Mr. Sanctions

Category: US State Department (US)

  • Plain-Language Summary of GE Settlement for DDTC Settlement

    Note: The Consent Agreement and Order documents were both not machine-readable, but Claude says the Proposed Charging Letter is more detailed anyhow.

    GE Aerospace’s $36 Million Export Violation Settlement — Plain-Language Summary

    What Happened?

    On April 17, 2026, the U.S. Department of State announced that GE Aerospace (the jet-engine arm of General Electric) agreed to pay $36 million to settle 116 violations of U.S. arms export law. The violations took place over a roughly six-year window, from April 2018 through late 2024.

    The relevant law is called ITAR — the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Think of it as the strict rulebook that governs who American defense companies can share military technology with, and how. Violating ITAR is serious: it can harm national security and, in theory, expose a company to penalties exceeding $1.27 million per violation.

    The Four Categories of Violations

    1. Sending Sensitive Military Data to China (the most serious)

    China is on America’s “do not share” list for arms and military technology. Despite this, GE had three separate incidentsof sending controlled technical data to China without authorization:

    • In 2018, an employee traveling to China carried a company laptop containing data related to F-35, F-16, F-15, and U-2 aircraft engines — and then left the laptop unattended with Chinese university officials for 90 minutes.
    • In 2021, an employee emailed a technical drawing of a component from the F118 military engine to a Chinese supplier, mistakenly thinking it was governed by a less-restrictive export rule (Commerce Department rules, rather than ITAR).
    • In 2023, GE shipped maintenance manuals for the F110 engine to Singapore on three occasions — but routed the packages through China, which itself is prohibited. Nobody had configured the shipping account to flag that as a problem.

    The U.S. government determined that at least one of these incidents — the F118 engine drawing — actually provided China with useful military information.

    2. Mismanaging Export Licenses and Agreements (the largest category — 103 charges)

    GE held many government-approved licenses and agreements covering what military technology it could share with foreign partners, and under what conditions. It repeatedly failed to follow the fine print. Examples include:

    • Shipping repaired military components to the UK Ministry of Defense when the UK MoD wasn’t listed as an authorized recipient on the relevant agreement.
    • Allowing Japanese partners to pass military engine components to 31 unauthorized sub-suppliers over five years, because GE didn’t properly verify who was in the chain.
    • Sending technical data to suppliers in Mexico that went beyond what the license actually permitted.
    • Using a license exemption to ship turbine blade castings to Canada 30 times when a specific government condition required obtaining separate licenses for each shipment — and then failing to track the quantities properly.
    • Having a Swedish partner share engine maintenance data with an unauthorized entity in South Africa.
    • Failing to notify Congress of certain defense exports to Sweden, as required by law.
    • Repeatedly failing to submit required paperwork — things like purchase orders, amendment notifications, and lists of parties to agreements — on time or at all.

    The root causes cited repeatedly: outdated internal procedures (some not updated in over 10 years), inadequate training, and insufficient oversight of foreign partners.

    3. Exporting Defense Hardware Without Authorization (4 charges)

    • A wrong engine combustion liner (for the F404-400) was accidentally shipped to Sweden because commercial paperwork got mixed up between two different items.
    • 15 machined chassis for the F-35 aircraft were temporarily exported to Israel across three shipments because an employee misclassified them under the wrong export control regime.

    4. Failing to Update Its Government Registration (3 charges)

    GE repeatedly failed to report material changes to its registration statement with the government’s defense trade regulator, as required within five days of any such change. This kind of administrative failure can obscure the government’s visibility into who a company is and what it’s doing.

    The Settlement Terms

    GE Aerospace will pay a civil penalty of $36 million. The Department of State agreed to suspend $18 million of that amount on the condition that those funds are used for remedial compliance improvements instead. For at least 24 months, GE must also engage an external Special Compliance Officer to oversee its compliance program, and must submit to at least one independent external audit. The full consent agreement runs for 36 months.

    Why Wasn’t the Penalty Larger?

    The maximum theoretical penalty for 116 violations would be enormous. The penalty was reduced significantly because:

    • GE voluntarily disclosed all 116 violations itself — it found the problems and reported them, rather than waiting to be caught.
    • GE fully cooperated with the government’s review.
    • GE had already started fixing its compliance program before the settlement.

    That said, the government also noted aggravating factors: some of the exports involved Significant Military Equipment, violations were systemic across multiple business units, and the China incidents caused real national security harm.

    Key Takeaways for Non-Expert Professionals

    1. Self-disclosure matters enormously. GE’s decision to report its own violations — all 116 of them — likely saved the company hundreds of millions of dollars in potential penalties and avoided debarment from government contracting.
    2. Compliance programs need maintenance. A recurring theme here is procedures that hadn’t been updated in a decade. Regulations change; compliance infrastructure has to keep pace.
    3. You’re responsible for your partners’ compliance. Many violations occurred not at GE directly, but through foreign partners and sublicensees. Under ITAR, the U.S. license-holder is responsible for ensuring the whole chain follows the rules.
    4. China is a red line. Any unauthorized sharing of military-related technical data with China — even routing a package through a Chinese airport — is treated as a serious aggravated violation.
    5. Paperwork isn’t optional. A surprisingly large number of the 116 charges were essentially administrative failures: late filings, missing notifications, wrong forms. These are avoidable with proper systems.

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  • April 18, 2026: Sanctions-Adjacent – State Deparment tags Nicaraguan Vice Minister for Human Rights Violations

    Designation of Nicaraguan Vice Minister of the Interior for Involvement in Gross Violations of Human Rights

    PRESS STATEMENT

    MARCO RUBIO, SECRETARY OF STATE

    APRIL 18, 2026

    Nearly eight years ago, the Rosario Murillo and Daniel Ortega dictatorship unleashed a brutal wave of repression against Nicaraguans who courageously stood against the regime’s increased tyranny, corruption, and abuse.  Today, to mark the anniversary of the April 2018 protests, and remember the more than 325 protesters murdered in the aftermath, the Trump Administration is designating Vice Minister of the Interior, Luis Roberto Cañas Novoa, under Section 7031(c) for his involvement in gross violations of human rights.

    This public designation is made under Section 7031(c) of the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (Div. F, P.L. 119-75).

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  • April 17, 2026: GE gets ITARed and feathered by DDTC

    U.S. Department of State Concludes $36 Million Settlement Resolving Export Violations by General Electric Company

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    APRIL 17, 2026

    The U.S. Department of State has concluded an administrative settlement with General Electric Company (GE Aerospace) to resolve 116 violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq., and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. parts 120-130. The Department of State and GE Aerospace reached this settlement following an extensive compliance review by the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance in the Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

    The administrative settlement between the Department of State and GE Aerospace, concluded pursuant to ITAR § 128.11, addresses multiple categories of ITAR violations, including GE Aerospace’s unauthorized exports of technical data to the People’s Republic of China; violations of terms, conditions, and provisos of several Directorate of Defense Trade Controls authorizations involving various countries; unauthorized exports of defense articles to two countries; and failure to report material changes to its ITAR registration.

    GE Aerospace voluntarily disclosed all the alleged violations, a substantial portion of which predate 2023. GE Aerospace also fully cooperated with the Department’s review of this matter and has implemented numerous improvements to its ITAR compliance program since the conduct at issue.

    Under the terms of the 36-month Consent Agreement, GE Aerospace will pay a civil penalty of $36 million. The Department has agreed to suspend $18 million of this amount on the condition that the funds will be used for the Department-approved Consent Agreement’s remedial compliance measures to strengthen GE Aerospace’s compliance program. In addition, for an initial period of at least 24 months, GE Aerospace will engage an external Special Compliance Officer to oversee the Consent Agreement, which will also require at least one external audit of its ITAR compliance program and implementation of additional compliance measures.

    This settlement demonstrates the Department’s role in furthering the national security and foreign policy of the United States by controlling the export of defense articles. The settlement also highlights the importance of exporting defense articles pursuant only to appropriate authorization from the Department. 

    The Consent Agreement and related documents will be available for public inspection in the Public Reading Room of the Department of State and on the Penalties and Oversights Agreements section of the DDTC’s website. 

    For additional information, please contact the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and Internal Security at T_Outreach_PM@state.gov.

    and here are the documents from the DDTC site:

    Proposed Charging Letter GE Aerospace 20260417Download
    Consent Agreement GE Aerospace 20260417Download
    Order GE Aerospace 20260417Download

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  • April 17, 2026: OFAC adds Iran-related counter-terror listings, and Sudan listings

    Counter Terrorism Designations; Sudan Designations

    Treasury Press Release: Economic Fury Targets Iran-Backed Iraqi Militia Commanders

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Sanctions Recruitment Network Enabling War in Sudan, Calls for Humanitarian Truce

    State Press Release: Taking Action Against Iran-Backed Militia Commanders Threatening U.S. Personnel

    State Press Release: Marking Three Years of Conflict in Sudan with Sanctions and Appeal for Humanitarian Truce

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: SDGT Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

    AL RAMMAHI, Ammar Jasim Kadhim

    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 16 Aug 1976
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: B29874786 (Iraq) expires 25 May 2033
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: KATA’IB HIZBALLAH

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Al Rammahi is a Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) operational commander who directs KH attack planning efforts and generates targeting information for attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities. He also coordinates the timing and location of KH operations. The State Department’s press release notes that KH, along with Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq, Harakat Al-Nujaba, and Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, undermines Iraq’s sovereignty, exploits its resources to fund terrorism, and attacks Iraq’s neighbors and innocent Iraqi civilians with impunity. These four groups are designated as both Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224 and as Foreign Terrorist Organizations pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

    ALBAKHATRA, Khalid Jameel Abed

    • AKA: BAKHATRI, Khaled
    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 01 Jan 1978
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: A13438387 expires 21 Jul 2026
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: KATA’IB SAYYID AL-SHUHADA

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Albakhatra is a senior Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) official who specifically serves as a KSS commander. KSS is supported by Iran with training, funding, and weapons and has threatened U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq.

    ALMOHAMMED, Radhwan Yousif Hameed

    • AKA:
      • ABDALLAH, Hajji
      • AL-MOHAMMED, Radhwan Youssef Hameed
      • AL-MOHAMMED, Ridwan Youssef Hameed
      • AL-MUHAMMAD, Ridwan Yusif Hamid
      • AL-TAWIL, Abu Abdallah
      • GHADIR, Abu
      • TAHIR, Abu
    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 23 Nov 1970
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: A18208609 (Iraq) expires 22 Nov 2028
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: KATA’IB HIZBALLAH

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Almohammed has been a key KH official for several years and coordinated KH operations. KH has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Iraq since its founding in 2006, against both U.S. forces and forces serving in support of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and is ideologically tied to Iran, receiving financial and military support from Iran.

    HAMZAH, Hasan Dheyab Hamzah

    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 25 Feb 1977
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: B10398022 (Iraq) expires 25 Feb 2032
    • alt. Passport: A11413285 (Iraq) expires 19 Aug 2024
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: KATA’IB HIZBALLAH

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Hamzah is a senior KH official involved in operations who coordinates KH operations, including threats to U.S. forces.

    JAYTHOOM, Husham Hashim

    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 25 Aug 1969
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: A21616600 (Iraq) expires 20 May 2031
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HARAKAT AL-NUJABA

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Jaythoom is a military trainer for Harakat al-Nujaba (HAN). HAN officials have publicly threatened to attack U.S. personnel in Iraq and the region, and HAN has openly pledged its loyalties to Iran at the expense of Iraqi sovereignty.

    MUKHAMIS, Saeed Kadhim

    • AKA:
      • MGHAMES, Sameer Kadem
      • MUGHAMIS, Said Kazim
    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 01 May 1972
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: G1364088 (Iraq) expires 17 Jul 2015
    • National ID No.: 00668627 (Iraq) expires 12 Dec 2020
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: KATA’IB SAYYID AL-SHUHADA

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Mukhamis is a senior KSS official. KSS is supported by Iran with training, funding, and weapons and has threatened U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq.

    SUWAED, Safaa Adnan Jabbar

    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 01 May 1972
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: A18386175 (Iraq) expires 22 Mar 2029
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: ASA’IB AHL AL-HAQ

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Suwaed is a senior Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) official and military commander, as well as a chief of operations in Salah ad-Din Province, Iraq. As of March 2026, AAH has utilized Iranian drones to attack U.S. and Coalition forces in Northern Iraq. AAH has claimed responsibility for thousands of attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces since its founding in 2006, and has been extensively funded and trained by Iran throughout.

    OFAC Program: SUDAN-EO14098 Executive Order 14098

    GARCIA BATTE, Jose Oscar

    • Addresses:
      • Calle 64, No. 7-62, Apt 403, Bogota, Colombia
      • Al Fattan Marine Tower, Apt 3105, Jumeriah Beach Residence, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • DOB: 25 Feb 1963
    • POB: Icononzo, Tolima, Colombia
    • Nationality: Colombia
    • Gender: Male
    • Cedula No.: 5934638 (Colombia)
    • Passport: PE144026 (Colombia) expires 29 Aug 2027
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: INTERNATIONAL SERVICES AGENCY S.A.S.

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Jose Oscar Garcia Batte is a Colombian national and former Colombian Army Colonel who owns the Bogota-based recruiting company Global Qowa Al-Basheria S.A.S. (GQAB), also known as Mi Futuro Global. Through GQAB, he knowingly recruited former Colombian military personnel to join the previously designated International Services Agency (A4SI) and its successor Fénix to fight in Sudan for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). He continued recruiting for A4SI even after learning that A4SI was sending personnel to Sudan to fight for the RSF. He has also recruited former Colombian military personnel to participate in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, with individuals fighting on behalf of both sides. The State Department’s Sudan press release notes that this action marks three years since the civil war began in Sudan on April 15, 2023, during which over 150,000 people have been killed, more than 14 million displaced, and famine conditions persist.

    GARCIA BATTE, Omar Fernando

    • Address: Calle 64, No. 7-62, Apt 403, Bogota, Colombia
    • DOB: 25 Sep 1961
    • POB: Icononzo, Tolima, Colombia
    • Nationality: Colombia
    • Gender: Male
    • Cedula No.: 5934268 (Colombia)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: GLOBAL QOWA AL BASHERIA S.A.S.

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Omar Fernando Garcia Batte is a Colombian national who serves as the manager and legal representative of Global Qowa Al-Basheria S.A.S. (GQAB). He is designated pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a leader, official, or senior executive officer of GQAB, a person whose property and interests are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098.

    QUIJANO TORRES, Jose Libardo

    • Address: Colombia
    • DOB: 24 Sep 1975
    • Nationality: Colombia
    • Gender: Male
    • Cedula No.: 74180772 (Colombia)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: FENIX HUMAN RESOURCES S.A.S.

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Quijano Torres is a Colombian national serving as the nominal manager of Fénix Human Resources S.A.S. (Fénix), a Bogota-based employment agency opened in February 2025 as a replacement for the previously designated International Services Agency (A4SI). Fénix was created by previously designated Alvaro Andres Quijano Becerra and his wife Claudia Viviana Oliveros Forero. Quijano Torres is designated pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a leader, official, or senior executive officer of Fénix.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: SUDAN-EO14098 Executive Order 14098

    FENIX HUMAN RESOURCES S.A.S.

    • AKA: “HRFENIX”
    • Address: Carrera 47 A No. 93-92, Bogota, Colombia
    • Website: https://hrfenix.com
    • Organization Established Date: 28 Feb 2025
    • NIT #: 9019295283 (Colombia)
    • Matricula Mercantil No: 03929145 (Colombia)

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Fénix Human Resources S.A.S. is a Bogota, Colombia-based employment agency opened in February 2025 by previously designated Alvaro Andres Quijano Becerra and his previously designated wife Claudia Viviana Oliveros Forero as a replacement for the previously designated International Services Agency (A4SI). Fénix is being designated for being responsible for, or complicit in, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan. The investigation leading to today’s designations was carried out in partnership with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations, National Targeting Center and Miami/Tampa Field Office.

    GLOBAL QOWA AL BASHERIA S.A.S.

    • AKA: “MI FUTURO GLOBAL”
    • Address: Carrera 13 No. 49-15 Oficina 401, Bogota, Colombia
    • Website: https://mifuturoglobal.com
    • Organization Established Date: 28 Jun 2012
    • NIT #: 9005343144 (Colombia)
    • Matricula Mercantil No: 02228829 (Colombia)
    • Linked to: GARCIA BATTE, Jose Oscar

    Supplemental Information: According to Treasury’s press release, Global Qowa Al-Basheria S.A.S. (GQAB), also known as Mi Futuro Global, is owned by Jose Oscar Garcia Batte, a former Colombian Army Colonel. Through GQAB, Garcia Batte knowingly recruited former Colombian military personnel to join A4SI and its successor Fénix to fight in Sudan for the RSF, a paramilitary group that has carried out summary executions, ethnically motivated attacks, sexual and gender-based violence, and torture. The State Department determined in January 2025 that RSF members committed genocide in Sudan, and in December 2023 that RSF members had committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. GQAB is designated pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted for or on behalf of, Jose Oscar Garcia Batte.

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  • April 16, 2026: State Department weighs in on OFAC Nicaragua designations

    Sanctioning the Ortega-Murillo Dictatorship-Linked Gold Sector

    PRESS STATEMENT

    THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SPOKESPERSON

    APRIL 16, 2026

    The United States is imposing sanctions on two of Ortega and Murillo’s sons, five other individuals, and seven companies that have enabled the dictatorship’s corrupt control over Nicaragua’s gold sector, seizure of property owned by U.S. citizens, and proliferation of its dynastic rule.

    Since 2020, the dictatorship has restructured the gold sector into a complex network of front companies and intermediaries designed to generate foreign currency, launder sanctioned assets, and reinforce political control for their own benefit. The dictatorship also has continually consolidated its illegitimate power into the first family’s hands, anointing their children as dictatorship officials to carry out their dynastic objectives.

    The Trump Administration will continue to use all diplomatic and economic tools to defend U.S. interests and amplify the Nicaraguan people’s demands for freedom, unalienable rights, and economic security. We call on the dictatorship to respect private property, unconditionally release all unjustly detained prisoners, and restore sound governance.

    Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the authorities under Executive Order (E.O.) 13851, as amended by E.O 14088. For more information on today’s action, please see the Department of the Treasury’s press release.

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  • April 15, 2026: Economic Fury from the State Department

    U.S. Upends Iranian Shadow Fleet and Oil-for-Gold Terror Financing Network

    PRESS STATEMENT

    THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SPOKESPERSON

    APRIL 15, 2026

    The United States is acting to decisively limit Iran’s ability to generate revenue as it attempts to hold the Strait of Hormuz hostage. Today’s sanctions target elements of U.S.-designated Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani’s multi-billion-dollar oil smuggling empire that enriches the Iranian regime and its elites. It also targets a separate oil-for-gold network that finances U.S.-designated Hizballah and the U.S.-designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).

    The Iranian regime continues to enrich corrupt elites like the Shamkhani family while ordinary Iranians suffer under a deteriorating economy. The regime likewise funnels the wealth of the Iranian people to Hizballah and other terrorists in the Middle East. These designations underscore our commitment to maximum pressure on Iran and its terrorist proxies.

    The complex schemes involving illicit Iranian oil, gold, and terrorist financing demonstrate the lengths to which Iran and its partners will go to evade sanctions and fund malign activities. We will continue to expose and disrupt these networks.

    Since President Trump issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, the United States has sanctioned over 1,000 persons, vessels, and aircraft as part of our campaign against Iranian malign activity. We will not relent in our efforts to deny Iran and its proxies the resources they use to threaten U.S. interests and regional stability.

    Today’s action marks the latest round of sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales and support to Iran’s terrorist proxies since the issuance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), directing maximum pressure on Iran and its regional proxies. More information on today’s designations can be found in Treasury’s Press Release

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  • April 14, 2026: State Department Press Release on OFAC Designations

    Sanctioning Senior Operatives of Cártel del Noreste

    PRESS STATEMENT

    THOMAS “TOMMY” PIGOTT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SPOKESPERSON

    APRIL 14, 2026

    Today, the Trump Administration is imposing sanctions on Cártel del Noreste (CDN)-linked casinos and senior operatives who enable the cartel’s money laundering, drug trafficking, and human smuggling activities along key border corridors, including Nuevo Laredo. These actions target the financial and logistical networks that sustain one of Mexico’s most violent criminal organizations, which the United States has designated as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

    Cártel del Noreste’s violence and intimidation, including its March 2022 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Nuevo Laredo, threaten U.S. personnel, undermine Mexican sovereignty, and destabilize communities on both sides of the border. By degrading CDN’s revenue streams and safe havens, the United States is acting to protect lawful cross-border commerce, safeguard American border communities, stop the trafficking of fentanyl and other illicit drugs killing Americans, and strengthen our shared efforts with Mexico to degrade and dismantle narco-terrorist organizations.

    Today’s action continues to deliver on President Trump’s promise to the American people to protect our homeland, counter drug trafficking, dismantle human smuggling networks, and confront the corruption and violence that these foreign organizations fuel throughout our region. These steps underscore the Trump Administration’s commitment to use all tools available to disrupt and dismantle narco-terrorist groups that endanger the United States and our partners.

    The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, which targets the international proliferation of illicit drugs and their means of production, and pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists and their supporters. This is the third action targeting CDN’s leadership and affiliates during the Trump Administration. For more information about today’s designations, please see Treasury’s press release.

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  • April 4, 2026: Is this sanctions, or just petty?

    Secretary Rubio Revokes Green Cards of Foreign Nationals with Ties to Iranian Terror Regime

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    APRIL 4, 2026

    Last night, the niece and grand niece of deceased Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Major General Qasem Soleimani were arrested by federal agents following Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s termination of their lawful permanent resident (LPR) status.  

    Hamideh Soleimani Afshar and her daughter are now in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As identified by both press reporting and her own social media commentary, Soleimani Afshar is an outspoken supporter of the totalitarian, terrorist regime in Iran.  

    While living in the United States, she promoted Iranian regime propaganda, celebrated attacks against American soldiers and military facilities in the Middle East, praised the new Iranian Supreme Leader, denounced America as the “Great Satan,” and voiced her unflinching support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a designated terror organization. Afshar Soleimani pushed this propaganda for Iran’s terrorist regime while enjoying a lavish lifestyle in Los Angeles, as attested to by her frequent posting on her recently deleted Instagram account. 

    In addition to the termination of Hamideh Soleimani Afshar and her daughter’s LPR status, Afshar’s husband has also been barred from entering the United States.  

    Earlier this month, Secretary Rubio also terminated the legal status of Fatemeh Ardeshir-Larijani, daughter of former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran Ali Larijani, and her husband Seyed Kalantar Motamedi. Both Ardeshir-Larijani and Motamedi are no longer in the United States and are barred from future entry. 

    The U.S. Department of State extends its appreciation to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for their continued partnership and collaboration in keeping Americans safe. 

    The Trump Administration will not allow our country to become a home for foreign nationals who support anti-American terrorist regimes. 

    You be the judge. If it was a blanket revocation, I might think differently. But it does seem like the First Amendment doesn’t apply to people on green cards – I thought it was supposed to protect offensive speech, like Nazis marching in Skokie.

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  • March 20, 2026: OFAC adds to Counter Terrorism sanctions, removes from Counter-Narcotics and Russian ones

    Counter Terrorism Designations; Counter Narcotics and Russia-related Designations Removals

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Sanctions Global Network Diverting Funds to Benefit Hizballah

    State Press Release: Sanctioning a Global Network Supporting Hizballah Financing

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: SDGT Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594.

    AL LAKIS, Hamdan Ali

    • Address: Kab Elias Main Road, Yaktine Building, 5th Floor, Kab Elias, Bekaa 009618, Lebanon
    • DOB: 17 Jun 1971
    • POB: Mar Elias Zahle, Lebanon
    • Nationality: Lebanon
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Male
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    Supplemental Information: Hamdan Ali Al Lakis manages the day-to-day operations of a money exchange set up with Alaa Hassan Hamieh. This arrangement allows Hamieh to maintain total access to the business and hide from government oversight while collecting the majority of the profits.

    BOUSTANY, Maya

    • AKA: * AL-BUSTANI, Maya
      • AL-BUSTANI, Maya Shadi
    • Address: Qatar; Al-Dabieh, Mount Lebanon, Lebanon
    • DOB: 09 Sep 1981
    • POB: Al-Dabieh, Lebanon
    • Nationality: Lebanon
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Female
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    Supplemental Information: Maya Boustany is an associate of Alaa Hassan Hamieh and serves as the Chief Operating Officer for one of his companies. She has acted as a proxy for the Hizballah finance team to establish a front company in Iraq.

    FADEL, Raoof

    • Address: Zone 55, Street 169, Building 85, Villa 3, Doha, Qatar
    • DOB: 20 Dec 1981
    • POB: El Dammamm, Saudi Arabia
    • Nationality: Lebanon
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    Supplemental Information: Raoof Fadel is part of the financial network led by Alaa Hassan Hamieh. He owns and operates Seven Seas for International Trading and Logistics, a Qatar-based company used to move funds for Hizballah.

    HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    • Address: Zantout Street, Safi Darwich Building, 1st Floor, Dawhet El Hoss, Beirut, Lebanon; Southern Tariya, Baalbek, Lebanon
    • DOB: 25 Jan 1980
    • Nationality: Lebanon
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions
    • Passport: OA110548 (Canada)
    • National ID No: 00003985449 (Lebanon)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HIZBALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Alaa Hassan Hamieh is a Hizballah financier and former Vice President of the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL). He oversees a global network of companies that launder and raise funds for Hizballah’s finance team, diverting more than $100 million since 2020. He was notably involved in diverting funds from a trade agreement between Iraq and Lebanon intended for reconstruction.

    HAMIEH, Daniel

    • AKA: HAMIE, Daniel
    • Address: Wojska Polskiego 23ABC, Suwalki, Podlaskie 16-400, Poland; Lebanon
    • DOB: 30 Nov 2002
    • POB: Bialystok, Poland
    • Nationality: Poland
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    Supplemental Information: Daniel Hamieh is the nephew of Alaa Hassan Hamieh. He co-owns the Poland-based entity Call Lync Spolka Z Ograniczona Odpowiedzialnoscia, which has transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars to companies affiliated with the Hizballah finance team.

    HAMIEH, Muhammad Hasan

    • AKA: HAMIYYAH, Muhammad Hasan
    • Address: Lebanon
    • DOB: 12 Sep 1983
    • POB: Tariyah, Lebanon
    • Nationality: Lebanon
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    Supplemental Information: Muhammad Hasan Hamieh is the brother of Alaa Hassan Hamieh. He assists in tracking funds associated with various projects operated in collaboration with Hizballah finance team members, including Muhammad Al-Bazzal and Rashid Al-Bazzal.

    HASHEM, Bahaa Addin

    • Address: Lebanon
    • DOB: 18 Nov 1982
    • POB: Damascus, Syria
    • Nationality: Syria
    • alt. nationality: Saint Kitts and Nevis
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: RE0151778 (Saint Kitts and Nevis)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    Supplemental Information: Bahaa Addin Hashem is a Syrian gray-arms dealer who co-owns several companies with Alaa Hassan Hamieh. He is the registered owner of the Slovenia-based Call Lync Telekomunikacijske Storitve D.O.O. and is also an employee of the previously designated Hizballah enterprise G.M. Farm.

    SALAMI, Mohamad Jamil

    • AKA: SALAMI, Mohamad
    • Address: Amir Bachir Street, Azarieh Building, Beirut, Lebanon
    • DOB: 17 May 1982
    • Nationality: Lebanon
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    Supplemental Information: Mohamad Jamil Salami is a Hizballah member within Alaa Hassan Hamieh’s network. He has been involved in telecommunications projects and a weapons systems company, and has personally transferred fundsto Hamieh.

    TARSHISHI, Hala Mohamad

    • AKA: TARCHICHI, Hala
    • Address: Lebanon
    • DOB: 26 Feb 1983
    • Nationality: Lebanon
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Female
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    Supplemental Information: Hala Mohamad Tarshishi serves as the secretary for Alaa Hassan Hamieh. She acts as a proxy for his companies and conducts financial transactions on his behalf to support his business network.

    WEHBE, Mohamad Hasan

    • AKA: WAHBI, Mohamed Hassan
    • Address: Ras Beirut, Lebanon
    • DOB: 08 Sep 1971
    • POB: Beirut, Lebanon
    • Nationality: Lebanon
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: LR2576480 (Lebanon) expires 13 Mar 2032
    • National ID No: 000034132689 (Lebanon)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    Supplemental Information: Mohamad Hasan Wehbe owns and operates several Lebanon-based entities, including Seven Seas SAL Offshore and Seven Seas Group S.A.R.L., which are utilized by Alaa Hassan Hamieh for money laundering and procurement.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: SDGT Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594.

    CALL LYNC S.A.L. OFFSHORE

    • Address: Beirut, Lebanon
    • Party Type: Entity
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Alaa Hassan

    CALL LYNC SPOLKA Z OGRANICZONA ODPOWIEDZIALNOSCIA

    • AKA: CALL LYNC S.P. Z.O.O.
    • Address: Wojska Polskiego 23ABC, Suwalki, Podlaskie 16-400, Poland
    • Party Type: Entity
    • Linked to: HAMIEH, Daniel

    CALL LYNC TELEKOMUNIKACIJSKE STORITVE D.O.O.

    • AKA: CALL LYNC D.O.O.
    • Address: Ljubljana, Slovenia
    • Party Type: Entity
    • Linked to: HASHEM, Bahaa Addin

    SEVEN SEAS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADING AND LOGISTICS

    • Address: Doha, Qatar
    • Party Type: Entity
    • Linked to: FADEL, Raoof

    SEVEN SEAS GROUP S.A.R.L.

    • Address: Beirut, Lebanon
    • Party Type: Entity
    • Linked to: WEHBE, Mohamad Hasan

    SEVEN SEAS SAL OFFSHORE

    • Address: Second Floor, Airport Business Center, Airport Road, Beirut, Lebanon
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 12 Jul 2012
    • Registration Number: 1806107 (Lebanon)
    • Party Type: Entity
    • Linked to: WEHBE, Mohamad Hasan

    Delistings:

    The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: SDNTK Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 598.

    GASTELUM SERRANO, Cesar (a.k.a. “LA SENORA“), Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; DOB 1961; POB Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male (individual).

    The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: RUSSIA-EO14024 Executive Order 14024, “Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation”.

    KORZHAVIN, Yurii Anatolyevich, Russia; DOB 28 Sep 1957; POB Moscow, Russia; nationality Russia; GenderMale; Tax ID No. 770702814195 (Russia) (individual).

    KORZHAVINA, Lidiya Germanovna, Russia; DOB 22 May 1958; POB Moscow, Russia; nationality Russia; GenderFemale; Tax ID No. 771405312885 (Russia) (individual).

    Source List:

    Note: The Treasury Department press release is legit, but it’s not part of the Recent Actions page item (follow the link if you don’t believe me).

    —

    , , , , , , ,

  • March 12, 2026: OFAC Sanctions-a-rama: Terrorism, North Korea, Narcotics Trafficking designations, changes, removals

    Counter Terrorism Designations; North Korea Designations and Designation Update; Counter Narcotics Designation Removal

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Continues to Disrupt Hamas’ Sham Charity Network as the Group Refuses to Disarm

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Sanctions Facilitators of DPRK IT Worker Fraud Targeting U.S. Businesses

    State Press Release: Sanctions to Disrupt DPRK IT Worker Schemes Defrauding U.S. Businesses

    State Press Release: United States Sanctions Hamas’s Illicit Charity Network

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [DPRK4] Executive Order 13810

    CELESTINO HERRERA, York Louis

    • Address: Barcelona, Spain
    • DOB: 07 Nov 1996
    • POB: La Vega, Dominican Republic
    • Nationality: Dominican Republic
    • Alt. Nationality: Spain
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210
    • Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
    • Passport: XDB250498 (Spain)
    • Alt. Passport: EM0642806 (Dominican Republic) issued 28 Feb 2013 expires 28 Feb 2019
    • National ID No.: 24558183W (Dominican Republic)
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: YUN, Song Guk

    Supplemental Information: Celestino Herrera provided material support and assistance to Yun Song Guk, a North Korean national leading a group of IT workers in Laos.

    HOANG, Minh Quang

    • Address: Hanoi, Vietnam
    • DOB: 16 Nov 1993
    • POB: Hanoi, Vietnam
    • Nationality: Vietnam
    • Gender: Male
    • Digital Currency Address – XBT: bc1qyy5pt5cx3zth8xlj92lq5y87dh8xv3nwgs4ncq
    • Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210
    • Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
    • National ID No.: 001093019421 (Vietnam)
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: YUN, Song Guk

    Supplemental Information: Hoang Minh Quang coordinated several dozen financial transactions totaling more than $70,000 with Yun Song Guk related to IT services performed by Yun’s team of North Korean freelance workers.

    YUN, Song Guk

    • AKA: YUN, So’ng-kuk
    • Address: Boten, Laos
    • DOB: 27 Jul 1969
    • Nationality: Korea, North
    • Gender: Male
    • Digital Currency Address – ETH: 0xb637f84b66876ebf609c2a4208905f9ddac9d075
    • Alt. Digital Currency Address – ETH: 0x95584C303FCd48AF5c6B9873015f2AD0ca84EaE3
    • Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210
    • Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
    • Passport: 180131469 (Korea, North)
    • Party Type: individual

    Supplemental Information: Yun Song Guk is a North Korean national who led a group of North Korean IT workers operating out of Boten, Laos, to conduct freelance IT work and generate revenue for the North Korean government.

    OFAC Program: [NPWMD] Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544

    DO, Phi Khanh

    • Address: Hanoi, Vietnam
    • DOB: 04 Mar 1980
    • POB: Hanoi, Vietnam
    • Nationality: Vietnam
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210
    • Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
    • Passport: B7083978 (Vietnam) issued 27 Aug 2012 expires 27 Aug 2022
    • National ID No.: 111534690 (Vietnam)
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: KIM, Se Un

    Supplemental Information: Do Phi Khanh is an associate of U.S.-sanctioned North Korean nuclear procurement facilitator Kim Se Un. He acts as a proxy for Kim, allowing him to use Do’s identity to open bank accounts and launder proceeds from North Korean IT workers.

    HOANG, Van Nguyen

    • Address: Vietnam
    • DOB: 20 Jul 1980
    • POB: Nghe An, Vietnam
    • Nationality: Vietnam
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210
    • Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
    • Passport: C7177903 (Vietnam) issued 18 Apr 2019 expires 18 Apr 2029
    • National ID No.: 013564395 (Vietnam)
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: KIM, Se Un

    Supplemental Information: Hoang Van Nguyen assists Kim Se Un in opening bank accounts and enabling cryptocurrency transactions to procure foreign currency for the North Korean regime. In 2022, he facilitated a counterfeit cigarette deal exceeding $200,000 on Kim’s behalf.

    OFAC Program: [DPRK4] Executive Order 13810

    NGUYEN, Quang Viet

    • Address: Vietnam
    • DOB: 12 Oct 1993
    • Nationality: Vietnam
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210
    • Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
    • National ID No.: 122094898 (Vietnam)
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: AMNOKGANG TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Between mid-2023 and mid-2025, Nguyen converted approximately $2.5 million into cryptocurrency for North Koreans, including illicit earnings from IT workers associated with Amnokgang Technology Development Company.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [DPRK4] Executive Order 13810

    AMNOKGANG TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

    • AKA: * AMNOKGANG TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
      • KOREA AMNOKGANG TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
      • KOREA APROKGANG TECHNOLOGY COMPANY
      • YALU RIVER TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
    • Address: South Hamgyong, Korea, North; Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, Korea, North
    • Digital Currency Address – ETH: 0xcB74874f1e06Fcf80A306e06e5379A44B488bA2D
    • Alt. Digital Currency Address – ETH: 0x0330070FD38Ec3bB94F58FA55D40368271E9e54A
    • Alt. Digital Currency Address – ETH: 0x9Be599d7867f5E1a2D7Ec6dB9710dF2b98A15573
    • Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210
    • Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
    • Organization Established Date: 1982
    • Organization Type: Other information technology and computer service activities
    • Digital Currency Address – TRX: TNrX2FwrHKoo4XACGkmSzqeK4pdnKYn6Z7
    • Alt. Digital Currency Address – TRX: TEEYCuGDyeNkuDj4u6GQRXxXo3Nh29r2vP
    • Alt. Digital Currency Address – TRX: TZB4NrX7k9ZsV6PRc1GigAztLL8WHpLvwP
    • Alt. Digital Currency Address – TRX: TDe2UNAvuUnTbbDo7518eMe3TXN5qJW8Ft

    Supplemental Information: Amnokgang is a North Korean IT company that manages delegations of overseas IT workers and conducts illicit procurement to obtain military and commercial technology.

    QUANGVIETDNBG INTERNATIONAL SERVICES COMPANY LIMITED

    • AKA: SHOPAR INTERNATIONAL E-TRADE COMPANY LIMITED
    • Address: 37C Alley 2/69 Hoang Liet Street, Hoang Liet Ward, Hanoi, Vietnam
    • Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210
    • Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
    • Organization Established Date: 04 Jul 2022
    • Tax ID No.: 0110050211 (Vietnam)
    • Linked to: NGUYEN, Quang Viet

    Supplemental Information: This Vietnamese company is linked to Nguyen Quang Viet and served as part of a network involved in laundering funds for North Korean IT workers.

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544

    GHAZI DESTEK DERNEGI

    • AKA: * GAZZE DESTEK ORGANIZATION
      • “GDD”
    • Address: Aksemsettin Mahallesi, Akdeniz Caddesi, Hakperest Sokak No: 16, Daire 18 Fatih, Istanbul, Turkey
    • Website: https://gdd.org
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2014
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Registered Charity No.: 34-209-183 (Turkey)
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: This organization is a sham charity that directly funds Hamas’s Military Wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. It uses deceptive practices to hide revenue-generating activities behind humanitarian work.

    HAYAT YOLU

    • AKA: * HAYAT YOLU ASSOCIATION
      • HAYAT YOLU KALKINMA YARDIMLASMA EGITIM VE KULTUR DERNEGI
    • Address: Cakmak, Sht., Burak Kurtulus Cd., No: 2, 34774, Umraniye, Istanbul, Turkey
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2014
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Registered Charity No.: 34-207-158 (Turkey)
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: Hayat Yolu is identified as an operational headquarters and a banking and financial hub for the Muslim Brotherhood, while also serving as a front to fund Hamas’s military operations.

    KOMITE NASIONAL UNTUK RAKYAT PALESTINA

    • AKA: * KNRP INDONESIA
      • NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
    • Address: Jl. Jabir No. 11 B, Ragunan, Pasar Minggu, Jakarta 12550, Indonesia
    • Website: https://knrp.org/
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 08 May 2006
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: Internal Hamas documents revealed that KNRP provided funding for projects that directly benefited Hamas fighters. The charity has coordinated with Hamas to distribute materials intended exclusively for the military wing.

    PALESTINIAN WHITE HANDS ASSISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY ASSOCIATION

    • AKA: * BEYAZ ELLER ASSOCIATION
      • BEYAZ ELLER YARDIMLASMA VE DAYANISMA DERNEGI
      • WHITE HANDS CHARITY
    • Address: Ikitelli Osb, Giyim Sanatkarlar Kooperatifi, 3 Ada A Blok No: 203, Basaksehir, Istanbul, Turkey
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 16 Nov 2011
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: This Türkiye-based entity is part of the covert global network utilized by Hamas to leverage donor sympathies and funnel money toward terrorist activities in Gaza.

    Delistings:

    The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDNTK] Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 598

    LOBO, Carlos Arnoldo (a.k.a. “EL NEGRO LOBO”; a.k.a. “NEGRO”), Col Toronjal, 2da Etapa, Casa 2, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; Col Toronjal, 2da Etapa, Casa 2, Numero 67, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; Colonia El Toronjal, Cuarta Etapa, Bloque, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; Hacienda La Rosita, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; French Harbour, Roatan, Islas de La Bahia, Honduras; Los Tangos, Copan, Honduras; Casa 67, Blq 02, San Pedro Sula, Cortes, Honduras; Hacienda Aldea La Rosita, Esparta, Atlantida, Honduras; Hacienda Satuye, Col. Satuye, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; DOB 28 May 1974; POB Esparta, La Ceiba, Honduras; Numero de Identidad 0103-1975-00009 (Honduras) (individual)

    “NEGRO” (a.k.a. LOBO, Carlos Arnoldo; a.k.a. “EL NEGRO LOBO”), Col Toronjal, 2da Etapa, Casa 2, La Ceiba,Atlantida, Honduras; Col Toronjal, 2da Etapa, Casa 2, Numero 67, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; Colonia El Toronjal, Cuarta Etapa, Bloque, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; Hacienda La Rosita, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; French Harbour, Roatan, Islas de La Bahia, Honduras; Los Tangos, Copan, Honduras; Casa 67, Blq 02, San Pedro Sula, Cortes, Honduras; Hacienda Aldea La Rosita, Esparta, Atlantida, Honduras; Hacienda Satuye, Col. Satuye, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; DOB 28 May 1974; POB Esparta, La Ceiba, Honduras; Numero de Identidad 0103-1975-00009 (Honduras) (individual)

    “EL NEGRO LOBO” (a.k.a. LOBO, Carlos Arnoldo; a.k.a. “NEGRO”), Col Toronjal, 2da Etapa, Casa 2, La Ceiba,Atlantida, Honduras; Col Toronjal, 2da Etapa, Casa 2, Numero 67, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; Colonia El Toronjal, Cuarta Etapa, Bloque, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; Hacienda La Rosita, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; French Harbour, Roatan, Islas de La Bahia, Honduras; Los Tangos, Copan, Honduras; Casa 67, Blq 02, San Pedro Sula, Cortes, Honduras; Hacienda Aldea La Rosita, Esparta, Atlantida, Honduras; Hacienda Satuye, Col. Satuye, La Ceiba, Atlantida, Honduras; DOB 28 May 1974; POB Esparta, La Ceiba, Honduras; Numero de Identidad 0103-1975-00009 (Honduras) (individual)

    Amendments:

    The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [NPWMD] Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544

    SIM, Hyon Sop

    • AKA: SIM, Hyo’n-so’p
    • Address: Dandong, China
    • DOB: 25 Nov 1983
    • POB: Pyongyang, North Korea
    • Nationality: Korea, North
    • Gender: Male
    • Digital Currency Address – ETH: * 0x4f47bc496083c727c5fbe3ce9cdf2b0f6496270c
      • 0xd04E33461FEA8302c5E1e13895b60cEe8AEfda7F
      • 0x76EA76CA4Eb727f18956aB93445a94c5280412B9
      • 0xFb3eFf152ea55D1BfA04Dbdd509A80fD7b72cdEB
      • 0xFda1Ec4A6178d4916b001a065422D31EBE5F62FF
      • 0x747AFB5c7A7fc34B547cD0FDEbf9b91759C5a52b
    • Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210
    • Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
    • Digital Currency Address – TRX: * TPDLpXxPcaSsupEZ3yrVksmNkYP5SLeKxu
      • TGXE9dGWawjfd3xqFSho1h1bRbRv9wUGrF
      • TNTFhgFoKH4srBMiWbfrVFqP2AThSmdwf1
      • TXhf9nU9bjo1j9z5qEesHdr6gtdndfnA4T
      • TK17wfSPp32RWrnzZPrGpv7TxdNFvvvE2s
      • TYeQD2VddTZ9NkFkAnT9DD8cUGetGUQZB2
    • Digital Currency Address – ARB: 0x4f47bc496083c727c5fbe3ce9cdf2b0f6496270c
    • Digital Currency Address – BSC: 0x4f47bc496083c727c5fbe3ce9cdf2b0f6496270c
    • Passport: 109484100 (Korea, North) expires 24 Dec 2024
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: KOREA KWANGSON BANKING CORP

    Supplemental Information: Sim Hyon Sop is a North Korean national involved in laundering funds derived from North Korean IT worker schemes. He has coordinated with other facilitators to convert illicit proceeds into cryptocurrency.

    List of Changes:

    • Field Name: Digital Currency Address – ETH
      • Added: 0xd04E33461FEA8302c5E1e13895b60cEe8AEfda7F
      • Added: 0x76EA76CA4Eb727f18956aB93445a94c5280412B9
      • Added: 0xFb3eFf152ea55D1BfA04Dbdd509A80fD7b72cdEB
      • Added: 0xFda1Ec4A6178d4916b001a065422D31EBE5F62FF
      • Added: 0x747AFB5c7A7fc34B547cD0FDEbf9b91759C5a52b
    • Field Name: Digital Currency Address – TRX
      • Added: TPDLpXxPcaSsupEZ3yrVksmNkYP5SLeKxu
      • Added: TGXE9dGWawjfd3xqFSho1h1bRbRv9wUGrF
      • Added: TNTFhgFoKH4srBMiWbfrVFqP2AThSmdwf1
      • Added: TXhf9nU9bjo1j9z5qEesHdr6gtdndfnA4T
      • Added: TK17wfSPp32RWrnzZPrGpv7TxdNFvvvE2s
      • Added: TYeQD2VddTZ9NkFkAnT9DD8cUGetGUQZB2

    Note: The two State Department press releases, while related, were issued separately and not with the OFAC Recent Actions page update. When I see both sets of releases when I write posts, I modify the Gemini post so all the items are included rather than write separate posts. Since I only provide titles and links, I thinks it’s more efficient for you to read one post rather than multiple ones.

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