Asking Claude’s Opinion: Can Congress Tie the President’s Hands on Sanctions?


I put a question to Claude that I suspect many practitioners have wondered about. Laws such as CISADA, CAATSA and the Libertad Act seem to cut into the President’s power to run foreign policy. Is Congress overstepping? Claude researched it and wrote up its opinion. A summary follows, and the full article, with numbered source notes, is embedded at the bottom of this post.

The short answer

No, Congress isn’t usurping anything. But the instinct behind the question points at something real.

The Constitution gives Congress the power to tax and to regulate foreign commerce, and those powers sit at the heart of sanctions. The Supreme Court has carved out only one foreign affairs power that belongs to the President alone. That is the power to recognize foreign governments, confirmed in Zivotofsky v. Kerry in 2015. Nearly everything else in sanctions policy is shared ground.

The President’s power is mostly borrowed

When a President signs an executive order freezing a country’s assets, he is usually using authority Congress gave him through IEEPA and the National Emergencies Act. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that Congress has handed the President substantial sanctions authority and wide discretion over waivers and licenses. Borrowed power has limits, though. In February 2026, the Supreme Court held in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that IEEPA does not allow the President to impose tariffs.

Where Congress tightens the screws

Since the 1990s, lawmakers have attached more and more conditions to that borrowed power. The Libertad Act wrote the Cuban embargo into law in 1996. CISADA set tough certification requirements for ending Iran sanctions. INARA froze sanctions relief while Congress reviewed the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. CAATSA added a review period before most Russia sanctions can be eased. Presidents of both parties have pushed back. Clinton warned of “overly rigid constraints.” Trump’s 2017 signing statement argued that parts of CAATSA’s review process were unconstitutional.

What happens in practice

Even with those restraints, the President usually wins on the ground. In September 2026, Congress passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act by wide margins. Ending its Russia sanctions for good requires a peace deal, but waiving them takes only a national interest certification. On October 16, Executive Order 14436 waived the law’s new tariffs and most of its sanctions.

Turkey shows the other side. The President said in July that CAATSA sanctions on Turkey’s arms procurement agency would come off. As of early October, they were still in place, hemmed in by statutory conditions and a watchful Congress.

Claude’s verdict

Sanctions are a shared power, and Congress has the stronger claim to their economic side. The real problem is accountability. Congress passes tough laws with built-in waivers, the President uses the waivers, and each side can claim credit or shift blame. Claude compares it to a joint business account. Congress owns the account and writes the rules, but the President holds the checkbook. For compliance teams, the statute is the floor, not the forecast.

Read the full article


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