. Even something as simple as allowing a foreign national employee to view a controlled document on a shared drive could count as a violation if no authorisation is in place.

    EAR — for dual-use and commercial items

    The EAR regulates the manufacture, sale, distribution and export of commercial and dual-use items, technology and information not already covered by ITAR. The governing agency is the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and its primary document is the Commerce Control List (CCL). Each item that falls under the EAR is assigned an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN).

    EAR applies to dual-use items — those with commercial applications that could also be adapted for military or security purposes, such as advanced semiconductors, encryption software, or certain chemicals. While EAR also places access restrictions, they are more nuanced. The level of restriction depends on the classification of the item, the destination country, the intended end use, and the end user.

    Penalties

    ITAR licences from DDTC typically take 60–90 days but can exceed 120 days for complex cases. EAR licences from BIS average 30–60 days. Civil penalties can exceed $1M per violation. Criminal penalties for wilful violations include fines up to $1M and 20 years imprisonment.

    Part 3: Comparing the Two Systems

    Here is where the most practically significant differences lie.

    1. Single agency vs. multiple agencies

    The UK channels everything through one body — the ECJU. The US divides responsibility between at least three major agencies (State, Commerce, Treasury), plus others for nuclear matters. The US regime has more jurisdictions, more categories of items, and more combinations of restrictions, exceptions, exemptions, and governing authorities. Overall the US regime is similar to but more restrictive and burdensome than the UK regime.

    2. The “deemed export” rule — a major US-specific concept

    This is one of the most significant differences for organisations employing international staff or collaborating across borders. The US export control regime recognises that certain disclosures or transfers of controlled items to certain individuals (typically foreign nationals that are not exempt) may be deemed to be an export or re-export. In plain terms: showing a controlled document to a foreign colleague in a US office can constitute an “export” requiring a licence.

    By contrast, the UK regime has no concept of “deemed” exports — disclosures and transfers under UK law are nationality-agnostic. The UK regime applies to transfers and disclosures of controlled items made from within the UK to destinations and recipients outside of the UK. This is a substantial practical difference for universities, research institutions, and multinationals.

    3. Extraterritorial reach — the US casts a much wider net

    US regulations routinely apply to items after they’ve been exported from the United States, and in many cases to items that have never touched US soil. For example, foreign-made products or software that contain US components, or are produced with the benefit of technology or software originating in the United States, may be subject to US export licence requirements.

    The US export control laws have a wide-ranging extraterritorial reach and the US government seeks to penalise companies and individuals who breach the export control laws, regardless of where they are located.

    The UK, by contrast, focuses primarily on exports departing from UK territory. EU and UK sanctions apply within the territory of the United Kingdom, aboard aircraft or vessels under their jurisdiction, to UK nationals, and to entities constituted under UK law. To date, neither the EU nor the UK has aggressively enforced sanctions against foreign persons processing transactions through their financial systems, in contrast to the United States.

    4. Licence types and flexibility

    The UK regime currently makes more extensive use of open licences and general authorisations (OGELs) for exporting predefined items to eligible destinations. These function as standing pre-approvals for common, lower-risk scenarios, reducing the burden on exporters. The US has analogous “licence exceptions” under the EAR, but commentators generally find them less accessible. Exporters with experience in both systems generally find the EU/UK system easier to navigate.

    5. End-use controls

    The UK regime has more widely defined end-use controls for unrated items — meaning UK exporters face a broader “catch-all” obligation to seek a licence even for items not on any formal list if they have reason to believe the end-use is problematic. The US end-use controls are similarly broad, though organised differently by item and destination.

    6. Shared international foundations

    Despite their differences, both systems rest on the same multilateral foundations — chiefly the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms and dual-use), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group (chemical and biological), and the Missile Technology Control Regime. This means the categories of controlled goods are broadly similar; the differences are procedural, institutional, and in the breadth of jurisdiction.

    Summary Table

    FeatureUKUS
    Central bodySingle agency (ECJU)Multiple agencies (BIS, DDTC, OFAC, others)
    Main licencesOGEL, SIEL, OIELLicence exceptions (EAR), DDTC licences (ITAR)
    Military itemsUK Military List (via ECJU)USML / ITAR (via DDTC/State Dept)
    Dual-use itemsStrategic Export Control List (via ECJU)Commerce Control List / EAR (via BIS/Commerce)
    Deemed exportsNot applicable — nationality-agnosticYes — disclosures to foreign nationals in the US can require a licence
    Extraterritorial reachPrimarily territorialBroad — applies to US-origin content worldwide
    Ease of navigationGenerally simplerMore complex; multiple overlapping frameworks
    PenaltiesCriminal fines and imprisonmentCivil fines up to $1M+; criminal fines up to $1M and up to 20 years imprisonment

    Practical takeaway: If your organisation exports from the UK, you are dealing with one agency applying one set of criteria. If you work with US-origin technology or employ non-US nationals on US-controlled projects — even in the UK — US rules may apply to you regardless. Any organisation operating internationally should be aware that the two systems can overlap, and compliance with one does not guarantee compliance with the other.

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