Mr. Sanctions

Category: General Licenses

  • April 15, 2026: Your thoughts on Open General Export Licenses: a survey

    Export Control & Sanctions

    Invitation to respond to our survey on Open General Export Licences

    The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) administers the UK’s system of export controls and licensing for military and dual-use items. This includes Open General Export Licences (OGELs), which are available for pre-determined military and dual-use controlled items being exported to a range of permitted restricted destinations.

    OGELs are often reported as a flexible and useful licence option, and can generally be used as soon as the exporter has registered. As such, ECJU is reviewing their usage and our overall service to exporters.

    If you are an exporter who has applied for an export licence from ECJU (whether or not you have registered for or regularly use OGELs), we would welcome your views to help shape our thinking.

    Our short survey has been set up to get feedback on:
    • exporter behaviour and experience in terms of using OGELs
    • why you do (or do not) use OGELs
    • what improvements to our service could be made to optimise their use

    The survey takes around 15 minutes to complete. Please note there is an opportunity to share contact details to allow us to follow up with you for further insights, but this is entirely optional and otherwise your survey responses will remain anonymous.

    Give your feedback via our survey hosted on Qualtrics.

    The closing date is 11:45pm on Thursday 30 April 2026.

    ECJU’s website can be found on GOV.UK

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  • Notice to Exporters 2026/11: Ministry of Defense Form F680 coming off SPIRE system

    NTE 2026/11: expiry date for F680s on SPIRE

    Updated 15 April 2026

    Introduction

    The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) of the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) is transitioning the MOD security approval form 680 (F680) away from SPIRE. From Friday 31 July 2026, you will no longer be able to process these applications on SPIRE.

    We ask that you transition to using the ‘Apply to Export Controlled Goods’ service for your F680 applications.

    Note that US UNCLASSIFIED ITAR applications are an exception to this transition and cannot be processed on the ‘Apply to Export Controlled Goods’ service at this time. If you submit US UNCLASSIFIED ITAR applications, you must continue to use SPIRE for these specific applications.

    To prepare for the change, you must ensure you have an account with the new service. If you do not yet have an account, set up an account to export controlled goods.

    Help and support

    For further guidance, you can watch the ‘Apply for an F680’ video.

    If you have any queries regarding your F680 application, contact spoecju-mod-lite-f680@mod.gov.uk.

    If you need help with your account, contact the helpdesk via lite.support@businessandtrade.gov.uk.

    Contact ECJU

    General queries about strategic export licensing

    Export Control Joint Unit
    Department for Business and Trade
    Old Admiralty Building
    Admiralty Place
    London
    SW1A 2DY

    Email exportcontrol.help@businessandtrade.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7215 4594

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  • Burning Questions: In Plain Language – the 2 new OFAC Venezuela General Licenses

    So, what do Venezuela GL 56 & 57 mean?

    Background

    Venezuela is subject to broad U.S. sanctions, meaning most transactions with the Venezuelan government and its entities are prohibited by default. OFAC issues General Licenses to carve out specific exceptions — activities that are permitted without needing individual approval.

    General License 56 — Negotiating Contingent Contracts

    The core idea: You’re allowed to negotiate and draft contracts with the Venezuelan government, but you cannot actually execute or perform those contracts until you get separate OFAC approval.

    Think of it like being permitted to draw up a deal and shake hands, but the contract only becomes real once a regulator gives the green light.

    What’s covered: Any commercial negotiations with any part of the Venezuelan government — ministries, state agencies, state-controlled companies, or anyone acting on their behalf. “Contingent contracts” is defined broadly to include bids, proposals, MOUs, pro forma invoices, and similar preliminary agreements.

    Key restrictions — you cannot:

    • Negotiate contracts involving Venezuelan or PdVSA (state oil company) bonds or debt
    • Use non-standard payment terms — no gold payments, no debt swaps, no Venezuelan digital currency (the “petro”)
    • Enforce any legal judgments against blocked Venezuelan assets
    • Involve any parties from Russia, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba
    • Involve any entity owned or controlled by Chinese interests
    • Deal with anyone on OFAC’s SDN (blacklist) list

    General License 57 — Financial Services to Certain Venezuelan Banks

    The core idea: U.S. financial institutions and service providers can conduct normal financial transactions with or for four specific Venezuelan banks and ordinary Venezuelan government employees.

    The four banks covered:

    1. Banco Central de Venezuela (the central bank)
    2. Banco de Venezuela
    3. Banco Digital de los Trabajadores
    4. Banco del Tesoro

    Any entity majority-owned by these banks is also covered.

    Also covered: Individual Venezuelan government employees whose assets are technically “blocked” purely because they work for the government — as long as they are not on the SDN blacklist.

    What “financial services” means here is defined very broadly: account management, wire transfers, ACH payments, debit/credit cards, digital wallets, remittances, payroll processing, currency exchange, correspondent banking, securities, and more.

    Key restrictions:

    • This does not unblock any frozen assets
    • It doesn’t override any other sanctions rules
    • All normal Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering obligations still apply

    Practical note for banks: A U.S. financial institution processing these transactions can rely on what the originating or receiving party tells them about compliance — as long as the bank has no reason to suspect something is wrong.

    How They Work Together

    GL 56 opens a path for businesses to explore and structure deals with Venezuela, while GL 57 enables the banking infrastructure needed to eventually support those deals. Neither license removes the requirement for further OFAC authorization before any real money moves on a new contract.

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  • April 16, 2026: OFAC Update 2, Part 2: Venezuela General Licenses & Frequently Asked Question

    From OFAC’s Recent Actions Notice:

    The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Venezuela General License 56, “Authorizing Commercial-Related Negotiations of Contingent Contracts with the Government of Venezuela,”:

    venezuela_gl56Download

    and Venezuela General License 57, “Authorizing Financial Services Transactions Involving Certain Venezuelan Banks and Government of Venezuela Individuals.”

    venezuela_gl57Download

    OFAC is also issuing one Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Question, FAQ 1248.

    1248. Since January 2026, OFAC has issued a series of Venezuela-related General Licenses related to purchases and investment in Venezuela’s natural resource sectors, such as Venezuela-related General Licenses (GLs) 48A and 50A, that include a reporting requirement. Which parties are responsible for providing such reports pursuant to those General Licenses?

    Answer

    In general, the parties engaged in the primary authorized activity are responsible for complying with the applicable reporting requirements in these Venezuela-related GLs. Parties that are only indirectly involved or providing services ancillary to the primary authorized activity are not required to file reports pursuant to the applicable license. For example, a company providing services for the generation of electricity in Venezuela under GL 48A would need to report such activities pursuant to that license, but a bank processing payments related to those services does not also need to provide a report. Similarly, under GL 50A, the parties listed in the annex would be required to provide reports describing their activities undertaken pursuant to the license, whereas the bank processing those related payments would not.

    Date Released

    April 14, 2026

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  • April 14, 2026: OFAC Update 1, Part 2: New and updated General Licenses, and an updated Frequently Asked Question

    From OFAC’s Recent Actions Notice:

    The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Counter Terrorism General License 35, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Entities Blocked on April 14, 2026.”

    ct_gl35Download

    OFAC is also issuing Russia-related General License 128C, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Lukoil Retail Service Stations Located Outside of Russia,” 

    russia_gl128cDownload

    Russia-related General License 130A, “Authorizing Transactions Involving Certain Lukoil Entities in Bulgaria,

    russia_gl130aDownload

    and is amending one Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1225).

    1225. What activities do Russia-related General License 128C and General License 131D authorize related to Lukoil International GmbH (LIG)?

    Answer

    OFAC has issued two General Licenses (GLs) relating specifically to Lukoil International GmbH (LIG) and its majority-owned subsidiaries (“LIG Entities”): GL 128C and GL 131D. The GLs are similar but have different expiration dates and terms as each serves a different purpose.

    • To mitigate the effects of Lukoil’s OFAC designation on retail consumers, OFAC issued on December 4, 2025 GL 128B to authorize maintenance, operation, and wind down activities for a narrow range of LIG entities, specifically Lukoil retail automobile service stations outside of the Russian Federation. OFAC subsequently issued GL 128C to extend the existing authorization until October 29, 2026.
    • To enable Lukoil to divest its assets outside of Russia to non-blocked parties, OFAC issued on December 10, 2025 GL 131A to authorize, among other things, maintenance and wind down activities of all LIG Entities. OFAC subsequently issued GL 131B, GL 131C, and GL 131D to extend the existing authorization until May 1, 2026. Please see Frequently Asked Question 1224 for additional information on authorizations regarding negotiations for the sale of LIG Entities.

    GL 128C and GL 131D expressly authorize transactions undertaken in the ordinary course of business, provided that the transactions do not involve any blocked persons other than the LIG Entities described in GL 128C and GL 131D. Transactions undertaken in the ordinary course of business may involve (but are not limited to): supply of motor fuel and lubricants; lease payments; insurance payments; property maintenance and environmental services; employee payroll, benefits, severance, and reimbursements; information technology services; payments to government authorities; legal services and proceedings; payments to suppliers, landlords, lenders, and partners; the preservation and upkeep of pre-existing tangible property; and activities associated with maintaining pre-existing capital investments. Also, both GL 128C and GL 131D authorize transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to performing pre-existing agreements and conducting intracompany transfers, provided that such transactions are consistent with previously established practices and support pre-existing projects or operations, consistent with the terms of the respective authorizations.

    Both GL 128C and GL 131D also authorize financial institutions, payment processors, and other entities to use, debit, and credit the accounts of the relevant LIG Entities to effectuate the respective authorizations, but both GLs are also expressly limited by the condition that no funds may be transferred to a person or account in the Russian Federation.

    Non-U.S. persons generally do not risk exposure to U.S. sanctions under E.O. 14024 for engaging in transactions with blocked persons that are generally authorized for U.S. persons, including for those authorized by GL 128C and GL 131D. Similarly, non-U.S. persons may rely upon GL 128C and GL 131Dregardless of whether a foreign financial institution maintains blocked accounts, provided the non-U.S. person’s activities are consistent with the terms of GL 128C and GL 131D, including the requirement that no payments may be transferred to any person or account located in the Russian Federation.

    Date Updated: April 14, 2026

    Date Released

    December 4, 2025

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  • Burning Question: For us non-experts, what was that new OFSI General Licence all about?

    Claude explains it all, and checks its work – with some light editing to remove some of the details of my prompt:

    General Licence INT/2026/9491628, issued by OFSI — the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, a unit of HM Treasury – today. The licence was issued under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 and allows for insolvency-related payments and activities connected with the Prince Group and their subsidiaries, subject to conditions.

    In plain terms: the Prince Group and its associated people and companies have been hit with UK financial sanctions — meaning their assets are frozen and doing business with them is normally illegal. This licence is a carefully bounded exception that allows bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings to go forward despite those sanctions.

    Who Is the Prince Group?

    The Prince Group is a high-profile, multi-billion-pound conglomerate with extensive business activities across Cambodia and beyond.

    In October 2025, the UK and US governments jointly sanctioned a network operating illegal scam centres across Southeast Asia. The UK and US designated the Prince Group as a transnational criminal organisation, accusing its chairman, Chen Zhi, of directing forced-labour “scam compounds” in Cambodia that used human trafficking victims to carry out cryptocurrency fraud, including “pig butchering” schemes — a form of fraud where victims are lured into fake romantic relationships and gradually convinced to invest large sums in fraudulent cryptocurrency platforms.

    The UK’s statement of reasons says there are reasonable grounds to suspect Prince Group is responsible for engaging in, facilitating, or supporting human rights abuses; providing financial services knowing they may contribute to human rights abuses; and profiting financially from human rights abuses — specifically, the operation of scam centres in Cambodia involving forced or compulsory labour.

    As a result of the October 2025 sanctions, a £100 million office block in the City of London, two multi-million-pound mansions, and a helicopter were frozen.

    Earlier in 2026, Cambodia arrested and extradited Chen Zhi to China to face charges of masterminding a multi-billion-dollar cyber-fraud empire. He had his Cambodian citizenship revoked by royal decree prior to his expulsion.

    What the Licence Actually Does

    When a company is sanctioned, its assets are frozen — which creates a legal problem for insolvency proceedings, because those proceedings inherently involve moving money around (paying creditors, selling assets, etc.). This licence solves that problem.

    The licence lists thirteen “Prince Group DPs” (designated persons) — the Prince Group Global Group Ltd itself, plus twelve related individuals and companies including Chen Zhi, and entities such as Byex Exchange Company Limited, BSquare Technology Co. Ltd., and Tian Xu International Technology PLC.

    Under the licence, any person (including an insolvency practitioner), designated person, or subsidiary may carry out “Permitted Insolvency Activities,” and a Relevant UK Financial Institution may process payments made in connection with those activities.

    The key constraint is significant: permitted insolvency activities include making, receiving, or processing payments and any other action in connection with insolvency proceedings — provided this does not result in funds or economic resources being made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of any designated person or subsidiary, save where such funds are ultimately held in a frozen account or treated as frozen.

    In other words: money can move through the insolvency process, but it cannot end up back in the pockets of the sanctioned parties. Any funds recovered must remain frozen.

    The licence took effect on 14 April 2026 and expires at 23:59 on 13 April 2031 — a five-year window.

    Source Transparency

    Directly sourced from the PDF itself (primary source):

    • All details about the licence number, date, definitions, list of designated persons, permissions, conditions, and duration.

    Sourced from UK government publications (GOV.UK and related official documents):

    • The sanctions designation details and the UK’s statement of reasons for designating the Prince Group (from the October 2025 Financial Sanctions Notice published on publishing.service.gov.uk).
    • The October 2025 joint UK/US announcement (gov.uk press release).

    Sourced from OCCRP (investigative journalism):

    • Details on the March 2026 widening of sanctions, the frozen London properties, Chen Zhi’s extradition to China, and Li Thet’s London penthouse seizure.

    Sourced from Khmer Times:

    • The scale of the “#8 Park” compound (reportedly capable of holding up to 20,000 workers) and Xinbi’s $19.9 billion in transactions — these figures originate from FCDO statements and Chainalysis data cited in those articles, not independently verified here.

    Not directly supported by my sources:

    • The internal operations of the insolvency proceedings themselves (who the insolvency practitioner is, what assets are involved, which jurisdiction is primary) — the licence notice doesn’t specify these, and I found no public reporting on them. The licence’s existence implies proceedings are underway or imminent, but the details are not public from what I could find.
    • Whether Prince Group entities have meaningful UK-registered assets beyond the properties already publicly reported — the licence covers subsidiaries “incorporated anywhere in the world,” suggesting the proceedings may span multiple jurisdictions.

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  • April 14, 2026: OFSI issues new General Licence

    Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury

    New OFSI General Licence INT/2026/9491628 issued

    On 14 April 2026, the General Licence INT/2026/9491628, Prince Group and their Subsidiaries – Insolvency related payments and activities was issued which allows for insolvency-related payments and activities connected with the Prince Group and their Subsidiaries, subject to conditions.

    Any persons intending to use General Licence INT/2026/9491628 should consult the copy of the Licence for full details of the permissions and usage requirements.

    Here’s the General License’s Publication Notice:

    Prince_Group_Insolvency_INT-2026-9491628_PNDownload

    and the General Licence itself:

    Prince_Group_Insolvency_-_INT-2026-9491628_GLDownload

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  • Burning Question: Why did OFSI extend the Maritime Reinsurance General Licence?

    My initial prompt to Gemini:

    Why did OFSI extend the expiration date of General Licence INT/2026/8893924 until July 8th?

    The initial response:

    The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) extended the expiration date of General Licence INT/2026/8893924 (the “Maritime Mutual Re-Insurance Wind Down” licence) to July 8, 2026, primarily to provide additional time for the orderly winding down of complex insurance and reinsurance contracts.

    The extension, which was announced on April 9, 2026 (the original expiry date), follows several key factors:

    1. Complexity of Maritime Insurance

    Maritime Mutual entities were designated on February 24, 2026, as part of a major sanctions package targeting Russia’s “shadow fleet.” Because insurance and reinsurance policies—particularly Protection and Indemnity (P&I) cover—involve long-tail liabilities and intricate regulatory requirements, the initial six-week wind-down period proved insufficient for UK insurers and brokers to legally exit or transfer these contracts.

    2. Industry Feedback

    The extension likely responds to feedback from the London insurance market and global maritime stakeholders. Winding down cover for hundreds of vessels simultaneously requires time to:

    • Identify all underlying risks.
    • Process necessary cancellations and premium refunds.
    • Ensure that vessels have sufficient time to seek alternative, compliant cover to meet international maritime conventions.

    3. Orderly Market Exit

    By extending the deadline to July 8th, OFSI aims to mitigate the risk of accidental breaches and prevent immediate, disorderly disruptions in the maritime sector. The licence permits UK persons to receive, process, and transmit funds or economic resources to “extricate themselves” from contracts written prior to the February 24th designation.

    Key Details of the Licence

    FeatureDetails
    Licence ReferenceINT/2026/8893924
    Entities InvolvedMaritime Mutual Association Limited (Gibraltar), Maritime Mutual Insurance Association (NZ) Limited, and their subsidiaries.
    Current Expiry23:59 on July 8, 2026
    PermissionsWinding down, cancelling, or terminating insurance/reinsurance contracts agreed in writing before Feb 24, 2026.

    … you might find it interesting that this extension coincides with a broader OFSI effort to manage the high volume of licensing applications, which reached over 900 in the previous fiscal year.

    This looked reasonable, but I was curious as to what Gemini was inferring rather than knowing. So…

    provide a source list for your response. Is any part of your response not supported by the sources?

    And here’s Gemini checking its work:

    My previous response was based on official UK government updates and industry analysis typical of such sanctions developments. Below is the source list and a breakdown of what is explicitly stated versus what is inferred based on regulatory context.

    Source List

    1. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI):
    2. HM Treasury – UK Sanctions List:
      • Designation entries for Maritime Mutual Association Limited and Maritime Mutual Insurance Association (NZ) Limited (February 24, 2026).
    3. Legal & Industry Trackers (Secondary Sources):
      • Ashurst Russia Sanctions Tracker (UK): Update for April 2026 detailing the extension of wind-down periods.
      • LexisNexis Corporate Crime Highlights: Entry dated April 9, 2026, regarding the Maritime Mutual extension.
      • Insurance Business Mag: “Maritime Mutual added to UK Russia sanctions list” (February 26, 2026), providing context on the “shadow fleet” and P&I cover.

    Support Analysis

    While the primary facts are strictly supported by the official record, the qualitative “reasons” for the extension involve a degree of synthesis.

    Part of ResponseSupported by Sources?Note
    New Expiry (July 8, 2026)YesExplicitly stated in the amended GL and Publication Notice (April 9, 2026).
    Announcement Date (April 9)YesThe date the amendment was published on GOV.UK.
    Designation Context (Feb 24)YesMatches the date Maritime Mutual was added to the UK Sanctions List.
    Reasons: “Complexity” & “Industry Feedback”PartialOFSI notices are typically technical; they rarely list “industry feedback” in the text of the licence itself. However, these are the standard justifications cited by legal experts (e.g., Ashurst, Baker McKenzie) and are consistent with OFSI’s “Reasonableness in licensing” policy published in March 2026.
    “Shadow Fleet” MentionContextualThis is the official reason for the original designation (supporting Russian energy exports via non-compliant vessels), but the extension notice doesn’t repeat this—it only references the DP (Designated Person).

    Is any part not supported?

    The specific claim that the extension was due to “London insurance market feedback” is an expert inference. While historically true for almost all OFSI maritime insurance extensions (like the previous LUKOIL or GTLK wind-downs), the April 9th publication notice for INT/2026/8893924 technically only lists the amendment to the date without a detailed “Statement of Reasons” for the extension itself.

    Sounds reasonable to me – what do you think?

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  • Burning Question: What is the AUKUS Nations General Licence?

    Claude explains it for us:

    What Is This Document?

    This is an Open General Licence (OGL) — a pre-approved, standing permission issued by the UK Secretary of State that allows eligible businesses and individuals to export certain controlled goods, software, and technology without needing to apply for a specific export licence each time. This particular one covers trade between the three AUKUS partner nations: the UK, Australia, and the United States.

    It came into force on 8 April 2026, replacing the previous version from October 2025.

    What Problem Does It Solve?

    Normally, exporting military or dual-use goods (things that have both civilian and military applications) requires a specific government licence for each transaction — a slow and bureaucratic process. Under the AUKUS defence partnership, the three nations agreed to dramatically streamline this, allowing much freer movement of defence-related goods and technology between them. This OGL is the UK’s legal mechanism for doing that.

    What Does It Permit?

    The licence allows eligible users to:

    Export and transfer dual-use items and military goods, software, and technology to, from, and between the UK, Australia, and the US — including items that have already been incorporated into other products (e.g. a component built into a larger system).

    Supply goods to Australian, US, or UK armed forces — or to contractors working directly alongside those forces — even when those forces are deployed outside the three home nations, including on naval vessels.

    Who Can Use It?

    Only members of the Authorised User Community (AUC) — a defined group of organisations and individuals that have been vetted and enrolled through a joint process coordinated with the US State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). You can’t simply self-certify; the UK’s Department for Business and Trade (DBT) must confirm your membership with the Ministry of Defence before you can register.

    US and Australian people operating in the UK but based overseas can also use the licence, but only for intangible technology transfers (i.e. sharing information, data, or software digitally — not shipping physical goods).

    Key Conditions You Must Meet

    1. Classified material rules — if what you’re exporting carries a security classification (OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE or above), you need prior written MOD approval. The route to that approval depends on the context:

    • If it’s tied to a UK Government defence contract, you go through a process called F1686 or get approval from the MOD Contracting Authority.
    • If it’s not linked to a UK Government contract, you need a separate approval called an F680, obtained through the government’s SPIRE system.
    • For anything classified CONFIDENTIAL or above (or SECRET), you also need a Security Transportation Planfrom MOD’s Defence Equipment & Support team.
    • Electronic transmission of classified material must use appropriate encryption.

    2. Shipping paperwork — every physical export must include a declaration on the commercial documents stating either the name of this licence or your specific licence reference number (in the format GBOGE 20??/????). This reference must also be entered into the UK customs declarations system.

    3. Recipient verification — at the time of export, you must confirm and record that your recipient is also within the Authorised User Community. You can’t use this licence to send goods to anyone outside it.

    4. Records — you must keep detailed records of every export, transfer, or trade action made under this licence for at least four years after the end of the year in which it happened. Records must be available for inspection by government auditors.

    5. Audits — you must cooperate with audit visits from the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU), including completing a pre-visit questionnaire when asked. Failure to comply can result in your authorisation being suspended or withdrawn.

    What Is NOT Permitted?

    Despite its broad scope, the licence has a significant list of excluded items — things that cannot be exported under it regardless of destination. These fall into two broad categories:

    Certain dual-use items — specifically a small number of entries from the international dual-use control lists (entries 0C003, 1C350.5, and 1C350.26), which relate to particularly sensitive materials.

    Specific military items, including:

    • Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines
    • Man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS — shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles) and their missiles
    • Cluster munitions and sub-munitions
    • Long-range rockets and missiles (300km+ range) and their components
    • Chemical weapons agents — specifically nerve agents (including Sarin, Soman, VX, and Novichok-type compounds), blister agents (mustard gas, Lewisite), and incapacitating agents
    • Biological agents modified to cause casualties
    • Certain energetic materials (specialist explosives and propellant components, many of which appear on this list because of international treaty obligations)
    • The F-22 aircraft and its components
    • Long-range UAVs (300km+ range)
    • Naval nuclear propulsion systems

    The logic here is that even between close allies, some categories of weapon are subject to separate treaty obligations or are simply considered too sensitive to move under a general permission.

    What Happens If You Break the Rules?

    DBT can suspend or withdraw your authorisation. If that happens, you — and anyone who exported goods on your behalf — could face criminal prosecution. Once a suspension notice is served, you must stop using the licence immediately.

    In Short

    This licence is a significant practical benefit for UK defence industry companies working with Australian and US partners under the AUKUS programme. It removes the need for individual export licence applications on most controlled goods and technology flowing between the three nations — but only for vetted participants, only for non-excluded items, and subject to meaningful paperwork, record-keeping, and oversight obligations. Think of it as a fast lane that still has rules, not a free pass.

    Sources:

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  • April 13, 2026: Notice to Exporters 2026/10: AUKUS Nations OGEL Updated

    NTE 2026/10: update to open general licence

    Published 8 April 2026

    The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) has updated the following open general licence: Open general licence (AUKUS Nations).

    This licence has been updated to permit the export of goods, software or technology to any Australian, US or UK armed forces including when deployed.

    Contact  ECJU

    General queries about strategic export licensing

    Export Control Joint Unit
    Department for Business and Trade
    Old Admiralty Building
    Admiralty Place
    London
    SW1A 2DY

    Email exportcontrol.help@businessandtrade.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7215 4594

    Here’s the relevant General Licence:

    open-general-licence-aukus-nationsDownload

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