Sanctions often involve a delicate balance of the impact on the sanctioned parties and the impact that those sanctions have on allies as well as disinterested parties. These two recent GLs are a case in point.

The US had recently gotten India to reduce its purchases of Russian petroleum, in return for relief on tariffs. Those purchases, which are understood to be the largest outside those made by China, also had exposed Indian parties to both primary and secondary sanctions, depending on the nature of the transaction.

But GLs 133 & 134 authorized specific purchases of Russian petroleum products – all because of the significant rise in the price of crude oil as a result of the hostilities between the US, Israel and Iran.

Given that there is no end in sight to the military conflict, the calculus is a matter of priorities: if the GLs are limited, as they currently are, the impact on the Russian sanctions program is limited to the licensed parties and purchases. When the war Is concluded, issuance of new GLs can stop, restoring the greater pressure on Russia – all while maintaining the US’ side of the bargain struck with India.

Would you make this trade-off? It might seem a bitter pill to swallow for some, but, given current facts on the ground and the relative logistics of providing other sources of petroleum… is there really a viable alternative?