Month: July 2026

  • Eleven Questions Practitioners Keep Asking OFAC

    OFAC’s FAQ database now runs to roughly 985 entries spread across 38 topic pages, from a single FAQ under Balkans-Related Sanctions to 243 under Iran. Read across the whole set, the same handful of question types show up again and again, program after program. Below are the eleven categories that emerged from that review, ordered from most to least common, with a rough sense of how much of the database each one accounts for.

    A caveat up front: these categories aren’t mutually exclusive. A single FAQ interpreting a Russia general license is very often also a secondary-sanctions question and a wind-down question at the same time. The counts below are estimates based on which category each FAQ most centrally addresses, not a mechanical tag count, so treat them as directional rather than exact.

    1. What does General License X authorize? (~340 FAQs, the largest category by far)

    This is the single most common reason an OFAC FAQ exists. A general license gets issued, and OFAC follows it with one or more FAQs spelling out exactly what it covers, what it doesn’t, and how long any wind-down window runs. These FAQs are almost never abstract – they’re triggered by one specific GL and answered in narrow, GL-specific terms. Belarus GL 4 and GL 5 (the Belaruskali wind-down), Russia GL 8L (energy wind-down) and GL 116 (entities linked to a specific designated individual), and the Afghanistan GLs 14 through 20 are all typical examples. If you’re trying to predict where OFAC will publish its next FAQ, a newly issued GL is usually the leading indicator.

    2. Secondary sanctions and non-U.S. person exposure (~100 FAQs)

    Concentrated heavily in Iran and Russia. These FAQs work through when a non-U.S., non-Iranian, or non-Russian person or financial institution can be exposed to U.S. sanctions for dealing with a blocked party – CISADA, the NDAA “significant transaction” test, and the Russia-related CAPTA Directive all generate this type of question repeatedly. A cluster of these FAQs exists purely to define the operative terms (what counts as “significant,” what “knowingly” means) because those definitions are what determine whether a foreign bank loses U.S. correspondent account access.

    3. Wind-down and divestment mechanics (~100 FAQs)

    Distinct from the general GL-scope questions above: these are about the lifecycle of a transaction after a designation happens – closing a correspondent account, paying down an outstanding loan, or negotiating the sale of a now-blocked entity. The recent Lukoil-related FAQs on divesting LIG entities are a good current example of this pattern.

    4. Humanitarian and agricultural/medical carve-outs (~80 FAQs)

    Nearly every country program has its own version of this question, because food, medicine, and medical device exports are treated as a standing exception that industry keeps asking about program by program – Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, Cuba, Venezuela, and Sudan all have a meaningful cluster here.

    5. Highly bespoke, single-entity FAQs (~80 FAQs)

    Especially visible in Iran and Russia: FAQs that read more like case notes on one company or one enforcement action than generalizable guidance – the Bank of Kunlun CISADA finding is a good example. This pattern is likely a big part of why Iran (243 FAQs) and Russia (159 FAQs) so heavily outweigh every other topic: long-running programs accumulate a one-off FAQ per major action rather than folding it into a general rule.

    6. Definitional FAQs (~70 FAQs)

    A surprising share of FAQs exist purely to pin down a term used in a statute or executive order – “significant financial transaction,” “knowingly,” “Iranian financial institution,” “Russia’s military-industrial base.” These read like industry asked for definitional certainty before OFAC ever issued formal regulatory text on the point, and OFAC answered by FAQ instead.

    7. The 50 Percent Rule and entity ownership (~50 FAQs)

    Some version of “is this entity blocked because a blocked person owns 50 percent or more of it, directly or indirectly through another entity” shows up in nearly every topic – Basic Information, Belarus, Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, and its own dedicated topic (Entities Owned by Blocked Persons). This is clearly one of the more persistently confusing mechanics in the whole sanctions regime, and OFAC keeps restating the same core rule with slightly different fact patterns each time.

    8. Correspondent and payable-through account mechanics (~50 FAQs)

    A process-level companion to the secondary sanctions category above: what a U.S. financial institution must actually do if it holds an account, or receives a wire, touching a blocked or listed party – block it, reject it, report it to OFAC within 10 business days, and hold it in an interest-bearing account pending further action.

    9. SDN List mechanics and name-matching (~50 FAQs)

    Assessing OFAC Name Matches is an entire topic devoted to this question, and it recurs elsewhere too – what the bracketed program tags on an SDN List entry mean (e.g., [IRAN], [IFSR], [SDGT]), how the delisting and reconsideration process works, and OFAC’s consistent point that it does not publish or endorse any kind of “safe list.”

    10. Building and running a compliance program (~40 FAQs)

    A separate cluster from the transaction-specific questions above – Starting an OFAC Compliance Program is its own topic, and there are sector-specific versions for insurance and for internet/web-based activity. These are less about a specific designation and more about internal controls generally.

    11. Sector determinations (~30 FAQs)

    “OFAC identified Sector X of a country’s economy – does that mean everyone in that sector is blocked?” Burma’s jet fuel sector, Russia’s metals and mining sector, and Belarus’s potash sector all generate this question. OFAC’s answer follows the same pattern each time: identifying a sector puts persons operating in it on notice of sanctions risk, but it does not automatically block everyone in that sector – only persons OFAC actually designates.


    A note on the numbers. The estimates above add up close to the full 985-FAQ database, but they shouldn’t be read as an exact partition – plenty of individual FAQs genuinely straddle two or three of these categories.

  • Initiating Rescission Process of Syria’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism

    PRESS STATEMENT

    MARCO RUBIO, SECRETARY OF STATE

    JULY 8, 2026

    Today, President Trump informed Congress of his administration’s intent to rescind Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), following a 45-day pre-notification period. This is yet another historic step by President Trump to give the Syrian people a chance at greatness. 

    Lifting sanctions on Syria will unlock international trade and investment, give Syria a chance to rebuild, and open up a new chapter for the Syrian people.  A stable, unified Syria at peace with itself and its neighbors benefits not only the region, but the entire world.

    The rescission follows President Trump’s June 30, 2025, Executive Order directing sanctions relief for Syria, the positive changes and counterterrorism actions taken by the Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and formal assurances provided by President al-Sharaa that Syria will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. 

    Today marks a significant milestone in the revived U.S.-Syria bilateral relationship and in Syria’s history as a nation.  We commend the government of Syria for charting a new course and look forward to enhancing our partnership with Syria and its people. 

  • Today, OFAC issued Russia-related General License 13R:

    and updated 2 Frequently Asked Questions:

    1118. As of December 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation may require a so-called “exit tax” payment prior to the divestment of assets located in the Russian Federation, potentially requiring transactions involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. Do U.S. sanctions prohibit the payment of this so-called “exit tax”? Does Russia-related General License (GL) 13R authorize transactions that involve the payment of this exit tax? 

    Directive 4 under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” as amended (Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive), prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons: any transaction involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, including any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction for or on behalf of such entities (collectively, “Directive 4 entities”). As noted in FAQ 1002, this includes both direct and indirect transactions.

    OFAC issued the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive with the explicit aim of preventing the Government of the Russian Federation from leveraging these institutions and their holdings of international reserves in ways that would undermine the impact of U.S. sanctions. Information currently available to OFAC suggests so-called “exit taxes” imposed by the Government of the Russian Federation involve payments to Directive 4 entities. Consequently, U.S. persons whose divestment from the Russian Federation will involve the payment of such an exit tax require a specific license from OFAC prior to the payment of such tax, unless otherwise authorized by OFAC.

    GL 13R authorizes U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, or certifications involving Directive 4 entities that would otherwise be prohibited by the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons’ day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation. Payment of exit taxes is not considered ordinarily incident and necessary to day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation and, thus, is not authorized under GL 13R.

    Therefore, U.S. persons whose divestment of assets in the Russian Federation will involve a payment of such an “exit tax” should seek a specific license from OFAC. Such persons may submit a request for a specific license with OFAC’s Licensing Division online at https://ofac.treasury.gov/ofac-license-application-page. License applications related to these payments should include information regarding the amount of the exit tax, the amount of ongoing taxes that would otherwise be paid to the Government of the Russian Federation should divestment not occur, the impact of a failure to pay the tax on the employees of the exiting company, the specific economic activity in Russia of the exiting company, and the impact on the Russian Federation of the divestment. OFAC will expedite its review of such requests, which will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

    While OFAC is aware that the Commission established by the Russian Federation to review such divestments may include individuals from entities subject to the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive or individuals listed on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, U.S. persons do not need to seek authorization from OFAC for their Russian buyers to submit an application to the Commission regarding a divestment transaction.

    Date Updated: July 08, 2026

    Updated on Jul 08, 2026

    Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions

    999. What authorizations exist for entities subject to Directive 4 under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” as amended (Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive)? 

    OFAC issued Russia-related General License (GL) 132 to authorize transactions involving the Paks II civil nuclear power plant project in Hungary, including those involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, that would be prohibited by the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive.

    OFAC issued Russia-related General License (GL) 115D to authorize civil nuclear energy-related transactions, including those involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, that would be prohibited by the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive.

    OFAC issued GL 13R to authorize U.S. persons to pay taxes, fees, or import duties and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, or certifications, to the extent such transactions are prohibited by the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons’ day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation. For further information on the types of transactions authorized by GL 13R, see FAQ 1118.

    OFAC also issued GL 14, authorizing certain transactions involving any Directive 4 entity where the Directive 4 entity’s sole function in the transaction is to act as an operator of a clearing and settlement system. GL 14 does not authorize any transfer of assets to or from any Directive 4 entity, or any transaction where a Directive 4 entity is either a counterparty or beneficiary to the transaction. In addition, GL 14 does not authorize any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of any Directive 4 entity. See FAQ 1003.

    Note that GL 13R, GL 14, GL 115D, and GL 132 continue to authorize against the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive.

    Date Updated: July 08, 2026

    Updated on Jul 08, 2026

  • UK Gov logo, 50% resolution.png

    Today, Tuesday 7 July, the UK Government has amended the designations of an individual and entity sanctioned under the Russia sanctions regime. Furthermore, 1 vessel specified under the Russia sanctions regime has been revoked.

    Amended Individual:

    Name:Unique ID:
    Stanislav Sergeyevich POPOVRUS3656

    Amended Entity:

    Name:Unique ID:
    HOUBI GLOBAL S.A.RUS3619

    Revoked Vessel:

    Name:IMO Number:Unique ID:
    Zangazur9420617RUS2579

    The Sanctions Notice:

    , ,
  • We found out today – witness Iran-related General License X1 (Revocation and Wind Down of June 21, 2026 Authorization for the Production, Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil, Petrochemical Products, and Petroleum Products of Iranian Origin):

  • The spreadsheet lists all OFAC Frequently Asked Questions Topics and the number of FAQs for each topic, sorted in descending order. Not totally surprising, but Iran sanctions (243) and Russia sanctions (159) top the list.

  • The prompt to Claude:

    What is the purpose of OFAC’s use of “Linked To” in its designations? What informational, practical and/or legal implications are there to this information? How does it inform data analytics and KYC/CDD efforts – and where do those fall in the range from requirement to nice to have for even the most high-profile firms? Is there anything else we ought to know about this data? Write your response for sanctions profesionals who are not lawyers.

    The response:

    The “Linked To” field is one of the more misunderstood pieces of SDN metadata, so it’s worth unpacking carefully.

    What “Linked To” actually is

    When OFAC designates a party, it frequently establishes a relationship between that party and an existing sanctions target or program. In the SDN data, this surfaces as a “Linked To” relationship – typically visible in the consolidated data files and on the SDN Search interface as a note that Entity A is “Linked To” Entity B (or to a specific program).

    The core purpose is to document why a party was designated and to whom or what they connect. OFAC rarely designates in a vacuum. A person gets added because they own or control a blocked entity, act on behalf of a designated party, materially assist a sanctioned regime, are a family member operating as a front, and so on. “Linked To” is OFAC’s way of preserving that connective tissue in the structured data.

    The critical distinction: derivative vs. standalone designation

    Here’s the nuance that trips people up. “Linked To” is a relationship attribute; it is not itself the legal basis for blocking. Every party on the SDN List is blocked in its own right by virtue of being on the list, regardless of what it’s linked to. The linkage tells you the narrative and often the authority under which OFAC acted, but the legal consequence – block the property, reject or freeze the transaction – flows from the SDN listing itself, not from the link.

    This matters because practitioners sometimes treat a “Linked To” entry as if it were a secondary target that also needs screening. It isn’t a screening target on its own; the linked party is either already an SDN in its own entry (in which case it’s screened directly) or it’s a program/authority reference. Don’t confuse the relationship pointer with an actionable name.

    Informational implications

    The field gives you three useful things:

    Attribution and context. It answers “why is this party here?” That’s valuable for alert adjudication, narrative building in SARs, and explaining a hit to a business line that wants to know the story.

    Network mapping. Aggregated across the list, “Linked To” relationships let you reconstruct the designation networks OFAC sees – the web of ownership, control, and agency around a primary target. This is the raw material for understanding a sanctioned oligarch’s corporate structure or a proliferation network’s front companies.

    Program inference. The linkage often clarifies which program or authority is in play, which affects how you handle related risk (e.g., a party linked to a Russia-program target carries different downstream implications than one linked to a counter-narcotics target).

    Practical and legal implications

    The practical caution: “Linked To” does not substitute for a 50 Percent Rule analysis. OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule blocks entities owned 50% or more, in aggregate, by one or more blocked persons – even if those entities are not on the SDN List and have no “Linked To” entry pointing at them. The “Linked To” field captures relationships OFAC chose to document; it does not capture every ownership relationship that triggers derivative blocking. Treating the field as a complete ownership map is a real compliance failure mode. The regulator’s position is that the obligation to identify 50%-owned entities rests with the filer, using ownership data that frequently lives entirely outside the SDN metadata.

    The legal reality, stated plainly: the block attaches to the listed party. “Linked To” is descriptive metadata, not an operative legal element you act on independently. You don’t “unblock” something because its link looks tenuous, and you don’t gain a separate blocking obligation because a link exists.

    Data analytics and KYC/CDD – requirement vs. nice-to-have

    Let me separate the layers, because the answer differs sharply by layer.

    Screening the SDN List itself: requirement, full stop. Every US person and most firms with US touchpoints must screen against the SDN List. That’s non-negotiable and doesn’t depend on “Linked To” at all – you screen the names, you resolve the hits.

    Using “Linked To” for alert adjudication and enrichment: strongly expected, effectively a de facto requirement at scale. For a high-profile firm, examiners and regulators expect a risk-based program that uses available context to make sound decisions. The field isn’t itself mandated, but a sophisticated institution that ignored readily available OFAC-provided context in its adjudication would struggle to defend that as reasonable. So in practice it sits closer to “requirement” than “nice to have” for large, high-risk firms – not because a rule names the field, but because using it is part of what a defensible risk-based program looks like.

    Network analytics / graph analysis built on “Linked To”: genuinely nice-to-have, but increasingly table stakes for the top tier. Reconstructing designation networks to get ahead of 50% Rule exposure, identify likely front companies before they’re listed, and map beneficial ownership risk is advanced practice. No rule requires you to build a graph database of OFAC linkages. But for globally systemic institutions and firms with heavy exposure to Russia, Venezuela, or proliferation-finance risk, this kind of analytics has moved from differentiator toward expected capability. The honest framing: not a legal requirement, but the gap between “compliant” and “credible at the frontier” increasingly runs through exactly this work.

    The through-line: the listing drives requirements; “Linked To” drives quality of judgment. Regulators assess programs on reasonableness and risk-sensitivity, and richer use of context is how you demonstrate both.

    Other things worth knowing

    A few practical cautions:

    Coverage is uneven. Not every designation carries a fully populated “Linked To” set, and the granularity varies across programs and vintages. Older entries were built under different data conventions. So don’t assume the absence of a link means the absence of a relationship.

    It’s directional and curated. The field reflects the relationships OFAC decided to memorialize for a given action, not an exhaustive relationship graph. It’s a lens on OFAC’s reasoning, not a complete intelligence picture.

    It appears in the enhanced/consolidated data, not the legacy flat SDN file in the same way. If your screening feed only ingests basic name/ID fields, you may not be capturing “Linked To” at all – worth confirming with your data vendor exactly which fields flow into your system versus your analytics environment.

    Finally, don’t over-read tenuous links. A documented linkage tells you OFAC saw a relationship material enough to note; it doesn’t quantify the strength or the current status of that relationship, and relationships decay over time while the metadata may not.

  • Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury

    OFSI: Amended and Extended Maritime Mutual Re-Insurance Wind Down General Licence

    OFSI has published an amended and extended Maritime Mutual Re-Insurance Wind Down General Licence INT/2026/8893924.  

    The General Licence was amended and extended as follows:

    • The expiry date of the General Licence has been extended from 06 July 2026 to 07 October 2026.
    • A monthly reporting requirement has been introduced. Designated Persons relying on the licence are now required to provide HM Treasury, within 14 days of the end of each calendar month, with a report setting out details of all activities and/or payments carried out under the licence during that month. Details of what the report(s) must include are listed within the General Licence and Publication Notice.

    The Publication Notice:

    and the General Licence: