Category: Enforcement

  • I always like to see echoes in enforcement actions, where something from this year is similar to the faces and factors of an earlier one. Some particular facts might be unique, but there are definite patterns.

    So, I built an Gemini prompt to compare the latest action against all previous actions since 2012 (when the Enforcement Guidelines started showing up in the enforcement releases), find the best fit in each year’s actions, then rank those.

    Yes, I will post the actual method I provided to Gemini – here are the results of this first attempt:

    Based on the procedure provided, I have identified the most recent OFAC enforcement action as of December 5, 2025, which is the action against Gracetown, Inc. (issued Dec 4, 2025).

    I have compared this “Anchor Case” against the enforcement actions from each year (2012–2025) to find the single best fit for that year. Below is the ranking of these yearly “best fits,” ordered from the strongest overall match to the weakest match.

    The Anchor Case (Reference for Comparison)

    • Entity: Gracetown, Inc.
    • Date: December 4, 2025
    • Determination: Egregious, Non-Voluntarily Self-Disclosed (Non-VSD).
    • Duration: > 2 Years (April 2018 – May 2020).
    • Key Behaviors: Willfulness/Recklessness; Ignoring explicit warnings (received direct OFAC notice regarding designated owner); Dealing in blocked property.

    Ranked Best Fits (2012–2025)

    1. 2019: UniCredit Group Banks

    • Date: April 15, 2019
    • Fine: $611,000,000
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): Strong. UniCredit operated accounts for blocked parties (IRISL) and ignored sanctions risks similar to Gracetown’s disregard of its owner’s designation. Both involved ignoring the blocked status of a known counterparty.
      • Mismatched Factors: UniCredit involved wire stripping (altering payment messages), which Gracetown did not explicitly do (Gracetown accepted payments via loan arrangements).

    2. 2014: BNP Paribas SA

    • Date: June 30, 2014
    • Fine: $963,619,900
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): Strong. BNP willfully ignored the status of sanctioned entities (Sudan, Iran, Cuba) and continued processing payments, paralleling Gracetown’s willful receipt of payments from a blocked owner.
      • Mismatched Factors: The scale of BNP’s systemic wire stripping was more complex than Gracetown’s property management violations.

    3. 2023: Binance Holdings, Ltd.

    • Date: November 21, 2023
    • Fine: $968,618,825
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): Strong. Binance management knew of the violations and willfully allowed them to continue, ignoring internal and external “warnings” about sanctions compliance, similar to Gracetown ignoring the OFAC notice.
      • Mismatched Factors: Binance’s lack of cooperation was noted as more severe (misleading regulators) compared to Gracetown’s standard posture.

    4. 2015: Schlumberger Oilfield Holdings, Ltd.

    • Date: August 7, 2015
    • Fine: $232,706,600
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): “Facilitation” of transactions for blocked parties. Schlumberger U.S. personnel facilitated business for Iran/Sudan, similar to Gracetown personnel managing property for a blocked oligarch.
      • Mismatched Factors: None significant; a very close procedural match.

    5. 2017: ZTE Corporation

    • Date: March 7, 2017
    • Fine: $100,871,266
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): ZTE received warnings and created an elaborate system to hide conduct. Gracetown also received a specific notice (the OFAC blocking notice) and continued dealing.
      • Mismatched Factors: ZTE involved a “Lack of Cooperation” (Factor 2) that was extreme (lying to federal investigators), whereas Gracetown’s cooperation was not flagged as deficient to that extent.

    6. 2018: Société Générale S.A.

    • Date: November 19, 2018
    • Fine: $53,966,916
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): Ignored warnings and processed payments for blocked parties.
      • Mismatched Factors: General banking sector behaviors (omitting data) vs. corporate property management.

    7. 2012: ING Bank N.V.

    • Date: June 12, 2012
    • Fine: $619,000,000
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): Management knowledge and willfulness.
      • Mismatched Factors: Factor 9 (Mitigating) — ING had substantial remediation credit which slightly alters the weighted comparison.

    8. 2013: Weatherford International

    • Date: November 26, 2013
    • Fine: $91,000,000
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): Export of goods/services to blocked countries; failure to heed compliance gaps.
      • Mismatched Factors: Less emphasis on “ignoring specific warnings from OFAC” compared to Gracetown.

    9. 2016: National Oilwell Varco (NOV)

    • Date: November 14, 2016
    • Fine: $5,976,028
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): Senior management approved dealings with Iran.
      • Mismatched Factors: The fine size and context (subsidiaries) are very similar to Gracetown, but the specific “ignoring of a blocking notice” was less central than in Gracetown.

    10. 2022: Bittrex, Inc.

    • Date: October 11, 2022
    • Fine: $24,280,829
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Egregious (Factor 1)Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Behavioral Match (Factor 4): Failure to screen/block (reckless disregard).
      • Mismatched Factors: Bittrex cooperated (Factor 2 was neutral/positive), whereas Gracetown was egregious partly due to the specific willfulness of ignoring the notice.

    11. 2025: IPI Partners, LLC (Comparison within same year)

    • Date: December 2, 2025
    • Fine: $11,485,352
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Mismatched Factors: Egregiousness (Factor 1) — IPI was determined to be Non-Egregious, making it a significantly worse match than the historical egregious cases.
      • Note: Gracetown (Dec 4) and IPI (Dec 2) are days apart, but the Egregiousness determination makes them dissimilar under your procedure.

    12. 2021: Mashreqbank PSC

    • Date: November 9, 2021
    • Fine: $100,000,000 (Settlement)
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Mismatched Factors: Egregiousness (Factor 1) — OFAC determined this case was Non-Egregious (despite the large fine, it was processed under non-egregious penalty caps due to cooperation). This fails the most important factor.

    13. 2020: BitGo, Inc.

    • Date: December 30, 2020
    • Fine: $98,830
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Non-VSD (Factor 8)Duration > 2 Years (Factor 5).
      • Mismatched Factors: Egregiousness (Factor 1) — Determined Non-Egregious. The violations were “reckless” but did not rise to the egregious penalty tier.

    14. 2024: State Street Bank and Trust Company

    • Date: July 26, 2024
    • Fine: $7,452,501
    • Match Analysis:
      • Matched Factors: Non-VSD (Factor 8).
      • Mismatched Factors: Egregiousness (Factor 1) — Determined Non-EgregiousDuration (Factor 5/6/7) — These violations were largely distinct processing errors rather than a multi-year sustained scheme like Gracetown. This is the weakest match as it lacks the “willful” behavioral characteristics.

    Summary of Factor Matches (Gracetown vs. Best Fits)

    FactorDescriptionBest Matches (2014, 2019, 2023)Weakest Matches (2020, 2021, 2024)
    1Egregious?MATCH (Yes)MISMATCH (No – Non-Egregious)
    2Cooperation?MATCH (Mixed/Satisfactory)MATCH (Satisfactory)
    3Aggravating (Weighted)MATCH (High score: Willful, Reckless, Management Knowledge)MISMATCH (Lower score: System errors, technical failures)
    4BehaviorsMATCH (Ignored warnings, obfuscation)MISMATCH (Screening tool errors, no active concealment)
    5Duration > 2 YrsMATCHVARIES (Often match, but context differs)
    8Self-Reported?MATCH (Non-VSD)MATCH (Non-VSD)

    So, how do you think the model did?

  • Based on the Gracetown, Inc. enforcement action (released December 4, 2025), here is the reformatted and simplified summary.


    What Happened

    Gracetown, Inc., a property management company based in New York, has been fined approximately $7.1 million for severely violating US sanctions against Russia. (Note: this is not a negotiated settlement, but a financial penalty imposed on Gracetown)

    Between 2018 and 2020, Gracetown managed luxury real estate properties in New York and Washington, D.C. for Oleg Deripaska, a high-profile Russian oligarch. The company continued this work even after the US government designated Deripaska as a sanctioned person (an “SDN”) in 2018. Most notably, Gracetown ignored a specific written warning from OFAC telling them to stop. Instead of freezing the assets, they continued to collect payments and manage the properties, helping the oligarch maintain his lifestyle and assets in the US.


    The Penalty

    The Settlement Amount: $7,139,305

    How it was calculated:

    In most sanctions cases, the final penalty is significantly lower than the legal maximum. However, in this case, OFAC determined that the penalty should be near the statutory maximum.

    OFAC decided that Gracetown’s actions were “egregious” (a remarkably bad and willful violation of the law). Because of this, and because Gracetown did not confess to the government before getting caught, they faced the severe “statutory maximum” penalty rather than a negotiated lower amount.

    To arrive at the final figure, OFAC analyzed the “General Factors.” Because the violations were deemed “egregious” and were not voluntarily disclosed, the standard reductions that many companies receive were not applied.

    Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

    Aggravating Factors (What made the penalty higher)

    • Behavior: Gracetown received a direct “Notification of Blocked Property” from OFAC explicitly warning them that Deripaska was sanctioned and that they must stop dealing with him. They ignored this notice and continued their business relationship.
      • General Factor: Willful or Reckless Violation of Law
      • Applicability: Deliberately ignoring a specific government warning constitutes a “willful” violation, which is the most serious level of culpability and leads to the harshest penalties.
    • Behavior: The company’s management had full actual knowledge that they were managing properties for Deripaska and that he was a sanctioned individual.
      • General Factor: Management Involvement
      • Applicability: Violations are treated more severely when senior management is aware of the illegal conduct and approves or directs it.
    • Behavior: Gracetown failed to report that they were holding “blocked property” (the real estate) to OFAC for over 45 months, despite legal requirements to do so within 10 days.
      • General Factor: Cooperation with OFAC (Lack thereof)
      • Applicability: Concealing information or failing to file mandatory reports is viewed as a failure to cooperate and an attempt to hide violations.
    • Behavior: The company provided economic benefits to a high-priority target of US foreign policy (a Russian oligarch linked to the Kremlin), undermining the impact of the sanctions.
      • General Factor: Harm to Sanctions Program Objectives
      • Applicability: Providing significant assets or services to key sanctioned individuals is considered to cause substantial harm to US national security interests.

    Mitigating Factors (What lowered the penalty)

    • Behavior: Gracetown had not received a penalty notice or finding of violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the date of the transactions.
      • General Factor: Sanctions History
      • Applicability: OFAC considers a company’s clean record over the previous five years as a standard mitigating factor in calculating civil penalties.
    • Behavior: Gracetown cooperated with OFAC’s investigation by entering into agreements to extend the statute of limitations (tolling agreements) and responding to requests for information.
      • General Factor: Cooperation with OFAC
      • Applicability: Demonstrating a willingness to work with the government during the investigation—even if the violation itself was not self-disclosed—is typically a factor that weighs in favor of the subject.

    Despite the existence of these two mitigating factors, they had a limited impact on the final penalty amount. Because OFAC determined that Gracetown’s conduct was egregious—specifically noting the willful decision to ignore a direct government warning (“Notification of Blocked Property”)—the agency focused primarily on the statutory maximum penalty. In cases of egregious and willful violations, standard mitigating factors like a clean history or administrative cooperation are often insufficient to significantly reduce the fine, resulting in a penalty that remains near the legal limit.


    What are the Takeaways?

    Never Ignore a Government Warning

    If OFAC sends your company a letter, notice, or subpoena regarding a specific client or risk, you must act immediately. Ignoring a direct warning is the surest way to face maximum penalties and potential criminal liability.

    Property Management is “Dealing in Blocked Property”

    Managing real estate for a sanctioned person—collecting rent, paying utilities, or performing repairs—is illegal. You are effectively providing a service that helps a sanctioned person maintain their asset.

    You Must Report “Frozen” Assets

    If you discover you are holding property (like a house, apartment, or bank account) for a sanctioned person, you cannot just “do nothing.” You must officially report that property to OFAC as “blocked” within 10 days. Failing to report is a separate, serious violation.

    Gatekeepers are Targets

    OFAC and the DOJ are aggressively targeting “gatekeepers”—lawyers, property managers, and accountants—who help oligarchs hide their wealth. You cannot claim you are “just a service provider” if you know the ultimate owner is sanctioned.


    Other Resources

    For more information on the specific sanctions programs and guidelines mentioned:

    • OFAC Sanctions Lists: The official list of blocked persons (SDN List), which includes Oleg Deripaska.
    • Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions Regulations: The specific laws Gracetown violated, which prohibit any dealings with designated Russian oligarchs.
    • Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines: The rulebook OFAC uses to determine if a case is “egregious” and to calculate the maximum penalty.
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  • Daily Digests are simple lists of hyperlinks to new content released by sanctions and export control regulators. When appropriate, additional posts of analysis and commentary, as well as summarizations and rephrasing of the contents will be posted separately.

    Mr. Sanctions does not attempt to comprehensively cover the worlds of sanctions and export control. Opinions expressed here are my own and do not represent that of my past current or future employers.

  • See the original Enforcement Release for comparison or if you want to know more.

    Based on the enforcement release regarding IPI Partners, LLC (“IPI”), here is the simplified and reformatted version.


    What Happened

    The Core Issue

    IPI Partners, LLC (“IPI”), a U.S. private equity firm, agreed to pay $11,485,352 to settle potential civil liability for violating U.S. sanctions against Russia. The issue arose because IPI continued to do business involving Suleiman Kerimov, a Russian oligarch, even after he was placed on the sanctions list (the “SDN List”).

    Description of the Conduct

    In 2017 and 2018, IPI sought and accepted investment funds from Kerimov through a series of legal entities (specifically a fund called “Definition” and a trust called “Heritage Trust”).

    • The Red Flag: On April 6, 2018, OFAC designated Kerimov as a sanctioned person. This meant U.S. companies were generally prohibited from dealing with his property or interests.
    • The Legal Advice: IPI checked with outside lawyers. The lawyers reviewed the corporate structure and concluded that because Kerimov did not formally own 50% or more of the direct investment entity (“Definition”), IPI did not need to block the account.
    • The Mistake: This advice was too narrow. While Kerimov might not have met the “50% ownership” threshold for automatic blocking of the entity itself, he still held a “property interest” in the funds (as the source of funds and beneficiary). U.S. law prohibits dealing with any property interest of a blocked person, not just entities they majority-own.
    • The Violation: Relying on that advice, IPI continued to manage the investment. Between July 2018 and June 2022, IPI processed 51 transactions (such as calling for capital or distributing profits) involving these funds.

    The Penalty

    Settlement Amount

    IPI agreed to pay $11,485,352. The maximum possible base penalty for these violations was $14,356,690.

    Why this Amount? (The Rationale)

    The settlement reflects OFAC’s determination that the violations were non-egregious (meaning they were not the most serious type of willful violation) but were not voluntarily self-disclosed (IPI did not report the issue to OFAC before being investigated).

    Factors Influencing the Penalty

    OFAC considered several “General Factors” from its Enforcement Guidelines to determine the final penalty amount:

    • Aggravating Factors (Reasons the penalty could be higher):
      • IPI knew or had reason to know of the sanctioned person’s involvement. IPI was aware that Kerimov was the ultimate source of the funds but failed to exercise due caution, relying on legal advice that focused only on ownership percentages rather than the broader “interest in property.”
        • Applicable General Factor: General Factor B: Awareness of Conduct
      • The conduct harmed the sanctions program. By continuing to process transactions for a sanctioned oligarch, IPI allowed economic resources to flow to a blocked person, undermining the purpose of the Russia sanctions program.
        • Applicable General Factor: General Factor C: Harm to Sanctions Program Objectives
      • IPI is a sophisticated financial institution. IPI is a large, commercially sophisticated firm with a global presence and access to significant legal and compliance resources. OFAC holds such institutions to a higher standard of compliance.
        • Applicable General Factor: General Factor D: Individual Characteristics
    • Mitigating Factors (Reasons the penalty was reduced):
      • No recent violations. IPI had not received a penalty notice or finding of violation from OFAC in the five years preceding these transactions.
        • Applicable General Factor: General Factor E: Compliance Program (often cited regarding clean history) / General Factor I: Other Enforcement Actions
      • Substantial cooperation. After initially providing unsatisfactory responses, IPI hired new counsel, significantly improved its cooperation, and even waived attorney-client privilege to allow OFAC to review the legal advice it had received.
        • Applicable General Factor: General Factor G: Cooperation with OFAC
      • Remedial measures. IPI took steps to fix the issue and improve its compliance program to prevent future violations.
        • Applicable General Factor: General Factor F: Remedial Response

    What are the Takeaways?

    Key Lessons for the Industry

    • Look Beyond the “50% Rule”: Dealing with a sanctioned person involves more than just checking if they own 50% of a company. You must ensure you are not dealing with any “interest” of a blocked person, including indirect interests through trusts or as a beneficiary.
    • Private Equity Risks: Investment firms must thoroughly understand the ownership structure of their investors (“Limited Partners”). If a sanctioned person is behind the money, you cannot process transactions for them, even through intermediaries.
    • Legal Advice Limitations: Relying on legal advice is not a “get out of jail free” card, especially if that advice is based on an incomplete understanding of the facts or a misinterpretation of the broad scope of sanctions laws (like “interest in property”).
    • Know Your Customer (KYC): It is critical to obtain and review full diligence materials to identify the ultimate beneficial owners of investment vehicles.

    Other resources

    Reporting Suspicious Activity

    If you have information about sanctions violations, you may be eligible for a monetary award. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) maintains a Whistleblower Program that rewards individuals who provide original information leading to successful enforcement actions. You can submit tips directly to FinCEN or through OFAC.

    Contacting OFAC

    For more information on sanctions programs, specific guidance, or to join the mailing list for updates, you can contact the Office of Foreign Assets Control directly via their compliance hotline or compliance email, or by visiting the official Treasury website.

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