Mr. Sanctions

Category: OFAC (US)

  • September 4, 2026: OFAC Update, Part 1: Iran Designations

    Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related General License

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Severs Iranian Regime’s Financial Lifelines in Türkiye

    Additions:

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [IRAN-EO13902]  Executive Order 13902

    GOLDEN GLOBAL PORTFOY YONETIMI ANONIM SIRKETI (Latin: GOLDEN GLOBAL PORTFÖY YÖNETİMİ ANONİM ŞİRKETİ)

    • Address: Astoria D:21, N: 127A Esentepe Mahallesi, Buyukdere Caddesi, Sisli, Istanbul, Turkey
    • Website: https://goldenglobalportfoy.com.tr/
    • Organization Established Date: 15 Jan 2025
    • Organization Type: Financial and Insurance Activities
    • Tax ID No.: 3961688364 (Turkey)
    • Legal Entity Number: 789000J1YGZ3PLCXMQ38
    • Registration Number: 1063899 (Turkey)
    • Linked to: GOLDEN GLOBAL YATIRIM BANKASI ANONIM SIRKETI

    Supplemental Information: Treasury designated this entity, a subsidiary of Golden Global Bank, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, the bank. Treasury’s press release ties Golden Global Bank to a scheme enabling Iran’s “rahbar” network to move oil revenue earned from sales to China into Turkey, where it could then be converted to cash and gold by rahbar money exchangers.

    GOLDEN GLOBAL VARLIK KIRALAMA ANONIM SIRKETI (Latin: GOLDEN GLOBAL VARLIK KİRALAMA ANONİM ŞİRKETİ)

    • Address: Astoria Blok IC Kapi No 17, N: 127 B-17 Esentepe Mahallesi, Buyukdere Caddesi, Sisli, Istanbul, Turkey
    • Website: https://goldenglobalvks.com.tr/
    • Organization Established Date: 01 Aug 2022
    • Organization Type: Financial and Insurance Activities
    • Tax ID No.: 3961486674 (Turkey)
    • Legal Entity Number: 789000S50A0J8E8FKE55
    • Registration Number: 396200 (Turkey)
    • Linked to: GOLDEN GLOBAL YATIRIM BANKASI ANONIM SIRKETI

    Supplemental Information: Treasury designated this entity, a subsidiary of Golden Global Bank, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, the bank. Treasury’s press release ties Golden Global Bank to a scheme enabling Iran’s “rahbar” network to move oil revenue earned from sales to China into Turkey, where it could then be converted to cash and gold by rahbar money exchangers.

    GOLDEN GLOBAL YATIRIM BANKASI ANONIM SIRKETI (Latin: GOLDEN GLOBAL YATIRIM BANKASI ANONİM ŞİRKETİ)

    • AKA: GOLDEN GLOBAL INVESTMENT BANK
    • Address: N:127 B-17 Esentepe Mahallesi, Buyukdere Caddesi, Sisli, Istanbul 34394, Turkey
    • SWIFT/BIC: GOGYTRIS
    • Website: http://www.goldenglobalbank.com.tr
    • Organization Established Date: 15 Oct 2019
    • Target Type: Financial Institution
    • Tax ID No.: 3961233191 (Turkey)
    • Legal Entity Number: 789000LV7F75LALJ3F52
    • Registration Number: 213202 (Turkey)

    Supplemental Information: Treasury’s press release describes Golden Global Bank as a Turkish financial institution established to give Iran’s “rahbar” network of oil-revenue facilitators a route to convert oil proceeds from Chinese buyers into cash and gold once the funds reached Turkey. The bank knowingly offered correspondent banking services to Iranian financial institutions, letting transactions flow through accounts controlled by the IRGC-Qods Force and its proxies, including accounts tied to Turkish businessman Sitki Ayan and his companies – a network OFAC designated in 2022 for moving hundreds of millions of dollars connected to IRGC-Qods Force oil sales. Treasury says the bank facilitated tens of millions of dollars in transactions for the IRGC-Qods Force and gave the Iranian regime correspondent banking access it used to move funds internationally. The designation is part of Operation Economic Outcast, the sanctions campaign Secretary Bessent announced on August 24, 2026 to sever Iran’s remaining economic lifelines and that Treasury says will keep expanding secondary sanctions exposure for those still doing business with the regime.

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  • September 4, 2026: OFAC Update, Part 2: New Iran-related Wind-Down General License

    It’s GL CC (Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Persons Blocked on September 4, 2026):

    iran_gl_ccDownload

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  • September 3, 2026: OFAC Update, Part 1: new Cuba designations and a Russia removal

    Cuba Designations; Russia-related Designation Removal; Issuance of Amended Cuba General License

    State Press Release: Further Sanctions on Cuba’s Elites, Financial Channels, and Resource Exploitation Apparatus

    Additions:

    The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [CUBA-EO14404]  Executive Order 14404, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to United States National Security and Foreign Policy”

    CASTRO CALIS, Fidel Ernesto

    • Address: Cuba
    • DOB: 16 May 1995
    • nationality: Cuba
    • Gender: Male
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: CASTRO ESPIN, Alejandro

    Supplemental Information: Fidel Ernesto Castro Calis is a grandson of Raúl Castro (Raúl Modesto Castro Ruz) and the son of Alejandro Castro Espín, who was previously designated under E.O. 14404. State designated him for being an adult family member of a person already designated under the order; his brother, Raúl Alejandro Castro Calis, was designated alongside their father on June 4, 2026.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [CUBA-EO14404]  Executive Order 14404, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to United States National Security and Foreign Policy”

    BANCO EXTERIOR DE CUBA

    • Address: Plaza de la Revolucion, Havana, Cuba
    • SWIFT/BIC: BECUCUHH
    • Website: bancoexteriorcuba.cu
    • Organization Established Date: 29 Feb 2000
    • Target Type: Financial Institution
    • Entity Code: 259 (Cuba)

    Supplemental Information: Banco Exterior de Cuba is a Cuban state-owned bank that specializes in corporate banking, foreign-trade finance, and international transactions. State designated it for operating in the financial services sector of the Cuban economy.

    COMERCIAL CUPET S.A.

    • Address: Havana, Cuba
    • Organization Established Date: 18 Sep 1991
    • Organization Type: Wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and related products
    • Target Type: State-Owned Enterprise
    • Entity Code: 60254 (Cuba)

    Supplemental Information: Comercial Cupet S.A. is a Cuban state-owned entity that represents Unión Cuba Petróleo (CUPET) in negotiations and joint ventures with foreign entities. State designated it for operating in the energy sector of the Cuban economy.

    EMPRESA DE SERVICIOS COMANDANTE RENE RAMOS LATOUR

    • AKA: “NICAROTEC”
    • Address: Mayari, Holguin, Cuba
    • Organization Established Date: 31 Jan 1977
    • Organization Type: Support activities for other mining and quarrying
    • Target Type: State-Owned Enterprise

    Supplemental Information: NICAROTEC is a Cuban state-owned industrial and technical services enterprise that provides geological and mining support for Cuba’s nickel sector. State designated it for operating in the metals and mining sector of the Cuban economy.

    EMPRESA IMPORTADORA DE ABASTECIMIENTO PARA EL PETROLEO

    • AKA: “ABAPET”
    • Address: Havana, Cuba
    • Organization Established Date: 21 Mar 2000
    • Organization Type: Wholesale of other machinery and equipment
    • Target Type: State-Owned Enterprise
    • Entity Code: 12127 (Cuba)
    • Linked to: UNION CUBA PETROLEO

    Supplemental Information: ABAPET is a subsidiary of Unión Cuba Petróleo (CUPET, designated under this order) that handles procurement support for CUPET, including imports of technological equipment, spare parts, specialized tools, and industrial inputs needed to sustain Cuba’s energy sector. State designated it for being owned, controlled, or directed by CUPET.

    EMPRESA IMPORTADORA Y ABASTECEDORA DEL NIQUEL

    • AKA: “CEXNI”
    • Address: Moa, Holguin, Cuba
    • Organization Established Date: 31 Dec 1994
    • Organization Type: Non-specialized wholesale trade
    • Target Type: State-Owned Enterprise
    • Entity Code: 3883 (Cuba)

    Supplemental Information: CEXNI is a foreign-trade and logistics enterprise that imports and supplies specialized raw materials, machinery, and equipment for Cuba’s nickel and cobalt industry. State designated it for operating in the metals and mining sector of the Cuban economy.

    Delistings:

    The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [RUSSIA-EO14024]  Executive Order 14024, “Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation”

    DULAC CAPITAL LTD (a.k.a. AK DYULAK KEPITAL LTD PREDSTAVITELSTVO; a.k.a. PREDSTAVITELSTVO AKTSIONERNOGO OBSHCHESTVA DYULAK KEPITAL LTD SHVEITSARIYA V G MOSCOW; a.k.a. PREDSTAVITELSTVO AKTSIONERNOGO OBSHCHESTVA DYULAK KEPITAL LTD SHVEITSARIYA V G SANKT PETERBURGE), Arosastrasse 7, Zurich 8008, Switzerland; Pr-kt Morskoi pom. 12-N, Saint Petersburg 197110, Russia; Pr-kt Leningradskii, Moscow 125167, Russia; Secondary sanctions risk: See Section 11 of Executive Order 14024.; Organization Established Date: 14 Dec 2007; Tax ID No.: 113974567 (Switzerland); alt. Tax ID No.: 9909354395 (Russia); Identification Number: SRWNNB.99999.SL.756 (Switzerland); Legal Entity Number: 529900E3569EJW938341; Registration Number: CH-020.3.031.775-0 (Switzerland).

    OFAC’s SDN List carried this entity as four separate old-style duplicate entries, each rotating a different one of the four names above into the primary-name position with the other three as AKAs; all four point to the same Zurich/Moscow/Saint Petersburg entity and are consolidated into the single entry above.

    Sources:

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  • September 3, 2026: OFAC Update, Part 2: new version of Cuba General License 4

    This is GL 4A (Authorizing Transactions for Third-Country Diplomatic and Consular Missions in Cuba):

    cuba_gl4aDownload

    What are the important differences? Let Claude explain:

    Paragraph (c) – restructured and narrowed:

    • GL 4 had two exclusions: (c)(1) barred financial transfers to any blocked person except for taxes, fees, import duties, or permits/licenses/public utility services tied to paragraph (a) transactions; and (c)(2) barred unblocking of any property.
    • GL 4A drops (c)(1) entirely. The sole remaining exclusion is the unblocking prohibition (what was (c)(2)), now written as the whole of (c).

    Practical effect (my reading, not stated in the text itself): By removing (c)(1)’s narrow carve-out, GL 4A appears to broaden the scope of authorized financial transfers to blocked persons. Under GL 4, such transfers were confined to taxes, fees, import duties, and permit/license/utility payments tied to official-business transactions. Under GL 4A, that specific limitation is gone – transactions otherwise meeting the “ordinarily incident and necessary” standard in (a) or (b) are no longer subject to that narrower financial-transfer restriction. The only thing GL 4A still expressly withholds is unblocking of property. 

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  • September 2, 2026: Finally – OFAC reminds you of the ARBP filing, issues new versions of Venezuela GLs, and amends a related FAQ

    Reminder to file the 2026 Annual Report of Blocked Property; Issuance of Amended Venezuela-related General Licenses and Frequently Asked Question

    09/02/2026

    Recent Actions Body

    On July 1, 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a recent actions notice, reminding U.S. persons holding blocked property as of June 30, 2026, to file an Annual Report of Blocked Property (ARBP) no later than September 30, 2026. Failure to file the ARBP by September 30 may lead to an enforcement referral.

    For additional information, please review OFAC’s Guidance on Filing the 2026 Annual Report of Blocked Property.

    Additionally, OFAC is issuing Venezuela-related General License 51D, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Coal or Minerals, Including Gold;” Venezuela-related General License 54C, “Authorizing the Supply of Certain Items and Services for Coal or Minerals Operations in Venezuela;” and Venezuela-related General License 55A, “Authorizing Negotiations of and Entry Into Contingent Contracts for Certain Investment in Venezuela’s Coal or Minerals Sectors.”

    Lastly, OFAC has amended one Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Question, FAQ 1247.

    The guidance:

    arbp_guidance_2026Download

    GL 51D:

    venezuela_gl51dDownload

    GL 54C:

    venezuela_gl54cDownload

    GL 55A:

    venezuela_gl55aDownload

    and the FAQ:

    1247. Do non-U.S. persons face sanctions risk for engaging in transactions authorized by General Licenses (GL) 46D, 51D, and 52B? 

    No, provided that non-U.S. persons comply with certain conditions outlined in GLs 46D, 51D, and 52B as described below. Subject to certain conditions, GLs 46D, 51D, and 52B authorize established U.S. entities to engage in certain transactions involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), as well as certain transactions with the Government of Venezuela, including Carbones del Zulia S.A. (Carbozulia), PdVSA, or CVG Compania General de Mineria de Venezuela CA (Minerven) that are ordinarily incident and necessary to, among other activities, the exportation, sale, supply, storage, purchase, delivery, or transportation of Venezuelan-origin oil, petrochemical products, minerals (including gold), or coal. Generally, non-U.S. persons do not risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in transactions authorized under GLs 46D, 51D, and 52B — such as transacting with PdVSA or importing Venezuelan-origin oil, petrochemical products, minerals, or coal, into a third country — provided that:

    • The non-U.S. entity was organized under the laws of a third country on or before January 29, 2025;
    • Any monetary payment to a blocked person, excluding payments for local taxes, permits, or fees, is made into the Foreign Government Deposit Funds, as specified in Executive Order 14373 of January 9, 2026, or any other account as instructed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury;
    • The payment terms are commercially reasonable;
    • The payment terms do not involve debt swaps, and are not denominated in digital currency, digital coin, or digital tokens issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, including the petro;
    • The transaction does not involve a person located in or organized under the laws of the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, or any entity that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by or in a joint venture with such persons;
    • The transaction does not involve an entity located in or organized under the laws of Venezuela or the United States that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by or in a joint venture with a person located in or organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China;
    • The transaction does not involve a blocked vessel; and
    • With respect to GL 51D, the transaction does not involve the processing or refining of Venezuelan-origin coal or minerals, including gold, in the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, or the People’s Republic of China.

    These conditions are designed to ensure that transactions involving the Government of Venezuela, including Carbozulia, PdVSA, Minerven, or Venezuelan-origin oil, petrochemical products, minerals, or coal occur through legitimate and authorized channels, consistent with efforts to restore prosperity, safety, and security to Venezuela. Non-U.S. persons who continue to transact with PdVSA or Minerven, or import Venezuelan-origin oil, petrochemical products, minerals including gold, or coal, without complying with the above conditions risk being designated themselves, including for providing financial, material, or technological support to blocked persons, being responsible for or complicit in a transaction involving deceptive practices or corruption and the Government of Venezuela, or operating in the gold or oil sectors of the Venezuelan economy.

    Please note that GL 52B contains additional restrictions on engaging in certain transactions prohibited by other Venezuela-related Executive orders, such as transactions related to bonds and debt issued by PdVSA, as well as on the entry into a settlement agreement or the enforcement of any lien, judgment, or other order through execution, garnishment, or other judicial process purporting to transfer or otherwise alter or affect property or interests in property of any persons blocked pursuant to the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations.

    Please see FAQ 1226 for the definition of “Venezuelan-origin oil,” which includes petroleum products.

    Please see FAQ 1232 for what OFAC considers “commercially reasonable terms.”

    Please see FAQ 1239 for information on how to make authorized payments to the Foreign Government Deposit Funds, as specified in E.O. 14373.

    Date Updated: September 02, 2026

    Updated on Sep 02, 2026

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  • August 28, 2026: OFAC adds to counter-terror and Iran sanctions

    Iran-related and Counter Terrorism Designations

    Treasury Press Release: Iran’s Access to UAE Banks Targeted Under Operation Economic Outcast

    State Press Release: U.S. Sanctions Sever Financial Lifelines of Iranian Regime

    Additions:

    The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Programs:

    • SDGT  Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
    • IFSR  Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 561

    TAEEDI, Reza Mohammad

    • Address: Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • DOB: 24 Aug 1975
    • Nationality: Iran
    • Additional Sanctions Information: Subject to Secondary Sanctions
    • Gender: Male
    • Passport: P6602606
    • Alt. Passport: E96037407
    • National ID No.: 784-1975-3624749-3 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: Bank Melli Iran

    Supplemental Information: Taeedi is the general manager of Bank Melli Iran’s Dubai branch. Treasury says that branch has moved billions of dollars through accounts tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), letting the IRGC-QF and its parent organization move funds into and out of Iran and helping fund Iran-aligned proxies, including in Iraq. State’s parallel statement describes Bank Melli more broadly as a financial hub for Iran’s armed forces, naming both the IRGC-QF and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics as beneficiaries. OFAC designated Taeedi under E.O. 13224, as amended, for acting on Bank Melli’s behalf.

    The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: IRAN-EO13902  Executive Order 13902

    KAMENG TRADING LIMITED

    • Address:
      • Room 701, Unit 108, 7/F, Tower B, New Mandarin Plaza, 14 Science Museum Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
      • Unit 89, 3F, Yau Lee Centre, No. 45, Hoi Yuen Rd, Kwun Tong, Hong Kong, China
    • Organization Established Date: 24 Jul 2024
    • Business Registration Number: 76846373 (Hong Kong)

    Supplemental Information: Treasury ties Kameng Trading Limited to Pedram Pirouzan Exchange House, also known as Opal Exchange, an already-designated Iranian exchange house that used the Hong Kong company to launder money for Iran. State’s statement likewise describes the firm as a Hong Kong-based company that helped already-designated Iranian individuals and entities access the international financial system. OFAC designated Kameng Trading Limited under E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.

    and here is the NPRM (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) of the Section 311 designation proposed by FinCEN:

    Banque-Misr-UAE-NPRMDownload

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  • August 28, 2026: Canada implements recent UNSC counter-terror updates

    On August 27, 2026, the UN Security Council Taliban Sanctions Committee amended one name on its sanctions list. For more information, consult the Press Release.

    This amendment takes effect immediately under Canadian sanctions legislation, pursuant to the Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Taliban, ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida.

    For further information on UN Security Council sanctions list, consult:

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  • August 27, 2026: Got Wite-Out? OFAC issues new versions of 8 Venezuela General Licenses, issues 2 new FAQs, amends 2, and archives 1 – and Claude explains the changes

    Issuance of Amended Venezuela-related General Licenses and Associated Frequently Asked Questions

    Release Date

    08/27/2026

    Recent Actions Body

    The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Venezuela-related General License 46D, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Oil or Petrochemical Products;” Venezuela-related General License 47B, “Authorizing the Sale of U.S.-Origin Diluents to Venezuela;” Venezuela-related General License 48C, “Authorizing the Supply of Certain Items and Services to Venezuela;” Venezuela-related General License 50C, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Oil or Gas Sector Operations in Venezuela of Certain Entities;” Venezuela-related General License 51C, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Minerals, Including Gold;” Venezuela-related General License 52B, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.;” Venezuela-related General License 54B, “Authorizing the Supply of Certain Items and Services for Minerals Operations in Venezuela;” and Venezuela-related General License 61A, “Authorizing the Supply of Certain Items and Services to Venezuela Related to Telecommunications.”

    Additionally, OFAC is issuing two new Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1267 and 1268), amending two Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1233 and 1244), and archiving FAQ 1260.

    Claude explains the difference:

    What’s new is that OFAC fully removed the separate governing-law requirement, the clause requiring contract terms to be “construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of a state or other jurisdiction within the United States.” So the two conditions that used to travel together (US governing law + dispute resolution venue) have been decoupled, and only the dispute-resolution piece survives. That’s the substantive change behind your two new FAQs:

    • FAQ 1267 (new): Asks whether the amended GLs still require a choice-of-law provision. Answer: no, effective Aug 27, 2026. OFAC states the rationale as responding to “investment-related reforms made by the GOV since January 2026.” It doesn’t name Venezuela’s Hydrocarbons Law amendment specifically, so connecting the two is my inference based on outside reporting, not something OFAC states in the FAQ itself.
    • FAQ 1268 (new): Confirms the dispute-resolution-venue requirement itself is untouched, and adds a clarifying line that the requirement “relates to the jurisdiction in which dispute resolution proceedings must occur, rather than the law governing the underlying contract.”

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  • August 26, 2026: OFAC Update, Part 1: Counter-Terrorism Designations

    Counter Terrorism Designations; Issuance of Counter Terrorism General License; Issuance of Amended Russia-related General License

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Takes Action Against Violent Far-Left Terrorist Networks

    State Press Release: Imposing Sanctions on Violent Far-Left Terrorist Groups

    State Fact Sheet: Designation of Autistici/Inventati as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: SDGT  Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

    ABDULNASSER, Zaid

    • AKA: “TAMIM, Zid”
    • Address: Germany
    • DOB: 1995
    • Nationality: Palestinian
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: MASAR BADIL

    Supplemental Information: Treasury identifies Abdulnasser, based in Germany, as a leader of Masar Badil.

    ALSAGHEER, Rawa

    • AKA: AL-SAGHIR, Ruwaa
    • Address: Brazil
    • DOB: 1997
    • Nationality: Palestinian
    • Gender: Female
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: Individual
    • Linked to: MASAR BADIL

    Supplemental Information: Treasury identifies Alsagheer, based in Brazil, as a leader of Masar Badil alongside Abdulnasser.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: SDGT  Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

    AUTISTICI INVENTATI

    • Address: Strada Statale Abetone e del Brennero 253, San Giuliano Terme, Province of Pisa 56017, Italy
    • Website: http://www.autistici.org
    • Email Address: http://www.associazione@ai-odv.org
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2001
    • Organization Type: Data processing, hosting and related activities

    Supplemental Information: Autistici Inventati, also known as the A/I Collective, is an Italian nonprofit founded in 2001 that runs the “Noblogs” hosting platform out of the Province of Pisa. According to State’s fact sheet, it vets every prospective user for ideological alignment before granting access to a suite of encrypted email, web hosting, and video conferencing tools reserved for left-wing groups. State puts its current footprint at roughly 16,000 mailboxes, 1,500 websites, 5,500 mailing lists, and 10,000 blogs.

    Treasury and State tie that infrastructure to a string of violent incidents. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has used its services. So has the anarchist network behind a wave of 2026 rail sabotage across France, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. The March 2026 attack on the Transalpine Pipeline, which briefly cut crude flows to Austria, Germany, and the Czech Republic, relied on A/I tools to claim credit and circulate a manifesto calling for further attacks. A separate German network used the platform to claim a January 2026 attack on Berlin’s power grid that killed one person and cut power to 45,000 households. Oregon’s Rose City Antifa, the campaign against Atlanta’s police training facility, and the “Jane’s Revenge” firebombings of crisis pregnancy centers all appear in State’s accounting as well. A/I’s channels have also carried communiqués for foreign terrorist organizations including the PFLP, Hamas, Hizballah, and the IRGC.

    MASAR BADIL

    • AKA: PALESTINIAN ALTERNATIVE REVOLUTIONARY PATH MOVEMENT
    • Address: Brazil; Germany; Canada; Belgium; Spain
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: Oct 2021
    • Organization Type: Advocacy organization
    • Linked to: SAMIDOUN PALESTINIAN PRISONER SOLIDARITY NETWORK

    Supplemental Information: Treasury describes Masar Badil, the Palestinian Alternative Revolutionary Path Movement, as inextricably linked to the Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network. The United States and Canada jointly sanctioned Samidoun in October 2024 as a front for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997. The two groups share fundraising mechanisms and overlapping Executive Committee membership, including already-sanctioned Samidoun leaders Khaled Barakat, Mohammad Khatib, and Jaldia Abubakra.

    PALESTINE ACTION

    • AKA: PALESTINE ACTION GROUP
    • Address: United Kingdom
    • Secondary Sanctions Risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 30 Jul 2020
    • Organization Type: Transnational Terrorist Group

    Supplemental Information: Treasury and State describe Palestine Action as a UK group that has carried out acts of terrorism since July 2020. Its members have broken into British defense facilities and military installations, causing millions of dollars in damage, and have injured UK law enforcement personnel. The group has also promoted its tactics on social media and encouraged copycat action abroad, including in the United States and along the U.S.-Mexico border. The UK government proscribed Palestine Action as a terrorist organization under the Terrorism Act 2000 in July 2025, and today’s designation complements that action.

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  • August 26, 2026: OFAC Update, Part Two: Russia (new version) and Counter-Terror (new) General Licenses

    First, Counter-Terrorism GL 36 (Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Autistici Inventati):

    ct_gl36Download

    Second, Russia GL 104B (Authorizing Transactions Related to Imports of Certain Diamonds Prohibited by Executive Order 14068):

    russia_gl104b_0Download

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