The prompt:

if President Trump revoked all the Executive Orders for all of the Russia-related sanctions programs (including Russia Harmful Foreign Activities, Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions and Magnitsky sanctions), what would be left of them due to any legislation passed by Congress, if anything?

The result from Gemini:

If President Trump were to revoke all Executive Orders (EOs) related to Russia, Ukraine, and Human Rights (Magnitsky), a significant portion of the sanctions regime would remain in force.

This is because Congress has aggressively “codified” (written into permanent law) many of these sanctions over the last decade to prevent exactly this scenario. The President cannot overturn a statute with an Executive Order.

Here is a breakdown of what would legally remain standing:

1. The “2014-Era” Sanctions (Codified by CAATSA)

The most durable layer of sanctions comes from the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017.

• What stays: CAATSA Section 222 explicitly codified the Obama-era Executive Orders related to the invasion of Crimea (EOs 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685).¹
• The Result: Even if the President signs a paper revoking these EOs, the sanctions exist as federal law. The “Sectoral Sanctions” (restrictions on Russian energy and banking debt/equity) and the blocking of major oligarchs designated under these authorities would remain legal obligations.
• The Lock: To remove these, the President must prove to Congress that Russia has met specific hardline criteria (e.g., implementing the Minsk agreements), which is currently politically impossible.

2. The Magnitsky Act (Human Rights)

The prompt mentions “Magnitsky sanctions.” It is crucial to distinguish between the two types, as one is much harder to kill.

• The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012: This is a statute, not an EO. It targets Russians involved in the death of Sergei Magnitsky and other gross human rights violations.² The President cannot revoke this program. He must enforce it by law.
• The Global Magnitsky Act (GloMag): This is also a statute, though it is implemented via EO 13818.³ If the President revoked EO 13818, the mechanism for enforcing GloMag would pause, but the underlying law requiring the President to impose sanctions on human rights abusers would remain, creating a legal conflict until a new mechanism was created.

3. The Sovereign Assets Freeze (REPO Act)

Passed in April 2024 (as part of the foreign aid package), the REPO for Ukrainians Act creates a statutory lock on the frozen assets of the Russian Central Bank.

• What stays: The Act explicitly prohibits the President from unblocking Russian sovereign assets (worth billions) until Russia withdraws from Ukraine and pays compensation.
• The Result: Even if the President revokes EO 14024 (which originally blocked the Central Bank), the REPO Act overrides that revocation. The money stays frozen by statute.

4. Trade and Energy Bans (2022 Laws)

Congress passed two specific laws in 2022 that operate independently of Executive Orders:

• The Oil Ban: The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act makes it illegal to import Russian energy products (oil, gas, coal) into the U.S. A President cannot waive this without a new law.
• The Tariff Hike: The Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act stripped Russia of “Most Favored Nation” trade status. This keeps tariffs on Russian goods incredibly high.

5. Chemical Weapons Sanctions (CBW Act)

Because the U.S. formally determined Russia used chemical weapons (Navalny/Skripal cases), the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 mandates specific sanctions.

• What stays: Restrictions on arms sales, bank loans, and technology exports.
• The Lock: These can only be removed if the President certifies to Congress that Russia has admitted inspectors and renounced chemical weapons.

6. The “Gap”: What Would Actually Disappear?

While the “floor” provided by Congress is high, revoking the EOs would still break the “ceiling” of the current maximum-pressure campaign.

• The “New” Designations: While the REPO Act freezes the Central Bank, thousands of individual Russian elites, smaller banks, and defense companies were designated solely under EO 14024 (the 2021 “Harmful Foreign Activities” order). Because EO 14024 was issued after CAATSA (2017), it was not codified by that specific law.
• Secondary Sanctions: The threat of secondary sanctions on foreign banks (China, Turkey, UAE) for aiding Russia’s military-industrial base relies heavily on recent amendments to EO 14024.⁴ Revoking the EO would eliminate this specific tool.

Summary: The Congressional Veto

Finally, CAATSA Section 216 acts as a safety valve for all of the above. It created a “Congressional Review” process.

• If the President tries to “terminate” or “waive” sanctions on Russia, he must notify Congress.
• Congress has 30 days to pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval.
• If passed (and capable of overriding a veto), this Resolution legally stops the President from removing the sanctions.

Bottom Line: If the Executive Orders were revoked, the energy ban, tariffs, central bank asset freeze, and 2014-era sanctions would legally remain. The primary loss would be the specific blocking of individuals and companies designated only under the post-2021 authorities (EO 14024), though Congress would likely move to block that revocation immediately.