Mr. Sanctions

Category: Legislation

  • January 21, 2026: Q3 TSRA Report Issued

    Report for Licensing Activities Undertaken Pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA)

    The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has released a Quarterly Report of Licensing Activities pursuant to Section 906(b) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), covering activities undertaken by OFAC under Section 906(a)(1) of the TSRA from July through September 2025. Under the procedures established in its TSRA-related regulations, OFAC processes license applications requesting authorization to export agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran under the specific licensing regime set forth in Section 906 of the TSRA.

    OFAC TSRA Program Information Page

    Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) text

    —

    , , ,

  • Burning Question: To TWEA or not to TWEA? (reposted)

    I will admit to not being really conversant in legislation like TWEA and IEEPA – to my uninformed mind, I see the significantly different civil monetary penalty caps. And I wondered:

    Given that IEEPA penalties are much heftier than those under TWEA, are there any compelling reasons to create a new sanctions program under TWEA?

    And I got this very surprising answer:

    While your premise regarding the penalties is legally correct—IEEPA civil penalties are indeed roughly 3x higher than those under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)—there is one “nuclear” authority that TWEA possesses and IEEPA lacks: Vesting.

    Under IEEPA, the government can generally only freeze (block) assets. Under TWEA, the government can seize (vest) them, taking full ownership.

    Because of this, the lower penalty cap under TWEA is misleading. In a TWEA scenario, the government doesn’t just fine you for the transaction; it can potentially take the entire underlying asset.

    Here is the breakdown of why a administration might theoretically prefer TWEA, despite the lower fine schedule, and why it is rarely used today.

    1. The “Nuclear Option”: Vesting vs. Blocking

    The most compelling reason to use TWEA is the power of vesting.

    • IEEPA (Peacetime Emergency): The President can “block” assets. This freezes the money or property, preventing the target from using it. However, the title (ownership) remains with the target. The U.S. government cannot simply take the money and spend it or give it to someone else without new, specific legislation (as seen with the REPO Act for Ukraine).
    • TWEA (Wartime): The President can “vest” assets. This means the U.S. government takes the title to the property. It becomes U.S. government property to be sold, liquidated, or used as the U.S. sees fit.
      • Context: This was used during WWII to seize enemy assets (e.g., Bayer, IG Farben) and repurpose them for the war effort.

    2. The Scope of “Regulation” (Tariffs and Trade)

    TWEA has historically provided broader cover for aggressive trade interventions, such as tariffs, that are currently being legally challenged under IEEPA.

    • Judicial Deference: Courts have historically given the President massive deference under TWEA (e.g., U.S. v. Yoshida International), effectively allowing the Executive to rewrite tariff schedules at will.
    • IEEPA Challenges: Recent court cases have begun to challenge the President’s ability to use IEEPA for tariffs, arguing that IEEPA is for “sanctions” (blocking assets), not “revenue generation” (tariffs). TWEA’s broader “regulate importation” authority during wartime is less legally fragile in this specific area.

    3. The “War” Barrier (The Catch)

    There is a massive legal barrier that makes creating a new TWEA program nearly impossible for standard foreign policy issues.

    • 1977 IEEPA Split: When Congress passed IEEPA in 1977, it explicitly split the President’s emergency powers. It confined TWEA authorities strictly to “time of war” (declared by Congress).
    • Peacetime Restriction: The President cannot invoke TWEA simply by declaring a National Emergency (as they do for IEEPA). Congress must formally declare war.
    • Current Status: The only TWEA program that remains active is the embargo on Cuba, which was grandfathered in before the 1977 split. All other modern sanctions (Iran, Russia, China, etc.) are under IEEPA because we are not in a declared state of war with those nations.

    Summary Comparison

    FeatureIEEPA (Peacetime)TWEA (Wartime)
    TriggerNational Emergency DeclarationDeclared War (by Congress)
    Asset AuthorityBlocking (Freeze only)Vesting (Seize/Take Title)
    Civil Penalty (2025)~$377,700 (or 2x transaction)~$111,300 (per violation)
    Statute of Limitations10 Years (as of 2024)10 Years (as of 2024)
    Judicial ScrutinyModerate (Recent challenges on tariffs)Low (Historically very high deference)

    Verdict

    You would only create a new program under TWEA if the U.S. entered a declared war and the goal was to permanently seize enemy assets rather than just freeze them. The lower civil penalty is irrelevant in that context because the government’s primary leverage is the ability to confiscate the property itself.

    —

    ,

  • Burning Question: Could President Trump undo all the OFAC Russian sanctions?

    The prompt:

    if President Trump revoked all the Executive Orders for all of the Russia-related sanctions programs (including Russia Harmful Foreign Activities, Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions and Magnitsky sanctions), what would be left of them due to any legislation passed by Congress, if anything?

    The result from Gemini:

    If President Trump were to revoke all Executive Orders (EOs) related to Russia, Ukraine, and Human Rights (Magnitsky), a significant portion of the sanctions regime would remain in force.

    This is because Congress has aggressively “codified” (written into permanent law) many of these sanctions over the last decade to prevent exactly this scenario. The President cannot overturn a statute with an Executive Order.

    Here is a breakdown of what would legally remain standing:

    1. The “2014-Era” Sanctions (Codified by CAATSA)

    The most durable layer of sanctions comes from the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017.

    • What stays: CAATSA Section 222 explicitly codified the Obama-era Executive Orders related to the invasion of Crimea (EOs 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685).1
    • The Result: Even if the President signs a paper revoking these EOs, the sanctions exist as federal law. The “Sectoral Sanctions” (restrictions on Russian energy and banking debt/equity) and the blocking of major oligarchs designated under these authorities would remain legal obligations.
    • The Lock: To remove these, the President must prove to Congress that Russia has met specific hardline criteria (e.g., implementing the Minsk agreements), which is currently politically impossible.

    2. The Magnitsky Act (Human Rights)

    The prompt mentions “Magnitsky sanctions.” It is crucial to distinguish between the two types, as one is much harder to kill.

    • The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012: This is a statute, not an EO. It targets Russians involved in the death of Sergei Magnitsky and other gross human rights violations.2 The President cannot revoke this program. He must enforce it by law.
    • The Global Magnitsky Act (GloMag): This is also a statute, though it is implemented via EO 13818.3 If the President revoked EO 13818, the mechanism for enforcing GloMag would pause, but the underlying law requiring the President to impose sanctions on human rights abusers would remain, creating a legal conflict until a new mechanism was created.

    3. The Sovereign Assets Freeze (REPO Act)

    Passed in April 2024 (as part of the foreign aid package), the REPO for Ukrainians Act creates a statutory lock on the frozen assets of the Russian Central Bank.

    • What stays: The Act explicitly prohibits the President from unblocking Russian sovereign assets (worth billions) until Russia withdraws from Ukraine and pays compensation.
    • The Result: Even if the President revokes EO 14024 (which originally blocked the Central Bank), the REPO Act overrides that revocation. The money stays frozen by statute.

    4. Trade and Energy Bans (2022 Laws)

    Congress passed two specific laws in 2022 that operate independently of Executive Orders:

    • The Oil Ban: The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act makes it illegal to import Russian energy products (oil, gas, coal) into the U.S. A President cannot waive this without a new law.
    • The Tariff Hike: The Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act stripped Russia of “Most Favored Nation” trade status. This keeps tariffs on Russian goods incredibly high.

    5. Chemical Weapons Sanctions (CBW Act)

    Because the U.S. formally determined Russia used chemical weapons (Navalny/Skripal cases), the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 mandates specific sanctions.

    • What stays: Restrictions on arms sales, bank loans, and technology exports.
    • The Lock: These can only be removed if the President certifies to Congress that Russia has admitted inspectors and renounced chemical weapons.

    6. The “Gap”: What Would Actually Disappear?

    While the “floor” provided by Congress is high, revoking the EOs would still break the “ceiling” of the current maximum-pressure campaign.

    • The “New” Designations: While the REPO Act freezes the Central Bank, thousands of individual Russian elites, smaller banks, and defense companies were designated solely under EO 14024 (the 2021 “Harmful Foreign Activities” order). Because EO 14024 was issued after CAATSA (2017), it was not codified by that specific law.
    • Secondary Sanctions: The threat of secondary sanctions on foreign banks (China, Turkey, UAE) for aiding Russia’s military-industrial base relies heavily on recent amendments to EO 14024.4 Revoking the EO would eliminate this specific tool.

    Summary: The Congressional Veto

    Finally, CAATSA Section 216 acts as a safety valve for all of the above. It created a “Congressional Review” process.

    • If the President tries to “terminate” or “waive” sanctions on Russia, he must notify Congress.
    • Congress has 30 days to pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval.
    • If passed (and capable of overriding a veto), this Resolution legally stops the President from removing the sanctions.

    Bottom Line: If the Executive Orders were revoked, the energy ban, tariffs, central bank asset freeze, and 2014-era sanctions would legally remain. The primary loss would be the specific blocking of individuals and companies designated only under the post-2021 authorities (EO 14024), though Congress would likely move to block that revocation immediately.

    —

    , , ,