Today, Monday 6th July, the UK Government has designated the following seven individuals and two entities under the chemical weapons sanction regime.
Entities designated:
Individuals designated:
and the Sanctions Notice:
Month: July 2026
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Secretary Rubio Terminates Legal Status of Cuban Communist Foreign Influence Operative
PRESS STATEMENT
THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, SPOKESPERSON
JULY 1, 2026
This week, three Cuban nationals were apprehended by federal agents following Secretary Rubio’s termination of their legal status. Carlos Antonio Lloga Dominguez – who spent more than a decade working as a foreign subversive for the Communist Cuban regime’s premier influence and intelligence front group in the United States – and his wife and son are now in federal custody pending removal from our country. Lloga Dominguez spent more than a decade employed by the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the People (ICAP). He has continued to maintain ties to the transnational communist subversion network throughout his time residing in our nation.
ICAP, which Secretary Rubio designated for sanctions under Executive Order 14404 earlier this month, is the central node in a sprawling Cuban intelligence and influence operation, claiming to span more than 2,000 organizations across more than 150 countries. The organization has a long and intimate relationship with Cuban intelligence agents; in fact, ICAP’s current president, Fernando González Llort, is a convicted Cuban spy who served 15 years in U.S. prison for his role in the infamous Wasp Network — a massive illegal Cuban spy ring uncovered in Florida in the late 1990s. Working in close coordination with the Cuban communist regime, ICAP maintains an outsized footprint across the United States, trafficking in vile anti-American propaganda, cultivating pro-Havana regime activists and politicians, and lobbying federal, state and local politicians on behalf of the Cuban dictatorship. The organization facilitates close working relationships between Havana and radical U.S. groups, using America’s far left milieu as a vehicle to export Cuba’s Communist revolution to the United States.
Under the Trump Administration, America will never become home for Cuban Communist regime thugs who peddle propaganda, run foreign influence operations, or seek to wage revolution against American civilization. As a reminder, pursuant to Executive Order 14404, all ICAP property and interests in property are blocked and any transactions with ICAP are prohibited absent an express authorization by the Departments of Treasury or State. And any foreign aliens involved in ICAP’s anti-American subversion operations should expect to soon find themselves on an ICE deportation flight.
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Hi –
All the Practitioners and Plain Language Guides are now available on the Resources pages. I’ve also added links to the US Export Controls Guides on the main Resources page – since it cuts across multiple regulators, it didn’t really fit into the US Resources page, which is AI created and maintained.
Also, all the Resources pages have been refreshed.
And the Industry Events Calendar now reflects all events for the next 6 months.
To be honest, the amount of work I need to do to keep these up to date is so minor (comparatively) means I can do this every 4-8 weeks so the content doesn’t get too staie. Mind you, there is always going to be little glitches in the AI processing – the important thing is to get the errors or other failings addressed, and to update the master prompts appropriately.
For example, in this last pass to make my first major update pass on the events calendar, I found that Claude was inferring URLs and not directly fetching them to confirm they work. That led to some broken links … and when I tried to address it, we found some sites where fetching was blocked by the site. Claude made some suggestions about how to address these failings, and now the spreadsheet Claude produces now has a new sheet that lists events it had errors in fetching but which I could try fetching myself (which I successfully did, actually).
Now, if it could only write to the Google Calendar… that would save me a lot of time and effort…. a guy can dream, can’t I?
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My editing of Claude’s responses is pretty minimal, and I want to explain it, in the service of full transparency.
What I do edit out is basically three things:
- In a chatbot, any process-type discussion (couldn’t access this document, now fetching this) appears as part of the response block – and gets picked up if you hit the Copy button. The process of how a chatbot tries to gather information, as a general matter, doesn’t add that much value, IMHO, to most of my intended audience – even the more AI-curious. So, I leave these out. Ditto for any discussion as it refines its thinking – what we largely care about is the final response. A good example is the (upcoming) Burning Questions post on the “secondary risk” wording in OFAC listings, where Claude prefixes the final response with this (none of which appears in my post):
- This is the sharper version of the “Burning Questions” angle from before — whether the field is being read as a rating rather than a citation, and whether that misreading clusters anywhere. Let me search for evidence rather than reason from priors, because the honest answer may be that this specific behavior is under-documented.
- That gave me adjacent material (screening mechanics, one vendor that tags secondary sanctions as a labeling feature) but not direct evidence of firms misreading the field as a rating. Let me look specifically at the de-risking / over-compliance pattern, which is where any geographic or asset-class clustering would show up.
- I now have solid material on the de-risking pattern and where it clusters, but I want to be honest about a distinction: the question asks specifically whether firms treat the wording as a rating, and most of what I’ve found is about firms reacting to the underlying risk. Those aren’t the same thing, and I don’t want to conflate them. Let me do one more targeted search on the data-field-as-signal angle.
- I have enough to give an honest, well-bounded answer.
- Sometimes, as part of its source checking, Claude will point out things where the difference between its initial drafting and its checking – semantically and in a practical sense – is not worth correcting, or where the discussion of the review itself doesn’t illuminate the response. Those I remove. If there is a real difference, by the way, I have Claude correct it – so I don’t post the original response.
- Often, Claude will propose I ask a follow-up question. These I remove.
Now, I do leave in some of Claude’s commentary from time to time. I do that for a number of reasons:
- I think the reasoning, and the natural language production of the “conversation”, is fascinating
- I think the back and forth of postulating something, posting a caveat and then proceeding, is more nuanced and informative to the audience (and, to be perfectly frank, to me as well)
- As much as this is a sanctions blog, it’s also a “AI in sanctions” blog. Some of these peeks behind the curtain inform us as we make decisions about how to use AI in our field
As always, I invite your comments, criticisms and suggestions.
- In a chatbot, any process-type discussion (couldn’t access this document, now fetching this) appears as part of the response block – and gets picked up if you hit the Copy button. The process of how a chatbot tries to gather information, as a general matter, doesn’t add that much value, IMHO, to most of my intended audience – even the more AI-curious. So, I leave these out. Ditto for any discussion as it refines its thinking – what we largely care about is the final response. A good example is the (upcoming) Burning Questions post on the “secondary risk” wording in OFAC listings, where Claude prefixes the final response with this (none of which appears in my post):
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Counter Narcotics Designations; Counter Terrorism Designations and Designation Update
Additions:
Treasury Press Release: Treasury Sanctions Brazilian Criminal Network Exploiting U.S. Financial System to Launder Drug Proceeds
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- OFAC Programs:
- SDGT Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
- ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059 Executive Order 14059
DE OLIVEIRA SHIMADA, Victor Henrique
- Address: Santos, Sao Paulo, Brazil
- DOB: 11 Feb 1985
- POB: Sao Paulo, Brazil
- Nationality: Brazil
- Gender: Male
- Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
- Passport: FT087922 (Brazil) expires 02 May 2027
- National ID No.: 33767898861 (Brazil)
- Party Type: individual
- Linked to: PRIMEIRO COMANDO DA CAPITAL
Supplemental Information: Shimada is the São Paulo-based leader of a network laundering money on behalf of Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), Brazil’s largest transnational criminal gang. He has served as a key link between Florida-based PCC operatives and foreign drug traffickers, and he and his organization have laundered more than $30 million in illicit proceeds generated in and around multiple U.S. cities, using cryptocurrency to move funds back to Brazil on PCC’s behalf. In January 2025, Shimada was briefly held under house arrest in Brazil after one of his companies, Victory Trading Intermediação De Negócios, Cobranças E Tecnologia Ltda, was used to launder money stolen from a Brazilian soccer club in an advertising fraud scheme. He is designated pursuant to Executive Order 14059 for providing, or attempting to provide, financial, material, or technological support for PCC, and pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing support to or in support of PCC.
NUNES HENRIQUE DE OLIVEIRA, Stella Stefanie
- Address: Sao Paulo, Brazil
- DOB: 21 Mar 1992
- POB: Sao Paulo, Brazil
- Nationality: Brazil
- Gender: Female
- Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
- National ID No.: 38917779816 (Brazil)
- Party Type: individual
- Linked to: DE OLIVEIRA SHIMADA, Victor Henrique
Supplemental Information: Stella is a close associate and relative of Shimada who has worked as his secretary and served as a broker for bulk cash pickups, providing logistical services that supported Shimada and his network’s laundering operations. She is designated pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, Victor Henrique de Oliveira Shimada.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- OFAC Programs:
- SDGT Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
- ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059 Executive Order 14059
AVENIDAS FLUTUANTES UNIPESSOAL LDA
- Address: Setubal, Portugal
- Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
- Organization Established Date: 02 Sep 2021
- Organization Type: Transportation and storage
- Tax ID No.: PT516576887 (Portugal)
- Linked to: DE OLIVEIRA SHIMADA, Victor Henrique
Supplemental Information: Avenidas Flutuantes Unipessoal Lda is a transportation and storage company based near Lisbon, Portugal, owned by Shimada. It is designated pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, Shimada.
PIXWAVE SOLUCOES DE PAGAMENTOS LTDA
- AKA (Latin script): PIXWAVE SOLUÇÕES DE PAGAMENTOS LTDA
- Address: Sao Paulo, Brazil
- Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
- Organization Established Date: 30 Mar 2023
- Organization Type: Financial and Insurance Activities
- Tax ID No.: 50147517000186 (Brazil)
- Linked to: DE OLIVEIRA SHIMADA, Victor Henrique
Supplemental Information: Pixwave is one of the São Paulo-based companies in Shimada’s corporate network; per Treasury’s press release, Pixwave is described as a construction company (though OFAC’s own listing classifies its organization type as “Financial and Insurance Activities” — readers should note this discrepancy between the two official sources). It is designated pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, Shimada.
VICTORY TRADING INTERMEDIACAO DE NEGOCIOS COBRANCAS E TECNOLOGIA LTDA
- AKA (Latin script): VICTORY TRADING INTERMEDIAÇÃO DE NEGÓCIOS, COBRANÇAS E TECNOLOGIA LTDA
- Address: Sao Paulo, Brazil
- Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
- Organization Established Date: 04 Aug 2021
- Organization Type: Professional, scientific, and technical activities
- Tax ID No.: 42987643000110 (Brazil)
- Linked to: DE OLIVEIRA SHIMADA, Victor Henrique
Supplemental Information: Victory Trading is described in Treasury’s press release as a financial services company in Shimada’s corporate network. In January 2025, Shimada was briefly held under house arrest in Brazil because Victory Trading was used to launder money stolen from a Brazilian soccer club as part of an advertising fraud scheme. It is designated pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, Shimada.
WAVE CONSTRUCOES INTELIGENTES LTDA
- AKA (Latin script): WAVE CONSTRUÇÕES INTELIGENTES LTDA
- Address: Santos, Brazil
- Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
- Organization Established Date: 13 Nov 2023
- Organization Type: Construction of buildings
- Tax ID No.: 52870614000128 (Brazil)
- Linked to: DE OLIVEIRA SHIMADA, Victor Henrique
Supplemental Information: Wave is described in Treasury’s press release as a financial services company in Shimada’s corporate network (OFAC’s own listing classifies its organization type as “Construction of buildings” — again, note the discrepancy between the two official sources). It is designated pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, Shimada.
State Press Release: Terrorist Designation of Chone Killers
- OFAC Programs:
- FTO Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 597
- SDGT Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
CHONE KILLERS
- AKA: “Chone Killer Gang”
- Address: Ecuador
- Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
- Organization Type: Transnational Terrorist Group
- Target Type: Criminal Organization
Supplemental Information: Chone Killers is an Ecuadorian gang that has committed numerous attacks targeting civilians, law enforcement officers, and government officials, including high-profile assassinations of public officials. It originated as a faction of Los Choneros — itself a designated FTO and SDGT — before splintering into a separate group in 2020. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the designation as part of continued cooperation with Ecuador and President Daniel Noboa to disrupt narcoterrorist revenue streams. The action was taken pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Executive Order 13224; the FTO designation takes effect upon publication in the Federal Register.
Amendments:
The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:
ISIL KHORASAN
- AKA:
- ISIL’S SOUTH ASIA BRANCH
- ISIS WILAYAT KHORASAN
- ISISK
- ISIS-K
- IS-KHORASAN
- ISLAMIC STATE KHURASAN
- ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND LEVANT IN KHORASAN PROVINCE
- ISLAMIC STATE’S KHORASAN PROVINCE
- SOUTH ASIAN CHAPTER OF ISIL
- THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND ASH-SHAM – KHORASAN PROVINCE
- THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA – KHORASAN
- Address: Afghanistan; Pakistan
- Digital Currency Address – XMR: 44dZUJ7w1T3fKAvFW8XyXUVoAGSbFvXef2wcbnsjNKGWYorpLJBjth5VKSFhLGkpYKJb2J341tdZHBnbpv72WL7e8zuxfR2; 45ezvPejNsKYntjhyyeb7fbfzilsxYQozc5Ffseh8jPGW4JZQQVXykNTfK5uGFiij7Hp3qPv3T5HCR7F3Fnmz2mzE1aKQwo; 47FVhkRkWgnLs81UBqgY8ui6axAB1627HJjkY2qPnWxMbGfx7387kcY6RzScHgGMQAaH6CBxKXAS4862tS2fhs9BRdmuyav
- Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
- Organization Established Date: 10 Jan 2015
- Organization Type: Transnational Terrorist Group
- Digital Currency Address – TRX: [see full list under “List of Changes” below]
Supplemental Information: No press release accompanied this amendment. The update adds an organization established date, an organization type, and a large number of digital currency (XMR and TRX) addresses to OFAC’s existing ISIL Khorasan listing; the group’s FTO/SDGT designation itself is unchanged.
List of Changes:
- Field Name: Digital Currency Address – XMR
- Added: 44dZUJ7w1T3fKAvFW8XyXUVoAGSbFvXef2wcbnsjNKGWYorpLJBjth5VKSFhLGkpYKJb2J341tdZHBnbpv72WL7e8zuxfR2; 45ezvPejNsKYntjhyyeb7fbfzilsxYQozc5Ffseh8jPGW4JZQQVXykNTfK5uGFiij7Hp3qPv3T5HCR7F3Fnmz2mzE1aKQwo; 47FVhkRkWgnLs81UBqgY8ui6axAB1627HJjkY2qPnWxMbGfx7387kcY6RzScHgGMQAaH6CBxKXAS4862tS2fhs9BRdmuyav
- Field Name: Organization Established Date
- Added: 10 Jan 2015
- Field Name: Organization Type
- Added: Transnational Terrorist Group
- Field Name: Digital Currency Address – TRX
- Added: TUoixKFaWVsHxGWgnYyMzpkrT22YqU7VvH; TBtRqkiFzyuwe8nSAGQghxygAfwAF5eERq; TTs7KRq39547ruAsxb9brAPuTLy7h3U6H1; TVttWTHTCU9kULP51m9BaHpmCW8H1BJJNQ; TCqKhk7MpPnGH3UfygE1TRzUo92a5tuVy6; TSbGiFzG9xFXUYgGA6RwbS3jvKNpeA4c3R; TVXHp8bMrpRd5HGy3w1yu9f87qwRrMHFp8; TQ8a74SiDig3EDSC14tosLACWLbvaNYwCJ; TWdqVcA3NyrNv71NgbMwKv3C5XMxj4XjSp; TX1zyMrYZNbtQx7yPZp4adZV5NbToGNrkS; TSSQDgExKUELagzAKTAcoLMviq4SZ1eTFm; TUfq9hfP7qUDMoJbzkjG4GPtNxhZewqk8Z; TCEe3McjK9FWby8YsNmtRDwJt1x2s5dFTL; TBJqexr1FfGxVKhDsKeou6FVLBW1aS1Ny7; TV6cvFEMcfxGsWqgxpBrXZ35MkhdtdhT3G; THfLaNMBAMz7xXnHoz5BkRMmrwuHKqfAfR; TCudJgJ14kk3Ss2PEgsT15frztKpyG7HEh; TCk1g37N3x6PDda63waydNQwqTUzFNpsrR; TU8hJXgHdxWuj4DaaBKQFUwDeB8B5Xacke; TL5WqcFX7XkhVLLwaXrdr57gnjC4stBeSG; TSFCGGbR57b56c4MXdiW5gzpD8j6cmimgo; TXHb3BkGgYmygyS14MJKX8kTcFGT7dXN4r; TN56YaCBymut2xoiRvy3v2qZ2pYgmBAtSo; TPnUDsrLYZg1UXGkpXSmhFEY5J5etfzE9S; TVXP7Aj5KFUPKMQUrsU6F3wUsyiLiUaUje; TDxXXmCELgrb5VwYobDMyTKVTTdY9LjEjx; TXoVNrqm11FFVKcF1vEND64gibVkr1HwAR; TEKeY9i4CcVySJMmhuh2AxZhtgTmugYUMW; TW9mABkenngQyJBqce5khR9fNCBF5gsBFQ; TWumrtaEaPCv8Bs9mXqKkhY5sZVd78QAdS; TD7TXyvmjPfJkfhJuQ58NXA9dX9q81mqAp; TEtLieZwyjJTth7S5EJqUNjtSbM1ui9toK; TS729BUXeZWBhJGPKCdK75q7VU4nhkJkYT; TER8k4zWt3byuHyvyBkLstz3QVUUuBs9pt; TByksCkUtMaYwHCSaetmAGufpeyfdXBrJk; TNmKrdYLPtFwPNWJUjrXdkQw4gSwpszUJd; TTuDmNhu8A6koPJRUd8Q5RnsT1FMfrZnoj; TGLrjZc9c48iMFB4ZmDnSjSRMq27MXPg2k; TVgJTK9qPg7wGTyeTG2MYF8aKMEx883xYU; TPkNp2Z5KiA1sLWpPMWsfNErVo2dHxc4iy; TDSGtCciE9yFKYzDj1kBBc3F7gosguDqwC; TNVbVXAgUT83Sv7E9oZwWutXqzs13sr6xN; TAwNQN5tmzJJ694PPuoFUxQY13quBs8YgA; TGNwKzHjYvYP2SwsrmCYrRRvCRdxQgLq1w; TA3rH2A7iHnm6pKH8gr9cK1EZnShnmZdFg; TLj5ZRvem4DAdbZLTGU3qAbAdLQug57JVo; TMRxAJt87MVYnadWne53AxZFG1FPKGfoGz; TRmrnQiUY1ofMcTQUXvgeauKcZPnmwUeUR; TBKq3SzXigsGhQNzdCYocpt8RzoMh3uxAr; TYAiWf2KhXrGuWxmCPaJgC6zNYwFuKtioi; TYVveapkRkm5RHcDNPU9QnPk8N5RdsS4iY; TK7HUNru8YLMz7vv8kzWRPrE2ZSgZeCaHV; TAyyw6ZoTZexvTcN7WRR9t79JUFgSAvkL8; TJGVHmHVNuU1vsXGGALLoirPwoRZoMUuhg; TB1Bcv3x8mg7PVV4nVM48pgHJKcYboTypU; TWxoDF6qvjMUeTYRimaiARGsJTUnjrzZn3; TCXihiScsAodR942Xq45df9qQAdr5nhkjQ; TDhtVUnmYwWfzWVrnzryr3fbQo8VTvj4ji; TE6VgR7rAuY4kuzCjdSVCZFXPjjzSQYY7X; TV62LkiP1GiNdFCJEdY3xf6GdNLCCi6mfu; TWBqpQLDPCrXgRW1X9yFqR8NFfjyFSq5k4; TQetJ6xMqvv2Fu4ftD9UdBhuaKem5HbMou; TWAfC6htS1FyFv1r3aKENuD8DQGMzBbP8L; TMfDhpUqW5W6HcMPXFaJfaiY271CYa51Hs; TB5J8W166YTUmtpUsy4XnNTKLVtesuE9eV; TSE5NWTJckiN8hJCUzwB3RgsMbdF4uCrmr; TDi9s3GeAtFBbUvGxqXiZnxiaH9QpqjYFn; TCUTmWspsaJb3U5JUs5AhVcGwaftyK1qtp; TYvR9x3Dqx39s9rooaSAHwVwF8psBrcFBV; TUyo1Kfnnjr2iMQdZxLWPX1U8Xiy1Wz5z5; TBhR5MLrTsNZ8FUyKgzdrCjWkYD2orYLdx; THstQuwNidzC4YeJ7uPowf55ZdVZtGcHJ5; TKX6rgpGpGrJWzf1qXUUSNL5cYHQt7Z9rY; TWoRwYzsifrD79DHDpTHC8fq787MvH9Qro; TDHJNJHosn6xNDxMecFZwXyTzE9bYGXp9L; TQVZEuLHacexyJX3nZStaPzxceS63C9bax; TQb6Pc4PmfUdUokLq5ygNioj4PnodNak9b; TR3yiEuFrbBnP8X5DKYFjRxCwbxcYyftD4; TEBHpD6iiAqhyS4w7zZFmD1rrv65a5HVTD; TMocScwSbSn2cqRCHVkzZSEar3Jk5AsXgo; TNKyDgjn2WHZwHhH2Mj5AGMnK4moBX9xQd; TPcwqbJ3ViWMUQMiKfMjDM7VTiCzdRu1cH; TVJ4B5R8c8dS65NtUXpZPMGUpCRq8BQUrC; TAgZxxuvfuKYJY5UPC1DXF8NPHbKtTzEGu; TCyAE8Lxa1rmTThhE5Z3X95PC9rgMrReMX; TSi1d66cgg3cPm9L6c2ZD8K1381XusSjkc; TR83KsDjUKeds62PcAgo7BfhPJPSpMk7Ba; TDX3dFNPvJeA9eVLLNqf1ixr4U2ktcDmoD; TJCUwt9EKeTyzDw42658h8aYxQXScLdCZR; TETfViHWf9ZNB6WJgZBRMB48pTaBFo5Rmd; TBhTMBAaEWiTtMgMdJ97ZmYotgHeY543cc; TFebC149jCDiow1MBphhfpHDLeMAKRNrqJ; TXw4d7BseHBn6sneMUzm4nEdfPVjuJGEH9; TQt3dWHiPdaKioG7nwovoTDUtxfimyuxYa; TE5R3hJ6REap6vh14YAqjXczKrYaiteTy3; TCCryMcQb5A5FSYkmcVy26Nd8J1FWHtfWh; TLC3piEQ5n4tcULKHqLTGhmYFUyHUVSxck; TLDtPq9PQsDuQunME8CSeVdYaLtRdrVgoJ; TRqbVMHWck3j2vKzA16L69v3cwuoyQSY8L; TA82wQ77kb9DieW4C8q7C4KwMfnCzfziqN; TUcjuVB6RFvsMgE352Kdc3VHvFvteti97B; TBfVDwNS6hC2Ln2qTLTRKMMPddscFEhhrU; TC7vaJsxZteEEnnm2EFm9BRSZvezvsuA86; TRWDtgCfXzTcMv8W6iJxh6umeqeF3zG7n5; TUa7BcRjT3eT7kPyNWPvHQkz4qF9v68D7A; TNHNySUf8LMzhzSiQnHCXCbgatscQbM4ZQ; TNzvDTvcQTaY9jFrv85JnqibnGcudePj1z; TUcNB6c22JmcwXbbbuv9HVPeVqv5HSiTwQ; TVUS1CVQnnzoJG8PBWkcWyf7DkLrS8yh5Z; TXR1nhqAek4c5Dq9EfjQLarcBWR9Jp6N7m; TFS2LHNcrffdAVRHpDUpNvnmCHs78cSNbz; TPTFrDhx5tntyp5mRX423DaAe8aLDMUs31; TCn9wM828B1GtsVn8kUaCvoE3RpfCAmtEB; TFtz6Ae6NNo9VvhnVrj6V1RyEFMtZQMh3r; TMoMat6oyJLKxSb6SfQWBWc7q5PSm3Gr6U; TNsMJKvAtqiWntAnrcS8jkugL37FGzoqss; TPCnxv28xNbvtAaEppddvnfkjQpaFeAkV3; TDXBEozXRJy7eBYNCoqrDMRCx5QBN4jCCt; TTrJwfL8SCSWBXWAPcZV8Pd5fZf1rznRhz; TFqo5f16FJfSKesPxtGN4VN5HNZJebqMQX; TPwjq8YuABThppKM5ppsuagBFwDhzpnY11; TXgm2Pej4dHzh6oAJvaxAVFDevgGJqfSKr; TUErmQ9GtRDGC4g4L5wjWS55Ju5hYfR3sa; THPfLwEGvHVgRzi7EMnviAFy5WG1feDH1p; TPH1ehJuNY8cRuJgWTXoGuzkVpK5ckueLF; TRZvMk2D4fmjGjtuZHRVpgw6yjk8NcjsHV; TMuBvwcgrTj6JysMmutXWaPjk1kREK2BDe; TE5paMkU1hPr8BdjkSJLvEyUBxjKKSx1H6; TBmqXsFNYTMkyw9jVGBAecGaLyLwbxFTM1; TFh7Z4qmdiT7opAYYLmNVXQJtVCkAtg7Zh; TLFqEhiG7RUSZ9x5iph99Ke5782dkgRnWf
OFAC Programs:
- FTO Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 597
- SDGT Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
Sources:
- OFAC Programs:
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Today’s OFAC Recent Actions Notice:
Reminder to File the 2026 Annual Report of Blocked Property
31 C.F.R. § 501.603 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (RPPR) requires U.S. persons holding blocked property as of June 30 of the current year to file an Annual Report of Blocked Property (ARBP) with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) by September 30. Persons that did not hold blocked property as of June 30 do not need to file an ARBP.
Please note that the term blocked property only applies to property that is blocked pursuant to OFAC regulations. Property that was unblocked by an OFAC general or specific license, or that was previously blocked pursuant to a sanctions program that was terminated on or before June 30, 2026, is not considered blocked property, and should not be included in the ARBP.
Similarly, a restricted account of a person ordinarily resident in Iran is not blocked property and should not be reported to OFAC in the ARBP, unless a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to an applicable sanctions authority has an interest in the account.
Persons filing the 2026 ARBP must use spreadsheet form TD-F 90-22.50 and submit the completed form through the OFAC Reporting System (ORS). Failure to file the ARBP by September 30 constitutes a violation of the RPPR.
For additional information, please review OFAC’s Guidance on Filing the 2026 Annual Report of Blocked Property.
and that guidance: