Mr. Sanctions

Category: Joint Statements/Publications

  • September 16, 2026: Joint Statement on Sanctions Evasion by North Korean Laborers

    Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on the Report Covering the DPRK’s Overseas Labour Program

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN

    SEPTEMBER 16, 2026

    Begin text:

    The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America on the occasion of the release of the latest report of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team.

    We, the participating states of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), have released a report today on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) violations and evasions of United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) through the ongoing overseas deployment of North Korean labourers. The MSMT is a multilateral mechanism established in October 2024 to monitor and report on the implementation of UN sanctions measures relating to the DPRK. The report is available on the official MSMT website.

    This report details the systemic evasion of UN sanctions by the DPRK and other countries through a global network of unlawful overseas labour, prohibited by UNSCRs 2375 and 2397. The report consolidates information provided by MSMT participating states and open-source information to show how the DPRK continues to deploy an estimated 35,600 to 101,280 labourers, nearly all of whom are located in the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation.

    Despite the 2019 repatriation deadline mandated by UNSCR 2397, at least 17 countries are suspected of continuing to host labourers, generating between US $450 million and $800 million in 2025 to fund the DPRK’s unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The report highlights that nearly all of the wages earned by overseas North Korean labourers are confiscated by the DPRK.

    The MSMT is sharing this information with the international community to highlight the significant risks associated with employing North Korean overseas labourers and the need to deter the employment of such labourers. We encourage all UN Member States to raise awareness and hold responsible parties and facilitators accountable for UNSCR violations, including through domestic action.

    This report addresses the monitoring gap created by the disbandment of the UN Security Council’s 1718 Committee Panel of Experts in April 2024, caused by Russia’s veto in March 2024. The report will assist the international community in fully implementing the relevant UNSCRs. Considering the continued violations and evasions of relevant UNSCRs, we urge the UN Security Council to reestablish the Panel of Experts in the same strength and structure it had prior to its disbandment.

    We underscore once again our shared determination to fully implement the UNSCRs. The MSMT will continue to monitor the implementation of UNSCRs related to the DPRK and expose ongoing attempts by the DPRK and others to violate and evade these measures.

    Quick Facts:

    • In 2017, the UN Security Council (UNSC) made it unlawful for any UN Member State to allow North Koreans to earn income within their jurisdictions. All countries were required to repatriate any North Koreans earning income within their jurisdictions back to the DPRK by 2019.
    • An estimated 20,000-70,000 North Korean labourers are deployed in China. Despite a temporary repatriation of 10,000-20,000 workers between 2023 and 2025, approximately 10,000 new North Korean labourers arrived in China between January 2025 and January 2026.
    • North Korean labourers are increasingly deployed to work in Russia, with 15,000-30,000 working in Russia as of the end of 2025. North Korean labourers are manufacturing military drones for Russia on Russian soil, such as in drone factories located in Russia. The Russian government has created a student visa scheme to camouflage North Korean labourers in Russia as students. Each North Korean labourer in Russia generates an average estimated US $7,500 in wages annually.
    • Estimates indicate that monthly wages earned by North Korean labourers in Russia may be up to five times as high compared to monthly wages in China, depending on the industry.
    • The DPRK confiscates 80-90% of wages earned by North Korean labourers. In some cases, the confiscated amount exceeds their actual earnings, leaving North Korean labourers indebted to the DPRK. DPRK authorities exercise extreme control over labourers’ movement and interactions with outsiders in order to prevent defections, while labourers who do defect risk reprisals against family members remaining in North Korea.

    End text.

    —

    , ,

  • July 31,m 2026: US State Department & others issue joint alert about North Korean workers

    Alert to Countries, Companies, and Other Entities Regarding North Korean IT Workers

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    JULY 31, 2026

    This alert is jointly issued by the U.S. Department of State and Federal Bureau of Investigation; Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Cybersecurity Office, National Police Agency, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; the Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Police Agency; Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Global Affairs Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; Germany’s Federal Foreign Office; Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs; New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; and the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation.

    North Korea relies upon a network of skilled Information Technology (IT) workers, deployed within and outside of North Korea, to obtain false identities and remotely earn income to fund North Korea’s unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

    North Korean IT workers impersonate nationals of other countries to obtain work and income through online platforms operated by private companies for employment, procurement, and contracting of services. These workers seek out contracts with the intent of remitting their salaries to their parent North Korean agencies. They also pose an insider threat to companies and are involved in data exfiltration, cryptocurrency theft, and theft of sensitive information. North Korean IT workers employ increasingly sophisticated methods, including the integration of AI, to obfuscate their identities and expand their activities globally.

    Our countries have repeatedly issued information to warn the international community and private sector of the threat posed by North Korean IT workers. Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea issued a “Joint Statement on North Korean IT Workers” in August 2025, and the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) released its second report on North Korea’s violation and evasion of UN sanctions through cyber and IT worker activities in October 2025. The United States, Japan, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada have all issued advisories regarding the risk North Korean IT workers pose to private companies, governments, and individual citizens. We continue to actively monitor and counter the North Korean IT worker threat.

    According to UN Security Council Resolution 2397, all UN Member States must repatriate to North Korea all North Korean nationals earning income in that Member State’s jurisdiction, subject to limited exceptions. Additionally, contracting with North Korean IT workers and paying them for services rendered may also violate the domestic laws of many countries, including Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea, and may result in legal consequences or financial penalties.

    The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identifies North Korea as a high-risk jurisdiction subject to a call for action (blacklist). The FATF continuously reiterates the need to implement robust targeted financial sanctions consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and calls on all jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect their financial systems from North Korean money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing risks. Yet, North Korea has increased connectivity with the international financial system through diversified revenue generation activities, including IT worker schemes. As spotlighted in the FATF’s Complex Proliferation Financing (PF) and Sanctions Evasion typologies report, North Korea frequently uses IT worker schemes to generate revenue that supports its weapons of mass destruction program.

    We urge all countries, companies, and other entities to deepen their understanding of North Korean IT worker schemes and implement measures to counter the tactics listed below. Companies operating online platforms should continue to strengthen their countermeasures, such as enhancing identity verification procedures (strict review of identification documents, requirement of in-person interviews, etc.) and detecting suspicious accounts (introduction of systems that notify anomalous information entries, etc.). The following information is provided by states participating in this alert.

    Modus Operandi Used by North Korean IT Workers

    • Many North Korean IT workers register for accounts on online platforms by falsifying their nationality or identity. Typical methods used include forging identification documents and impersonating another person. North Korean IT workers use images of identification documents provided by third parties—such as proxies residing in third countries—to register accounts, while the actual work is conducted by the North Korean IT workers themselves.
    • North Korean IT workers are increasingly likely to use third-party proxies to facilitate the creation of online accounts, participate in job interviews, and even establish in-person contact to create a false sense of trust and obtain work contracts.
    • North Korean IT workers often attempt to avoid being paid by direct deposit and may request payment via money transfer services or cryptocurrency. In many cases, North Korean IT workers provide employers a third party’s bank account as the recipient for payments, request that the third party transfer the funds to a designated foreign account, and provide a part of the payment to the third party as a fee for use of their bank account.
    • North Korean IT workers often possess high-level skills in IT-related work and are seeking work in wider areas—such as the development of web pages, mobile applications, software, and blockchain applications—through online platforms and other channels. In some cases, they also get work contracts directly from companies or individuals.
    • While many North Korean IT workers reside in North Korea, China, and Russia, as well as Southeast Asian and African countries, they may conceal the fact that they are working from abroad using third-party proxies, VPNs, remote desktop software, and similar tools.
    • North Korean IT workers are known to use third-party proxies as facilitators overseas, such as in the United States, to run “laptop farms” which receive company-provided laptop computers for North Korean IT workers to remotely access, obfuscating their true location.
    • In addition to obtaining IT-related work, North Korean IT workers may obtain foreign currency by engaging in fraudulent foreign exchange trading using automated trading systems they themselves developed.

    Furthermore, accounts associated with North Korean IT workers often exhibit the characteristics below. If multiple characteristics apply to a job applicant, there is a possibility that a North Korean IT worker is fraudulently seeking work.

    For companies operating online platforms:

    • Frequent changes to registered information (such as account name, contact details, and bank account information for receiving salaries).
    • The account holder’s name does not match the name on the registered payment account.
    • Multiple accounts have been created using the same identification document.
    • Identification documents used for identity verification appear forged or altered using image editing software.
    • Multiple accounts are accessed from the same IP address.
    • A single account is accessed from multiple IP addresses within a short period of time.
    • The account remains logged in for an unusually long period of time.
    • The cumulative work hours or related metrics are unnaturally high.
    • An account user posts false reviews for itself, likely to improve the account’s rating.

    For those hiring or procuring services:

    • The account’s profile contains errors or uses unnatural expressions that appear to be the result of inaccurate machine translation, indicating a lack of proficiency in the language of the country they claim to be from. (However, North Koreans may use translation services or large language models to produce convincing profiles and communications in second languages.)
    • Discrepancies appear in video conference meetings, including photo ID mismatches or video feeds that appear to be manipulated or artificially generated.
    • Refuses to participate in video conference meetings.
    • Offers to work at rates lower than the general market rate.
    • Shows signs that the account is being operated by multiple people. North Korean IT workers often operate in teams, and the individual whom a hiring or procuring official interacts with may change depending on the time of day.
    • Requests payment in cryptocurrency.

    —

    , ,

  • June 23, 2026：New OFSI–OFAC Joint Guidance: Comparative Overview of UK and U.S. Sanctions Regimes

    On Tuesday, OFSI and OFAC both published a joint guidance which compares the two sanctions regimes:

    ofac_ofsi_comp_06232026Download

    And OFAC published a story about the partnership between the regulators:

    Achieving our Objectives, Supporting our Stakeholders: OFAC-OFSI Enhanced Partnership Exchange 2026

    June 23, 2026

    Sanctions are among the most powerful tools available to the U.S. and UK governments in advancing our respective foreign policy and national security interests. In January 2026, as part of the continuing Enhanced Partnership, the HM Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) met for the latest in-person exchange in London. 

    The week-long strategic dialogue focused on how we use our respective authorities to meet foreign policy and national security demands, such as tightening or lifting sanctions, adopting new technology, and highlighting enforcement efforts. The exchange reinforced our shared commitment to ensuring sanctions are administered in a way that is as effective and clear as possible to the public.

    Building on this cornerstone goal, we are publishing additional joint guidance, The U.S. and UK Economic Sanctions Authorities: A Comparative Overview. The guidance compares key aspects of U.S. and UK sanctions regimes, identifying similarities and differences on topics such as sanctions lists, licenses, as well as recordkeeping and reporting requirements. This new publication focuses on ensuring that those who are required to comply with our sanctions have a clear and strong understanding of how to do so. 

    SHARED OBJECTIVES, EVOLVING PRIORITIES

    Sanctions remain at the forefront of our respective governments’ response to geopolitical events in an increasingly complex world. While we continue to clarify and communicate existing rules, practices, and expectations, evolving priorities shape our work and often require new approaches, measures, or even new sanctions regimes.

    In response to dynamic demands, OFAC and OFSI continue to use a range of tools to ensure sanctions remain effective and aligned with shared objectives. For instance, OFAC and OFSI identified the following opportunities to work together to improve the efficacy of our respective sanctions regimes: 

    • evaluate our parallel mechanisms to enable us to rapidly increase sanctions pressure;
    • harness lessons learned from the novel restrictions developed as part of our coordinated response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine to apply to other scenarios;
    • identify typologies and economic impact of sanctions targets to more effectively disrupt concerning behavior, such as in relation to the shadow fleet;
    • review and enhance processes necessary to dismantle sanctions regimes in a structured way, such as in Syria; and
    • translate the lessons learned and insights from our global sanctions regimes, such as counternarcotics or illegal migration, to produce new tools and resources that can be applied across shared sanctions regimes.

    A coordinated approach to developing and deploying these measures remains essential to ensuring sanctions have the most impact across jurisdictions.

    NEW TOOLS, BETTER SYSTEMS

    Measuring the real-world impact of sanctions is critical to demonstrating effectiveness. During our recent exchange, OFAC and OFSI explored the methodologies and technological tools available to assess the disruptive effect of sanctions. Quantitative analysis is not only vital to understanding how to target malign actors more effectively, but also to assess where additional mitigation, such as licences or exceptions, are necessary. Investing in new tools that improve impact analysis is essential to OFAC and OFSI implementing sanctions more effectively. For our stakeholders, keeping pace with technological advancements allows us to more effectively utilise different data sources, whether it be stakeholder feedback, licence application information, or private sector-developed data to resolve emergent problems affecting global industries.

    Similarly, we are always conscious of the impact sanctions can have on our stakeholders and their compliance teams. To reduce the burden of sanctions while meeting increased demands, we continue to modernise systems for applying for licences, disclosing violations, submitting reports, or seeking guidance. This includes sharing our experiences using artificial intelligence to support our functions going forward. We expect the use of emerging technologies to automate routine tasks or support information analysis to ultimately lead to improved decision-making, provide clearer guidance for industry seeking support, and deliver improved public service to our stakeholders.  

    INTO THE FUTURE

    As our Enhanced Partnership enters its fifth year, much has changed, but our core mission remains the same. Sanctions should deliver maximum impact, minimise unintended consequences, and be easily understood and implemented. This most recent exchange builds on our strong foundations: regular engagement, information-sharing facilitated through the OFAC-OFSI Memorandum of Understanding, and joint industry engagements throughout the year. As the two largest implementing sanctions authorities, close contact on pressing matters impacting both of our jurisdictions remains crucial. We look forward to our next exchange this autumn in Washington DC.

    Giles Thomson, Director Economic Crime & Sanctions, The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, HM Treasury

    Bradley Smith, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury

    and OFSI published the above on its blog.

    —

    , , , , ,

  • May 29, 2026: Multinational statement on North Korean Sanctions Evasion

    Here’s the joint statement:

    Joint Statement on DPRK Sanctions Accountability

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    MAY 29, 2026

    The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom, and by the European External Action Service.

    Begin Text:

    The Governments of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States and the European External Action Service welcomed the April 30 Open Source Centre briefing to the United Nations Security Council on continuing maritime sanctions evasion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The evidence presented—including vessel imagery, voyage reconstruction, Automatic Identification System (AIS) manipulation, and port call analysis—indicates clear violations of obligations under Security Council resolutions prohibiting the export of DPRK coal and iron ore. The vessels identified as involved in these activities in recent months are DREAM WAVE (IMO 8693073), PEACEFUL 8 (IMO 1039424), ORION (IMO 9638953), FU RUN DA 1 (IMO 1099814), and OSTROV ANTSIFEROVA (IMO 9178070).

    We further note the clear evidence supporting the seven vessels nominated to the 1718 Committee in December 2025 for designation under Security Council resolution 2321 that remain under consideration and call on the Committee to act swiftly to designate these vessels: FLYFREE (IMO 1092684), CASIO (IMO 9125786), MARS (IMO 1077402), CARTIER (IMO 1091898), SOPHIA/PRADA (IMO 1079345), ARMANI (IMO 1078561), and YI LI 1 (IMO 1059149).

    Under United Nations Security Council resolution 1718, paragraph 12, the Committee is mandated to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding violations and to strengthen implementation of the measures it oversees. Prompt designations are essential to preserving the credibility and effectiveness of the UN sanctions regime.

    End Text

    —

    , , ,

  • March 5, 2026: Sanctions-Adjacent: Joint Statement about the situation in the DRC

    Joint Statement from the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes (ICG) on the Situation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

    MEDIA NOTE

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    MARCH 5, 2026

    The Governments of the United States of America, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, chaired by Sweden, issue the following statement on situation in the eastern DRC:

    Begin Text

    The ICG expresses its profound concern regarding the continued and recent violations in eastern DRC of the ceasefires upheld by the signing of the Washington Accords on 4 December 2025 and the commitment in Doha on 19 July 2025 to a permanent ceasefire and a permanent cessation of hostilities. Such violations include the use of drones in military attacks which also pose an acute risk to civilian populations. All parties involved should urgently and unequivocally recommit to ceasing the hostilities and return to negotiations.

    There can be no military solution to the conflict.

    We urge all parties to fully implement their obligations and commitments made under the Washington Accords and the Doha process and to comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2773 and 2808, and the full respect of territorial integrity. The ICG commends the ongoing mediation by the AU-appointed mediator, Faure Gnassingbé, President of the Council of the Republic of Togo, and the Panel of Facilitators, as well as the crucial mediation conducted by the US and Qatar. We welcome the efforts by Qatar, the ICGLR and MONUSCO to establish a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism. We recall the importance of creating conditions for an inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue with all key Congolese stakeholders – a necessary element for durable peace in the DRC – and welcome the consultations undertaken by the Republic of Angola.

    We stand ready to support these efforts.

    The ICG calls on all parties to honor their obligations to respect international humanitarian law and to ensure full, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to enable critical assistance to those in need. We welcome positive steps forward such as the commitments by governments and actors in the region to improve and facilitate humanitarian access, including following the visit of EU Commissioner Lahbib; the reopening of the border between the DRC and Burundi; and the use of the Goma airport during the recent visit to Goma by MONUSCO Interim Head and Special Representative of the Secretary-General van de Perre, which should lead to the sustained reopening of the Goma airport for humanitarian flights.

    The ICG further calls on parties to stop incitement to hatred, discrimination or violence, including against Rwandophone minorities, and other actions that gravely endanger civilian populations and social cohesion.

    End Text

    —

    , ,