Category: Export Control

  • This message is to notify registered New EXCOL users that as of tomorrow, May 1, 2026, the January 2026 edition of A Guide to Canada’s Export Control List (the Guide) will be in force.

    The new version of the Guide will bring into force the commitments Canada has made in the various multilateral export control regimes up to January 1, 2026.

  • Notice: pre-publication of proposed additions to the Export Control List / Avis : prépublication des ajouts proposés à la Liste des marchandises d’exportation contrôlée

    NB: This notice relates to export controls. Information on sanctions will continue to be published separately, as applicable.

    Greetings,  

    On April 25, 2026, proposed amendments to the Export Control List were pre-published in the Canada Gazette for a 30-day public consultation.

    The proposed amendments would cause additional items to be controlled for export, including certain semiconductors, assemblies that contain them, and advanced manufacturing technologies. If approved, these amendments would become law and be reflected in the next update to the Guide to Canada’s Export Control List.

    Stakeholders and the public can read about and comment on these proposed regulations in Canada Gazette Part I, Volume 160, number 17, which can be found here: https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2026/index-eng.html.

    This consultation will end on May 25th.  

  • Export Control & Sanctions

    Final reminder to have your say: Survey on Open General Export Licences

    The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) administers the UK’s system of export controls and licensing for military and dual-use items. This includes Open General Export Licences (OGELs), which are available for pre-determined military and dual-use controlled items being exported to a range of permitted restricted destinations.
    OGELs are often reported as a flexible and useful licence option, and can generally be used as soon as the exporter has registered. As such, ECJU is reviewing their usage and our overall service to exporters.
    If you are an exporter who has applied for an export licence from ECJU (whether or not you have registered for or regularly use OGELs), we would welcome your views to help shape our thinking.
    This week is your last chance to provide feedback via our short survey on:
    • exporter behaviour and experience in terms of using OGELs
    • why you do (or do not) use OGELs
    • what improvements to our service could be made to optimise their use

    The survey takes around 15 minutes to complete. Please note there is an opportunity to share contact details to allow us to follow up with you for further insights, but this is entirely optional and otherwise your survey responses will remain anonymous.

    Give your feedback via our survey hosted on Qualtrics.

    The closing date is 11:45pm on Thursday 30 April 2026.

    ECJU’s website can be found on GOV.UK

  • OTSI header

    Sanctions End-Use Controls

    Yesterday, legislation was laid before Parliament to introduce Sanctions End-Use Controls into specified trade sanctions regimes. These powers will come into force on 12th May 2026

    To assist businesses, OTSI has published guidance on how these controls will be used. 

    OTSI’s website can be found on GOV.UK

    And here’s that guidance:

    Guidance

    Sanctions End-Use Controls: guidance for businesses

    Published 22 April 2026

    1. Disclaimer

    This guidance is set out to support UK businesses potentially affected by Sanctions End-Use Controls. It does not constitute legal advice. Any party in doubt about its legal position should seek independent legal advice.

    2. Foreword

    Sanctions End-Use Controls form part of the wider approach of the government to tackling the circumvention of trade sanctions. This publication is intended to help UK businesses understand Sanctions End-Use Controls that have been introduced in relevant sanctions legislation containing export prohibitions, and to support exporters to third countries where there is a high risk of diversion of goods and related technology to a sanctioned destination or person. It sets out the key features of the controls, what exporters can expect if ‘informed’ by the government that their goods or related technology may pose a sanctions diversion risk, and how to respond in practice. It also provides clarity on the intended operation of Sanctions End-Use Controls and outlines best practice around compliance, record keeping, and risk awareness. This guidance will be updated as necessary.

    3. Sanctions End-Use Controls (SEUC)

    Sanctions End-Use Controls constitute a new licensing requirement for export to a non-sanctioned third country where the exporter has been informed by the government that there is a risk of ultimate diversion of the goods or related technology, via that route, to a sanctioned destination. These controls build upon current ‘making available’ prohibitions, that make it an offence to make available restricted goods and technology to a sanctioned destination by direct or indirect means.  

    This measure will only apply to goods, or technology related to the export of a good, that are not otherwise subject to strategic export controls (i.e., items that are not included on the UK’s strategic control lists for military and dual-use items, or subject to the UK’s WMD or Military End-Use Controls).  

    Sanctions End-Use Controls are designed to: 

    • prevent sanctioned goods and related technology from reaching sanctioned jurisdictions and end users 
    • complement existing circumvention provisions under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA) 

    The government will apply this control where there are concerns around sanctions diversion risks with the end user of the good or technology.

    4. Purpose of the measure

    Trade sanctions include prohibitions on supplying specific goods and related technologies to specific locations and people. The government has seen sanctioned countries go to great lengths to circumvent our trade sanctions by purchasing sanctioned goods and related technologies via intermediaries in third countries. 

    Prior to the introduction of Sanctions End-Use Controls, in situations where the government suspected specific shipments were at risk of being diverted to sanctioned destinations, HMRC and DBT were able to advise the exporter of the risk. Once advised of the risk, it was at the discretion of the exporter whether to continue with the export.  

    Once a good has left the UK there are limited options for the government to prevent onward diversion to sanctioned people and destinations. If a sanctions breach has occurred, this is a criminal offence. However, enforcement action of such an offence takes place after the breach has occurred and cannot prevent the transfer occurring in the first place.  

    Sanctions End-Use Controls give the government the power to impose a licensing requirement on UK exporters who wish to progress specific exports, once they have been informed by the government of a high risk of the goods and related technologies being diverted to a sanctioned person or destination. This applies where such exports are not otherwise subject to export controls. Ultimately this will allow the government to assess and, where necessary, prevent exports where there is a credible risk of diversion of an item subject to sanctions to use by a sanctioned person or in a sanctioned destination. This is an important tool to tackle circumvention of trade sanctions at source.

    5. Goods covered by Sanctions End-Use Controls

    Sanctions End-Use Controls apply to all trade sanctions regimes where restrictions extend beyond arms embargoes (where the military end-use control already applies). Currently this means it applies to goods and related technologies sanctioned under the following sanctions regimes: 

    However, the requirement to obtain a licence under Sanctions End-Use Controls only applies following a process where the government ‘informs’ an exporter that their goods or related technologies and, if applicable, related technology may be at risk of diversion to a sanctioned end user, intermediary, or jurisdiction.  

    Once an exporter has been informed, it becomes a criminal offence to export those goods or related technologies without first obtaining an appropriate licence to export. Exporters who have not been ‘informed of the need for a licence should continue as normal. These regulations do not establish a blanket requirement for licensing types of goods or technologies. Exporters will be notified if the government deem a licence is necessary.

    6. What to do when you get ‘informed’

    Sanctions End-Use Controls are designed and intended to be used in a targeted way, where the government has identified a specific sanctions diversion risk linked to the good or exporter, the route, end user or intermediary. 

    If you are informed by the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), which may come through HMRC’s national clearance hub or through direct contact with DBT (through the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation, OTSI), that your export is at risk of sanctions circumvention you will receive a written informing notice which will: 

    • identify the shipment or transaction in scope, 
    • set out that an export licence is required before the goods or technologies can be exported 

    From the point you are informed, you must not proceed with export of the goods or technologies covered by the notice unless a licence is granted. If you choose not to apply for a licence and still seek to export the goods or technologies after being informed, you will be in breach of UK sanctions law and subject to enforcement action. 

    If the goods have already been intercepted at the border, HMRC may: 

    • detain the goods while a licensing decision is made 
    • allow the goods to be returned to the exporter, pending the outcome of the licence application 

    When you are informed, you will be given information on how to apply for a licence, and any evidence you should provide to help DBT assess the risk of diversion.  

    OTSI is currently not accepting advance sanctions end-use controls licence applications. You should wait to be informed before applying for a licence. OTSI will keep this approach under consideration.

    7. When goods may be stopped at the border

    Sanctions End-Use Control powers apply to all goods and related technologies within the sanctions regimes outlined in section 3, where these are not otherwise controlled under strategic export control legislation.  

    As a general rule, the government will seek to apply Sanctions End-Use Controls to address exports that have been identified and publicised to exporters as of potential concern. the government will always endeavour to publicise known risks to assist businesses in understanding higher risk goods and transactions. 

    Currently, the highest risks identified by the government are related to circumvention of our Russia regime. The government has published guidance on the highest risk goods and export destinations in our Countering Russian Sanctions Evasion: Guidance for Businesses, which is kept up to date as patterns of circumvention change and will inform OTSI’s application of sanctions end-use controls. You can also check the Russia Common High Priority List, an internationally agreed list of Western items critical to Russian weapons systems and its military development. 

    The government uses a range of sources to inform and prioritise which exports are most at risk of circumvention. This includes, but is not limited to, publicly available sanctions evasion typologies and data indicating increased risk. Exporters are strongly encouraged to do the same as relates to their products and end users. 

    The requirement for a licence only applies where the exporter has been ‘informed’. Goods will only be subject to a licensing requirement where the government has informed’ you in writing of a specific diversion risk. This risk will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  

    OTSI does not intend to impose blanket licensing requirements for a specific type of good going to a specific destination but reserves the right to do so, should the need arise.

    8. How to apply for a licence

    If you are informed under Sanctions End-Use Control powers, you must apply for a licence before proceeding with the export of the goods or technologies covered by the informing notice. 

    Find out how to submit a licence application to the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI)

    Applications will be assessed on a case-by-case basis by DBT, working closely with other departments as needed. Factors that could be considered include: 

    • the nature of the good or related technology and its potential uses 
    • the diversion risks associated with the customer, route or end-user 
    • the exporter’s compliance history and due diligence processes 
    • any additional intelligence available to HM Government 

    Possible outcomes include: 

    • the licence is granted, and the export may proceed subject to any licence conditions 
    • the licence is refused, and the goods or technologies may not be exported to the end-user or route identified 

    The complexity of the case and the availability of information will affect how long it takes to reach a decision. Exporters are encouraged to submit detailed, complete and accurate applications as early as possible after receiving an ‘informing’ letter to minimise potential delays.

    9. Information needed for a licence application

    Further information on applying for a trade sanctions licence can be found at the following link: 

    10. Record keeping and due diligence requirements

    Sanctions End-Use Controls do not change your record keeping or due diligence expectations. If exporting goods or related technologies, you are expected to conduct adequate due diligence to demonstrate compliance with UK sanctions. If you are informed, you may be asked to supply details of your due diligence and a licence for export will be granted if you can satisfactorily demonstrate that your goods are not ultimately destined for a sanctioned destination. 

    For more information on due diligence please read our countering Russian sanctions evasion – guidance for businesses. While this guidance is Russia-specific, much of the advice can be applied to other UK trade sanctions regimes.

    11. Penalties for non-compliance

    Failure to comply with the licensing requirement pursuant to a notice issued under Sanctions End-Use Controls is a breach of trade sanctions and may result in enforcement action. 

    Possible consequences include: 

    • detention or seizure of goods by HMRC at the border 
    • revocation or refusal of existing and future export licences 
    • being publicly named under OTSI’s powers to name companies who breach sanctions  
    • a report about the breach being published by OTSI 
    • OTSI imposing a monetary penalty 
    • criminal investigation and potential prosecution 

    HMRC is responsible for the enforcement of trade sanctions within its role as the UK customs authority. This applies to goods that cross the UK border and strategic goods and technology (as well as services ancillary to those movements). HMRC also criminally investigates relevant breaches referred by other agencies. OTSI leads on the civil enforcement of sanctioned services, as well as trade in sanctioned goods, technologies and services outside the UK, where a UK person is involved. OTSI can refer cases to HMRC to consider criminal investigation.  

    In some circumstances, monetary penalties may be imposed on a strict liability basis. This means that a monetary penalty can be imposed even where the person did not know or have reasonable cause to suspect that they were in breach of sanctions.  

    Exporters are encouraged to cooperate fully with any enquiries by HMRC, OTSI or other enforcement authorities and to seek legal advice where appropriate.

    12. Case studies

    Sanctions End-Use Controls apply to exports to non-sanctioned destinations where the exporter has been informed by the government that the export is at risk of diversion to a sanctioned destination. During the licensing process it may be determined that this risk is minimal and therefore the government is content with the onward export of these goods or related technologies. In these circumstances, a licence will be issued for the export of these goods or related technologies. If, however, the exporter ignores the informing letter and proceeds with the export without applying for a licence, this would constitute a criminal offence.

    12.1 Case Study 1: Licence refused after being ‘informed’

    For example:

    A UK company exporting industrial cooling systems to a Central Asian third country distributor is informed by DBT that the goods are likely to be re-exported to a sanctioned Russian entity. The goods were stopped at port by HMRC and the details referred to DBT for assessment. The company then receives a letter requiring them to apply for a licence under the Sanctions End-Use Controls. The goods are either held or can be returned to the customer pending a decision. These goods cannot be exported to the end user until the outcome is determined. The application is refused due to diversion concerns. The company updates its due diligence procedures and stops trading with that distributor.

    12.2 Case Study 2: Licence granted after being ‘informed’ 

    For example:

    A UK trader applies for a licence to export precision electronics to a Middle Eastern country after being stopped at customs and informed. During the licence review, the exporter provides clear information on the end use of the products that indicates a reduced risk of diversion. The exporter is issued with a licence for these goods, and the export can continue its onward journey. 

    12.3 Case Study 3:  Continuing with an unauthorised export after having been ‘informed’  

    For example:

    A freight forwarder receives an informing letter about a consignment of bearings due for export to a company in the Caucasus region, raising diversion concerns. The letter makes clear that an export licence is required before proceeding. The forwarder overlooks the letter and exports the shipment. The company is investigated for breach of Sanctions End-Use Controls, and risks enforcement action as set out in section 8.

    13. Further information

    13.1 Goods are not being banned for export

    Sanctions End-Use Controls are a targeted mechanism that only apply once you are informed of specific risk factors. If informed, you must apply for a licence before exporting. 

    13.2 Differences between SEUC and existing catch-all controls

    The UK’s existing end-use export controls apply where there are specific risks that an item might be used for the production of WMD or for a military end use in a country subject to a full or partial arms embargo. Sanctions End-Use Controls focus on goods and related technology not subject to these controls (e.g. where they are not for export to a country subject to a full or partial arms embargo), but where there is an identified risk of circumvention of an export subject to sanctions for use in a sanctioned destination or by a sanctioned person.  

    13.3 Comparison of UK sanctions end‑use controls and the EU catch‑all provisions

    The UK SEUC are similar to the EU’s “catch-all” provision in that they both provide powers to impose licensing conditions on goods to prevent circumvention, however, sanctions end-use controls apply across all sanctioned goods in all sanctions regimes, whereas the EU’s “catch-all” provision applies only to the highest risk goods within their Russia sanctions. 

    13.4 Applying for a licence where there is a risk of diversion

    If you believe your goods are at risk of diversion to a sanctioned destination , you should consider not carrying out the transaction. You are strongly encouraged to undertake further due diligence before proceeding and you may also wish to seek legal advice. Sanctions regulations prohibit direct and indirect supply, so you may be at risk of a breach of sanctions regulations if you proceed with a transaction where you have reason to believe the goods are ultimately intended for a sanctioned jurisdiction or person. 

    OTSI is not currently accepting advance licence applications but will keep this under review. You should wait until you are informed before submitting a licence application. If you suspect that your export may be in scope of Sanctions End-Use Controls and have determined that you wish to proceed.  In any event, the licensing process should not be used as a replacement for substantive due diligence. To speed up the process you are encouraged to provide as much information as possible during the licensing process. For more information please read our guidance on applying for a licence from OTSI.

    14. Contacts and further information

  • Note: The Consent Agreement and Order documents were both not machine-readable, but Claude says the Proposed Charging Letter is more detailed anyhow.


    GE Aerospace’s $36 Million Export Violation Settlement — Plain-Language Summary

    What Happened?

    On April 17, 2026, the U.S. Department of State announced that GE Aerospace (the jet-engine arm of General Electric) agreed to pay $36 million to settle 116 violations of U.S. arms export law. The violations took place over a roughly six-year window, from April 2018 through late 2024.

    The relevant law is called ITAR — the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Think of it as the strict rulebook that governs who American defense companies can share military technology with, and how. Violating ITAR is serious: it can harm national security and, in theory, expose a company to penalties exceeding $1.27 million per violation.


    The Four Categories of Violations

    1. Sending Sensitive Military Data to China (the most serious)

    China is on America’s “do not share” list for arms and military technology. Despite this, GE had three separate incidentsof sending controlled technical data to China without authorization:

    • In 2018, an employee traveling to China carried a company laptop containing data related to F-35, F-16, F-15, and U-2 aircraft engines — and then left the laptop unattended with Chinese university officials for 90 minutes.
    • In 2021, an employee emailed a technical drawing of a component from the F118 military engine to a Chinese supplier, mistakenly thinking it was governed by a less-restrictive export rule (Commerce Department rules, rather than ITAR).
    • In 2023, GE shipped maintenance manuals for the F110 engine to Singapore on three occasions — but routed the packages through China, which itself is prohibited. Nobody had configured the shipping account to flag that as a problem.

    The U.S. government determined that at least one of these incidents — the F118 engine drawing — actually provided China with useful military information.

    2. Mismanaging Export Licenses and Agreements (the largest category — 103 charges)

    GE held many government-approved licenses and agreements covering what military technology it could share with foreign partners, and under what conditions. It repeatedly failed to follow the fine print. Examples include:

    • Shipping repaired military components to the UK Ministry of Defense when the UK MoD wasn’t listed as an authorized recipient on the relevant agreement.
    • Allowing Japanese partners to pass military engine components to 31 unauthorized sub-suppliers over five years, because GE didn’t properly verify who was in the chain.
    • Sending technical data to suppliers in Mexico that went beyond what the license actually permitted.
    • Using a license exemption to ship turbine blade castings to Canada 30 times when a specific government condition required obtaining separate licenses for each shipment — and then failing to track the quantities properly.
    • Having a Swedish partner share engine maintenance data with an unauthorized entity in South Africa.
    • Failing to notify Congress of certain defense exports to Sweden, as required by law.
    • Repeatedly failing to submit required paperwork — things like purchase orders, amendment notifications, and lists of parties to agreements — on time or at all.

    The root causes cited repeatedly: outdated internal procedures (some not updated in over 10 years), inadequate training, and insufficient oversight of foreign partners.

    3. Exporting Defense Hardware Without Authorization (4 charges)

    • wrong engine combustion liner (for the F404-400) was accidentally shipped to Sweden because commercial paperwork got mixed up between two different items.
    • 15 machined chassis for the F-35 aircraft were temporarily exported to Israel across three shipments because an employee misclassified them under the wrong export control regime.

    4. Failing to Update Its Government Registration (3 charges)

    GE repeatedly failed to report material changes to its registration statement with the government’s defense trade regulator, as required within five days of any such change. This kind of administrative failure can obscure the government’s visibility into who a company is and what it’s doing.


    The Settlement Terms

    GE Aerospace will pay a civil penalty of $36 million. The Department of State agreed to suspend $18 million of that amount on the condition that those funds are used for remedial compliance improvements instead. For at least 24 months, GE must also engage an external Special Compliance Officer to oversee its compliance program, and must submit to at least one independent external audit. The full consent agreement runs for 36 months.


    Why Wasn’t the Penalty Larger?

    The maximum theoretical penalty for 116 violations would be enormous. The penalty was reduced significantly because:

    • GE voluntarily disclosed all 116 violations itself — it found the problems and reported them, rather than waiting to be caught.
    • GE fully cooperated with the government’s review.
    • GE had already started fixing its compliance program before the settlement.

    That said, the government also noted aggravating factors: some of the exports involved Significant Military Equipment, violations were systemic across multiple business units, and the China incidents caused real national security harm.


    Key Takeaways for Non-Expert Professionals

    1. Self-disclosure matters enormously. GE’s decision to report its own violations — all 116 of them — likely saved the company hundreds of millions of dollars in potential penalties and avoided debarment from government contracting.
    2. Compliance programs need maintenance. A recurring theme here is procedures that hadn’t been updated in a decade. Regulations change; compliance infrastructure has to keep pace.
    3. You’re responsible for your partners’ compliance. Many violations occurred not at GE directly, but through foreign partners and sublicensees. Under ITAR, the U.S. license-holder is responsible for ensuring the whole chain follows the rules.
    4. China is a red line. Any unauthorized sharing of military-related technical data with China — even routing a package through a Chinese airport — is treated as a serious aggravated violation.
    5. Paperwork isn’t optional. A surprisingly large number of the 116 charges were essentially administrative failures: late filings, missing notifications, wrong forms. These are avoidable with proper systems.
  • U.S. Department of State Concludes $36 Million Settlement Resolving Export Violations by General Electric Company

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    APRIL 17, 2026

    The U.S. Department of State has concluded an administrative settlement with General Electric Company (GE Aerospace) to resolve 116 violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq., and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. parts 120-130. The Department of State and GE Aerospace reached this settlement following an extensive compliance review by the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance in the Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

    The administrative settlement between the Department of State and GE Aerospace, concluded pursuant to ITAR § 128.11, addresses multiple categories of ITAR violations, including GE Aerospace’s unauthorized exports of technical data to the People’s Republic of China; violations of terms, conditions, and provisos of several Directorate of Defense Trade Controls authorizations involving various countries; unauthorized exports of defense articles to two countries; and failure to report material changes to its ITAR registration.

    GE Aerospace voluntarily disclosed all the alleged violations, a substantial portion of which predate 2023. GE Aerospace also fully cooperated with the Department’s review of this matter and has implemented numerous improvements to its ITAR compliance program since the conduct at issue.

    Under the terms of the 36-month Consent Agreement, GE Aerospace will pay a civil penalty of $36 million. The Department has agreed to suspend $18 million of this amount on the condition that the funds will be used for the Department-approved Consent Agreement’s remedial compliance measures to strengthen GE Aerospace’s compliance program. In addition, for an initial period of at least 24 months, GE Aerospace will engage an external Special Compliance Officer to oversee the Consent Agreement, which will also require at least one external audit of its ITAR compliance program and implementation of additional compliance measures.

    This settlement demonstrates the Department’s role in furthering the national security and foreign policy of the United States by controlling the export of defense articles. The settlement also highlights the importance of exporting defense articles pursuant only to appropriate authorization from the Department. 

    The Consent Agreement and related documents will be available for public inspection in the Public Reading Room of the Department of State and on the Penalties and Oversights Agreements section of the DDTC’s website. 

    For additional information, please contact the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and Internal Security at T_Outreach_PM@state.gov.

    and here are the documents from the DDTC site:

  • The Claude prompt:

    Explain the UK’s export control licensing system, and compare and contrast it to that of the US, in language suitable for non-expert professionals. Show your sources and verify that the response is supported by the sources. If anything is less than well-supported, see if you can find sources that buttress or clarifies those points.

    The response:

    UK and US Export Control Licensing Systems: A Plain-English Guide

    Export controls are laws that regulate what goods, technology, and services a country allows to leave its borders — and to whom. They exist to prevent sensitive or dangerous items from reaching hostile states, terrorist groups, or others who might misuse them. Both the UK and US have comprehensive systems, but they’re structured quite differently. Here’s how each works, followed by a direct comparison.


    Part 1: The UK System

    Who runs it?

    The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) administers the UK’s system of export controls and licensing for military and dual-use items. It brings together operational and policy expertise from the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). DBT has overall responsibility for the statutory and regulatory framework of export controls and for decisions to grant or refuse an export licence. FCDO and MOD are DBT’s principal advisers, advising on the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria used to assess licence applications.

    Think of the ECJU as a single front door for the whole system — but with three departments consulting behind the scenes before a decision is made.

    What items are controlled?

    The UK maintains the Strategic Export Control Lists, which detail military goods, dual-use items, and controlled technologies. These lists align broadly with EU and international lists but diverge in specific areas, particularly post-Brexit. The list is searchable online through the UK government website.

    Controlled goods include most items which have been specially designed or modified for military use and their components, including any technology and software used in or with the item, as well as dual-use items — goods that can be used for both commercial or military purposes, such as ball bearings that use technology which could be repurposed to make ballistic missiles.

    Importantly, even if a product is not listed on the control lists, it may be subject to end-use controls if the exporter knows or suspects it will be used in prohibited applications, such as weapons development or military purposes in embargoed countries. This “catch-all” provision imposes a responsibility on exporters to obtain licences for unlisted goods if they possess knowledge of restricted end-use.

    What types of licences are there?

    The UK offers three main licence types, designed to suit different export scenarios:

    1. Open General Export Licence (OGEL) — the simplest route. OGELs are the most flexible and commonly used licence, enabling unlimited exports to pre-approved destinations. You only need to register once to start using them. They’re pre-published, publicly available, and cover many routine, lower-risk situations.

    2. Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) — needed when no OGEL applies. SIELs for permanent exports are generally valid for 2 years or until the quantity specified has been exported, whichever occurs first. The ECJU aims to provide a decision on 70% of SIEL applications within 20 working days, and 99% within 60 working days.

    3. Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL) — for repeat business. An OIEL allows a named exporter to export multiple shipments of specific controlled goods to named destinations. It is tailored to an exporter’s specific needs and is available to exporters who have a track record in applying for export licences, or those who can demonstrate business need. OIELs are usually valid for 3 to 5 years.

    How are applications assessed?

    The ECJU assesses all licence applications on a case-by-case basis against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, which provide a thorough risk assessment framework. A licence will not be granted when it is inconsistent with the Criteria. Those criteria weigh factors including human rights in the destination country, regional stability, the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the UK’s international obligations.

    What are the consequences of non-compliance?

    It is a criminal offence to export controlled goods without the correct licence. Penalties vary depending on the nature of the offence. They can range from de-registration to fines or imprisonment.


    Part 2: The US System

    A more fragmented structure

    The US system is notably more complex because it is split across multiple agencies depending on the type of item involved. The three principal bodies are: the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which oversees the Export Administration Regulations (EAR); the US Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), which oversees the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Arms Export Control Act; and the US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which administers economic sanctions and embargoes. Nuclear-related export controls are additionally administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy.

    In practice, most exporters need to navigate two main regimes: ITAR and EAR.

    ITAR — for purely military items

    Administered by the US Department of State through the DDTC, ITAR governs items on the United States Munitions List (USML). This list covers a wide range of defense-related items, from firearms and explosives to spacecraft and advanced targeting systems. ITAR does not only apply to the physical objects themselves — it also applies to technical data and services related to those items. That means design documents, instructions, or even the know-how to maintain an ITAR-controlled aircraft engine are just as tightly regulated as the engine itself.

    ITAR regulations place strict restrictions on who can view or handle controlled items and data. In almost all cases, only US persons (meaning US citizens or permanent residents) are permitted access unless a special licence is obtained. Even something as simple as allowing a foreign national employee to view a controlled document on a shared drive could count as a violation if no authorisation is in place.

    EAR — for dual-use and commercial items

    The EAR regulates the manufacture, sale, distribution and export of commercial and dual-use items, technology and information not already covered by ITAR. The governing agency is the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and its primary document is the Commerce Control List (CCL). Each item that falls under the EAR is assigned an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN).

    EAR applies to dual-use items — those with commercial applications that could also be adapted for military or security purposes, such as advanced semiconductors, encryption software, or certain chemicals. While EAR also places access restrictions, they are more nuanced. The level of restriction depends on the classification of the item, the destination country, the intended end use, and the end user.

    Penalties

    ITAR licences from DDTC typically take 60–90 days but can exceed 120 days for complex cases. EAR licences from BIS average 30–60 days. Civil penalties can exceed $1M per violation. Criminal penalties for wilful violations include fines up to $1M and 20 years imprisonment.


    Part 3: Comparing the Two Systems

    Here is where the most practically significant differences lie.

    1. Single agency vs. multiple agencies

    The UK channels everything through one body — the ECJU. The US divides responsibility between at least three major agencies (State, Commerce, Treasury), plus others for nuclear matters. The US regime has more jurisdictions, more categories of items, and more combinations of restrictions, exceptions, exemptions, and governing authorities. Overall the US regime is similar to but more restrictive and burdensome than the UK regime.

    2. The “deemed export” rule — a major US-specific concept

    This is one of the most significant differences for organisations employing international staff or collaborating across borders. The US export control regime recognises that certain disclosures or transfers of controlled items to certain individuals (typically foreign nationals that are not exempt) may be deemed to be an export or re-export. In plain terms: showing a controlled document to a foreign colleague in a US office can constitute an “export” requiring a licence.

    By contrast, the UK regime has no concept of “deemed” exports — disclosures and transfers under UK law are nationality-agnostic. The UK regime applies to transfers and disclosures of controlled items made from within the UK to destinations and recipients outside of the UK. This is a substantial practical difference for universities, research institutions, and multinationals.

    3. Extraterritorial reach — the US casts a much wider net

    US regulations routinely apply to items after they’ve been exported from the United States, and in many cases to items that have never touched US soil. For example, foreign-made products or software that contain US components, or are produced with the benefit of technology or software originating in the United States, may be subject to US export licence requirements.

    The US export control laws have a wide-ranging extraterritorial reach and the US government seeks to penalise companies and individuals who breach the export control laws, regardless of where they are located.

    The UK, by contrast, focuses primarily on exports departing from UK territory. EU and UK sanctions apply within the territory of the United Kingdom, aboard aircraft or vessels under their jurisdiction, to UK nationals, and to entities constituted under UK law. To date, neither the EU nor the UK has aggressively enforced sanctions against foreign persons processing transactions through their financial systems, in contrast to the United States.

    4. Licence types and flexibility

    The UK regime currently makes more extensive use of open licences and general authorisations (OGELs) for exporting predefined items to eligible destinations. These function as standing pre-approvals for common, lower-risk scenarios, reducing the burden on exporters. The US has analogous “licence exceptions” under the EAR, but commentators generally find them less accessible. Exporters with experience in both systems generally find the EU/UK system easier to navigate.

    5. End-use controls

    The UK regime has more widely defined end-use controls for unrated items — meaning UK exporters face a broader “catch-all” obligation to seek a licence even for items not on any formal list if they have reason to believe the end-use is problematic. The US end-use controls are similarly broad, though organised differently by item and destination.

    6. Shared international foundations

    Despite their differences, both systems rest on the same multilateral foundations — chiefly the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms and dual-use), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group (chemical and biological), and the Missile Technology Control Regime. This means the categories of controlled goods are broadly similar; the differences are procedural, institutional, and in the breadth of jurisdiction.


    Summary Table

    FeatureUKUS
    Central bodySingle agency (ECJU)Multiple agencies (BIS, DDTC, OFAC, others)
    Main licencesOGEL, SIEL, OIELLicence exceptions (EAR), DDTC licences (ITAR)
    Military itemsUK Military List (via ECJU)USML / ITAR (via DDTC/State Dept)
    Dual-use itemsStrategic Export Control List (via ECJU)Commerce Control List / EAR (via BIS/Commerce)
    Deemed exportsNot applicable — nationality-agnosticYes — disclosures to foreign nationals in the US can require a licence
    Extraterritorial reachPrimarily territorialBroad — applies to US-origin content worldwide
    Ease of navigationGenerally simplerMore complex; multiple overlapping frameworks
    PenaltiesCriminal fines and imprisonmentCivil fines up to $1M+; criminal fines up to $1M and up to 20 years imprisonment

    Practical takeaway: If your organisation exports from the UK, you are dealing with one agency applying one set of criteria. If you work with US-origin technology or employ non-US nationals on US-controlled projects — even in the UK — US rules may apply to you regardless. Any organisation operating internationally should be aware that the two systems can overlap, and compliance with one does not guarantee compliance with the other.

  • Export Control & Sanctions

    Invitation to respond to our survey on Open General Export Licences

    The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) administers the UK’s system of export controls and licensing for military and dual-use items. This includes Open General Export Licences (OGELs), which are available for pre-determined military and dual-use controlled items being exported to a range of permitted restricted destinations.

    OGELs are often reported as a flexible and useful licence option, and can generally be used as soon as the exporter has registered. As such, ECJU is reviewing their usage and our overall service to exporters.

    If you are an exporter who has applied for an export licence from ECJU (whether or not you have registered for or regularly use OGELs), we would welcome your views to help shape our thinking.

    Our short survey has been set up to get feedback on:
    • exporter behaviour and experience in terms of using OGELs
    • why you do (or do not) use OGELs
    • what improvements to our service could be made to optimise their use

    The survey takes around 15 minutes to complete. Please note there is an opportunity to share contact details to allow us to follow up with you for further insights, but this is entirely optional and otherwise your survey responses will remain anonymous.

    Give your feedback via our survey hosted on Qualtrics.

    The closing date is 11:45pm on Thursday 30 April 2026.

    ECJU’s website can be found on GOV.UK

  • NTE 2026/11: expiry date for F680s on SPIRE

    Updated 15 April 2026

    Introduction

    The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) of the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) is transitioning the MOD security approval form 680 (F680) away from SPIRE. From Friday 31 July 2026, you will no longer be able to process these applications on SPIRE.

    We ask that you transition to using the ‘Apply to Export Controlled Goods’ service for your F680 applications.

    Note that US UNCLASSIFIED ITAR applications are an exception to this transition and cannot be processed on the ‘Apply to Export Controlled Goods’ service at this time. If you submit US UNCLASSIFIED ITAR applications, you must continue to use SPIRE for these specific applications.

    To prepare for the change, you must ensure you have an account with the new service. If you do not yet have an account, set up an account to export controlled goods.

    Help and support

    For further guidance, you can watch the ‘Apply for an F680’ video.

    If you have any queries regarding your F680 application, contact spoecju-mod-lite-f680@mod.gov.uk.

    If you need help with your account, contact the helpdesk via lite.support@businessandtrade.gov.uk.

    Contact ECJU

    General queries about strategic export licensing

    Export Control Joint Unit
    Department for Business and Trade
    Old Admiralty Building
    Admiralty Place
    London
    SW1A 2DY

    Email exportcontrol.help@businessandtrade.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7215 4594

  • Export Control & Sanctions

    Reminder: Upcoming Webinar: Editing Applications in the ‘Apply to Export Controlled Goods’ service (22 April)

    Dear exporter, 
    This is a reminder to register for our upcoming webinar on Editing Applications in the ‘Apply to Export Controlled Goods’ service (also known as LITE). If you haven’t yet done so and would like to attend, please register using the link below:

    22 April 2026, 10:00-11:00: How to use the ‘Apply to Export Controlled Goods Service ‘: Editing Applications

    You can pre-submit questions for the webinar series via this link: Export Control Joint Unit – Webinar Series – Fill in form

    Those who register for the webinar will automatically receive the recording, so we encourage you to sign up even if you are unable to attend the live event.

    If you have any questions, please submit them to

    LITE.support@businessandtrade.gov.uk. We will endeavour to cover them in the webinar or respond separately.

    Kind Regards,

    Export Control Joint Unit