Category: Iran

  • Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designations

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDGT]  Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594; Executive Order 13224, as amended, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism”

    ABU RAS, Marwan Muhammad Ayish

    • AKA: ABU-RAS, Marwan Mohammed Ayesh
    • Address: Gaza
    • DOB: 12 Jul 1958
    • POB: Gaza
    • Nationality: Palestinian
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: Marwan Muhammad Abu Ras is a Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and a professor and former senior administrator at the Islamic University of Gaza, where he taught future Hamas leaders including Yahya Sinwar. He chairs the Palestinian Scholars Association in Gaza — also designated in this action — and the Jerusalem and Palestine Committee of the International Union of Muslim Scholars. In April 2025 he appeared as a keynote speaker at a large rally in Diyarbakır, Turkey, publicly calling on the audience to support Hamas’s Qassam Brigades “with your prayers, your wealth, your politics, your weapons.”

    ABUKISHEK, Saif Hashim Kamel

    • Address: Barcelona, Spain
    • DOB: 13 Jun 1981
    • POB: Nablus, West Bank
    • Nationality: Palestinian
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: 3624406 (Palestinian) expires 21 Jan 2020
    • National ID No.: 905632774 (Palestinian)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: POPULAR CONFERENCE FOR PALESTINIANS ABROAD

    Supplemental Information: Based in Barcelona, Spain, linked to the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA), which was designated by OFAC in January 2026 for supporting Hamas. No additional individual profile information beyond his OFAC listing was identified from third-party sources.

    AHMED, Sherif Ahmed Ewis

    • AKA: AMAR, Saif Aldeen
    • Address: Turkey
    • DOB: 03 Mar 1987; alt. DOB 03 Mar 1983
    • Nationality: Egypt
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: A19586466 (Egypt) expires 21 Dec 2023; alt. Passport N010823022 (Syria)
    • National ID No.: 28703032200032 (Egypt)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: HASM

    Supplemental Information: An Egyptian national based in Turkey linked to Harakat Sawa’d Misr (HASM), also known as the Arms of Egypt Movement. HASM is a Muslim Brotherhood-linked Egyptian militant group designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. in January 2021, responsible for attacks targeting Egyptian police, military, and government officials.

    AL-NAJJAR, Muhammad Jamal Hassan

    • Address: Turkey
    • DOB: 19 Jun 1988
    • Nationality: Palestinian
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: 5799691 (Palestinian) expires 09 May 2028
    • National ID No.: 801991969 (Palestinian)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: A Palestinian national based in Turkey linked to HAMAS. No additional individual profile was identified from third-party sources beyond his OFAC listing.

    AUEDA, Jaldia Abubakra

    • Address: Madrid, Spain
    • DOB: 28 Feb 1967
    • Nationality: Spain
    • Gender: Female
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • National ID No.: 51449229T (Spain)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: SAMIDOUN PALESTINIAN PRISONER SOLIDARITY NETWORK

    Supplemental Information: Jaldia Abubakra is Samidoun’s Madrid coordinator. She has also been identified as a member of the executive committee of Masar Badil, an organization analysts describe as sharing significant leadership overlap with Samidoun. Samidoun was designated by OFAC in October 2024 as a “sham charity” that serves as an international fundraiser for the PFLP terrorist organization.

    KHATIB, Mohammed

    • Address: Belgium
    • DOB: 13 Apr 1990
    • POB: Lebanon
    • Nationality: Palestinian
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: TA017352 (Belgium) expires 18 Jan 2019
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: SAMIDOUN PALESTINIAN PRISONER SOLIDARITY NETWORK

    Supplemental Information: Mohammed Khatib is Samidoun’s European coordinator, based in Belgium. He has been described by Palestinian media as a PFLP operative and spokesman. Belgium revoked his refugee status in August 2025, classifying him as a “hate preacher.” The Dutch government barred him from entering the Netherlands in October 2024, citing his condoning of violence by EU-designated terrorist organizations. In February 2026, Greek authorities detained him at Heraklion Airport in Crete on national security grounds and initiated deportation proceedings.

    MAHFOUZ, Hisham Abu

    • Address: Amman, Jordan
    • DOB: 12 Mar 1961
    • POB: Amman, Jordan
    • Nationality: Palestinian
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: POPULAR CONFERENCE FOR PALESTINIANS ABROAD

    Supplemental Information: Hisham Abu Mahfouz is the Deputy Secretary-General and at times Acting Secretary-General of the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA), based in Amman. The PCPA was established in Istanbul in February 2017 and designated by OFAC in January 2026 for supporting Hamas. Mahfouz headed the organizing committee for the PCPA’s founding 2017 conference and has represented the PCPA in meetings with foreign officials in Doha and South Africa. He has been a visible spokesperson for the organization in media coverage.

    MOGHNY, Karim Sayed Ahmed

    • Address: Turkey
    • DOB: 24 Aug 1974
    • Nationality: Turkey
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: U21113393 (Turkey); alt. Passport U22175027 (Turkey)
    • National ID No.: 40262238872 (Turkey)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To:
      • HAMAS
      • HASM

    Supplemental Information: A Turkish national based in Turkey with dual links to both HAMAS and HASM (Harakat Sawa’d Misr, the Arms of Egypt Movement). He is one of only two individuals in this action linked to more than one designated organization, and the only individual in this action linked to both a Palestinian and an Egyptian terrorist group. No additional profile information was identified from third-party sources.

    OFAC Program: [IRAN-EO13902]  Executive Order 13902, “Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran”

    CHAKHERLO, Ali Hazrati (Arabic: علی حضرتی چاخرلو)

    • AKA:
      • CHAKHARLOO, Ali Hazrati
      • HAZRATI, Ali
    • Address: Istanbul, Turkey
    • DOB: 07 Jan 1993
    • POB: Iran
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Gender: Male
    • National ID No.: 2870484119 (Iran)
    • National Foreign ID Number: 99390181000 (Turkey)
    • Residency Number: YAA 095363 (Turkey); alt. Residency Number YAB 253356 (Turkey)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: EBRAHIMI AND ASSOCIATES PARTNERSHIP COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Ali Hazrati Chakherlo is a key figure in the Turkish operations of Amin Exchange (Ebrahimi and Associates Partnership Company). His Turkish residency permits appear in leaked internal Amin Exchange records published by WikIran in October 2025, which identified him as facilitating the exchange’s front business in Turkey. Members of the Ebrahimi family and senior employees of the company hold Turkish legal residency and citizenship to support these operations.

    EBRAHIMI, Mahmoud (Arabic: محمود ابراهیمی)

    • AKA: IBRAHIMI, Mahmut
    • Address: Turkey
    • DOB: 31 Aug 1970
    • POB: Iran
    • Nationality: Iran; alt. nationality Turkey
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Gender: Male
    • Passport: U22267217 (Turkey)
    • National ID No.: 1501298658 (Iran); alt. National ID No. 25613728172 (Turkey)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: EBRAHIMI AND ASSOCIATES PARTNERSHIP COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Mahmoud Ebrahimi is co-owner of Amin Exchange (Ebrahimi and Associates Partnership Company) and chairman of the board of directors of Azar Folad Amin Industries Co. (AFA), the Tabriz-based holding company that owns the exchange house and subsidiaries in steel, agriculture, and shipping. He holds both Iranian and Turkish nationality. He is a brother of co-owner Yousef Ebrahimi, also designated in this action. Leaked internal documents published by WikIran identify him as a key figure in the Ebrahimi sanctions-evasion network.

    EBRAHIMI, Yousef (Arabic: یوسف ابراهیمی)

    • AKA: IBRAHIMI, Yusuf
    • Addresses: Iran; Turkey
    • DOB: 16 Dec 1977
    • POB: Ahar, Iran
    • Nationality: Iran; alt. nationality Turkey; alt. nationality Dominica
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Gender: Male
    • Passport: V45786901 (Iran); alt. Passport U23890441 (Turkey) expires 22 Feb 2031; alt. Passport RA053188 (Dominica)
    • National ID No.: 1501300148 (Iran); alt. National ID No. 72376169360 (Turkey)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: EBRAHIMI AND ASSOCIATES PARTNERSHIP COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Yousef Ebrahimi is co-owner and board member of Amin Exchange (Ebrahimi and Associates Partnership Company), and vice chairman of the board of the parent company Azar Folad Amin Industries Co. (AFA). He holds Iranian, Turkish, and Dominican nationality. Leaked documents from Amin Exchange’s hacked servers published by WikIran confirm his Turkish and Iranian passports and his ownership role in the exchange house. He is a brother of co-owner Mahmoud Ebrahimi, also designated in this action.

    NEMATI, Samad (Arabic: صمد نعمتی)

    • Address: Iran
    • DOB: 14 Feb 1982
    • POB: Iran
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Gender: Male
    • National ID No.: 2754782796 (Iran)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: EBRAHIMI AND ASSOCIATES PARTNERSHIP COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Samad Nemati is the CEO of Amin Exchange (Ebrahimi and Associates Partnership Company) and a former officer of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), having served until 2009 when he was discharged at the rank of lieutenant. He served as head of Amin Exchange’s accounting department from 2010 to 2015 before becoming CEO. Leaked documents published by WikIran in both 2023 and 2025 identify him as the key operational figure managing the exchange’s sanctions-evasion activities on behalf of the Iranian regime.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [IRAN-EO13902]  Executive Order 13902, “Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran”

    ALIEEN GOODS WHOLESALERS LLC (Arabic: العلیین لتجارة السلع بالجملة ش ذ م م)

    • Address: Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Organization Established Date: 20 Nov 2019
    • Organization Type: Wholesale and retail trade
    • License: 863076 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Chamber of Commerce Number: 331418 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Registration Number: 1465829 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Economic Register Number (CBLS): 11435861 (United Arab Emirates)

    AQUILA WORLDWIDE MARINE DEVELOPMENTS CORP.

    • Address: 21st Floor, Global Plaza, Calle 50, Panama City, Panama
    • Organization Established Date: 2025
    • RUC #: 155774435-2-2025 (Panama)
    • Identification Number: IMO 0416503

    ARDEN ANGEL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

    • Address: Room 1201, 12th Floor, Tai Sang Bank Building, 130-132, Des Voeux Road Central, Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 17 Jan 2022
    • Identification Number: IMO 6283562
    • Registration Number: 73730890 (Hong Kong)

    AURORA BUSINESS COMPANY LIMITED

    • Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro 96960, Marshall Islands
    • Organization Established Date: 16 Jan 2024
    • Identification Number: IMO 0001777
    • Registration Number: 123752 (Marshall Islands)

    BESTFORTUNA COMPANY LIMITED

    • Addresses: Unit 1021, Beverley Commercial Centre, 87-105 Chatham Road South, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China; Unit 32, 11/F, Li Ka Industrial Building, 8 Wu Fong Street, San Po Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 22 Oct 2021
    • Company Number: 3095574 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 73466687 (Hong Kong)

    BOLD TRADING FZE (Arabic: بولد تریدنغ م.م.ح)

    • Address: Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates
    • Organization Established Date: 26 Jan 2012
    • License: 5016667 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Economic Register Number (CBLS): 11404029 (United Arab Emirates)

    CHENG PAN CO., LIMITED (Chinese Traditional: 承攀有限公司)

    • AKA: CHENG PAN CO LIMITED
    • Addresses: Rm 5015, 5/F, Yau Lee Centre, 45 Hoi Yuen Road, Kwun Tong, Hong Kong, China; Room 401, 4F, Wanchai Central Building, 89 Lockhart Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 03 Apr 2018
    • Company Number: 2674522 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 69156505 (Hong Kong)

    EBRAHIMI AND ASSOCIATES PARTNERSHIP COMPANY (Arabic: شرکت تضامنی ابراهیمی و شرکا)

    • AKA: AMIN EXCHANGE
    • Address: No. 0, Ground Floor, 29 Bahman Boulevard, Bakhtar Street, South Valiasr, Tabriz County, Central District, Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province 5167653533, Iran
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Organization Established Date: 20 Feb 2007
    • National ID No.: 10200266420 (Iran)
    • Registration Number: 21081 (Iran)

    Supplemental Information: Ebrahimi and Associates Partnership Company, operating as Amin Exchange, is a Tabriz-based Iranian exchange house that functions as a major hub for Iranian sanctions evasion. Documents hacked from its servers and published by WikIran in April 2023 and October 2025 reveal that Amin Exchange uses a network of over 100 covert front companies, concentrated in China and the UAE, to bring foreign currency into Iran in circumvention of international sanctions, with a leaked database of over 32,000 documented deals between Iranian companies and foreign clients. The exchange is managed by ex-IRGC officer Samad Nemati and owned by brothers Yousef and Mahmoud Ebrahimi (all three also designated in this action). It operates as a subsidiary of Azar Folad Amin Industries Co. (AFA), a private Tabriz conglomerate. Amin Exchange has been documented collaborating with major sanctioned Iranian petrochemical exporters including PGPICC (Persian Gulf Petrochemical Commercial Company).

    GJADES SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

    • Address: Flat C, 23rd Floor, Lucky Plaza, Lockhart Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 19 Apr 2024
    • Identification Number: IMO 6493421
    • Registration Number: 76464581 (Hong Kong)

    GLOBAL FORTUNE SHIPPING LIMITED

    • Address: 7 Copperfield Road, West Midlands, Coventry CV2 4AQ, United Kingdom
    • Organization Established Date: 29 Nov 2024
    • Identification Number: IMO 0178209
    • Company Number: 16109226 (United Kingdom)

    GREAT SAIL SHIPPING LIMITED

    • Address: Flat/Rm A 12/F Zj 300, 300 Lockhart Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 10 Mar 2022
    • Identification Number: IMO 6302744
    • Company Number: 3134167 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 73856666 (Hong Kong)

    GS CHEMICAL TRANSPORTATION LIMITED

    • Address: Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 07 Sep 2021
    • Identification Number: IMO 6257827
    • Company Number: 3083492 (Hong Kong)
    • Registration Number: 73344190 (Hong Kong)

    MATERIUM GROUP FZE (Arabic: ماتریوم جروب ح.م.م)

    • Addresses: Umm Al Quwain, United Arab Emirates; Office No: 9F-A-26 Empire Heights, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Organization Established Date: 26 Jul 2024
    • Organization Type: Wholesale of construction materials, hardware, plumbing and heating equipment and supplies
    • License: 10315 (United Arab Emirates) issued 26 Jul 2024

    MEKONG LINES INC.

    • Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro 96960, Marshall Islands
    • Organization Established Date: 18 Jul 2022
    • Identification Number: IMO 6337174
    • Business Registration Number: 115421 (Marshall Islands)

    MOZART MARITIME INC.

    • Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro 96960, Marshall Islands
    • Organization Established Date: 23 Dec 2025
    • Identification Number: IMO 0421146
    • Business Registration Number: 136015 (Marshall Islands)

    NINGBO JIARUI TRADING CO., LTD. (Chinese Simplified: 宁波迦瑞贸易有限公司)

    • Address: No. 6, Yueshangzhi 1st Road, Dongshanghe Village, Henghe Town, Cixi, Ningbo, Zhejiang 315300, China
    • Organization Established Date: 20 Oct 2020
    • Unified Social Credit Code (USCC): 91330282MA2H8QXU61 (China)

    OCEAN MARVEL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

    • Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro 96960, Marshall Islands
    • Organization Established Date: 08 Dec 2025
    • Identification Number: IMO 0401979
    • Registration Number: 135695 (Marshall Islands)

    OW MARITIME INCORPORATED

    • Address: 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia
    • Organization Established Date: 2024
    • Identification Number: IMO 0095675

    ROMY LINES INCORPORATED

    • Address: Cotton Ground, Nevis, Saint Kitts and Nevis
    • Organization Established Date: 2025
    • Identification Number: IMO 0351225

    SCIENCE OBEDIENT INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED

    • Address: Office 1, Ground Floor 41, Devonshire Street, London W1G7AJ, United Kingdom
    • Organization Established Date: 29 Dec 2020
    • Identification Number: IMO 6358303

    SPARKLING COURAGE LIMITED

    • Address: Road Town, Tortola, Virgin Islands, British
    • Identification Number: IMO 6380179

    SPLENDID LEXY TRADING COMPANY LTD

    • Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro 96960, Marshall Islands
    • Organization Established Date: 12 Sep 2025
    • Identification Number: IMO 0385978
    • Business Registration Number: 133830 (Marshall Islands)

    STARSHINE PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION LIMITED (Chinese Simplified: 星耀石化有限公司)

    • Address: 19th Floor, Ho King Commercial Centre, Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 15 Dec 2021
    • Company Number: 3112795 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 73640655 (Hong Kong)

    SUN OCEAN SHIPPING INCORPORATED

    • Address: 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia
    • Identification Number: IMO 5696949

    TAURUS GAS COMPANY LIMITED

    • Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro 96960, Marshall Islands
    • Organization Established Date: 25 Aug 2023
    • Identification Number: IMO 6485996
    • Registration Number: 121525 (Marshall Islands)

    VEINTO GLOBAL MARINE INC.

    • Address: 21st Floor, Global Plaza, Calle 50, Panama City, Panama
    • Organization Established Date: 2025
    • RUC #: 155774364-2-2025 (Panama)
    • Identification Number: IMO 0418694

    VERDA GAS CO LTD

    • Address: Unit D, 18th Floor, Golden Sun Centre, 59-67, Bonham Strand West, Sheung Wan, Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 15 Dec 2025
    • Identification Number: IMO 0412196
    • Company Number: 79394971 (Hong Kong)

    VIGOROUS TRADING LIMITED (Chinese Traditional: 進盛貳易有限公司)

    • Address: Unit 305-306, 3/F, New East Ocean Centre No. 9, Science Museum Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 28 Mar 2014
    • Company Number: 2069752 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 63071561 (Hong Kong)

    OFAC Program: [SDGT]  Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594; Executive Order 13224, as amended, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism”

    THE PALESTINIAN SCHOLARS ASSOCIATION

    • Address: Al-Katiba Street, Opposite the Civil Service Bureau, Gaza
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 1992
    • Registration Number: 8239 (Palestinian)
    • Linked To: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: The Palestinian Scholars Association is a Gaza-based Islamic scholars organization established in 1992. Its chairman, Marwan Muhammad Abu Ras, is also designated in this action as a Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Reporting from April 2025 identifies Abu Ras as actively calling for support of Hamas’s Qassam Brigades at rallies in Turkey, and describes the Palestinian Scholars Association as expanding its activities into Turkey through Abu Ras’s presence there.

    The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [IRAN-EO13902]  Executive Order 13902, “Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran”

    BRIGHT GOLD (3EEC9)

    • Vessel Type: Chemical/Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Panama
    • Vessel Year of Build: 1999
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9171503
    • MMSI: 374670000
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: GS CHEMICAL TRANSPORTATION LIMITED

    DAKUSH (E5U5359)

    • Vessel Type: Chemical/Products Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Cook Islands
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2004
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9278698
    • MMSI: 518999378
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: MEKONG LINES INC.

    DOUBLE IN (T7DJ2)

    • Vessel Type: LPG Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: San Marino
    • Vessel Year of Build: 1992
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 8917807
    • MMSI: 268252804
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: SCIENCE OBEDIENT INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED

    FEADSHIP (YJRK9)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Vanuatu
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2007
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9322279
    • MMSI: 577697000
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: MOZART MARITIME INC.

    G JADES (D6A3797)

    • Vessel Type: LPG Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Comoros
    • Vessel Year of Build: 1997
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9131096
    • MMSI: 620999798
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: GJADES SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

    GALA ROSE (VROT2)

    • Vessel Type: Chemical/Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Hong Kong
    • Other Vessel Flag: China
    • Vessel Year of Build: 1997
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9126015
    • MMSI: 477524600
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: SPARKLING COURAGE LIMITED

    GAS ENDURANCE (TRBS7)

    • Vessel Type: LPG Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Gabon
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2003
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9240419
    • MMSI: 626480000
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: AQUILA WORLDWIDE MARINE DEVELOPMENTS CORP.

    GAS STRENGTH (TRBP8)

    • Vessel Type: LPG Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Gabon
    • Vessel Year of Build: 1999
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9172636
    • MMSI: 626457000
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: VEINTO GLOBAL MARINE INC.

    GREAT SAIL (8PZW3)

    • Vessel Type: LPG Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Barbados
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2000
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9177583
    • MMSI: 314001124
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: GREAT SAIL SHIPPING LIMITED

    LUNA LUSTER (9LS2181)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Sierra Leone
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2005
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9292187
    • MMSI: 667002478
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: GLOBAL FORTUNE SHIPPING LIMITED

    MIDAS (3E8015)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Panama
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2003
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9266841
    • MMSI: 352006683
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: OCEAN MARVEL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

    MIGHTY NAVIGATOR (VRXQ6)

    • Vessel Type: LPG Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Hong Kong
    • Other Vessel Flag: China
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2001
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9206396
    • MMSI: 477227800
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: VERDA GAS CO LTD

    NARSIS (TJM5238)

    • Vessel Type: Chemical/Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Cameroon
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2008
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9408358
    • MMSI: 613913606
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: SUN OCEAN SHIPPING INCORPORATED

    OCEAN RADIANCE (T8A4807)

    • Vessel Type: LPG Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Palau
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2000
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9194969
    • MMSI: 511101444
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: AURORA BUSINESS COMPANY LIMITED

    OCEAN WAVE (T8A5483)

    • Vessel Type: Products Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Palau
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2007
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9387152
    • MMSI: 511101945
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: OW MARITIME INCORPORATED

    QUANTUM STAR (3E5322)

    • Vessel Type: LPG Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Panama
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2001
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9225342
    • MMSI: 352003912
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: TAURUS GAS COMPANY LIMITED

    SWIFT FALCON (3EMI9)

    • Vessel Type: Chemical/Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Panama
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2002
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9246803
    • MMSI: 374176000
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: ARDEN ANGEL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

    TEJAS (3E2257)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Panama
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2006
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9326067
    • MMSI: 352002323
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: ROMY LINES INCORPORATED

    VASLATI (TJMA15)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Cameroon
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2003
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9252333
    • Party Type: Vessel
    • Linked To: SPLENDID LEXY TRADING COMPANY LTD

    Mr. Sanctions’ Note: There were no new press releases from Treasury or State at the time this was produced. So, the following sources were used by Claude in drafting supplemental information on these designated parties.

    Sources:

    , , ,
  • What Happened

    Adani Enterprises Limited (AEL), a large Indian multinational conglomerate with operations across energy, infrastructure, and other sectors, has agreed to pay $275,000,000 to settle potential civil liability for apparent violations of U.S. sanctions on Iran.

    From November 2023 to June 2025, AEL purchased shipments of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) from a Dubai-based trading company (the “Dubai Supplier”) that claimed to be supplying gas from Oman and Iraq. Multiple red flags should have put AEL on notice that the LPG actually originated from Iran. During this period, AEL caused U.S. financial institutions to process 32 U.S. dollar (USD)-denominated payments totaling approximately $192,104,044 for the shipments.

    Background: How AEL Got Into the LPG Business

    AEL entered the LPG market in June 2023, importing gas for sale to customers in India through Mundra Port — a major port on India’s western coast operated by AEL’s affiliate, Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd. (APSEZ). Neither AEL nor any of its affiliates had previously traded LPG on its own account through Mundra Port, making this a brand-new business line.

    To compete in an established market, AEL needed a discounted supply source. In July 2023, AEL representatives — including the head of its newly formed LPG unit — met with the Dubai Supplier, which was already involved in supplying purportedly Omani-origin LPG to another Indian buyer. By September 2023, a deal was taking shape. Internal AEL documents at the time described the arrangement as “discounted LPG from Middle East” on a spot basis.

    AEL ran its standard Know Your Customer (KYC) process on the Dubai Supplier and its affiliates and found no matches on OFAC’s SDN List. It also relied on APSEZ’s existing 2020 sanctions compliance program, which prohibited Iranian-origin cargo from entering APSEZ-controlled ports. On paper, AEL appeared to have done its homework.

    What AEL apparently did not know — and did not dig deeply enough to uncover — was that the Dubai Supplier was operating as a conduit for Iranian LPG. An affiliate of the Dubai Supplier had already been designated by OFAC in March 2023 for purchasing LPG from a sanctioned Iranian petrochemical company. Iran, practically alone among Middle Eastern producers, was offering deeply discounted LPG — exactly the kind of deal AEL was looking for.

    The Purchases

    AEL completed its first purchase in November 2023: a cargo of fully refrigerated propane shipped on a 25-year-old Handysize LPG tanker, with documents listing the origin as Sohar, Oman. AEL paid approximately $5.67 million. Over the next year and a half, AEL purchased 34 additional cargos of what turned out to be Iranian-origin LPG from the Dubai Supplier and its affiliates, using similar documentation and payment structures.

    Payments were generally made in USD or UAE dirhams (AED) from accounts at UAE or Indian banks. In total, U.S. financial institutions processed $192,104,044 in USD payments across 32 of the 35 shipments. (The remaining three shipments were either paid entirely in AED or were never completed.)

    Red Flags AEL Overlooked

    From early in the relationship, there were multiple warning signs that the Dubai Supplier’s cargo wasn’t what it claimed to be. AEL failed to act meaningfully on any of them.

    • Third-party warnings: On at least four separate occasions between March 2023 and February 2024, AEL and APSEZ received inquiries from outside parties alleging that the Dubai Supplier’s cargos may have originated in Iran. AEL appears to have dismissed these as interference from competitors trying to block it from entering the LPG market. Its response was limited to reviewing shipping documentation and obtaining verbal assurances from the Dubai Supplier itself.
    • Suspicious vessel behavior: Ships carrying the Dubai Supplier’s cargos routinely engaged in conduct associated with sanctions evasion: manipulating or disabling their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders, making commercially illogical port calls, and frequently changing their names, ownership, and flag state. AEL and APSEZ did not monitor for these vessel-level red flags.
    • Implausible origin claims: The very first shipment claimed to be loaded in Sohar, Oman — but Sohar is not a significant source of Omani LPG exports (those primarily come from Salalah), and Sohar lacked the refrigerated storage and loading infrastructure needed to load fully refrigerated LPG at the time. The claimed origin simply didn’t make logistical sense.
    • Document irregularities: Certificates of origin provided by the Dubai Supplier showed illogical and non-sequential numbering, were repeatedly issued long after the shipments had been made, and used outdated document templates — all indicators of potential falsification.
    • Below-market pricing: Iran — virtually alone among Middle Eastern LPG sources — offered significantly discounted gas. The prices AEL received from the Dubai Supplier were sufficiently below prevailing market rates that, accounting for realistic freight costs, port fees, and profit margins, the economics of the claimed Omani or Iraqi origin simply didn’t add up. AEL should have treated this as grounds for heightened scrutiny.
    • A blocked payment: In February 2024, the Dubai Supplier’s bank stopped a payment due to “internal policy,” raising concerns about whether the cargo was actually from Iraq or Iran. The supplier directed AEL to a new bank account at a different Dubai bank. Payment was eventually released after the supplier provided additional shipping documentation that later appeared to be falsified.

    Discovery and Response

    In June 2025, the Wall Street Journal published an investigative report tracking LPG tankers traveling between Gulf ports and Adani-operated Mundra Port, alleging that Adani Group entities had been importing Iranian-origin LPG. AEL responded publicly with a stock exchange filing calling the allegations “baseless and mischievous,” categorically denying “any deliberate engagement in sanctions evasion or trade involving Iranian-origin LPG,” and stating that it was “not aware of any investigation by US authorities on this subject.”

    Privately, the picture was different. AEL simultaneously suspended all LPG imports and retained U.S.-based legal counsel to conduct a comprehensive internal investigation. Whatever the public posture, the private pivot was prompt: AEL cooperated extensively with OFAC’s subsequent investigation, proactively sharing the findings of its internal review, producing large volumes of documents, responding to all agency requests, and moving quickly toward a resolution. OFAC credited AEL for this cooperation in determining the final settlement amount — though the public denial at the moment of disclosure is precisely why the case does not qualify for voluntary self-disclosure credit.

    The Violations

    OFAC found 32 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), 31 C.F.R. part 560, specifically § 560.203(a) — by causing U.S. financial institutions to facilitate trade-related transactions involving goods of Iranian origin, in violation of § 560.206 of the ITSR. The settlement agreement is available on OFAC’s website.


    The Penalty

    Because AEL did not voluntarily self-disclose the violations and OFAC determined the case to be egregious, the applicable starting point under OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines was the statutory maximum base penalty: $384,208,088.

    All 32 apparent violations were treated as egregious.

    After weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors described below, OFAC agreed to settle for $275,000,000 — a reduction of approximately $109 million from the base penalty.

    Aggravating Factors

    • Reckless conduct despite clear warning signs
      • General Factor: Willfulness or Recklessness of the Conduct; Awareness of Conduct at Issue
      • AEL received multiple third-party warnings that its LPG cargos may have come from Iran, yet failed to conduct meaningful additional investigation. It also ignored commercially implausible pricing, suspicious vessel behavior, and document red flags. Moreover, AEL’s own sanctions compliance program at the time explicitly acknowledged that causing U.S. financial institutions to process Iran-related transactions could expose the company to civil or criminal penalties — meaning AEL knew the legal stakes but still did not act on the warning signs.
    • Substantial harm to the goals of Iran sanctions
      • General Factor: Harm to Sanctions Program Objectives
      • A central goal of U.S. Iran sanctions is to cut off Iran’s ability to earn revenue from its energy sector. By purchasing Iranian LPG and routing USD payments through the U.S. financial system, AEL provided Iran with significant economic benefit — money the Iranian government uses to fund its nuclear program, support terrorist proxy groups, and oppress its own population.
    • Size and sophistication of the company
      • General Factor: Individual Characteristics
      • AEL is a large, diversified international conglomerate with extensive operations in energy and infrastructure sectors. A company of that scale and global experience is expected to maintain correspondingly robust sanctions compliance capabilities.

    Mitigating Factors

    • Clean prior record
      • General Factor: History of Prior OFAC Actions
      • AEL had not received any OFAC penalty notice or Finding of Violation in the five years preceding the earliest transaction at issue.
    • LPG business was a small part of AEL’s overall operations
      • General Factor: Individual Characteristics
      • AEL’s LPG unit was newly formed and represented less than 1.5% of the company’s consolidated revenue for 2025 — a figure consistent with AEL’s own public statements, which put the LPG segment at approximately 1.46% of consolidated revenue. The violations arose from a nascent, peripheral part of a much larger enterprise.
    • Substantial cooperation with OFAC
      • General Factor: Cooperation with OFAC
      • AEL conducted a thorough, independent internal investigation on an expedited basis and at significant cost; responded promptly to all OFAC requests for information; and produced large volumes of data to support the agency’s investigation.
    • Meaningful remedial action
      • General Factor: Remedial Response
      • AEL took significant steps to address the root causes of the violations, including: (1) ceasing all LPG imports into India; (2) creating and adopting a new, robust risk-based sanctions compliance policy overseen by a dedicated Group Head of Compliance; (3) applying the enhanced policy across all of AEL’s business units for consistency and comprehensiveness; (4) incorporating maritime hydrocarbon transport risks — including those identified in OFAC’s published guidance — into its sanctions risk assessment; and (5) deploying specialized maritime intelligence technology designed to flag sanctions evasion activity in the marine transport sector.

    The $275,000,000 settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that while the violations were serious and egregious — and AEL did not come forward before the government became aware — the company’s prompt response, extensive cooperation, and significant compliance overhaul after the conduct came to light all warranted meaningful credit.


    What are the Takeaways?

    Non-U.S. companies using the U.S. dollar face real U.S. sanctions exposure. If your company routes payments through the U.S. financial system — even indirectly through correspondent banking — you can be held liable under U.S. sanctions law, even if your company is not based in the United States. AEL is an Indian company that never directly held a U.S. bank account, but the USD-denominated payments it initiated passed through U.S. financial institutions, giving OFAC jurisdiction. The lesson: if your payments touch the dollar, they touch U.S. sanctions law.

    Buying energy products from or near the Middle East is high-risk territory for Iran sanctions. Restricting Iran’s energy exports has been a consistent, bipartisan U.S. policy priority, and OFAC has issued multiple rounds of guidance — in 2019, 2020, 2024, and most recently in 2025 — specifically warning the energy industry about Iran’s sophisticated evasion tactics. If you’re importing petroleum products, LPG, or petrochemicals with any connection to that region, treat it as a high-risk environment requiring enhanced due diligence from the start.

    Certificates of origin and supplier warranties aren’t enough — you need to independently verify. Iran actively uses neighboring jurisdictions — particularly Oman, the UAE, and Iraq — as cover for its petroleum exports. Importers cannot rely solely on counterparty-provided documentation or supplier assurances to satisfy their sanctions due diligence obligations. Those documents need to be independently corroborated, with particular attention to whether the claimed loading ports and infrastructure are consistent with the claimed product type and origin.

    Know Iran’s shadow fleet — and actively monitor for it. Iran moves a large share of its petroleum exports using a “shadow fleet” of vessels that engage in well-documented evasion tactics: turning off or falsifying AIS transponders, conducting ship-to-ship transfers at sea, making economically illogical port calls, and frequently cycling through new names, owners, and flag states. The majority of the vessels involved in AEL’s purchases were subsequently designated by OFAC. Energy importers should build real-time maritime intelligence monitoring into their compliance programs — and stay current as evasion typologies evolve. OFAC’s 2025 Guidance for Shipping and Maritime Stakeholders on Detecting and Mitigating Iranian Oil Sanctions Evasion is required reading.

    If a deal is too good to be true, it probably involves sanctions evasion. Buyers of energy products from high-risk regions should treat prices significantly below prevailing market rates as a red flag requiring enhanced scrutiny — not an opportunity. Heightened caution is especially warranted when the below-market prices come from a counterparty with a limited public profile or trading history, or when multiple affiliated entities are used to structure similar transactions for no clear commercial reason.

    Compliance isn’t box-checking — investigate allegations promptly and seriously. When a third party alleges that your supply chain involves sanctioned goods or origins, that allegation requires a thorough, good-faith investigation — not a shrug and a request for assurances from the counterparty under scrutiny. AEL received at least four separate third-party warnings over more than a year and essentially took the Dubai Supplier’s word that everything was fine. The result was a $275 million settlement.

    Even without voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation with OFAC pays off. This case makes clear that OFAC will offer meaningful penalty reductions in exchange for prompt internal investigation, transparent sharing of findings, and genuine cooperation with the agency’s inquiry — even when a company doesn’t come forward before OFAC initiates its investigation. AEL received roughly a $109 million reduction from the statutory maximum base penalty. Voluntary self-disclosure would likely have produced a lower starting point still, but cooperation alone had real, quantifiable value here.


    Other Resources

    OFAC Compliance Framework

    In May 2019, OFAC published A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments, which lays out what OFAC considers to be the essential building blocks of an effective sanctions compliance program. The Framework also explains how OFAC takes compliance program quality into account when resolving enforcement cases, and includes an appendix identifying common root causes of sanctions violations that OFAC has observed in its investigations.

    Civil Penalties and Enforcement Rules

    The rules governing OFAC’s civil penalties process are set out in the regulations for each individual sanctions program, the Reporting, Procedures, and Penalties Regulations (31 C.F.R. part 501), and the Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines (31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A). Recent enforcement actions and civil penalties information, including the settlement agreement in this case, are available at https://ofac.treasury.gov/civil-penalties-and-enforcement-information.

    FinCEN Whistleblower Program

    The U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) operates a whistleblower incentive program that covers OFAC sanctions violations, violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and Bank Secrecy Act violations. Individuals located anywhere in the world who provide information about potential sanctions violations may be eligible for a financial award if their tip leads to a successful enforcement action resulting in penalties exceeding $1,000,000. The program is open across all commercial sectors.

  • UK Gov logo, 50% resolution.png

    Today, Thursday 14 May, the UK Government has revoked 1 specification, varied 1 designation, and made 3 amendments to designations imposed under the Russia Sanctions Regime.

    Revoked Specification:

    Name:IMO Number:Unique ID:
    MILLEROVOIMO 9035541RUS2605

    Varied Individual:

    Name:Unique ID:
    Yulia GURYEVA-MOTLOKHOVRUS2066

    Amended Individuals:

    Name:Unique ID:
    Pavel Valerevich NIKITINRUS3515
    Dmitriy Evgenievich SHEVCHENKORUS3519
    Timofey Vladimirovich VASILIEVRUS3573

    Furthermore, the UK Government has amended 4 designations made under the Iran Sanctions Regime.

    Amended Individuals:

    Name:Unique ID:
    Namiq SALIFOVIRN0269
    Nihat Abdul Kadir ASANIRN0270
    Reza HAMIDIRAVARIIRN0271
    Farhad ZARRINGHALAMIRN0274

    Lastly, the UK Government has amended 1 designation made under the Afghanistan Sanctions Regime.

    Amended Individual:

    Name:UN ID:Unique ID:
    Nooruddin Turabi Muhammad QASIMTAi.058AFG0046

    Heres’s the sanctions notices – Russia:

    Iran:

    and Afghanistan:

  • Notice of Changes to the Consolidated List – 12 May 2026

    DFAT updated the Consolidated List on 3 February 2026 pursuant to the below listed legislative instrument made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

    The updated Consolidated List can be downloaded from the following page: Consolidated List | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

    Australian Sanctions Office

    _______________________________

    Australian Sanctions Office | Regulatory and Legal Policy Division

    Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

  • Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designations

    State Press Release: New Round of Economic Fury Sanctions Targets IRGC Oil Operations

    Treasury Press Release: Economic Fury Ramps Up Pressure on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Oil Operations

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    • OFAC Programs:
      • [SDGT]   Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
      • [IRGC]   Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
      • [IFSR]   Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 561

    GHEHI, Mohammadreza Ashrafi (a.k.a. GHAHI, Mohammadreza Ashrafi)

    • Location: Iran
    • DOB: 13 Dec 1978
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Male
    • National ID No.: 0067816509 (Iran)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IRGC] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Commercial Chief of the IRGC Shahid Purja’fari Oil Headquarters; communicated with Haokun Energy Group regarding unresolved debts owed to the IRGC.

    SALAMI, Samad Fathi (a.k.a. FATHISALMI, Samad)

    • Location: Iran
    • DOB: 22 Jun 1980
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Male
    • Passport: V52953880 (Iran)
    • National ID No.: 6339379079 (Iran)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IRGC] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Finance Chief of the IRGC Shahid Purja’fari Oil Headquarters; responsible for managing financial issues for the IRGC, including handling foreign currency overseas.

    ZADEH, Ahmad Mohammadi (a.k.a. ZADEH, Ahmad Mohammedi)

    • Location: Iran
    • DOB: 23 Sep 1961
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Male
    • Passport: U65222701 (Iran)
    • National ID No.: 3539608613 (Iran)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IRGC] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Chief of the IRGC Shahid Purja’fari Oil Headquarters; actively worked to resolve debts owed by OFAC-sanctioned Haokun Energy Group, Ltd. to the IRGC through cover company Golden Globe.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    • OFAC Programs:
      • [SDGT]   Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
      • [IFSR]   Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 561

    ATIC ENERGY FZE (Arabic: أتيك انيرجي م م ح)

    • Address: Office No E-23G-21, P1-ELOB, Hamriya Free Zone, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
    • Established: 01 Jul 2021
    • License: 19471 (UAE)
    • Economic Register No. (CBLS): 11700054 (UAE)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Worked on behalf of the IRGC to facilitate shipments of Iranian oil on five sanctioned shadow fleet tankers in 2025: HANSON (IMO 9237412), OTLA (IMO 9299719), SCALER (IMO 9254915), BELLA 1 (IMO 9230880), and ANDROMEDA V (IMO 9197832).

    BLANCA GOODS WHOLESALER LLC (Arabic: بلانكا للسلع بالجمله ذ م م)

    • Address: Office No 101-05, Port Said, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Established: 07 Nov 2019
    • License: 862498 (UAE)
    • Chamber of Commerce No.: 330818 (UAE)
    • Registration No.: 1464969 (UAE)
    • Economic Register No. (CBLS): 11433157 (UAE)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Arranged a 2025 oil deal with the IRGC via cover company Golden Globe.

    HONG KONG BLUE OCEAN LIMITED (Chinese: 香港藍海有限公司)

    • Address: Hong Kong, China
    • Established: 21 Feb 2025
    • Business Registration No.: 77740261 (Hong Kong)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Cover company serving a similar role to Golden Globe in arranging IRGC oil sales to overseas buyers. In 2025, involved in multiple shipments each worth tens of millions of dollars, including cargoes on sanctioned tankers GAGAN (IMO 9256468), CANGJIE (IMO 9299680), and HASNA (IMO 9212917).

    HONG KONG SANMU LIMITED

    • Address: Flat 1019B, 10/F, Liven House No. 61-63 King Yip Street, Hong Kong, China
    • Established: 08 Dec 2022
    • Business Registration No.: 74680616 (Hong Kong)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Cover company serving a similar role to Golden Globe in arranging IRGC oil sales to overseas buyers. In 2025, involved in multiple shipments each worth tens of millions of dollars, including cargoes on sanctioned tankers GAGAN (IMO 9256468), CANGJIE (IMO 9299680), and HASNA (IMO 9212917).

    JIANDI HK LIMITED (Chinese: 監地香港有限公司)

    • Address: Hong Kong, China
    • Established: 06 Mar 2024
    • Business Registration No.: 76275900 (Hong Kong)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: In mid-2025, entered into a deal with the IRGC to purchase tens of millions of dollars of Iranian oil.

    MAX HONOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LIMITED

    • Address: Unit 26 of Factory A on 5th Floor, Union Hing Yip Factory Building, No. 20 Hing Yip Street, Hong Kong, China
    • Established: 20 Jan 2023
    • Business Registration No.: 74792613 (Hong Kong)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Purchased millions of barrels of Iranian oil from the IRGC in 2025. Oil was carried on sanctioned tankers SCALER (IMO 9254915) and SKIPPER (IMO 9304667).

    OCEAN ALLIANZ SHIPPING LLC (Arabic: أوشن اليانز للشحن ذ م م)

    • Address: Office OFF2-RF, Parcel 353-1869, Al Safa First, Bur Dubai, Dubai, UAE; Burlington Tower, 802, Business Bay, Bur Dubai, Dubai, UAE
    • Website: https://www.oceanallianz.com
    • Established: 02 Oct 2018
    • License: 815724 (UAE)
    • Economic Register No. (CBLS): 11318398 (UAE)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Worked on behalf of the IRGC to facilitate shipments of Iranian oil on five sanctioned shadow fleet tankers in 2025: HANSON (IMO 9237412), OTLA (IMO 9299719), SCALER (IMO 9254915), BELLA 1 (IMO 9230880), and ANDROMEDA V (IMO 9197832).

    UNIVERSAL FORTUNE TRADING LLC (Arabic: يونورسال فورتشن للتجارة ذ م م)

    • Address: Office No 204-12, Al Murar, Deira, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Established: 12 Aug 2022
    • License: 1088893 (UAE)
    • Chamber of Commerce No.: 413426 (UAE)
    • Economic Register No. (CBLS): 11925055 (UAE)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Worked with the IRGC in 2025, signing a contract with Golden Globe for oil carried by the sanctioned tanker XD LEO (IMO 9312872). Also used as a front company by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

    ZEUS LOGISTICS GROUP (Arabic: مجموعة زويس اللوجستية)

    • Address: Al Qurm, Muscat, Oman
    • Established: 08 Jan 2017
    • Registration No.: 1283041 (Oman)
    • Programs: [SDGT] [IFSR]
    • Linked To: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886
    • Context: Worked with the IRGC in 2025 to arrange vessels to carry Iranian oil cargoes, including a cargo carried by the sanctioned tanker CANGJIE (IMO 9299680).
    , , ,
  • UK Gov logo, 50% resolution.png

    Today, Monday 11th May, the UK Government has designated the following 9 individuals and 3 entities under the Iran Sanctions Regime.

    Individuals designated:

    Name:Unique ID:
    Ekrem Abdulkerym OZTUNCIRN0268
    Namiq SALIFOVIRN0269
    Nihat Abdul Kadir ASANIRN0270
    Reza HAMIDIRAVARIIRN0271
    Farhad ZARRINGHALAMIRN0274
    Fazlolah ZARRINGHALAMIRN0275
    Mansour ZARRINGHALAMIRN0278
    Nasser ZARRINGHALAMIRN0279
    Pouria ZARRINGHALAMIRN0280

    Entities designated:

    Name:Unique ID:
    ZINDASHTI NETWORKIRN0272
    BERELIAN EXCHANGEIRN0273
    GCM EXCHANGEIRN0277

    The sanctions notice:

    , ,
  • Disrupting Iran’s Overseas Military Procurement Networks

    FACT SHEET

    OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

    MAY 8, 2026

    Today, the Department of State is sanctioning four entities, including for providing satellite imagery that enables Iran’s military strikes against U.S. forces in the Middle East. The supply of satellite imagery of U.S. facilities in the Middle East to Iran threatens American and partner personnel. The United States will continue to take action to hold China-based entities accountable for their support to Iran and ensure Iran cannot reconstitute its proliferation-sensitive programs following Operation Epic Fury. The targeting of U.S. service members and partners will not go unanswered.

    The Department of the Treasury is concurrently designating 10 entities and individuals that are enabling efforts by Iran’s military to secure weapons, as well as raw materials with applications in Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and ballistic missile programs.

    The United States, as directed in the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, is committed to disrupting procurement efforts supporting Iran’s military programs and will not hesitate to hold accountable non-Iranian entities and individuals that contribute to or otherwise support Tehran’s proliferation programs in defiance of United Nations (UN) resolutions.

    These actions follow the reimposition of UN restrictive measures and sanctions on September 27, 2025, in response to Iran’s “significant non-performance” of its nuclear commitments. These include, as outlined in Operative Paragraph 8 of UN Security Council resolution 1929, obligations on UN Member States to prevent the transfer to Iran from or through their territories of certain conventional weapons and related materiel, as well as technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to such items.

    All Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13949, which targets certain persons with respect to the conventional arms activities of Iran.

    The Department of State is designating the following entities pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13949 for having provided to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13949.

    • Meentropy Technology (Hangzhou) Co. Ltd (MizarVision) is a China-based geospatial intelligence firm that published open-source images detailing U.S. military activity during Operation Epic Fury.
    • The Earth Eye (TEE) is a China-based entity that provided satellite imagery to Iran during Operation Epic Fury.

    The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to Section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13949 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in any activity that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of arms or related materiel or items intended for military end-uses or military end-users, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by the Government of Iran (including persons owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of the Government of Iran) or paramilitary organizations financially or militarily supported by the Government of Iran.

    • Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd. (Chang Guang) is a China-based commercial satellite company that has collected satellite imagery of U.S. and allied military facilities to support Iranian imagery requests during Operation Epic Fury. Additionally, Chang Guang has previously provided satellite imagery to U.S.-designated Houthis, to target U.S. military assets. Chang Guang was previously designated on December 12, 2023, pursuant to E.O. 14024.
    • Ministry of Defence Export Center (MINDEX) is the exporting arm of the U.S.-designated Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). MINDEX promotes Iranian defense equipment at international military exhibitions. MINDEX is the new name of the U.S.-designated Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX). MODLEX was previously designated on July 12, 2012, pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act, for or on behalf of, MODAFL. MODLEX was listed under United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1929 (2010) on June 9, 2010.
  • Non-Proliferation and Iran-related Designations and Designations Updates

    Treasury Press Release: Economic Fury Disrupts Networks Supplying Weapons and UAV Components to Iran

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    • OFAC Programs:
      • [NPWMD]  Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544
      • [IFSR]  Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 561

    LI, Genping

    • AKA: 李根平 (Chinese Simplified)
    • Address: Ningbo, Zhejiang, China
    • DOB: 15 Aug 1983
    • POB: Nanfeng County, Jiangxi, China
    • Nationality: China
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Gender: Male
    • Passport: E10413641 (China) expires 11 Dec 2022
    • National ID No.: 362524198308156510 (China)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: HITEX INSULATION NINGBO COMPANY LIMITED

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Li Genping is the legal representative of Hitex Insulation Ningbo Company Limited and manages the company’s sales, purchasing, and financial operations. Hitex has supplied or attempted to supply millions of dollars’ worth of carbon fiber, honeycomb fabric, and other raw aerospace-grade materials to Pishgam Electronic Safeh Company (PESC), ultimately for the IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC ASF SSJO). PESC has procured thousands of servomotors recovered in downed Shahed-136 UAVs.

    MALEKI, Mohammadmahdi

    • AKA: MALEKI, Mohammad Mahdi
    • Address: Belarus
    • DOB: 26 Apr 1995
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Gender: Male
    • Passport: I67689026 (Iran) expires 09 Mar 2029
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: CENTER FOR INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Maleki is a Belarus-based Iranian national and employee of Armory Alliance who contributed to weapons procurements for the Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), also now known as the Center for Progress and Development of Iran (CPDI).

    TOLIBOV, Mohammed Ali

    • AKA:
      • TOLIBOV, Muhamadali
      • TOLIBOV, Mukhamadali Khaydarkhudzhaevich (Cyrillic: ТОЛИБОВ, Мухамадали Хайдархуджаевич)
    • Address: Belarus
    • DOB: 17 Jan 1982
    • Nationality: Belarus
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Gender: Male
    • Passport: MR4193252 (Belarus)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked To: ARMORY ALLIANCE LLC

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Tolibov is a Belarusian national and CEO of Armory Alliance, and has been a long-standing arms procurement facilitator for Iran in Belarus.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    • OFAC Programs:
      • [NPWMD]  Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544
      • [IFSR]  Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 561

    AE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO LIMITED

    • AKA: 艾宜國際貿易有限公司 (Chinese Traditional)
    • Address: 19H, Maxgrand Plaza, No. 3 Tai Yau Street, San Po Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Organization Established Date: 06 Mar 2018
    • Company Number: 2662172 (Hong Kong)
    • Business Registration Number: 69032202 (Hong Kong)
    • Linked To: CENTER FOR INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Hong Kong-based AE International Trade Co Limited received millions of dollars in transfers from Dubai-based Elite Energy FZCO in furtherance of CITC’s weapons procurement efforts, which included seeking to purchase MANPADS from China.

    ARMORY ALLIANCE LLC

    • AKA: ООО АРМОРИ АЛЬЯНС (Cyrillic)
    • Address: Building 33, Section 14, 13A, Tarkhanova St, Minsk 220035, Belarus
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Organization Established Date: 20 Oct 2021
    • Tax ID No.: 193596647 (Belarus)
    • Linked To: CENTER FOR INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Belarus-based Armory Alliance acted as an intermediary in weapons procurements for CITC in an effort to obfuscate the Iranian end-user.

    ELITE ENERGY FZCO

    • Address: BCB3 612, Sixth Floor, Business Cluster – Building 3, Dubai CommerCity, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Website: https://elitefzco.com
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Organization Established Date: 01 Nov 2023
    • License: 50320 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Linked To: AE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO LIMITED

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Dubai-based Elite Energy FZCO transferred millions of dollars to Hong Kong-based AE International Trade Co Limited in furtherance of CITC’s weapons procurement efforts.

    HITEX INSULATION NINGBO COMPANY LIMITED

    • AKA: 宁波含特堡温材料有限公司 (Chinese Simplified)
    • Address: Room 803, No. 10, Lane 818, Qianhe South Road, Yinzhou District, Ningbo, Zhejiang, China (Chinese Simplified: 前河南路818弄10号803室, 鄞州区, 宁波市, 浙江省, China)
    • Address: Room 903-904, Raymond Building, NSBD, Ningbo, Zhejiang, China
    • Address: No. 108, Kaijia Road, Yaobei Industrial Zone, Yuyao, Ningbo, Zhejiang, China
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Organization Established Date: 09 Oct 2010
    • Unified Social Credit Code (USCC): 91330204561293923J (China)
    • Linked To: PISHGAM ELECTRONIC SAFEH COMPANY

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, China-based Hitex Insulation Ningbo Company Limited has supplied or attempted to supply millions of dollars’ worth of carbon fiber, honeycomb fabric, and other raw aerospace-grade materials to PESC, ultimately for the IRGC ASF SSJO. PESC has procured thousands of servomotors with applications in one-way attack UAVs, which have been recovered in downed Shahed-136 UAVs.

    HK HESIN INDUSTRY CO LIMITED

    • AKA: 香港赫新實業有限公司 (Chinese Traditional)
    • Address: Room 1303, 13/F, Cheong Tai Building, No. 287-289 Reclamation Street, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Organization Established Date: 19 Dec 2025
    • Business Registration Number: 79441310 (Hong Kong)
    • Linked To: CENTER FOR INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Hong Kong-based HK Hesin Industry Co Limited acted as an intermediary in weapons procurements for CITC in an effort to obfuscate the Iranian end-user.

    MUSTAD LIMITED

    • Address: Rm 1506, 15/F, Cheung Fung Commercial Bldg., 21-25 Cheung Sha Wan Road, Sham Shui Po, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Organization Established Date: 08 Oct 2024
    • Business Registration Number: 77151111 (Hong Kong)

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, Hong Kong-based Mustad Limited, acting as an intermediary, facilitated or attempted to facilitate financial transactions in furtherance of the IRGC’s procurement of millions of dollars’ worth of weapons.

    YUSHITA SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO LIMITED

    • AKA: 昱思达上海国际贸易有限公司 (Chinese Simplified)
    • Address: Unit 1004, 10th Floor, No. 698 Runchuan Road/No. 5788 Chuansha Road, Pudong New Area, Shanghai, China
    • Address: Room 1315, Block A, Greenland East Coast International Plaza, No. 581 Xiuchuan Road, Chuansha Town, Shanghai, China
    • Address: Unit 904, 9th Floor, No. 698 Runchuan Road/No. 5788 Chuansha Road, Pudong New Area, Shanghai, China
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Organization Established Date: 08 Dec 2011
    • Unified Social Credit Code (USCC): 91310115586820144H (China)
    • Linked To: CENTER FOR INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, China-based Yushita Shanghai International Trade Co Limited is a facilitator for CITC (also known as the Center for Progress and Development of Iran), which coordinates Iranian technology acquisition efforts including seeking to purchase weapons such as MANPADS from China.

    OFAC Program: [IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO]  Executive Order 13949

    MEENTROPY TECHNOLOGY HANGZHOU CO LTD

    • AKA:
      • 觅熵科技 杭州 有限公司 (Chinese Simplified)
      • MIZARVISION
    • Address: No. 501, 2nd Street, Baiyang Street, 6-1103, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China
    • Organization Established Date: 03 Dec 2021
    • Registration Number: 310141000638093 (China)
    • Unified Social Credit Code (USCC): 91310115MA1K4Q0G00 (China)

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, the U.S. Department of State is concurrently designating four entities in connection with Iran’s conventional arms activities. This entity carries the [IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO] program tag (Executive Order 13949) placing it in that group.

    THE EARTH EYE CO

    • AKA:
      • BEIJING MUMEI STARRY SKY TECHNOLOGY CO LTD
      • BEIJING MUMEI XINGKONG TECHNOLOGY CO LTD
    • Address: No. Jia 21-120, Beizhuanghu Village, Machikou Town, Changping District, Beijing, China
    • Website: https://www.teesat.com
    • Organization Established Date: 10 Nov 2021
    • Unified Social Credit Code (USCC): 91110105MA04H61R7D (China)

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, the U.S. Department of State is concurrently designating four entities in connection with Iran’s conventional arms activities. This entity carries the [IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO] program tag (Executive Order 13949) placing it in that group.

    Amendments:

    The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    • OFAC Programs:
      • [NPWMD]  Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544
      • [IFSR]  Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 561

    CENTER FOR INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

    • AKA:
      • CENTER FOR PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN
      • OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL STUDIES
      • OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
      • OSIS
      • PRESIDENCY OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL STUDIES
      • TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION OFFICE
      • “CITC”
      • “CPDI”
      • “POSIS”
      • “TCO”
    • Address: No 7 East Avesta Rd, Sheykh Bahaie Street, Sheykh Bahaie Sq, Tehran 1995859611, Iran
    • Address: PO Box 141554671, Tehran, Iran
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Organization Established Date: 01 Jan 1983 to 31 Dec 1984
    • Target Type: Government Entity
    • National ID No.: 14002821290 (Iran)

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, CITC coordinates Iranian technology acquisition efforts and has sought to purchase weapons, including MANPADS, from China. It is now also known as the Center for Progress and Development of Iran (CPDI). The U.S. Department of State originally designated CITC pursuant to E.O. 13382 in June 2012.

    List of Changes:

    • Field Name: AKA
      • Added: CENTER FOR PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN
      • Added: “CPDI”
      • Changed: f.k.a. OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL STUDIES to: a.k.a. OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL STUDIES
      • Changed: f.k.a. PRESIDENCY OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL STUDIES to: a.k.a. PRESIDENCY OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL STUDIES
      • Changed: f.k.a. “OSIS” to: a.k.a. OSIS
      • Changed: f.k.a. “POSIS” to: a.k.a. “POSIS”
    • Field Name: Address
      • Changed: Tehran, Iran to: No 7 East Avesta Rd, Sheykh Bahaie Street, Sheykh Bahaie Sq, Tehran 1995859611, Iran; PO Box 141554671, Tehran, Iran
    • Field Name: Organization Established Date
      • Added: 01 Jan 1983 to 31 Dec 1984
    • Field Name: Target Type
      • Added: Government Entity
    • Field Name: National ID No.
      • Added: 14002821290 (Iran)
    • OFAC Programs:
      • [IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO]  Executive Order 13949
      • [RUSSIA-EO14024]  Executive Order 14024

    CHANG GUANG SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.

    • AKA:
      • 长光卫星科技有限公司 (Chinese Simplified)
      • CHANGGUANG SATELLITE CO., LTD.
      • “CGSTC”
      • “CGSTL”
      • “CHARMING GLOBE”
    • Address: No. 1299, Mingxi Road, Beihu Science Technology Development District, Changchun, Jilin, China
    • Secondary sanctions risk: See Section 11 of Executive Order 14024.
    • Organization Established Date: 2014
    • Unified Social Credit Code (USCC): 91220101310012867G (China)

    Supplemental Information: Per the Treasury press release, the U.S. Department of State is concurrently designating four entities in connection with Iran’s conventional arms activities. This amendment adds the [IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO] program tag (Executive Order 13949) to Chang Guang Satellite Technology’s existing [RUSSIA-EO14024] designation and adds two new abbreviated aliases.

    List of Changes:

    • Field Name: AKA
      • Added: “CGSTC”
      • Added: “CGSTL”
    • Field Name: Program Tags
      • Added: [IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO]
    • OFAC Programs:
      • [NPWMD]  Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544
      • [IFSR]  Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 561
      • [IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO]  Executive Order 13949

    MINISTRY OF DEFENCE EXPORT CENTER

    • AKA:
      • MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LEGION EXPORT
      • MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXPORT
      • “MINDEX”
      • “MINDEX CENTER”
      • “MODLEX”
    • Address: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran, located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran
    • Address: PO Box 19315-189, Pasdaran Street, South Noubonyand Square, Tehran, Iran
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions

    Supplemental Information: This is Iran’s arms export body, previously listed under the primary name Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX). The update assigns a new primary name — Ministry of Defence Export Center — and adds the [IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO] program tag (Executive Order 13949) to its existing [NPWMD] and [IFSR] designations, reflecting the concurrent U.S. Department of State action on Iran’s conventional arms activities.

    List of Changes:

    • Field Name: Primary Name
      • Changed: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXPORT to: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE EXPORT CENTER
    • Field Name: AKA
      • Added: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXPORT
      • Added: “MINDEX”
      • Added: “MINDEX CENTER”
      • Changed: MODLEX to: “MODLEX”
    • Field Name: Program Tags
      • Added: [IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO]
  • Counter Terrorism and Iran-related Designations; Cuba Designation and Designations Updates; Issuance of Cuba-related General License and Frequently Asked Questions

    Treasury Press Release: Economic Fury Targets Iraqi Oil Official, Iran-Backed Terrorist Militias in Iraq

    State Press Release: Sanctioning Iran-Aligned Actors Undermining Iraq’s Sovereignty and Exploiting Its Resources

    State Press Release: U.S. Sanctions Target Cuba’s Military Regime, Elites

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

    AL SHUWAILI, Mohammed Issa Kadhim (Arabic: محمد عيسى كاظم الشويلي)

    • AKA: “ABU MARYAM”
    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 19 May 1982
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: B23828763 (Iraq) expires 08 Feb 2033
    • alt. Passport: A12147355 (Iraq) expires 19 May 2025
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: QASIR, Ali

    Supplemental Information: Al-Shuwaili, operating under the alias Abu Maryam, is a senior official of Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada (KSS), an Iran-aligned terrorist militia. Since at least 2025, he has collaborated directly with Hizballah illicit finance team members, including Ali Qasir, on the purchase and delivery of weapons into Iraq. He also arranged the payment of millions of dollars to Hizballah to facilitate the purchase of weapons and coordinated logistics related to the transfer and delivery of weapons with Hizballah associates. He is designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Ali Qasir.

    AL-BEHADILI, Mustafa Hashim Lazim (Arabic: مصطفى هاشم لازم البهادلي)

    • AKA:
      • AL BHADLI, Moustafa Hachem Lazem
      • AL-BAHADLI, Mustafa Hashim Lazem
      • LAZIM, Mustafa Hashem
      • LAZM, Mustafa Hashim
      • “AWN, Sayyid”
    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 21 Aug 1980
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: B27823144 (Iraq) expires 15 Apr 2033
    • alt. Passport: A14930721 (Iraq) expires 22 Jan 2027
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: ASA’IB AHL AL-HAQ

    Supplemental Information: Al-Behadili, also known as Sayyid Awn, is a leader and economic official for Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, he played an important role in developing an oil trucking and security unit, enabling AAH to become a dominant actor in the Iraqi metals industry and enter the fuel oil sector. Working directly with U.S.-designated AAH senior leader Laith Al-Khazali, he controlled oil smuggling financing and oversaw mineral industry activities. In southern Iraq, he managed oil smuggling operations and AAH projects, using businesses, projects, and government contracts as a front for AAH financial activity. He was also complicit in dealing directly with Iran and the IRGC-Qods Force, negotiating contracts to ship oil from Iran and coordinating with the IRGC-QF on shipping AAH’s oil. He is designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided support for Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq.

    MAKSUS, Ahmed Khudair Maksus

    • AKA: AL-MAKSUSI, Ahmad Khudayr Maksus
    • Address: Iraq
    • DOB: 06 Oct 1970
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: A5885993 (Iraq) expires 02 Jul 2019
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: KATA’IB SAYYID AL-SHUHADA

    Supplemental Information: Ahmed Khudair Maksus Maksus is the former Deputy Secretary General of Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada (KSS) under U.S.-designated Secretary General Hashim Finyan Rahim al-Saraji. KSS is an Iran-aligned terrorist militia that has planned and executed numerous attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria. He is designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.

    OFAC Program: [IRAN-EO13902] Executive Order 13902

    AL-BAHADLY, Ali Maarij (Arabic: علي معارج البهادلي)

    • AKA: AL BEHEDILI, Ali Maarij Sewadig
    • Address: Baghdad, Iraq; Alamara, Iraq
    • DOB: 01 Jul 1966
    • POB: Maysan, Iraq
    • Nationality: Iraq
    • Gender: Male
    • Passport: D1019788 (Iraq) expires 30 Jun 2026
    • National ID No.: 0041626 (Iraq)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: SAID, Salim Ahmed

    Supplemental Information: Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly is Iraq’s Deputy Minister of Oil, who has abused his position to facilitate the diversion of Iraqi oil products to benefit known Iran-affiliated oil smuggler Salim Ahmed Said as well as Iran-backed terrorist militia Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). Since 2018, Maarij has held multiple positions in Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, including head of the licensing and contracts office, Deputy Minister, and acting Minister of Oil. In his official capacities, he enabled Said to illicitly procure oil products by granting exportation rights to Said’s companies. He authorized trucking several million dollars’ worth of oil per day from the Qayarah oil field to VS Oil in Khor Zubayr for export, where Iranian oil was mixed with Iraqi oil before being shipped to market. He is also responsible for falsifying documentation on the provenance of oil. He is designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided support for Salim Ahmed Said.

    OFAC Program: [CUBA-EO] Executive Order 14404

    LASTRES MORERA, Ania Guillermina

    • Address: Marianao, Havana, Cuba
    • DOB: 19 Aug 1962
    • POB: Marianao, Cuba
    • Nationality: Cuba
    • Gender: Female
    • Party Type: Individual

    Supplemental Information: Lastres is the Executive President of Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), the Cuban military-controlled umbrella enterprise that controls an estimated 40 percent or more of the island’s economy. She is responsible for the management of GAESA’s illicit assets held internationally. She is designated pursuant to section 2(a)(i)(E) of E.O. 14404 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of GAESA.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

    GULF ENERGY FOR GENERAL TRANSPORT AND MARINE SERVICES AND REAL ESTATE CONSULTANCY LLC (Arabic: طاقة الخليج للنقل العام والخدمات البحرية والاستشارات العقارية محدودة المسؤولية)

    • AKA:
      • GULF ENERGY COMPANY FOR GENERAL TRANSPORT, MARINE SERVICES & REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS LTD
      • GULF ENERGY FOR GENERAL TRANSPORT, MARINE SERVICES AND REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS COMPANY LTD
    • Address: Apartment 3, Building 2/56, Zukak 2, Baghdad, Baghdad Governate, Iraq; Berth 12, Khor Al Zubair Port, Al Basrah, Iraq
    • Website: gulfenergy.info
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 12 Apr 2010
    • Organization Type: Sea and coastal freight water transport
    • alt. Organization Type: Transportation and storage
    • Company Number: 38676649 (Iraq)
    • Linked to: AL-BEHADILI, Mustafa Hashim Lazim

    Supplemental Information: One of four Iraqi companies owned or controlled by Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili that operate in the oil sector. Designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili.

    GULF ENERGY OIL SERVICES LIMITED (Arabic: طاقة الخليج للخدمات النفطية المحدودة)

    • Address: Baghdad, Iraq
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 13 Oct 2009
    • Organization Type: Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction
    • Business Registration Number: 73792 (Iraq)
    • Linked to: AL-BEHADILI, Mustafa Hashim Lazim

    Supplemental Information: One of four Iraqi companies owned or controlled by Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili that operate in the oil sector. Designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili.

    GULF GENERAL CONTRACTING LIMITED

    • Address: Baghdad, Iraq
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 05 Feb 2000
    • Business Registration Number: 7249 (Iraq)
    • Linked to: AL-BEHADILI, Mustafa Hashim Lazim

    Supplemental Information: One of four Iraqi companies owned or controlled by Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili that operate in the oil sector. Designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili.

    IRAQ INTERNATIONAL ENERGY FOR THE IMPORT AND SALE FOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS LIMITED (Arabic: طاقة العراق الدولية لاستيراد وبيع المنتوجات النفطية المحدودة)

    • AKA: IRAQ ENERGY INTERNATIONAL FOR IMPORTING AND SELLING OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY LTD
    • Address: Mahala 211, Dar 22, Zukak 11, Harthiya, Baghdad, Iraq
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 25 Jul 2019
    • Organization Type: Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction
    • Business Registration Number: 10365 (Iraq)
    • Linked to: AL-BEHADILI, Mustafa Hashim Lazim

    Supplemental Information: One of four Iraqi companies owned or controlled by Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili that operate in the oil sector. Designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili.

    Amendments:

    The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Programs:

    • [CUBA] Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515
    • [CUBA-EO] Executive Order 14404

    GRUPO DE ADMINISTRACION EMPRESARIAL S.A.

    • AKA:
      • GAESA
      • “GRUPO GAE”
    • Address: Edificio de la Marina, Avenida Del Puerto Y Brapia, Havana, Cuba
    • Organization Established Date: 28 Feb 1999
    • Organization Type: Activities of holding companies
    • Entity Code: 60446 (Cuba)

    Supplemental Information: GAESA is a Cuban military-controlled umbrella enterprise that controls an estimated 40 percent or more of Cuba’s economy. It is involved in various sectors and is designed to generate income for the benefit of the regime’s corrupt elites rather than the Cuban people. Its revenues are estimated at more than three times the state’s budget, and it likely controls up to $20 billion in illicit assets. GAESA was designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 2(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14404 for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Cuban economy.

    List of Changes:

    • Entity Code: Added: 60446 (Cuba)
    • Program Tags: Added: [CUBA-EO]

    MOA NICKEL SA

    • Address: Moa, Cuba
    • Organization Established Date: 1994
    • Organization Type: Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores

    Supplemental Information: MOA NICKEL SA is a joint venture between Sherritt International Corporation and the Cuban state-owned La Compania General de Niquel. It has exploited Cuba’s natural resources to benefit the regime at the expense of the Cuban people, profiting from assets originally expropriated by the Cuban regime from U.S. persons and corporations. Designated pursuant to section 2(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14404 for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Cuban economy.

    List of Changes:

    • Address: Changed: Cuba to: Moa, Cuba
    • Organization Established Date: Added: 1994
    • Organization Type: Added: Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores
    • Program Tags: Added: [CUBA-EO]

  • First, Iran General License W (Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Persons Blocked on May 1, 2026):

    and the new Frequently-Asked Question 1250:

    IRAN SANCTIONS

    1250. Are Iranian digital asset exchanges blocked under OFAC sanctions?

    Answer

    Yes. Executive Order (E.O.) 13599, as implemented by section 560.211(b) of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), blocks the property and interests in property of Iranian financial institutions. An Iranian financial institution is blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599 regardless of whether it is listed on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). Iranian digital asset exchanges meet the regulatory definition of an “Iranian financial institution” as persons that engage in the business of activities described in section 560.324 of the ITSR.

    All property and interests in property of Iranian digital asset exchanges in the possession or control of U.S. persons, including U.S. financial institutions, or within U.S. jurisdiction, are blocked pursuant to section 560.211 of the ITSR and must be reported to OFAC. See FAQ 160 for additional information regarding the sanctions implications of E.O. 13599. For additional information regarding the application of sanctions to digital assets, please see FAQs 559560561562563594646, and 647, as well as OFAC’s Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Virtual Currency Industry.

    Date Released

    May 1, 2026

    and a new OFAC Alert (Hormuz News U Can Uz, as Stephen Colbert would say):