Category: Venezuela

  • The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Venezuela-related General License 5X, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or After August 4, 2026;” Venezuela-related General License 24A, “Certain Transactions Involving the Government of Venezuela Related to Telecommunications and Mail Authorized;” and Venezuela-related General License 59, “Authorizing the Supply of Certain Items and Services Involving Consorcio Venezolano de Industrias Aeronáuticas y Servicios Aéreos, S.A. (Conviasa).”

    Additionally, OFAC is amending one Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Question, FAQ 595.

    New versions: GL 5X:

    and GL 24A:

    And new GL 59:

    And here’s the amended FAQ:

    595. What does Venezuela-related General License 5X authorize? 

    The President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13835 on May 21, 2018. Subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions related to the sale, transfer, assignment, or pledging as collateral by the Government of Venezuela (GOV) of any equity interest in an entity owned 50 percent or more by the GOV. One effect of subsection 1(a)(iii) is to require authorization before U.S. persons may engage in certain transactions regarding any equity interest in an entity owned 50 percent or more by the GOV. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. 13835, OFAC received inquiries about how and whether subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 could affect the ability to enforce bondholder rights to the CITGO shares serving as collateral for the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) 2020 8.5 percent bond. OFAC issued General License (GL) 5 on July 19, 2018, which removed E.O. 13835 as an obstacle to holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond gaining access to their collateral.

    General License 5 was replaced and superseded by General License 5A on October 24, 2019 with a delay in the effectiveness of the authorization in the general license. Since that date, OFAC has extended the delay in effectiveness multiple times. Most recently, OFAC issued General License 5X on June 18, 2026, which further delays the effectiveness of the authorization in GL 5 until August 4, 2026. Between October 24, 2019 and August 4, 2026 (the date the authorization in General License 5X becomes effective), there is no authorization in effect that licenses against subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 applicable to the holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond. As a result, during such period, transactions related to the sale or transfer of CITGO shares in connection with the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond are prohibited, unless specifically authorized by OFAC.

    To the extent an agreement may be reached on proposals to restructure or refinance payments due to the holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond, additional licensing requirements may apply. OFAC would encourage parties to apply for a specific license and would have a favorable licensing policy toward such an agreement.

    Date Updated: June 18, 2026

    Updated on Jun 18, 2026

  • Here’s what OFAC said:

    The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Venezuela-related General License 46C, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Oil or Petrochemical Products;” Venezuela-related General License 47A, “Authorizing the Sale of U.S.-Origin Diluents to Venezuela;” Venezuela-related General License 48B, “Authorizing the Supply of Certain Items and Services to Venezuela;” Venezuela-related General License 50B, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Oil or Gas Sector Operations in Venezuela of Certain Entities;” Venezuela-related General License 51B, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Minerals, Including Gold;” Venezuela-related General License 52A, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.;” and Venezuela-related General License 54A, “Authorizing the Supply of Certain Items and Services for Minerals Operations in Venezuela.”

    Additionally, OFAC is issuing two Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Questions, FAQs 1259 and 1260.

    Let’s go backward this time – here are the FAQs:

    1260. Does the requirement in certain Venezuela General Licenses (e.g., 46C, 47A, 48B, 50B, 51B, 52A, and 54A) that the terms of contracts be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of a state or other jurisdiction within the United States mean that U.S. law must govern all aspects of the underlying activity? 

    No.  Certain Venezuela general licenses (GLs) require that any contract for transactions authorized by the GL with the Government of Venezuela or certain other covered entities (e.g., Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. in GL 52A or CVG Compañía General de Minería de Venezuela CA in GL 51B) specify that the terms of the contract be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of a state or other jurisdiction within the United States. The GLs also require dispute resolution proceedings relating to the contract or its breach to occur in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Singapore. If the parties agree to submit their dispute to arbitration, the procedural rules applicable are those rules agreed by the parties, or the rules of internationally recognized institutions or the rules of the seat of arbitration.

    This requirement means that the laws of a state or other jurisdiction within the United States must govern questions of contract law between the parties relating to the contract, including interpretation, contractual performance obligations, breach, contractual remedies, payment obligations, termination, validity, assignment or novation, and enforceability of the contract.

    The requirement permits the inclusion of contract terms that recognize that certain aspects of the underlying activity in Venezuela may be subject to applicable Venezuelan law and regulations, including laws and regulations governing the exercise of Venezuela’s sovereign regulatory authority, administrative permits and licenses, concessions, labor, environmental, health and safety, and other mandatory regulatory requirements.

    Released on Jun 10, 2026

    Venezuela Sanctions

    1259. Are private and commercial flights authorized to arrive in and depart from airports in Venezuela, and can they receive ground services in-country? 

    Yes. Venezuela-related General License (GL) 30B authorizes U.S. persons to engage in all transactions involving the Government of Venezuela (GOV), including its agencies and instrumentalities like the Instituto Nacional de Aeronáutica Civil (INAC) and Instituto Nacional de los Espacios Aquaticos (INEA), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the operation or use of airports in Venezuela.

    Transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the operation or use of airports in Venezuela include but are not limited to: the provision of baggage and ground handling services; safety and security services; airport operational services; air navigation and overflight services; fuel and into-plane services; and the payment of aeronautical, customs, immigration, and other government-imposed fees and taxes. Please see FAQ 1236 for additional information on GL 30B’s authorizations.

    GL 30B does not authorize transactions involving blocked persons other than (i) INEA, or (ii) GOV persons blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13884, including INAC.

    Additionally, Venezuela-related GL 33 authorizes the receipt of, and payment for, services involving the GOV related to overflights and emergency landings in Venezuela. It also authorizes transactions necessary to provide air ambulance and related medical services, including medical evacuation.

    GL 33 does not authorize transactions involving persons identified on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) or owned 50 percent or more by persons identified on the SDN List.

    Generally, non-U.S. persons do not risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in transactions authorized for U.S. persons, including engaging in transactions authorized pursuant to GL 30B or GL 33. Additionally, U.S. sanctions programs issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), including the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, do not generally prohibit transactions ordinarily incident to travel to or from any country.

    Released on Jun 10, 2026

    and the GLs:

  • I’m happy to report that someone reads this old blog – Francisco Ramos M. does! He wrote me to tell me that my CAATSA Practitioners’ Guide inspired him to try his hand at one, too. Here it is – clearly aimed at a different audience (nothing wrong with that).

    Here’s his English version:

    and his Spanish:

    I had Claude compare the two English versions, and it gave us both some very helpful feedback – including the fact that my version does not take into account Venezuelan regulations and Francisco’s does.

    Of course, we’d love your feedback… hint, hint.

  • Again, there will also be a Spanish language version later once I get done with some grammar and terminology fixed… in the meantime, the English version:

  • The Spanish version will be later today (I ran out to Claude usage – it doesn’t reset till after noon)

  • Claude compares and contrasts GL58 with other Venezuela GLs and, to be honest, comes up with a really interesting detailed analysis that, to be fair, I’m not sure I could reproduce:

    This is a genuinely distinctive license. Let me walk through what makes it unusual compared to the rest of the Venezuela GL landscape.


    What GL 58 does: It authorizes U.S. persons to provide legal, financial advisory, and consulting services to the Government of Venezuela and PdVSA in connection with potential restructuring of GoV/PdVSA debt. It was signed by OFAC Director Bradley T. Smith and dated today, May 5, 2026.

    What makes it different from the other Venezuela GLs:

    1. It’s debtor-side, not creditor-side or commerce-side. This is perhaps the most striking feature. The entire wave of 2026 Venezuela GLs — GL 46B through GL 57 — has been about enabling U.S. commercial actors to engage in trade, investment, and financial services with Venezuela. These GLs provide opportunities for U.S. persons to engage in business related to the oil and gas, petrochemical and metals and mining industries in Venezuela, albeit under certain conditions. GL 58 flips the perspective: it authorizes U.S. professionals to advise the Venezuelan government itself on how to restructure its debt obligations. That’s a fundamentally different posture — it’s enabling the debtor to get professional help, not enabling creditors or commercial parties to do business.

    2. It authorizes preparation but explicitly prohibits execution. Paragraph (b)(1) creates a sharp firewall: the actual restructuring, transfer, or settlement of debt is not authorized, nor are direct negotiations between GoV/PdVSA and creditors. The license only covers assessment, development, and preparation of restructuring options and proposals (Note 2 to paragraph (a)). This “preparation only” structure is unusual. Compare this to GL 49A and GL 56, which authorize negotiating and entering into contingent contracts — those GLs let parties reach binding agreements (contingent on further OFAC authorization). GL 56 permits transactions necessary to negotiate contingent commercial contracts with the Government of Venezuela across all sectors, provided contracts expressly condition performance on separate OFAC authorization. GL 58 doesn’t even go that far; it stops at the advisory stage before any negotiating table is set.

    3. It sits in tension with the GL 5 series. The GL 5 line (now at 5W, issued just yesterday) has spent years blocking the enforcement of bondholder rights to CITGO shares. OFAC issued GL 5W on May 4, 2026, which further delays the effectiveness of the authorization — pushing the CITGO bondholder enforcement window out to June 19, 2026. So OFAC is simultaneously preventing creditors from seizing collateral while now enabling the debtor to get professional advice on restructuring. Read together, GL 5W and GL 58 suggest OFAC is trying to steer the situation toward a negotiated resolution rather than a disorderly collateral seizure.

    4. The dual-agency reporting requirement is unusual. Paragraph (c) requires that signed service contracts be furnished to both the State Department (Sanctions_inbox@state.gov) and the Department of Energy (VZReporting@doe.gov) within 10 business days. Most other Venezuela GLs don’t impose this kind of contract-reporting obligation. The DOE involvement underscores the energy-sector dimension of PdVSA’s debt, while State Department involvement signals foreign policy coordination.

    5. The payment-method prohibitions are notably specific. Paragraph (b)(2) bars payment terms involving debt swaps, gold, or Venezuelan government-issued digital currency including the petro. No other GL I’ve reviewed spells out payment-method restrictions with this level of specificity. This suggests OFAC is concerned about advisory fees being structured as backdoor value transfers to the regime.


    What this signals in context: OFAC’s rapid release of new guidance and GLs represent only the U.S. side of what appears to be a fundamental re-ordering of the U.S.-Venezuela economic relationship. The 2026 GLs have been progressively opening sectors — oil (GL 46B, 50A, 52), minerals (GL 51A, 54, 55), all-sector negotiations (GL 56), and banking infrastructure (GL 57). GL 58 adds a new layer by opening the door to sovereign debt resolution advisory work. Combined with the simultaneous extension of GL 5W to block disorderly CITGO collateral seizures, it looks like OFAC is laying the procedural groundwork for an eventual managed debt restructuring — but keeping tight control by requiring separate authorization before anyone can actually execute a deal.

    How well-supported is this analysis? The factual claims about what the other GLs do are well-sourced from OFAC’s own publications, law firm analyses (Mayer Brown, Baker McKenzie, Leech Tishman, Paul Hastings, Herbert Smith Freehills), and OFAC FAQ pages. The interpretive claim — that GL 58 signals a managed path toward debt restructuring — is my inference from reading the licenses together. It’s a reasonable reading, but it’s speculation about policy intent, not established fact. I’d watch for Treasury press statements, State Department commentary, or new FAQs that might confirm or complicate that reading.

    I’d be really interested to see what consultants in our field think about this – I do notice Baker McKenzie’s name in there and that undoubtedly enhances the quality of the analysis, knitting together disparate elements that the day-to-day practitioner is too busy to contemplate.

    Got beef with this – or kudos? Let me know in the comments.

  • This one is General License 58 (Authorizing Certain Services to the Government of Venezuela in Connection with Potential Debt Restructuring):

    My take: as opposed to finding an exception to prohibitions and then licensing them, this GL seems very much about “repairing” the Venezuelan state, which it undoubtedly has needed after so many years of mismanagement. Nice to see.

  • This time it’s Venezuela-related General License 5W (Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or After June 19, 2026):

    And Frequently Asked Question 595 got an update, too:

    595. What does Venezuela-related General License 5W authorize?

    Answer

    The President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13835 on May 21, 2018. Subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions related to the sale, transfer, assignment, or pledging as collateral by the Government of Venezuela (GOV) of any equity interest in an entity owned 50 percent or more by the GOV. One effect of subsection 1(a)(iii) is to require authorization before U.S. persons may engage in certain transactions regarding any equity interest in an entity owned 50 percent or more by the GOV. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. 13835, OFAC received inquiries about how and whether subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 could affect the ability to enforce bondholder rights to the CITGO shares serving as collateral for the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) 2020 8.5 percent bond. OFAC issued General License (GL) 5 on July 19, 2018, which removed E.O. 13835 as an obstacle to holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond gaining access to their collateral.

    General License 5 was replaced and superseded by General License 5A on October 24, 2019 with a delay in the effectiveness of the authorization in the general license. Since that date, OFAC has extended the delay in effectiveness multiple times. Most recently, OFAC issued General License 5W on May 4, 2026, which further delays the effectiveness of the authorization in GL 5 until June 19, 2026. Between October 24, 2019 and June 19, 2026 (the date the authorization in General License 5Wbecomes effective), there is no authorization in effect that licenses against subsection 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 applicable to the holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond. As a result, during such period, transactions related to the sale or transfer of CITGO shares in connection with the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond are prohibited, unless specifically authorized by OFAC.

    To the extent an agreement may be reached on proposals to restructure or refinance payments due to the holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond, additional licensing requirements may apply. OFAC would encourage parties to apply for a specific license and would have a favorable licensing policy toward such an agreement.

    Date Updated: May 04, 2026

    Date Released

    January 20, 2022