Final reminder to have your say: Survey on Open General Export Licences
The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) administers the UK’s system of export controls and licensing for military and dual-use items. This includes Open General Export Licences (OGELs), which are available for pre-determined military and dual-use controlled items being exported to a range of permitted restricted destinations. OGELs are often reported as a flexible and useful licence option, and can generally be used as soon as the exporter has registered. As such, ECJU is reviewing their usage and our overall service to exporters. If you are an exporter who has applied for an export licence from ECJU (whether or not you have registered for or regularly use OGELs), we would welcome your views to help shape our thinking. This week is your last chance to provide feedback via our short survey on: • exporter behaviour and experience in terms of using OGELs • why you do (or do not) use OGELs • what improvements to our service could be made to optimise their use
The survey takes around 15 minutes to complete. Please note there is an opportunity to share contact details to allow us to follow up with you for further insights, but this is entirely optional and otherwise your survey responses will remain anonymous.
General Licence INT/2026/9512597 issued and 1 FAQ added, 1 FAQ withdrawn and 2 FAQs amended
On 24 April 2026, the General Licence INT/2026/9512597 was issued. The General Licence pertains to legal Services which will take effect following the expiry of Legal Services General Licence INT/2025/7323088 on 28 April 2026.
Any persons intending to use General Licence INT/2026/9512597 should consult the copy of the Licence for full details of the definition, permissions, and usage requirements.
184. The Legal Services General Licence has been updated and is available online. What has changed and what does this mean for law firms, legal advisors, Counsel and providers of Expenses?
General Licence INT/2026/9512597 refreshes the fees and expenses caps for Parts A and B for the six-month period from 29 April 2026 until 28 October 2026, when the licence expires.
In addition to refreshing the caps, OFSI has also made some amendments to the General Licence.
‘DP Group’ means a DP designated for the purposes of an asset freeze by the UK under the UK Autonomous Sanctions Regulations, excluding those designated for the purpose of compliance with United Nations obligations, together with any entities owned or controlled by that DP.
Several permissions and conditions of the General Licence have been amended to incorporate this definition. Please consult the full licence online.
A DP and its owned or controlled entities may pay the legal fees for that DP or another entity within that DP group.
The Licence fee and expenses caps apply to all matters that a Law Firm (or Counsel, if engaged under a direct instruction) are handling for individuals or entities within a DP group, or, where there is no DP Group, for the designated entity or individual.
General Licence INT/2026/9512597 has also been amended to permit payments to a Non-UK Bank Account held by an individual regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Law Society of Scotland or the Law Society of Northern Ireland, who provides Legal Services outside the United Kingdom, otherwise than at a branch of a Law Firm that falls within paragraph 8.2.1 (Part A) or 11.2.1 (Part B). Please consult the full licence for the complete permission.
50. How do the fees and expenses caps apply? Is it per DP (i.e., for all a DP’s matters across all law firms) or is it per law firm being instructed by a DP?
OFSI has amended the General Licence so the £2,000,000 caps for each of Parts A and B, and the related expenses caps, now apply to each law firm instructed by the DP Group, or where there is no DP Group, to the designated entity or individual.
The caps cover all the matters being handled by that law firm for the DP Group, or where there is no DP Group, to the designated entity or individual. This means that the caps do not apply to each individual matter handled by that law firm.
Amended on: 24 April 2026
Scope of Legal Services General Licence
57. Can an entity owned and/or controlled by a designated person (DP) pay the DP’s legal fees even though the entity did not explicitly receive the legal advice?
Yes, provided the conditions of the General Licence are met. The General Licence states at paragraph 5 that a DP may pay professional legal fees, Counsel’s fees, and/or Expenses to a Law Firm, a Legal Adviser, Counsel or a provider of Expenses for Legal Services which have been provided to that DP or to any other DP in the same DP Group.”
The General Licence defines a DP as “those individuals or entities designated (or owned or controlled by an individual or entity designated) … excluding those designated for the purpose of compliance with United Nations obligations.”
Today, OFAC issued Cyber-related General License 2 (Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Anco Water Supply Co. Ltd. Related to the Treatment and Distribution of Drinking Water):
About 8:30 last night, I got OFAC’s notice of issuing General License 134B (Authorizing the Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin Loaded on Vessels as of April 17, 2026):
Of course, this seems different from what OFAC usually does when they change versions, as opposed to issuing a new GL. Let’s let Claude explain the history of this GL:
Good question — your instinct is right that 134B is structurally unusual compared to a typical amended GL. Here’s a breakdown:
The GL 134 lineage in brief:
GL 134 (March 12, 2026) authorized transactions for Russian-origin oil loaded on vessels before 12:01 a.m. EDT on March 12, 2026, through April 11, 2026.
GL 134A (March 19, 2026) amended GL 134, keeping the same March 12 loading cutoff and April 11 expiration, but added a new prohibition in paragraph (b)(1) barring transactions involving persons in or organized under the laws of North Korea, Cuba, Iran, the Crimea, and Covered Regions of Ukraine. That Cuba exclusion was notably the key change — GL 134 had apparently left open a question about whether Cuban transactions were covered, prompting OFAC to quickly amend it.
134A → 134B: The key differences
Comparing 134A to the 134B you’ve uploaded, there are two substantive changes:
Loading cutoff date extended by ~36 days — from March 12 to April 17, 2026. This is the big one.
Authorization window extended — from April 11 to May 16, 2026.
The paragraph (b)(1) exclusion list (Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Covered Regions/Crimea) appears to be carried over from 134A unchanged.
Why your observation is correct
Normally when OFAC issues an amended GL (the A, B, C progression), the change is clarificatory or administrative — same underlying authorization, tweaked language. What makes 134B unusual is that extending the loading cutoff date by over a month is not a clarification — it’s a new substantive authorization covering an entirely different universe of cargo (everything loaded between March 12 and April 17 that 134A never covered at all). In effect, OFAC has used the amendment format to issue what is functionally a fresh, broader wind-down license, rather than simply extending or clarifying the original. This mirrors what OFAC did with the parallel Iran GL U series and likely reflects a deliberate policy choice to keep rolling authorizations flowing as market conditions evolve, without the optics of issuing a wholly new GL from scratch.
I always wondered about this… Claude’s answer gives some insight into OFAC’s thinking:
EMSA and Nicaragua General License 5
What is EMSA?
Exportadora de Metales Sociedad Anonima (EMSA) is a Managua-based precious metals company that collects unrefined gold from six locations across Nicaragua, smelts it at its Managua headquarters, and sells it in bulk in the United States, with proceeds electronically transferred to a Nicaraguan bank account. Treasury describes it as “one of multiple enterprises organized by the Nicaraguan government to generate revenues for government use” — framing it not as an independently problematic private firm but as a deliberate instrument of the regime. Those proceeds have, per the press release, “possibly been used to equip, train, and pay the salaries of Nicaraguan paramilitary groups subordinate to the Nicaraguan government.”
Investigative reporting (Expediente Público) identifies EMSA’s owner as Edward Irías Pastora, nephew of Sandinista official Edén Pastora, who was linked to paramilitary organization during the 2018 social protests. That ownership connection helps explain how EMSA fits into the regime’s network, though Treasury’s designation rests on EMSA’s operational role in the gold sector, not the ownership lineage per se.
The April 16, 2026 Action
EMSA’s designation was part of a large, coordinated action targeting five individuals and seven companies. The broader sweep included:
Two sons of Ortega and Murillo — Maurice Ortega (Presidential Delegate for Sports) and Daniel Edmundo Ortega (head of the Communication and Citizenship Council) — designated as government officials, extending the family dynasty designations beyond the previously sanctioned Laureano Ortega Murillo.
The Vice Minister of Energy and Mines, Santiago Bermudez, designated as a government official — targeting the ministry that controls mining concessions and has been central to every prior round of Nicaragua gold sanctions.
Companies that stepped into the shoes of previously sanctioned entities: Grupo Minero Xiloa (Minero) explicitly became more prominent after COMINTSA and Capital Mining were sanctioned in May 2024, and multiple former officials of sanctioned entities ENIMINAS, Caruna, and Albanisa are now involved in it. Nelson Sobalvarro, the legal representative of COMINTSA, transferred its concessions to new entities — Zhong Fu before sanctions and Thomas Metal after — and was designated as a frontman. A notary, Lester Tamariz, who expedited those transfers was also designated.
Several Chinese-linked firms (Thomas Metal, Xinxin, Brother Metal) granted large concessions by the regime, and Xinxin is specifically noted as having shipped over $25 million in gold to the United States in early-to-mid 2025.
Companies involved in the forcible seizure of a U.S.-owned facility: Zhong Fu and Santa Rita, along with two individuals, physically occupied the plant of BHMB Mining Nicaragua S.A. — a company with U.S. investment — expelled its security personnel, and assumed control of the property without compensation. Secretary Bessent’s statement leads with this: “The United States will not allow the illicit confiscation of American-owned assets.”
Why EMSA Got a Wind-Down GL When the Other Six Designated Companies Did Not
GL 5 authorizes wind-down transactions involving EMSA through May 16, 2026 — a 30-day window. None of the other six companies designated in the same action received one.
The answer is in the press release itself. EMSA is specifically described as selling gold “in bulk in the United States” — it had active, ongoing commercial relationships with U.S. buyers at the moment of designation, with electronic transfers presumably clearing through U.S. financial institutions. Immediately blocking EMSA without any safe harbor would have instantly put U.S. counterparties — refiners, traders, banks processing open transactions — in violation of OFAC regulations for deals already in the pipeline through no fault of their own.
The other designated companies do not carry the same characterization. Xinxin’s U.S. shipments are described in the past tense (early-to-mid 2025); the others are not described as having direct, current bulk U.S. sales relationships. The GL follows the pattern established in this same sanctions program: when ENIMINAS was designated in June 2022, OFAC issued GL 3; when the General Directorate of Mines was designated in October 2022, OFAC issued GL 4. In each case, the wind-down license accompanied entities with live U.S. commercial exposure.
Nicaragua’s Gold Sector and the Regime’s Use of It
At the country level, the United States has been Nicaragua’s dominant gold export destination — in 2021, Nicaraguan gold exports to the U.S. reached $1.534 billion, representing the vast majority of total gold exports that year. By 2025, the U.S. remained Nicaragua’s largest overall export destination at 38% of total merchandise exports, with Canada second largely due to gold shipments.
Treasury has been systematically targeting this revenue stream since 2022, and the regime has consistently adapted — restructuring around new entities after each designation wave. The press release describes the mining sector since 2020 as “a complex network of front companies and frontmen designed to generate foreign currency, launder sanctioned assets, and reinforce political control,” managed by two previously sanctioned individuals: Laureano Ortega Murillo and Energy Minister Salvador Mansell Castrillo.
Source Check
What is directly supported by the press release: EMSA’s operational description (bulk U.S. gold sales, six collection locations, Managua smelting, electronic transfers); its characterization as a regime revenue instrument; the paramilitary financing allegation (with Treasury’s own “possibly” hedge); the full list of co-designees and their roles; the BHMB property seizure; Secretary Bessent’s quoted rationale; the legal authority (EO 13851 as amended by EO 14088); FBI and CBP collaboration; the history of prior designations (ENIMINAS, COMINTSA, Caruna, Albanisa, Laureano, Mansell).
What is supported by other sourced materials: EMSA ownership by Edward Irías Pastora (Expediente Público); U.S. dominance as Nicaragua gold export destination (Confidencial Digital, BLP Legal); prior wind-down GLs for ENIMINAS and DGM (Treasury press releases from 2022).
What is inference, clearly labeled as such: The causal link between EMSA’s U.S. bulk sales and OFAC’s decision to issue a wind-down GL is logical and consistent with established OFAC practice, but OFAC does not publish a written explanation for why any particular entity receives a wind-down GL. The connection is well-supported but not explicitly stated in any source.
General Licence INT/2025/7628424 — Plain English Summary
What is this, and why does it exist?
This is a UK financial sanctions licence issued by OFSI (the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, part of HM Treasury). It was granted under Regulation 40 of the Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 — the UK’s domestic legal framework for Iran-related nuclear sanctions.
Under those sanctions, certain Iranian banks and their UK subsidiaries are “Designated Persons” (DPs) — meaning their assets are frozen and financial transactions involving them are normally prohibited. But a total freeze creates a practical problem: these entities still have UK staff, UK office costs, and UK legal obligations. This licence is the solution. It carves out a narrow, carefully controlled set of payments that are permitted despite the freeze.
Who are the “Designated Persons” covered?
The licence names five entities in Annex 1: Bank Melli (including Melli Bank PLC), Bank Saderat Iran, Bank Tejarat, Persia International Bank Plc, and Iran Insurance Company. These are the Iranian-linked financial institutions with a UK presence that the licence applies to.
What does the licence actually allow?
The DPs, or persons acting on their behalf, may make payments for:
Staff pay: remuneration, allowances, and contractual or statutory redundancy payments to UK employees and UK directors;
Pensions of UK employees and UK directors;
IT services: fees and costs for UK providers of broadband, telephone, email, anti-virus/cybersecurity software, operating system software, and regulatory reporting software; and
Accountancy services: fees for UK chartered or certified accountants for the DPs’ UK operations.
In short: the frozen entities can still pay their UK-based staff, keep their IT running, and meet their accountancy obligations — but nothing more.
Key safeguards and conditions
All payments may only be made to accounts held at a regulated UK financial institution (a “Relevant Institution”).
Payments must not be made, directly or indirectly, to any Designated Person. So the money can flow to ordinary UK employees and suppliers, but not back into frozen accounts.
Within 14 days of the end of each calendar month, the UK branch of the DP must send a report to HM Treasury detailing every payment made that month — including who sent and received the money, the purpose, the amount, the payment route, and the date.
All parties must keep accurate records for a minimum of six years.
Duration and today’s update
The licence took effect on 23 October 2025 and, as updated today (16 April 2026), expires at 23:59 on 22 October 2026 — the update today appears to have extended the expiry date by six months, from 22 April 2026 to 22 October 2026. This is consistent with the typical OFSI practice of rolling such licences forward in six-month blocks.
🔍 Transparency: What is and isn’t supported by my sources
Claim
Source support
Licence issued under Iran Nuclear Regulations
✅ Directly from the licence text
Five named DPs in Annex 1
✅ Directly from the licence text
Four categories of permitted payments
✅ Directly from the licence text
Reporting and record-keeping requirements
✅ Directly from the licence text
Extension today to 22 October 2026
✅ The fetched PDF (updated 16 April 2026) shows this date, replacing the earlier 22 April 2026 expiry
The reason for today’s update (i.e., why it was extended, not just that it was)
⚠️ Not stated in the licence text or any source I found. OFSI does not typically explain renewals. This is an inference based on the changed expiry date.
Previous amendment history (Oct/Dec 2025)
✅ Confirmed by both the licence text and Mayer Brown’s sanctions update
If you need to act on this licence — for example, if you are one of the named banks or are providing services to them — you should consult the official GOV.UK page and consider seeking specialist sanctions law advice, as I am not a lawyer and the licence text itself notes that full details govern over any summary.
These sort of explanations almost makes sanctions compliance easy… almost.
The definition of “IT Providers” was amended and now reads:
“UK providers of broadband services, telephone services, email services, anti-virus and cybersecurity software services, operating system software services and regulatory reporting software.”
Permission 4.2 was added to the licence:
4.2 Where a payment is made by a Person acting on behalf of one of the DPs in accordance with paragraph 4.1, the DP may repay the Person the same amount as the payment provided payment is made from a UK account.
Permissions 8.2 and 8.3 were added to the licence:
8.2 Process currency conversions and deduct reasonable fees as appropriate when processing payments under paragraph 4 on behalf of one of the DPs; and
8.3 Transfer funds between different currency accounts held by one of the DPs in order to effect any conversion required under paragraph 8.2.
Reporting requirement 10.1 was amended to reflect the new permission 4.2:
10.1 The name of the DP sender or the Person making the payment on their behalf; and
The licence was extended by six months and now expires on 22 October 2026.
Any persons intending to use General Licence INT/2025/7628424 should consult the copy of the Licence for full details of the permissions and usage requirements.
Explain the UK’s export control licensing system, and compare and contrast it to that of the US, in language suitable for non-expert professionals. Show your sources and verify that the response is supported by the sources. If anything is less than well-supported, see if you can find sources that buttress or clarifies those points.
The response:
UK and US Export Control Licensing Systems: A Plain-English Guide
Export controls are laws that regulate what goods, technology, and services a country allows to leave its borders — and to whom. They exist to prevent sensitive or dangerous items from reaching hostile states, terrorist groups, or others who might misuse them. Both the UK and US have comprehensive systems, but they’re structured quite differently. Here’s how each works, followed by a direct comparison.
Part 1: The UK System
Who runs it?
The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) administers the UK’s system of export controls and licensing for military and dual-use items. It brings together operational and policy expertise from the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). DBT has overall responsibility for the statutory and regulatory framework of export controls and for decisions to grant or refuse an export licence. FCDO and MOD are DBT’s principal advisers, advising on the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria used to assess licence applications.
Think of the ECJU as a single front door for the whole system — but with three departments consulting behind the scenes before a decision is made.
What items are controlled?
The UK maintains the Strategic Export Control Lists, which detail military goods, dual-use items, and controlled technologies. These lists align broadly with EU and international lists but diverge in specific areas, particularly post-Brexit. The list is searchable online through the UK government website.
Controlled goods include most items which have been specially designed or modified for military use and their components, including any technology and software used in or with the item, as well as dual-use items — goods that can be used for both commercial or military purposes, such as ball bearings that use technology which could be repurposed to make ballistic missiles.
Importantly, even if a product is not listed on the control lists, it may be subject to end-use controls if the exporter knows or suspects it will be used in prohibited applications, such as weapons development or military purposes in embargoed countries. This “catch-all” provision imposes a responsibility on exporters to obtain licences for unlisted goods if they possess knowledge of restricted end-use.
What types of licences are there?
The UK offers three main licence types, designed to suit different export scenarios:
1. Open General Export Licence (OGEL) — the simplest route. OGELs are the most flexible and commonly used licence, enabling unlimited exports to pre-approved destinations. You only need to register once to start using them. They’re pre-published, publicly available, and cover many routine, lower-risk situations.
2. Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) — needed when no OGEL applies. SIELs for permanent exports are generally valid for 2 years or until the quantity specified has been exported, whichever occurs first. The ECJU aims to provide a decision on 70% of SIEL applications within 20 working days, and 99% within 60 working days.
3. Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL) — for repeat business. An OIEL allows a named exporter to export multiple shipments of specific controlled goods to named destinations. It is tailored to an exporter’s specific needs and is available to exporters who have a track record in applying for export licences, or those who can demonstrate business need. OIELs are usually valid for 3 to 5 years.
How are applications assessed?
The ECJU assesses all licence applications on a case-by-case basis against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, which provide a thorough risk assessment framework. A licence will not be granted when it is inconsistent with the Criteria. Those criteria weigh factors including human rights in the destination country, regional stability, the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the UK’s international obligations.
What are the consequences of non-compliance?
It is a criminal offence to export controlled goods without the correct licence. Penalties vary depending on the nature of the offence. They can range from de-registration to fines or imprisonment.
Part 2: The US System
A more fragmented structure
The US system is notably more complex because it is split across multiple agencies depending on the type of item involved. The three principal bodies are: the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which oversees the Export Administration Regulations (EAR); the US Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), which oversees the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Arms Export Control Act; and the US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which administers economic sanctions and embargoes. Nuclear-related export controls are additionally administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy.
In practice, most exporters need to navigate two main regimes: ITAR and EAR.
ITAR — for purely military items
Administered by the US Department of State through the DDTC, ITAR governs items on the United States Munitions List (USML). This list covers a wide range of defense-related items, from firearms and explosives to spacecraft and advanced targeting systems. ITAR does not only apply to the physical objects themselves — it also applies to technical data and services related to those items. That means design documents, instructions, or even the know-how to maintain an ITAR-controlled aircraft engine are just as tightly regulated as the engine itself.
ITAR regulations place strict restrictions on who can view or handle controlled items and data. In almost all cases, only US persons (meaning US citizens or permanent residents) are permitted access unless a special licence is obtained. Even something as simple as allowing a foreign national employee to view a controlled document on a shared drive could count as a violation if no authorisation is in place.
EAR — for dual-use and commercial items
The EAR regulates the manufacture, sale, distribution and export of commercial and dual-use items, technology and information not already covered by ITAR. The governing agency is the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and its primary document is the Commerce Control List (CCL). Each item that falls under the EAR is assigned an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN).
EAR applies to dual-use items — those with commercial applications that could also be adapted for military or security purposes, such as advanced semiconductors, encryption software, or certain chemicals. While EAR also places access restrictions, they are more nuanced. The level of restriction depends on the classification of the item, the destination country, the intended end use, and the end user.
Penalties
ITAR licences from DDTC typically take 60–90 days but can exceed 120 days for complex cases. EAR licences from BIS average 30–60 days. Civil penalties can exceed $1M per violation. Criminal penalties for wilful violations include fines up to $1M and 20 years imprisonment.
Part 3: Comparing the Two Systems
Here is where the most practically significant differences lie.
1. Single agency vs. multiple agencies
The UK channels everything through one body — the ECJU. The US divides responsibility between at least three major agencies (State, Commerce, Treasury), plus others for nuclear matters. The US regime has more jurisdictions, more categories of items, and more combinations of restrictions, exceptions, exemptions, and governing authorities. Overall the US regime is similar to but more restrictive and burdensome than the UK regime.
2. The “deemed export” rule — a major US-specific concept
This is one of the most significant differences for organisations employing international staff or collaborating across borders. The US export control regime recognises that certain disclosures or transfers of controlled items to certain individuals (typically foreign nationals that are not exempt) may be deemed to be an export or re-export. In plain terms: showing a controlled document to a foreign colleague in a US office can constitute an “export” requiring a licence.
By contrast, the UK regime has no concept of “deemed” exports — disclosures and transfers under UK law are nationality-agnostic. The UK regime applies to transfers and disclosures of controlled items made from within the UK to destinations and recipients outside of the UK. This is a substantial practical difference for universities, research institutions, and multinationals.
3. Extraterritorial reach — the US casts a much wider net
US regulations routinely apply to items after they’ve been exported from the United States, and in many cases to items that have never touched US soil. For example, foreign-made products or software that contain US components, or are produced with the benefit of technology or software originating in the United States, may be subject to US export licence requirements.
The US export control laws have a wide-ranging extraterritorial reach and the US government seeks to penalise companies and individuals who breach the export control laws, regardless of where they are located.
The UK, by contrast, focuses primarily on exports departing from UK territory. EU and UK sanctions apply within the territory of the United Kingdom, aboard aircraft or vessels under their jurisdiction, to UK nationals, and to entities constituted under UK law. To date, neither the EU nor the UK has aggressively enforced sanctions against foreign persons processing transactions through their financial systems, in contrast to the United States.
4. Licence types and flexibility
The UK regime currently makes more extensive use of open licences and general authorisations (OGELs) for exporting predefined items to eligible destinations. These function as standing pre-approvals for common, lower-risk scenarios, reducing the burden on exporters. The US has analogous “licence exceptions” under the EAR, but commentators generally find them less accessible. Exporters with experience in both systems generally find the EU/UK system easier to navigate.
5. End-use controls
The UK regime has more widely defined end-use controls for unrated items — meaning UK exporters face a broader “catch-all” obligation to seek a licence even for items not on any formal list if they have reason to believe the end-use is problematic. The US end-use controls are similarly broad, though organised differently by item and destination.
6. Shared international foundations
Despite their differences, both systems rest on the same multilateral foundations — chiefly the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms and dual-use), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group (chemical and biological), and the Missile Technology Control Regime. This means the categories of controlled goods are broadly similar; the differences are procedural, institutional, and in the breadth of jurisdiction.
Summary Table
Feature
UK
US
Central body
Single agency (ECJU)
Multiple agencies (BIS, DDTC, OFAC, others)
Main licences
OGEL, SIEL, OIEL
Licence exceptions (EAR), DDTC licences (ITAR)
Military items
UK Military List (via ECJU)
USML / ITAR (via DDTC/State Dept)
Dual-use items
Strategic Export Control List (via ECJU)
Commerce Control List / EAR (via BIS/Commerce)
Deemed exports
Not applicable — nationality-agnostic
Yes — disclosures to foreign nationals in the US can require a licence
Extraterritorial reach
Primarily territorial
Broad — applies to US-origin content worldwide
Ease of navigation
Generally simpler
More complex; multiple overlapping frameworks
Penalties
Criminal fines and imprisonment
Civil fines up to $1M+; criminal fines up to $1M and up to 20 years imprisonment
Practical takeaway: If your organisation exports from the UK, you are dealing with one agency applying one set of criteria. If you work with US-origin technology or employ non-US nationals on US-controlled projects — even in the UK — US rules may apply to you regardless. Any organisation operating internationally should be aware that the two systems can overlap, and compliance with one does not guarantee compliance with the other.